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1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Without an awareness of history  
and local memories, today’s Rwanda  
is incomprehensible.1
 
  
 
Soon after the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, in 1994, research around this horrific event 
flourished. Although a variety of authors of different expertise (journalists, human rights 
activists, witnesses, academics, both Rwandans and foreigners) produced a great deal of 
literature, it is mostly scholars who had conducted research in Rwanda prior to 1994 who 
after 1994 took the lead in the endeavour to write about this genocide. Certain of these 
scholars produced serious work that has advanced our knowledge about it. These include 
anthropologists, political scientists, historians, sociologists and economists. As their prior 
research had brought them close to Rwanda, they felt the need and the moral obligation to 
contribute to the understanding of this genocide.  
 
This serious literature has increased our understanding with regard to a number of 
problems. It has for instance challenged the view that the genocide was the result of 
popular anger following the death of President Habyarimana in the plane crash of April 
6th, 1994. It has rejected the western journalistic view of the war and genocide in Rwanda 
as a result of innate and secular “tribal” conflict and confrontation between the Hutu and 
the Tutsi. Most importantly, it has advanced knowledge about the causes,2 the making of 
the genocide at the national level,3 and at some local levels.4
                                                 
1 Danielle de Lame, A Hill among a Thousand, Transformations and Ruptures in Rural Rwanda, Madison, 
Wisconsin, Tervuren (Belgium), The University of Wisconsin Press, Royal Museum of Central Africa, 
2005, p. xiii. 
 In this respect, it has to 
2 See Paul J. Magnarella, “How could it happen? The Background and Causes of the Genocide in Rwanda”, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 3, 2005, pp. 801-822. 
3 Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to murder. The Rwandan genocide, London, New York, Verso, 2004; Cécelle 
Meijer and Philip Verwimp “The Use and Perception of Weapons before and after Conflict: Evidence from 
Rwanda”, A Working Paper of the Small Arms Survey, October 2005, pp. 1-38. 
4 Timothy Longman, “Genocide and socio-political change: Massacre in two Rwandan villages”, Issue: A 
journal of opinion, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1995, pp. 18-21; Alison Des Forges, ‘Leave None to Tell the Story.’ 
Genocide in Rwanda, London, Brussels, Human Rights Watch, Paris, Fédération Internationale des Ligues 
des Droits de l’Homme, 1999; African Rights, Rwanda. Death, despair and defiance, Revised 1995 
Edition, London, African Rights, Rwanda. Death, despair and defiance; Jean-Paul Kimonyo, De la 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
2 
some extent analysed the contexts of the genocide from the political,5 economic,6 social7 
and cultural8 perspectives.9
 
 In establishing the context of the genocide, many authors 
have turned to the whole history of Rwanda in order to understand the genocide.  
But there is something this literature has not yet managed to accomplish. There is still no 
detailed research on genocide for all the regions where the Tutsi genocide occurred. 
Furthermore, as far as deeper understandings of process are concerned, there are temporal 
gaps in terms of the periods before, during and after the event of genocide. In other 
words, all the dynamics at play in order to understand the genocide in a comprehensive 
way are not yet completely explored. This suggests that there is still much room for 
further research around the genocide in Rwanda. One area which has been strongly 
recommended is the study of the genocide at the local levels.10
 
 This provides the 
opportunity to test the existing theories in areas not yet explored. This is where my 
research is situated. It seeks to understand the conditions that made possible the Tutsi 
genocide in Gishamvu and Kibayi Communes of the Butare Prefecture. 
That genocide was planned at the national level is in no doubt today.11
                                                                                                                                                 
révolution au génocide, Thèse de doctorat en science politique, Université du Québec à Montréal, 
Septembre 2002 ; Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, Paris, Karthala, 2008; André 
Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994: les politiques du génocide à Butare, Paris, Karthala, 2005. 
 What is not yet 
5 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, 
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2001. 
6 Philip Verwimp, “Development ideology, the peasantry and genocide: Rwanda represented in 
Habyarimana’s speeches”, Journal of Genocide Research, 2, 3, 2000, pp. 325-361, pp. 325-326; Philip 
Verwimp, “An Economic Profile of Peasant Perpetrators of Genocide. Micro-level Evidence from 
Rwanda”, November 2003, pp. 1-35; Philip Verwimp, “The political economy of coffee, dictatorship, and 
genocide”, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 19, 2003, pp. 161-181; David Yanagizawa, 
“Malthus in Rwanda? Scarcity, Survival and Causes of the Genocide”, unpublished paper, March 2006, pp. 
1-31. 
7 Faustin Rutembesa et al. (dir.), Rwanda: L’Eglise catholique à l’épreuve du génocide, Greenfield Park, 
Les Editions Africana, 2000 ; Timothy P. Longman, “Empowering the weak and protecting the powerful: 
the contradictory nature of the churches in Rwanda, Burundi and Congo,” African Studies Review, Vol. 41, 
No. 1, pp. 49-72; Tharcisse Gatwa, Rwanda : Eglises, victimes ou coupables ? : Les églises et l’idéologie 
ethnique au Rwanda, 1900-1994, Yaoundé, Editions CLE, 2001. 
8 Christopher C. Taylor, Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994, Oxford, Berg, 1999. 
9 A number of these works combine the political and the socioeconomic perspectives, whereas some take 
those domains separately. 
10 Timothy Longman, “Placing genocide in context: research priorities for the Rwandan genocide”, Journal 
of Genocide Research, 6, 1, March 2004, pp. 29-45. 
11 See for that matter Melvern, Conspiracy to murder; Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story; Human 
Rights Watch, “The Rwandan Genocide : How It Was Prepared”, A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
3 
fully known however is how all local regions responded to the national call for genocide. 
Yet such knowledge should help understand why the implementation of the 
extermination of Tutsi differed from region to region whereas the master plan was the 
same; how manipulation from above was received, reshaped and implemented at the local 
level and for what motives (same or different motives as government). It is worth noting 
that these local differences are due in part to the varying histories of those regions prior to 
genocide: 
 
The local level is both the most fertile field for finding data on the genocide and the 
area of greatest need for research. Despite its small size, Rwanda contains 
considerable diversity [in the precolonial and colonial] […]. The various prefectures 
and communes set up by the postindependence government had diverse 
relationships with the central state, depending in large part on their patronage ties to 
the regime [in different times]. The genocide, because of its decentralized nature, 
reflected the country’s regional diversity. Differences in the ethnic distribution, 
political party affiliations, presence of refugees, and time of RPF occupation, 
among other factors, affected how the genocide was carried out in various 
localities.12
 
  
This suggests that the local contexts varied, among other reasons because of the 
relationship between the central power with the local area. Therefore a journey in search 
of the republic’s nature and character in rural areas is of paramount importance. 
 
The choice of two communes is made for the sake of comparing them. Gishamvu and 
Kibayi have some similarities and differences. They are located in the Butare Prefecture 
which lost nearly 75% of its Tutsi population during the genocide.13
                                                                                                                                                 
April 2006, Number 1, pp. 1-17; Catharine Newbury, “Background to Genocide : Rwanda”, Issue: A 
journal of Opinion, Vol. 23, No. 2, Rwanda, 1995, pp. 12-17; David Newbury, “Understanding genocide”, 
African Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, April 1998, pp. 73-97; and Mamdani, When Victims Become 
Killers. 
 However, the two 
communes had a different demographic distribution as far as Tutsi and Hutu population is 
concerned. The census of 1988 indicated that in Gishamvu the Tutsi population was 
27.03%, whereas it was only 6.38 % in Kibayi. It is also interesting to look at their 
context since colonial times and to compare the impact of the genocide on each 
commune. 
12 See Longman, “Placing genocide in context”, p. 39. On the decentralized nature of the genocide, see also 
Melvern, Conspiracy to murder, pp. 31, 195, and 212. 
13 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 15-16. 
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Furthermore, my research aims at reconstructing a history of the genocide. It looks at the 
periods before and during the genocide. Historical research of those two communes since 
colonial times until 1994 here attempts to understand something of the longue durée14 of 
the political and socioeconomic life. Those political and socioeconomic factors are to be 
studied in their interrelation.15 In other words, my research looks at “the space for 
genocide”, that is, political and socioeconomic conditions that made possible the 
genocide in those two communes. The concept “a space for genocide” is borrowed from 
Pradeep Jeganathan’s concept of “A space for violence”, which means “…the conditions 
of possibility of violence”.16 As David Newbury has explained, “[w]hile we may never 
understand the depths of intensity of the killings, we can still understand the contextual 
situation that individuals acted in at the time…”17 While we condemn the violence or 
madness of the genocide, we need to understand the “real or alleged” conditions that 
made it possible, that is, its rationalities.18
 
 This dissertation argues that those conditions 
were structural and conjunctural. It contends that the genocide cannot be understood 
unless one looks at the structure of power and society that produced it, as well as its time 
of occurrence. 
As far as agency is concerned, I chose to focus on local authorities and local population, 
that is, the rulers and the ruled, in their multiple identities and statuses, actions and 
perceptions. Indeed, the decentralised nature of the genocide obliges us to study the role 
of the local authorities and local population while studying genocide in a local setting. In 
                                                 
14 Fernand Braudel, On History, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1980, pp. 25-54. 
15 This interrelationship approach has been advocated and used by Catharine and David Newbury, (1995, 
2000, 1998), Verwimp (2000, November 2003, 2003), Yanagizawa (2006). Their attempt is to link the rural 
and the urban, the political and the socioeconomic in order to draw a fuller picture of the genocide. 
16 Pradeep Jeganathan, “A Space for Violence. Anthropology, Politics and the Location of a Sinhala 
Practice of Masculinity”, in Partha Chatterjee, Pradeep Jeganathan (eds), Community, Gender and 
Violence: Subaltern Studies XI, New York, Columbia University Press, 2000, pp. 37-65, p. 61. 
17 Newbury, “Understanding genocide”, p. 88. 
18 Jacques Semelin, “Rationalités de la violence extrême”, Critique internationale, n°6, hiver 2000, pp. 
122-124, p. 124; René Lemarchand, “Rwanda : The Rationality of Genocide”, Issue : A Journal of Opinion, 
Vol. XXIII, No. 2, 1995, pp. 8-11, p. 8; Pal Ahluwalia et al., “Introduction : Unsettling violence ”, in Pal 
Ahluwalia et al. (eds.), Violence and Non-Violence in Africa, London and New York, Routledge, 2007, pp. 
1-11, p. 1; Derrida in Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror. Dialogue with Jürgen 
Habermas and Jacques Derrida, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 2003, p. 107. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
5 
Butare, the local administration helped to hinder and then facilitate the genocide.19  On 
the other hand, a big part of the organisation of killings, such as the use of roadblocks, 
was shaped by national authorities and was transferred to the local authorities.20 
Furthermore, while the genocide propaganda was organized at the national level and used 
the media, it is local authorities who mobilized local population at the grassroots level.21 
As a result, a great number of local peasants got involved in killings: “…while state 
actions in Rwanda in 1994 may have speeded the process of genocide, people 
themselves, thinking and acting in mobs, assumed a degree of initiative in the violence, 
and killed with methods that far exceeded state mandates.”22 But most importantly, all 
along the postindependence period, the commune was the local administrative unit par 
excellence for implementing the governmental policy. Local authorities at the commune 
level were the bridge between the government and local population. They gave to power 
its social and diffuse connotations.23
 
 
This dissertation is about “local histories” of those agents. It does not claim to be the 
totalizing history or the grand narrative. In fact, I am producing not a single history of 
these two communes but plural histories of the locals who happened to be plural in their 
agencies, experiences and representations. I am not proposing a conventional history 
(with a capital H), but complex pieces of histories which appear to be sometimes 
                                                 
19 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 460, 513, 592. See also Michele D. Wagner, “All the 
Bourgmestre’men: Making sense of genocide in Rwanda”, Africa Today, Vol. 45, Issue 1, January-March 
1998, p. 6, and Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994. 
20 Melvern, Conspiracy to murder, p. 195. 
21 See for example Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story; African Rights, Rwanda. Death, despair and 
defiance . 
22 Charles Mironko, “Igitero: means and motive in the Rwandan genocide”, Journal of Genocide Research, 
6, 1, 2004, pp. 47-60, p. 47. 
23 On how power is exercised and how it operates socially and relationally, see Rita Abrahamsen, “African 
studies and the postcolonial challenge”, African Affairs, 102, 2003, pp. 189-210, p. 199; Gilles Deleuze, 
Deux régimes de fous: Textes et entretiens 1975-1995, Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 2003, pp. 11-13; 
Leela Ghandi, Postcolonial Theory. A Critical Introduction, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999, 
p. 14; Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”, Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976, 
English Series Editor: Arnold I. Davidson, New York, Picador, 2003, pp. 14-17; Michel Foucault, 
Language. Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews…, p. 208 in Honi Fern Haber, 
Beyond postmodern politics. Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 93-94. 
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coherent and sometimes scattered.24 My dissertation includes as much continuities as it 
does discontinuities,25 and makes use of narratives, descriptions and explanations.26
 
 
I use the notion of the local for Gishamvu and Kibayi experiences in the geographical 
sense and not as an epistemological boundary, to use Mamdani’s term.27 As far as policy 
and theory are concerned, my study refers extensively to the national and the 
supranational. In fact, it is aberrant to talk about genocide in the strictly local sense, since 
the concept itself goes beyond national boundaries, not to mention genocide experiences 
which sadly have become global. Gishamvu and Kibayi are just geographical targets and 
not isolated from the rest of Rwanda and the world.28
 
 As mentioned above, Gishamvu 
and Kibayi Communes were until 1994 located in the Former Butare Prefecture, located 
itself in the South of Rwanda.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 On history in plural, see Michel Foucault, “Politics and the study of discourse”, in Graham Burchell, 
Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, with two lectures by 
and interview with Michel Foucault, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 53-72, pp. 53-55. I 
am indebted to Premesh Lalu who attracted my attention in this direction. 
25 Michel Foucault, L’archéologie du savoir, Paris, Editions Gallimard, 1969, pp. 10 et 12; Foucault, 
“Politics and the study of discourse”, pp. 53-72, pp. 58-59; John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, 
Methods and New Directions in the Study of Modern History, Second Edition, London and New York, 
Longman, (1991) 1997, p. 19. 
26 Paul Veyne, Comment on écrit l’histoire, Essai d’Epistémologie, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1971, pp. 201-
202 ; Georges, Lefebvre, Réflexions sur l’histoire, Paris, Maspéro, 1978, pp. 26-27 ; 40, 47-52 ; Tosh, The 
Pursuit of History, p. 112. 
27 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, pp. XII-XIII. 
28 On genocide as going beyond state boundaries, see Mark Levene, “Why Is the Twentieth Century the 
Century of Genocide?”, Journal of World History, Vol. 11, No. 2, Fall 2000, pp. 305-336, p. 308. On 
avoiding the problem of isolating postcolonial Africa in the understanding of power and violence, see 
Patrick Chabal, “Pouvoir et violence en Afrique postcoloniale”, Politique Africaine, 42, Violence et 
pouvoir, Juin 1991, pp. 51-64, p. 54. 
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Map 1: Rwanda Administrative Map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
8 
Map 2: Butare Prefecture Administrative Map 
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Map 3: Gishamvu and Kibayi Administrative Map 
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This dissertation follows on from previous works on the Tutsi genocide.29
 
 A careful 
analysis suggests that those works intended to reach several objectives that include the 
reconstruction of events, the keeping of memory and the search for materials that would 
be used for judicial matters. From the published works, as far as the historical perspective 
is concerned, it is possible to identify three sets of literature: one that uses history in 
understanding the genocide, the other that focuses on local research in providing 
complementary knowledge on the genocide, and lastly one that attempts to uncover the 
factors and the causes of the genocide. 
Indeed, rich historical research that is available today on the Tutsi genocide provides a 
valuable basis and opportunity for the undertaking of new research. To begin with, I 
agree with Timothy Longman that so far, “[t]he best analysis of the genocide is found in 
Des Forges (1999) […] Des Forges provides extensive evidence of the organized nature 
of the genocide, and she carefully explains the ideology behind the killing, the 
administration of the killing, and the quiescence of the international community.”30
                                                 
29 For detailed but non-exhaustive bibliographical lists, see Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “Interprétations du 
génocide de 1994 dans l’histoire contemporaine du Rwanda”, Clio en Afrique, n°2, été 1997, 
http://www.univ.mrs.fr/~wclio-af/numero/2/sources/1.html, consulté le 04/01/2005; Déo Byanafashe, 
“Rwanda : dix ans d’écriture et de recherche sur le génocide”, in Dialogue, n°178, avril-juin 2004, pp. 91-
98; Lennart Aspegren, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW. An ICTR Bibliography (English, French, 
Scandinavian, German), Drafted by Lennart Aspegren, Judge, UN International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), 1995-2000, s.d. 
 Most 
importantly, Des Forges extends the national situation to study the local administration of 
genocide in certain areas that include the Butare Prefecture for some communes. Her 
work is a good example for those seeking to understand genocide in a local setting in 
relation to the national area, since the planning was national but the execution was both 
national and local. It gives a detailed historical overview of the genocide. Another work 
that attempts to examine in a comprehensive way the Tutsi genocide is African Rights 
1995. Though that research was conducted in a short time after the genocide, the 
extensive number of interviews and the attempt to explain wholly the “policy of 
massacres” makes it a valuable source.  These two works look at the whole history of 
30 Longman, “Placing genocide in context”, p. 34. 
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Rwanda in order to understand the genocide and not the other way around. My work 
intends to follow these sound methodological approaches. 
 
The work of Mamdani31 does much the same, but by focusing on political history. 
Drawing from the history of Rwanda since the end of the 19th century, Mamdani explores 
the role played by colonial powers in redefining, reshaping, and rigidifying the Hutu and 
Tutsi political identities which became racialized by colonial policies and interests. It 
shows how this ethnic colonial legacy is perpetuated in the First Republic (1962-1973), 
and in the Second Republic (1973-1994). In addition, it looks at the regional backgrounds 
in order understand the context and the consequences of the civil war and the genocide. 
Most importantly, the strength of his work lies in the conceptual framework around 
power and identity. But, as his title suggests, he failed to reconstruct “how victims 
become killers”, that is, the process whereby certain local Rwandans embarked on the 
killing of their fellow Tutsi.32 A rather different emphasis on economic history comes out 
in the work of Uvin.33 Looking at the international development agencies and their role in 
Rwanda especially during the Habyarimana regime (1973-1994), the book shows how 
donors’ financial aid was used not for developing rural areas, but for strengthening the 
authoritarian regime, preparing and spreading the implementation of the genocide. It 
shows that the lack of a political definition of aid by the international community 
accounted for its mistake in helping an extremist government towards its extremist 
policy. Though Prunier34
                                                 
31 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. 
 also looks at the history of Rwanda since the end of 19th 
century, he emphasizes the role of ethnic ideology in explaining how many ordinary 
Rwandans became involved in killings. One area of debate is his statement that 
Rwandans were obedient towards power and that this eased the participation in the state 
32 See also the reviews of Mamadou Diouf in Florence Bernault, “L’écriture scientifique en temps de crise 
(Rwanda, Côte-d’Ivoire, Mali). Dossier coordonné par Florence Bernault ; textes et interventions de Pierre 
Boilley, Danielle De Lame, Mamadou Diouf, Jan Vansina, Claudine Vidal”, Afrique et Histoire, n° 2, 2004, 
pp. 267-294, p. 286, and Alice U. Karekezi, “The Rwandan Genocide, review of Mandani M., When 
Victims Become Killers (2001)”, Africa Review of Books, October 2004, pp. 13-14. 
33 Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, West Hartford, Kumarian Press, 
1998. 
34 Gérard Prunier, Rwanda: le génocide, Paris, Dagorno, 1999.  
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project of genocide. In this dissertation, I test several statements on obedience and 
disobedience. I test also political and economic statements at the local level. 
 
Linda Melvern’s book35 is a masterpiece concerning the planning of the genocide at the 
top. Using the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) testimonies of the top 
planners of genocide, including Prime Minister Jean Kambanda who pleaded guilty and 
told the story of the genocide to ICTR in exchange for the protection of his family, the 
book gives more insight than anything published before the testimony of Prime Minister 
Kambanda. Among other bits of precious information, it explains how the civil defence 
plan was conceived from the top military and governmental office and how it planned to 
involve the civil population in the military activities. This document was called 
“Organization of civil-defence.” In its effort to explain how the planning and execution of 
the genocide were made, Human Rights Watch in turn comes back to the civil defence 
force highlighted clearly in the testimony of Kambanda.36
 
  
Pottier37 shows how Rwandan history and national identity have been subjected to 
multiple interpretations in time by various political and intellectual actors. 
Methodologically, his contribution is very important, since it underscores how careful 
any researcher on Rwandan history must be and especially with regard to the Tutsi 
genocide.  One of his main arguments in the 2002 book, which is about the 
representations of the past or the uses of history in post-1994 Rwanda, is however not 
referred to directly in this dissertation for the simple reason that it only deals with events 
up to 1994. In the same vein of interpretive complexity, Nkusi, Uvin, Hintjens and 
Mamdani38
                                                 
35 Melvern, Conspiracy to murder. 
 remind us of certain points in the history of Rwanda that have remained of 
36 Human Rights Watch, “The Rwandan Genocide: How It Was Prepared”. 
37 Johan Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002; Johan Pottier, 
“Escape from genocide. The politics of identity in Rwanda’s massacres”, in Broch-Due, V. (ed.), Violence 
and belonging. The quest for identity in post-colonial Africa, London and New York, Routledge, 2005, pp. 
195-213. 
38 Laurent Nkusi, “L’énoncé des sujets controversés dans l’histoire du Rwanda”, in Déo Byanafashe, (sous 
la direction de), Les défis de l’historiographie rwandaise. Tome 1 : Les faits controversés, Butare, Editions 
de l’UNR, 2004, pp. 55-84 ; Uvin, Aiding Violence; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers; Helen M. 
Hintjens, “When identity becomes a knife. Reflecting on the genocide in Rwanda”, Ethnicities, Vol. 1, No. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
13 
great controversy. These include the Hutu “revolution” of 1959, Hutu and Tutsi 
identities, and the role of colonialism. Hence, there is a need to keep these ongoing 
debates in mind while dealing with those issues. 
 
The second body of literature looks at the local cases. Indeed, since many works have 
been published concerning the Tutsi genocide at the national level, new research should 
look at specific issues of the genocide and specific localities in order to add something to 
the existing knowledge: “The research mostly needed now is not overly ambitious 
comprehensive analyses of the genocide that rehash the same secondary sources but 
sectoral, thematic, and local level research that tests theories of genocide and adds new 
data, creating building blocks upon which a more complex and complete understanding 
of Rwanda’s terrible tragedy can be constructed.”39 Scott Straus, in his research of 2006, 
which included both the national and local, also advocated more local research: “The new 
consensus has made considerable advances on the tribalism model, but our understanding 
of the genocide is still at a largely macro and sometimes superficial level. What is needed 
now is a more micro-level, social scientific investigation, one that identifies and evaluates 
the mechanisms and dynamics driving the genocide.”40
 
 The few works so far produced in 
this direction have proved to be of valuable importance.  
For example, the work of Danielle de Lame41
                                                                                                                                                 
1, 2001, pp. 25-54. 
 has pioneered the model of studying a local 
setting. Though conducted in the 1980s, the research of de Lame proved to be very useful 
in understanding the genocide at the local level. Studying the hill of Munzanga and 
linking it to the national context, the work of de Lame offers a picture of rural life during 
the time of the crises of the 1980s. It shows the strengths and weaknesses of the state at 
the local level, the social relations between rural peasants and elites, how the peasants 
39 Longman, “Placing genocide in context”, p. 30. 
40 Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide. Race, Power and War in Rwanda, Ithaca and London, Cornell 
University Press, 2006, p. 40.  
41 Danielle de Lame, Une colline entre mille ou le calme avant la tempête, Transformations et Blocages du 
Rwanda Rural, Tervuren, MRAC, 1996. The English version is: Danielle de Lame, A Hill among a 
Thousand, Transformations and Ruptures in Rural Rwanda, Madison, Wisconsin, Tervuren (Belgium), The 
University of Wisconsin Press, Royal Museum of Central Africa, 2005. 
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were not equal in their poverty, how the peasantry was not a congregate group, and 
therefore how their behaviour during the genocide differed. It shows the importance of 
studying social relations between different groups at the local level and their material 
lives in order to understand their behaviour by the time of genocide. Longman’s article 
on Kibuye42
 
 does this also. It shows how the relation between the local elite and local 
peasants has determined the way peasants embarked on killings or not. Where the 
population was against local power-holders, the latter had to hire killers from elsewhere 
to come to kill people in those places. This suggests that the populations were not just 
obedient, that they were also rational calculators. My research will follow this path by 
looking at the role of local authorities in their different backgrounds and interests, and 
local population in their varied social statuses, aspirations, and their unfolding behaviour 
in 1994 in two different communes. 
Following de Lame and Longman, and looking at two communes, one in Butare and one 
in Kibuye, Kimonyo43 found that even though the state engineered the genocide project, 
it only partly executed it, since other sectors of society also became involved in killings: 
civil society, political parties, local population, military, etc. Political mobilization, 
argues Kimonyo, was not the monopoly of the state. Opposition parties, especially the 
MDR (Republican Democratic Movement), were instrumental in this process. 
Guichaoua’s work also contributes greatly in documenting the genocide in the Butare 
Prefecture, but it does not fully explain the interconnection between the planning of 
genocide by political leaders and its implementation at the local level.44
                                                 
42 Longman, “Genocide and socio-political change”. 
 The focus is on 
political leaders of Rwanda and specifically of Butare. Moreover, Guichaoua’s main 
focus is on the urban commune of Butare, not the whole Prefecture of Butare. The work 
of Lee Ann Fujii also looks at genocide at local level, focusing this time at sector level, 
examining one sector in the central part of Rwanda and another in the North. Her 
comparison of the two areas, her careful analysis of agency, identity politics, and 
behaviour before and during the genocide, are a great contribution to the understanding of 
what happened at local level. Most importantly, she deconstructed the concepts of 
43 Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire. 
44 Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
15 
ethnicity and regionalism in relation to identity, violence and conflict in a way very few 
authors have previously attempted. Finally, her remarkable effort to theorize violence in 
general and genocide in particular is highly commendable.45 Timothy Longman deepened 
the analysis begun in his 1995 article in a more recent book, where he takes the two cases 
of Kibuye from a longue durée perspective and this time studies the role of the Christian 
Churches in Rwanda in political developments since colonial times up to 1994 and (and 
during the genocide.) He argues that the Churches were not mere passive agents vis-à-vis 
state policies, that they were active agents in the shaping and implementation of what he 
called ethnic politics, in their close cooperation with the state, all the way up to the 
genocide. Moreover, the Churches taught to their followers to obey the state authorities.46
 
  
The merit of all these local researches is that they show to what extent all local actors 
(elites, peasants) were rational calculators in their varied behaviours and to different 
degrees. I test all these local findings on Gishamvu and Kibayi. I also resort to some of 
the methodological approaches of this locally-based research and use it for my research 
about an area that has not yet been studied thoroughly regarding genocide. 
 
Lastly, a number of works have insisted that obedience was among the causes that could 
explain how genocide was implemented in Rwanda. Criticizing Prunier for his theory of 
obedience to explain why many Rwandan peasants embarked in killings, Claudine Vidal 
remarked that if obedience was observed among some peasants, such an assertion could 
not be generalized to the whole country and to all peasants.47
                                                 
45 Lee Ann Fujii, Killing Neighbors: Webs of violence in Rwanda, Ithaca and London, Cornell University 
Press, 2009. 
 Such a critique is vitally 
important because it suggests that it is difficult to generalize when it comes to causes of 
popular participation in genocide. I argue that there have been several contexts and not a 
single context. Space is important; as important as local agency. Possibly one would 
investigate every local setting and understand the causes of participation in that area, in 
order to make valid conclusions. One reason for this careful local study is that the 
46 Timothy Longman, Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010. 
47 Claudine Vidal, “Questions sur le rôle des paysans durant le génocide des Rwandais Tutsi”,  Cahiers 
d’études africaines, 150-152, XXXVIII-2-4, 1998, pp. 331-345, p. 339. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
16 
Rwandan peasantry was never a homogenous group.48
 
 As Vidal highlights, the historical 
contexts of the relations between ethnic groups, in rural areas, were not uniform, in the 
north, south, east or west. But she pursues this by explaining that the differences were not 
just regional. They were also characterized by an internal social stratification. As 
Danielle de Lame has explained, all peasants in the villages she studied were not equally 
poor, there were differing socio-economic levels among them. 
Jean Bigagaza et al. offer a detailed analysis of land in the conflict of Rwanda from the 
1980s onwards. They conclude that it played a crucial role in the genocide as one of 
causal factors. “To the poor rural Hutu, inheritance of additional land and property was a 
big incentive to participate in the genocide.”49 And again: “The role of land is crucial in 
understanding the civil war and genocide in Rwanda.”50 Pottier also analyses the land 
issue and shows to what extent it was a source of conflict.51 If anything, the literature on 
land in Rwanda52 reveals that there was land shortage, and inefficient exploitation for 
those who had it. This seems to have been an incentive to kill by landless or more 
ambitious people.53
 
 
Paul J. Magnarella,54 David Newbury,55 Catharine Newbury,56 Peter Uvin,57 Andy 
Storey58 and Helen Hintjens59
                                                 
48 Vidal, “Questions sur le rôle des paysans ”, p. 336; Newbury, “Understanding genocide”. 
 offer detailed analyses of factors relevant to explain the 
49 Jean Bigagaza, Carolyne Abong and Cecile Mukarubuga,  “Land Scarcity, Distribution and Conflict in 
Rwanda”, in J. Lind, K. Sturman (eds), Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts, Nairobi 
ACTS PRESS/Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2002, pp. 50-82, p. 59. 
50 Bigagaza et al., “Land Scarcity”, p. 65. 
51 Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda. 
52 See Yanagizawa, “Malthus in Rwanda?”; Daniel C. Clay and Jim McAllister, “Family Development 
Cycle, Social Class, and Inequality in Rwanda”, Rural Sociology, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 22-40; Bigagaza et 
al., “Land Scarcity”; de Lame, A Hill among a Thousand, pp. 125-; Verwimp, “The political economy of 
coffee”; Idem, “An Economic Profile”. 
53 “… the interests for members of both these groups to participate in the genocide is to be found in their 
respective relation to the land and labour markets. The landlords or employers had “something to defend”, 
meaning their job, their land, their farm or farm output and their overall privileged position in Rwandan 
society. The poor, […] could expect to gain from participation: it has been widely documented that a large 
number of participants, mainly the rank and file among the perpetrators were very interested in the property 
of the murdered Tutsi. Among the property, land was a much desired asset.” (Verwimp, “The political 
economy of coffee”, p. 29.) 
54 Paul J. Magnarella, “How could it happen? The Background and Causes of the Genocide in Rwanda”, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 3, 2005, pp. 801-822. 
55 Newbury, “Understanding genocide”. 
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Rwandan genocide: ecological, economic, cultural and political factors. They stress the 
following: the  civil war of 1990,  Hutu power ideology against Tutsi, economic 
exploitation of the masses by the Hutu upper elite, the failure of the government to solve 
the ecological and economic crisis of the 1980s-1990s by addressing sustainable 
solutions, and the choice to eliminate a portion of a population as a solution for that 
ecological question (disequilibrium between land and demography), economic decisions 
of international monetary institutions on Rwanda at the beginning of the 1990s, ethnicity 
that can be traced back to the late precolonial and the colonial periods, but also regional 
factors, such as the influence of Burundi massacres on ethnic politics in Rwanda, and 
gender issues. The key point that can be drawn from these works is that though all those 
factors may have contributed to the spread of killings, political manipulation seems to 
have been the main cause of the genocide.60 In answer to the question of why people 
killed, Uvin argued that ordinary people killed for the following motives that varied in 
degree between Rwanda and Burundi: fear, prejudice, a desire for revenge, impunity, 
opportunism and obedience.61 In an earlier article, he has emphasized the role of 
prejudice in the Rwandan crisis since colonial times. He indicates that after 
independence, prejudice was used to distinguish the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa groups and 
discriminate against some of them.62 Finally, Verwimp tried to link the politics and the 
economics in order to understand the Habyarimana regime’s context and policy.63 
Newbury and Newbury advocated a link between the political and the rural in the 
understanding of Rwandan history.64 Studies by Little and Horowitz65
                                                                                                                                                 
56 Newbury, “Background to Genocide”. 
, and the responses 
57 Uvin, Aiding Violence. 
58 Andy Storey, “Structural Adjustment, State Power and Genocide: the World Bank and Rwanda”, Paper 
for presentation at the conference on ’The global constitution of “failed states”: consequences of a new 
imperialism?”, Sussex, 18-20 April 2001. 
59 Hintjens, “When identity becomes a knife”, pp. 25-54. 
60 On this see also African Rights, Rwanda. Death, despair and defiance, p. 14; Yanagizawa, “Malthus in 
Rwanda?”. 
61 Peter Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda. Different Paths to Mass Violence”, 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3, April 1999, pp. 253-271, pp. 263-265. 
62 Peter Uvin, “Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda”, African Studies Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, 
September 1997, pp. 91-115. 
63 Verwimp, “Development ideology”; and “The political economy of coffee”. 
64 David Newbury and Catharine Newbury, “Review Essay. Bringing the Peasants Back In: Agrarian 
Themes in the Construction and Corrosion of Statist Historiography in Rwanda”, American Historical 
Review, June 2000, pp. 832-877. 
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of Robins and Ndoreraho,66 show the need to link politics and economics, the rural and 
the politics, as far as agriculture for instance is concerned. Little and Horowitz argued 
that in 1987 there was a tension between the government and the rural smallholders over 
what crops to grow, the former privileging the export crops such as coffee, tea and 
pyrethrum, the latter preferring subsistence crops which were by far more profitable for 
their local consumption and local market and enjoying better prices. The response of 
Robins and Ndoreraho refuted the idea of conflict of interest between the state and rural 
smallholders, emphasizing that the state policy and discourse was in favour of 
subsistence crops. The reply of Little and Horowitz disagreed again with Robins and 
Ndoreraho for their adherence to the state rhetoric, and gave more evidence for the 
divergence between the state’s interests and rural smallholders’ interests regarding the 
choice of crops to promote.67
 
   
Following this literature, my research examines political and socio-economic factors in 
their interrelationship. In addition, it looks at the role of state elites, local elites and local 
population in order to grasp the contours of conflicting interests, redefinition of conflicts, 
the changing patterns between the making and remaking of choices of actors (proponents 
and opponents) in different times and spaces, in order to understand the occurrence and 
the development of genocide in the two targeted communes. 
 
Thus, this research attempts to answer the following questions: How and why genocide 
became possible in Gishamvu and Kibayi? In other words, what was the nature of power 
at different epochs and how was it exercised? How did forms of political competition 
evolve? In relation to these forms of competition, what forms of violence occurred across 
history and how did they manifest themselves at local level up to 1994? And what was 
the place of identity politics? Then, what were economic and social conditions since 
colonial times up to 1994 and how were these conditions instrumentalized in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
65 Peter D. Little, and Michael M. Horowitz, “Subsistence Crops Are Cash Crops: Some Comments with 
Reference to Eastern Africa”, Human Organization, Vol. 46, No. 3, 1987, pp. 254-257. 
66 Edward Robins, and Ndoreraho Valens, “Agricultural Policy and Practice in Rwanda: A Response to 
Little and Horowitz”, Human Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1988, pp. 270-271. 
67 Peter D. Little and Michael M. Horowitz, “Authors’ Reply”, Human Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1988, 
pp. 272-273. 
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construction of the ideology of genocide? Finally, how did the Tutsi genocide unfold in 
Gishamvu and Kibayi? 
 
In order to answer these questions, I use historical and comparative methods. These go 
hand in hand with the techniques of the collection, analysis and interpretation of both 
written materials and interviews. Written documentation refers to both archives and 
published works. Archives include colonial reports and correspondence, 
postindependence reports, minutes and correspondence at national, prefecture and 
commune levels. The bulk of prefecture and commune archives are in Kinyarwanda 
language.68 Oral materials include in-depth and open ended interviews of 106 informants 
from Gishamvu and Kibayi who include 43 survivors, 16 perpetrators, 43 bystanders, and 
4 who were not in Rwanda during the genocide. Altogether, my approach in these 
methods and techniques is qualitative. With regard to written and oral materials, I use 
triangulation in three ways. First, I confront written archives and interviews. Secondly, as 
far as interviews are concerned, I use the views of victims, bystanders and perpetrators. 
Thirdly, I use the standpoints of leaders and constituents69
 
 which are found in both 
written materials and interviews. Here triangulation means the cross-reference of three 
different groups of informants in different sources, against and alongside each other.   
Concerning oral sources, I consider eyewitness accounts as extremely valuable, but 
subject them to a critical examination. On this, I follow the advice of Totten and Parsons:  
 
Although eyewitness accounts are a valuable means of documenting historical 
events, their validity as a primary source is as good as the procedures by which they 
are collected as well as the accuracy of the witnesses whose accounts are 
documented. The same research standards used to develop historical works need to 
be applied to gathering, recording, authenticating, and interpreting eyewitness 
                                                 
68 Archives that are in Kinyarwanda language are presented in English both in the footnotes and in the 
bibliography. Moreover, all translations of quotations from French and Kinyarwanda into English are by 
myself. This means that I used sources and works which are in three languages: Kinyarwanda, French and 
English. The bulk of publications were in French and English. All archives were in French and 
Kinyarwanda, while interviews were in Kinyarwanda.  
69 On the respect of both intellectuals and masses’ views, see Michel Foucault, Language. Counter-
Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews…, p. 208 in Honi Fern Haber, Beyond postmodern 
politics. Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 93-94. 
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accounts.70
 
 
In this respect, I check the validity of the interview data through cross-reference against 
other sources, i.e., when information of one person is supported or substantiated by 
others. Secondly I put that information in its context of production, that is, I examine the 
motives that drove those informants or authors to make such allegations and the context 
under which they operated. The information gathered from the oral and even the written 
sources, official and private, becomes ‘evidence’ only when its modes of production have 
been interrogated.71
 
  
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The first chapter examines colonial legacies 
and agencies. It argues that the nature of colonial power perpetuated domination, 
oppression, and discrimination, that the economic sphere was exploitative and that the 
social policies were repressive and divisive. Since colonial experiences are by now fairly 
well-documented, this chapter focuses on local memories and experiences of 
colonization, by emphasizing the performance and the evaluation of local authorities, the 
hardships of economic exploitation and social repression in everyday life in Gishamvu 
and Kibayi. The chapter ends with a section on the late colonial reforms, and argues that 
these reforms, although they were productive of new political dynamics, were not 
sufficient enough to improve lives of people.  
 
The second chapter is concerned with the decolonization process. It shows how the 
period between 1957 and 1962 was intense in terms of political activity, and how 
Rwandan intellectuals formulated their strategies in order to gain power. It also explores 
the agency of both Belgian colonial masters and the Roman Catholic Church leaders in 
those political developments. It describes as much as possible the violence of 1959-1962 
                                                 
70 Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, “Introduction”, in Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons and Israel 
W. Charny, Century of genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, Second Edition, New York, 
Routledge, 2004, pp. 1-13, p. 6. 
71 On ways of examining the evidence or at least doubting about it, see Premesh Lalu, “The Grammar of 
Domination and the Subjection of Agency: Colonial Texts and Modes of Evidence”, History and Theory, 
Vol. 39, No. 4, Theme Issue 39: “Not Telling”: Secrecy, Lies, and History, Dec., 2000, pp. 45-68; Paul 
Ricoeur, La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, Paris, Seuil, 2000, pp. 213-214, 218 et 443. On the paramount 
importance of context in history, see Tosh, The Pursuit of History, pp. 60 and 89. 
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that came to be called “revolution” and the shift of power from Belgian administration 
and Tutsi auxiliaries to Hutu intellectuals through appointment by the Belgian authority, 
through elections or through violence. It ends with the consequences of that violence in 
society, such as the exile of Tutsi and other monarchists, the issue of property and 
representations around that event called “revolution”. From all these political, social and 
economic developments, one learns how complex are agency, status, identity, interests, 
social relations, and conflicts. 
 
The third chapter studies the First and Second Republics in Gishamvu and Kibayi. It 
shows how political leaders managed society as well as the economy, and how local 
authorities and local population responded to the state policies. In this regard, it analyses 
the agency of postindependence leaders in dealing with issues left by the colonial rule 
and by the decolonization struggles and which continued to pose problems after 
independence, such as land, refugees and violence. It examines the policy of structural 
violence at local level and argues that this policy went beyond the issues of ethnicity and 
regionalism which have received most attention in the literature to date. The remainder of 
the chapter deals with everyday life in the economic sphere, in the political sphere and in 
social relations. It is there that it documents the relations between local leaders and 
constituents, the perception of constituents about their leaders concerning their economic 
and power performance, how they obeyed and/or disobeyed them, and relations between 
locals as far as their ethnic identities were concerned. This chapter shows that the 
everyday and the notion of the big ‘event’ were not always separated.72
 
 
The fourth chapter revisits the economic crises of 1985 onwards and checks their 
implications in Gishamvu and Kibayi. It then explores the local experiences around the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front war, how the regime in place represented it and instrumentalized 
it in order to repress the Tutsi community and political opponents. It thereafter describes 
the criminal and social violence at local level, arguing that this violence resulted from 
both the economic crises and the war. The chapter dwells then on intense political 
                                                 
72 On the everyday as being also eventful, see Veena Das, Life and Words, Life and the Descent into the 
Ordinary, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2007, p. 8. 
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activities of political parties since the inception of the multiparty system in 1991 and 
argues that even in rural areas these parties were very active. This intense activity is seen 
both in the organisation of campaign meetings and in the competition among parties, 
using all means including political violence. This chapter ends with a section on 
disobedience during the multiparty system. If one links this culture of violence to the one 
of the early 1960s, one notices to what extent a space for violence and then for genocide 
was being prepared.  
 
The fifth chapter examines the ideology that led to the Tutsi genocide. It argues that the 
arguments of this ideology drew as much on past histories and experiences, and on 
political and economic crises of the early 1990s. It starts with a theory on conditions of 
possibility of genocide, then it goes on to examine how the ideology of genocide was 
constructed in Rwanda. It argues that this ideology used four core tools: the 
dehumanization, the manipulation of history and ethnicity, the depiction of the Tutsi 
community as a threat, and massacres of Tutsi between 1990 and 1993. The last part of 
the chapter deals with the Tutsi genocide at national level. 
 
The sixth and the seventh chapters reconstruct the unfolding of the genocide in Gishamvu 
and Kibayi Communes. As far as the commencement of physical violence against the 
Tutsi is concerned, these chapters link the national context with local developments, 
showing to what extent this point of origin differed in both communes. Then the local 
genocide is described by sectors as much as possible, stressing the perpetrators, the 
victims, the rescuers and the varied pattern of the massacres and of the scattered killings 
of individuals, either by sector or by commune. These chapters also stress the different 
periods or phases of the genocide. They also look at the intra-Hutu violence stemming 
from various motives, such as disputes around expropriated property or Tutsi wives. The 
main source used for reconstructing the unfolding of the Tutsi genocide in these two 
communes is the interviews I conducted, since archival documents and secondary 
materials remain scarce. 
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This dissertation concludes by emphasizing the importance of the linkages between 
longer-term processes and more immediate conjunctures, and between politics, 
economics and social dynamics, in order to understand the preconditions and the 
conditions that made possible the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda more broadly and in 
Gishamvu and Kibayi specifically. The conclusion also assesses how the key questions 
concerning the genocide have been addressed throughout the chapters of this dissertation, 
and identifies the strengths and the limits of such questions in the case of the local 
communes under examination. 
 
This dissertation starts with an analysis of precolonial and colonial experiences, in line 
with its efforts to understand the Rwandan context using a longue durée perspective.  It is 
to this early period that we must now turn in Chapter 1.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
COLONIAL LEGACIES AND AGENCIES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In studying the Tutsi genocide, an understanding of colonial experiences becomes 
important. First, it helps understand among other reasons where the authoritarian power 
that perpetrated genocide and the crisis that led to it come from. Moreover, that 
authoritarian power, the context in which it operated, and the means it used are analyzed 
by considering the colonial legacy. This helps understand what David Scott called “the 
political rationalities of colonial power.”1
 
 Secondly, the colonial becomes crucial because 
even genocide think-tanks used languages and ideological references drawn from colonial 
historiography. The Hamitic hypothesis stating that the Tutsi were aliens, and the 
reinterpretation of certain Rwandan precolonial myths to prove that certain Rwandans 
were alloctonous and others autochtonous are precise cases in point. The version of 
Rwandan history as a history of a successive arrival of ethnic groups, Twa first, and then 
Hutu and lastly the Tutsi, all coming from different places, had been engineered by 
colonial scholars and taught to Rwandan students for decades. Those who did not study it 
had to get it through radio and extremist press propaganda, first in 1959 and again in 
1990 and 1994. 
Furthermore, my elderly informants included their colonial experiences in their 
explanation about the genocide in their rural area communes. One reason for this may be 
that in the local perception, history (amateka in Kinyarwanda) still means to some extent 
political history or past deeds of leaders, and particularly memories of or about the 
monarchy. The further one can go into the past, the more he or she is considered as an 
                                                 
1 David Scott, “Colonial Governmentality”, Social Text, 43, Autumn 1995, pp. 191-220, p. 193. 
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expert of “history”. The more one can recite names of chiefs and places the more one is 
seen or sees him/herself as a keeper of authoritative historical knowledge. Since my 
informants who were sixty and over at the time of the interview were born or lived during 
the colonial period, history for them meant a period from colonialism onward.  The ease 
with which they still remembered colonialism, especially through its colonial agents, the 
Belgians, the Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs, suggests that it is important to include even the 
colonial local past experiences and representations in a study that focuses on genocide in 
local areas.  
 
In addition to power considerations, this chapter looks as well at economic and social 
experiences and finally deals with the colonial reforms that started to soften the 
oppressive and repressive measures. But the colonial suggests that we also look at the 
precolonial as well. In this chapter, I refer to the precolonial slightly, because I did not 
find many recollections about it in Gishamvu and Kibayi, and because at national level, 
some other authors have already done this. 
 
1.1. SOME NOTES ON THE PRECOLONIAL STRUCTURES IN RWANDA 
 
In Rwandan historiography, the precolonial period is a much more complex time span to 
consider. On the one hand, so much literature has been produced about it. Although this 
literature contains some few insights into social and cultural traits, it remains largely a 
political history. Moreover, most authors who wrote about it during the colonial period 
tended to focus more on the central part of the country than other regions. After 
independence, a move has been made in the direction of producing monographs on 
peripheral parts of what became Rwanda. This has been done both by Rwandan and 
foreign students and scholars. On the other hand, after 1994, some works slightly 
mentioned the precolonial in order to clarify some issues of the past of Rwanda that can 
help explain the historical context of the genocide. They focused mostly on the 
occupation of territory, control of power, and ethnic identity – Hutu-Tutsi relations in 
social and political institutions – to mention a few. In my attempt to revisit the 
precolonial setting, I identify major trends and debates but leave them open. 
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Archaeological and linguistic evidences indicate that the territory that later became 
central Rwanda was already populated by the first millennium BC.2 The earliest social 
organisation that seems to have prevailed in that territory was based on lineage and clan 
structures. It is worth noting that these lineages and clans were not static. The state in the 
sense of monarchy or “sacred royalty” came later. But once the monarchies developed, 
kinship structures (lineage, clan and others) continued to operate in social, economic and 
political matters. The territory of Rwanda was occupied by many such monarchies or 
kingships, some of which came to be progressively conquered by the Nyiginya kingdom. 
This becomes clear at least from the mid-15th century onward. The name Rwanda came 
from the Nyiginya kingdom, but the culture that was found within that entity went 
beyond the Nyiginya influence.3
 
 
The territory of the Nyiginya kingdom grew slowly from the centre (Gasabo) to include 
other parts of the territory progressively until the advent of colonial rule. Some few 
regions located in the north-west and the south-west were not yet subjugated by the 
Nyiginya kingdom when the Germans came.  However, all these political entities shared 
a Rwandan identity in the sense of a similar core culture and language.4
 
  
Since at least two thousand years, the population seems to have been stable within 
Rwandan territory.5
                                                 
2 Jan Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien, le royaume nyiginya, Paris, Karthala, 2001, pp. 26-27.  
 Its main economic activities revolved around agriculture, animal 
husbandry, craft production, hunting, gathering, and the exchange of goods and services. 
3 Emmanuel Ntezimana in Gurdun Honke, et al., Au plus profond de l’Afrique. Le Rwanda et la 
colonisation allemande 1885-1919, Bonn, Peter Hammer Verlag, 1990, p. 74; Didier Goyvaerts, “Conflict 
and Ethnicity in Pre-colonial Rwanda?,” in Didier Goyvaerts (ed.), Conflict and Ethnicity in Central Africa, 
Tokyo, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign 
Studies, 2000, pp. 155-176, pp. 172-173; Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien, p. 49; Charles Kabwete Mulinda, 
The Dynamic Aspect of Some Traditional Institutions in Precolonial Rwanda, MA thesis, University of the 
Western Cape, August 2002, p. 23. 
4 Alexis Kagame, Un abrégé de l’ethno-histoire du Rwanda, V1, Butare, Editions Universitaires du 
Rwanda, 1972 ; Roger Heremans, Introduction à l’histoire du Rwanda, Kigali, Ed. Rwandaises, 1971; 
Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, 
Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 68 ; Kabwete Mulinda, The Dynamic Aspect, 
pp. 102-131.  
5 Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien, p. 31. 
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This society seems to have been more egalitarian in earlier times, when the demography 
was still low in comparison with the size of territory. In this regard, there seems to have 
been fewer conflicts between agricultural and animal economies. Those who needed land 
and pastures were moving freely to new lands in order to acquire the needed resources. 
But as the population grew over centuries, new resources were needed. The progressive 
clearing of forests by individuals and families, and conquest of territories by armies in 
order to acquire the control over land, cattle and subjects, can be read as an attempt to 
resolve this issue of economic welfare and expansion.  
 
Some time before the 17th century, a relation between poor people needing cattle and 
cattle-owners was created. It was called Ubuhake. That relation existed in neighbouring 
kingdoms of Rwanda but bore different names. Concerning Ubuhake, some poor who 
sought the ownership of cattle had to go to submit themselves to people who were rich in 
cattle. The owners of cattle who in turn needed subjects accepted the terms of entering 
that relation or contract. Then Ubuhake became a sort of clientship based on exchange of 
the usufruct of a cow between a person called patron (shebuja) and the other called client 
(umugaragu). Before receiving the cow, the client had to perform a number of duties that 
included manual labour, allegiance and support in various social circumstances of 
everyday life. The transfer of the usufruct of the cow was the conclusion of that 
relationship or contract. In addition to the transfer of the cow, the patron also had other 
duties such as the protection of his client (s) in justice matters. The more cattle became 
scarce as a result of population growth or of cattle diseases, the more it was considered as 
precious and therefore the more it led to the increase of Ubuhake relationships. The 
existing literature suggests that this institution started in the central part of the country 
and arrived or developed in peripheral parts only later around the eighteenth century.6
 
 
Clientship was also recorded for land exchange or use. The history of traditional 
institutions around land such as Ubukonde in the north-western part of the country and 
the Igikingi in the nineteenth century also shows a pattern evolving in relation to time and 
space. Whenever the demography was small, conditions of clients vis-à-vis their patrons 
                                                 
6 On the evolution of Ubuhake, see Kabwete Mulinda, The Dynamic Aspect, pp. 46-73. 
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tended to be generous. They became exploitative as the population size was increasing 
and resources were becoming scarce. Ubukonde was a much more ancient institution. 
Oral traditions mention it already by the 15th century. It meant the right of lineages called 
abakonde, that is, those who have cleared the forest in order to acquire a portion of land 
to exploit it in various economic activities: in agriculture (ubukonde bw’isuka) (the 
ubukonde of hoe); in hunting (ubukonde bw’inzogera) (the ubukonde of bell) and in cattle 
rearing (ubukonde bw’inka) (the ubukonde of cow). The lineages or individuals who 
could not have enough labour to clear land sought land clientship from the abakonde 
lineages and in the process became their subjects (abagererwa). However, ubukonde 
rights or identities were not static. Some experiences of the northwestern part of the 
country suggest that some abagererwa families, through their military power, gained the 
status of abakonde. This kind of ubukonde was called ubukonde bw’umuheto (ubukonde 
of bow).7
 
 
As for the Igikingi institution, it was created around 1840 in order to solve the problem of 
demographic increase and multiplication of cattle. These two factors put pressure on land. 
This pressure had started to be perceived as early as the 17th and 18th centuries when 
massive clearings of forest were registered. People from saturated places rushed into 
areas occupied by forests and started to clear them in order to gain some land. Those 
internal immigrations pursuing empty lands occurred both in the northwest, in the south 
and in the southwest.8 Igikingi was a reserved portion of land for herding given by the 
king or other top authorities to other leaders or owners of cattle. It reduced the public 
land that every owner of cattle used before without condition. It started to be 
implemented in the centre of the country and reached peripheral regions much later 
during the reign of Rwabugiri (1860-1895). There are even areas which did not witness it 
at all, such as those regions that had a low density of population where every owner of 
cattle had enough land for grazing. As a result, where the Igikingi system reached, it was 
necessary to own an exclusive pastoral domain.9
                                                 
7 On a summary about Ubukonde, see Kabwete Mulinda, The Dynamic Aspect, pp. 75-80. 
 Since some of those in need of land for 
grazing had to seek clientship from owners of ibikingi (plural of igikingi), a new 
8 Kabwete Mulinda, The Dynamic Aspect, pp. 81-82. 
9 Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien, pp. 168-169; Kabwete Mulinda, The Dynamic Aspect, pp. 94-95. 
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clientship for land was born. In addition to ubuhake clientship seeking cattle, clients who 
owned cattle but not land for grazing, had to negotiate a land clientship. As a result, as 
explains Nkurikiyimfura, Ubuhake in this mid-19th century became not only a “pastoral 
clientship” but came to be perceived as the “pastoral and land clientship”. 
 
Concerning the evolution of political power, the centralization of power and therefore the 
control of resources and labour was one of the most important concerns of kings for a 
long time. In order to gain more labour power and additional cattle, conquests of 
neighbouring kingdoms were organised by the Nyiginya kingdom. Alexis Kagame places 
the first clear attempt of the Nyiginya king to centralize power around the 15th century 
during the reign of Kigeri I Mukobanya.10  Indeed, the history of the Rwandan army is a 
record of successive conquests and annexations of territories, of looting the cattle from 
subjugated kingdoms and of capturing the defeated soldiers. Starting from the 17th 
century during the reign of Ruganzu Ndori, the kings co-opted great chiefs by concluding 
with them an Ubuhake relationship. During the next century, that relationship got 
extended from chiefs to owners of cattle and to agriculturalists. When spoliation of cattle 
became a major problem facing cattle owners, especially during the 18th and 19th 
centuries, people entered the Ubuhake clientship not just to acquire cattle, but also to 
protect those that they had.11
 
 
Moreover, few years after the creation of the Igikingi institution, the king Yuhi Gahindiro 
initiated another major administrative reform. That was around 1840. He created the 
posts of chief of land and chief of grass or pastures. The first acted as the administrator of 
land for agriculture or territory, while the second managed the cattle. These two were 
added to the third chief, i.e., army chief.12
                                                 
10 See Alexis Kagame, “Les grands tournants dans l’histoire de la culture rwandaise”, Etudes Rwandaises, 
2, mars 1978, pp. 1-10, pp. 1-3 and Kagame, Un abrégé de l’ethno-histoire, pp.61-62 et 65-66.  
 Nkurikiyimfura thinks that this administrative 
reform was an attempt by the royal court to control the local chiefs who could easily 
become rich thanks to the distribution of Ibikingi lands to clients and by gaining many 
11 Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien, pp. 116-117, 124, 181-182 ; Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of 
a Genocide, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 21 ; Emmanuel Ntezimana, “Les causes de la 
Révolution Rwandaise,” in Dialogue, n°137, nov.-déc. 1989, pp. 35-49, p. 39. 
12 Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien, p. 170. 
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Ubuhake clients.13 However, it is worth stressing that the reform of igikingi and of the 
three chiefs was implemented very slowly, for they became widespread only during the 
reign of Kigeri Rwabugiri (1860-1895).14
 
 
Again, the royal court achieved the centralization of the kingdom by controlling as much 
as possible the power of great families that ruled the country. Although kings tried as 
much to crush factions among these great families that ruled the country in a hereditary 
manner from the 18th century onwards, it is Rwabugiri who relatively succeeded to 
annihilate those families, although they did not fail entirely. Rwabugiri waged several 
wars of extending the territory, appointed individuals from modest families to posts of 
army command and administration of territory, and seriously threatened the hereditary 
rights of great families. But after his death, it was clear that the influence of great families 
in the power structure was still important.15
 
  
Then what was the nature of identity politics during this time in relation to the 
management of economic assets and control of power? It is worth noting that ethnic 
identity has remained one of the most controversial and complex issues to deal with in   
Rwandan historiography. However, knowledge about Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities and 
relations over time and space has advanced although gaps still remain. For example, on 
the issue of great migrations (so emphasized in the colonial and later on post-
independence historiography) which assigned to each group a certain time of arrival in 
the territory that became Rwanda and place of origin, it has been made clear that those 
assertions could not be supported. As Vansina wrote, referring to archaeological and 
linguistic findings, “[t]there has never been successive immigrations of Twa hunters-
gatherers, of Hutu agriculturalists and of Tutsi pastoralists, because those social 
categories were elaborated in place in order to classify people already established 
there.”16
                                                 
13 Jean-Népomucène Nkurikiyimfura, Le gros bétail et la société rwandaise, Doctoral Thesis, T. I., Paris,  
1986, pp. 95-96. 
 In the same vein, Takeuchi stated:  
14 Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien, p. 171.  
15 Emmanuel Ntezimana, “Le Rwanda social, administrative et politique à la fin du dix-neuvième siècle”, in 
Gurdun Honke et al., Au profond de l’Afrique. Le Rwanda et la colonisation allemande 1885-1919, Bonn, 
Peter Hammer Verlag, 1990, p. 77 ; Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien, pp. 112 et 209-210. 
16 Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien, p. 249, see also pp. 32-33. 
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It is appropriate to understand the emergence of Bantu speakers in the Great 
Lakes region, not as the migration of a single ethnic group, but the gradual 
appearance of several such groups having similar languages and cultures. 
Therefore, neither Tutsi nor Hutu should be regarded as a single separate group 
from the dawn of history. Statements such as ‘the Tutsi arrived in Rwanda before 
the fourteenth century’ or ‘[the Hutu] arrived in Rwanda during the first 
millennium’ are entirely inappropriate.17
 
 
 
The second issue of great controversy was on the assertion that the Tutsi were pastoralists 
and the Hutu agriculturalists. Mamdani viewed this issue as follows:  
 
Many Hutu had cattle, and many Tutsi farmed the land. […] The division of labor 
observed between the two at the onset of the colonial period is better thought of as 
a division enforced through the medium of political power rather than as a 
timeless preoccupation of the two separate groups. The economic community was 
less a natural than a historical artifact, less a biological predisposition than a 
political creation.18
 
 
The third issue is on the debate whether Tutsi and Hutu are political or social identities. 
According to Vansina, Tutsi referred to a certain political elite or a social class among the 
pastoralists.19 However, towards the end of the 19th century, Tutsi came to include not 
just the political elite, but all the pastoralists.20 Mamdani preferred to consider them as 
political identities which changed across time and space and whose change was 
influenced by the evolution of the Rwandan state itself.21
 
 Takeuchi, who also reflected 
upon precolonial developments, emphasized the role of state formation in the Hutu-Tutsi 
relations. In the process, he formulated the following hypothesis:  
It is likely that the notion ‘Tutsi’ was developed at the court and carried with it the 
idea of ‘ruling class’, as opposed to the rest of the population consisting not only 
of Hutu and Twa but also of Tutsi. […] On the other hand, the notion ‘Hutu’ 
might be understood as originally referring to ‘the rest of the Tutsi’. We may say 
                                                 
17 Shinichi Takeuchi,  “Hutu and Tutsi: A Note on Group Formation in Pre-colonial Rwanda”, in Didier 
Goyvaerts (ed.), Conflict and Ethnicity in Central Africa, Tokyo, Institute for the Study of Languages and 
Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2000, pp. 177-208, p. 186. 
18 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p. 51. Emphasis in original. 
19 Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien, p. 52. 
20 , Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien, p. 53. 
21 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, pp. 56 and 73.  
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that all the people who were alienated from power (i.e. the court) were 
collectively called ‘the Hutu’, simply because they did not belong to ‘the Tutsi’.22
 
  
Finally, David Newbury warned against the danger to think that the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa 
identities have always been salient or powerful. He reminds that two centuries ago, 
people identified themselves in terms of region or neighbourhood and kin group. He 
pursues this argument:  “With the expansion of the power of the monarchy, these 
categories of Tutsi and Hutu gradually came to over-ride in importance the local 
identities and to encompass virtually the entire population, in a process which was only 
completed under colonial rule.”23 He sees these identities as progressively but firmly 
constructed ethnic identities, which bear complexities within themselves and vis-à-vis 
each other: “Even within one ethnic category the patterns of change that occurred in one 
region differed from those in other regions; in other words, there is not a single coherent 
‘Tutsi history’ or ‘Tutsi culture,’ just as there is no single ‘Hutu history’ or ‘Hutu 
culture.’”24
 
 
The last context that reinforced the Hutu and Tutsi distinction was the creation of 
institutions that provoked or increased the likelihood of economic and social conflict. For 
example, the Igikingi institution is described as having increased the means of control of 
ruled people by the leaders. Also in order to obtain land through Igikingi, the recipient 
had first to be “tutsified” if he was not Tutsi in the first place. This is believed to have 
enhanced the ‘ethnic’ consciousness.25 The Uburetwa institution created around 1870 and 
that requested the prestation of services from Hutu and rarely from Tutsi of two days out 
of the four or five that made up the Rwandan week also reinforced the Hutu-Tutsi 
distinction.26 This despite the fact that “the Hutu/Tutsi distinction could not be 
considered a socioeconomic distinction, one between exploiters and exploited or rich and 
poor.”27
                                                 
22 Takeuchi, “Hutu and Tutsi”, pp. 200-201. 
 Indeed, the poor Tutsi who were the majority among the Tutsi shared the same 
23 David Newbury, “Understanding genocide”, African Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, April 1998, pp. 73-
97, p. 83. 
24 Newbury, “Understanding genocide”, p. 83. See also pp. 84-87. 
25 Jean-Népomucène Nkurikiyimfura, Le gros bétail et la société rwandaise : Evolution historique des XII-
XIV siècles à 1958, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1994, pp. 96-97. 
26 Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien, p. 172. 
27 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p. 74.  
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economic condition with the Hutu. Moreover, Vansina thinks that the administrative 
reform that created the chief of grass and chief of land made a distinction between Tutsi 
pastoralists and Hutu agriculturalists as they were assigned a separate local leadership.28 
But since these three institutions spread slowly from the centre to the peripheral regions, 
one needs to relativise their impact nationwide. The inequality that they created varied 
across regions.29
 
 
Finally, these institutions that developed conflict of interests between the Hutu and the 
Tutsi evolved hand in hand and coexisted with other social institutions that tended to 
soften conflict in the sense that they strengthened reciprocity, exchange and mutual help 
between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Those institutions are the Ubuse that developed clan 
solidarity, the Kubandwa traditional cult that linked the Tutsi and Hutu members in the 
same religious beliefs and rituals, and the ideology of the monarchy that tended to go 
beyond Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities by emphasizing the Rwandan identity.30 Although 
the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities existed towards the end of precolonial times, they 
remained socio-political identities. They were seen as racial identities by the colonial rule 
that applied racial theories to describe them.31
 
 After this quick overview of the 
precolonial structures, let us now turn to colonial experiences both at national and local 
levels.  
1.2. POLITICAL COLONIAL DOMINATION 
 
1.2.1. The Terms of Colonial Power and Domination 
 
                                                 
28 Vansina, Le Rwanda ancien, pp. 174-175. 
29 Yves Ternon, “Rwanda 1994. Analyse d’un processus génocidaire”, in Revue d’histoire de la Shoah : 
Rwanda : Quinze ans après : Penser et écrire l’histoire du génocide des Tutsi, n° 190, Janvier/Juin 2009, 
pp. 15-57, pp. 22-23. 
30 Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, pp. 22-23. 
31 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, pp. 75 and 78; Ternon, “Rwanda 1994. Analyse d’un processus 
génocidaire”, pp. 15-57, p. 23; Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, p. 16. 
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Rwanda32
 
 has been colonized by two European powers, Germany from 1897 until 1916, 
and Belgium from 1916 until 1962. Both colonial powers have relied on the existing 
Rwandan monarchical administrative apparatus to enforce their rule. Except for the 
interference of Germans in Rwandan politics and the easing of the settlement of first 
Christian Missions in many provinces of Rwanda, the German presence did not change 
much in the existing political landscape. Germans came at a critical moment when the 
monarchy was coming from a destructive war of succession known as the Rucunshu war 
(1896-1897). The King Musinga faction had just won over the Rutarindwa faction, 
though some elements of the latter faction continued to rebel against the new king. 
Musinga, who was just enthroned by his uncles and mother in 1897, was helped by the 
Germans to counter and defeat those rebellions.  
Belgians occupied Ruanda-Urundi territory since 1916 after defeating the Germans 
during the First World War. That military occupation continued until 1924 when the 
League of Nations decided to grant to Belgium the command of Ruanda-Urundi, as a 
Mandated Territory. Belgium administered these two tiny kingdoms as a province of the 
Congo Colony. When in 1945 the League of Nations became the United Nations, the 
Mandate system also changed into Trusteeship, and Belgium was granted the Tutelage 
power over Ruanda-Urundi. The text of the Tutelage Accord was approved by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 December 1946 and was accepted by 
Belgium on 25 April 1949. Hence, the Belgian colonial rule over Rwanda has had three 
separate “legal” systems: Military occupation, Mandate and Trusteeship. It is worth 
noting that the concept “colony” has never been used in the Rwanda case, though it 
applied in real Belgian power management.33
 
 
                                                 
32 The territory called “Rwanda” can be easily geographically delimited with the advent of colonisation 
which stabilized the borders. However, before, it is hard, since borders changed regularly. (See Alberto 
Basomingera, “La participation de la population à l’administration et à l’exécution des missions de 
développement des collectivités locales au Rwanda”, Revue Juridique du Rwanda, Vol. VI, n° 3-4, juillet-
octobre 1982, pp. 231-264, p. 234.) 
33 See Emmanuel Ntezimana, “Les réactions rwandaises aux présences européennes (1870-1945) : 
Questions de typologie et de terminologie”, in Les réactions africaines à la colonisation en Afrique 
Centrale, Actes du colloque international d’histoire, Kigali, 6-10 mai 1985, pp. 61-94, p. 63. 
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There has been no doubt about the indirect character of the German colonial rule in 
Ruanda-Urundi, for, German administrators being very few in the territory, could not 
operate alone effectively. Yet, “indirect rule” as system was not yet conceptualised that 
way. This concept was developed by Sir Frederick Lugard some time later, i.e., in 1922, 
after German colonial rule in Ruanda-Urundi.34 On the other hand, the indirect character 
of Belgian rule has been debated. The Belgian colonial rule used the Congolese Force 
Publique (Military organ) until 13 June 1960 for a direct control of security.35 Rwandans 
could only be policemen, not soldiers.36 Since 1925, the administrative structure was 
organised as follows: Rwanda was under the supervision of the Resident who reported to 
the Vice-General Governor of Ruanda-Urundi who was based to Bujumbura in 
Burundi.37 The latter reported to the General Governor of Congo and Ruanda-Urundi 
who was in Léopoldville (Kinshasa) in Congo.38
 
 The Resident had Territory 
Administrators placed at the level of the provinces. The Resident supervised the King of 
Rwanda, while the Territory Administrators controlled the Chiefs and Subchiefs at the 
local levels.  
The Belgian colonial administration was characterized by regular reforms. But two 
among them seem to have borne significant effects. The first one occurred between 1926 
and 1931. The second took place in the 1950s.39
                                                 
34 See Frederick Lugard, The dual mandate in British tropical Africa, Edinburgh, London, W. Blackwood 
and sons, 1922.  
 The administrative reform of Rwanda 
and Burundi between 1926 and 1931 changed the boundaries of provinces, regrouped 
hills, which were the smallest significant administrative settings, and reduced the number 
of Rwandan leaders. It abolished the previous structure of three chiefs (army chief, land 
35 It is only at this date that Rwandans and Burundians entered the army, known as la Garde Territoriale du 
Ruanda-Urundi. (Guy Logiest, Mission au Rwanda. Un blanc dans la bagarre Tutsi-Hutu, Bruxelles, 
Didier Hatier, 1988, p. 159.) 
36 Ministère des Colonies, Rapport sur l’Administration Belge au Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1959, 
Bruxelles, 1960, p. 17. 
37 In the 1955 administrative reform, this post became General Resident of Ruanda-Urundi. 
38 It is only at the end of 1959 that the subordination of the administration of Ruanda-Urundi to the one of 
Congo was being discussed and reviewed. Indeed, when Congo was about to gain independence, the Vice-
Governor of Ruanda-Urundi became General Resident of Ruanda-Urundi and ceased to report to the Congo 
colonial structure.  See “La déclaration gouvernementale belge du 10 novembre 1959”, in Chronique de 
Politique Etrangère, Décolonisation et Indépendance du Rwanda et du Burundi, volume XVI, numéros 4-
6, Juillet-Décembre 1963, pp. 445-446. 
39 For the 1950s reforms, see below.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
36 
chief and grass chief) and set up a single chief’s structure. This restructuring of power 
along a single person, be he a king or chief, was then a widespread practice in various 
colonial systems.40 It is through this new structure that the Belgians attempted to control 
more directly the everyday exercise of power. The reform of 1926-31 indeed 
strengthened the repressive features of power while rejecting the conciliatory ones.41 
“[T]he indigenous rulers were endowed by the colonial states with a set of powers quite 
different from those they had had before.”42 It is worth noting that the so called 
“customary law” had not much to do with the “precolonial” legal instruments.43
 
 It was a 
completely new instrument. Furthermore, the colonial rule generalized the control of the 
Rwandan kingdom to the whole territory of Rwanda, a situation that had not yet been 
reached until the early 1920s.  
This reform gave to the Belgian administration the opportunity to dispose of chiefs and 
subchiefs who were not submissive and attempted to remain ‘independent’, and to 
replace them by young ones (their sons) who had already studied at the primary school of 
Nyanza.44 It demoted a number of individuals deemed not appropriate to rule due to their 
group identity (Hutu, foreigners) or individuals supposedly of inferior status or activity 
(female servants).45
                                                 
40 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, Kampala, London, Fountain Publishers, James Currey, 1996, 
p. 39. 
 In fact, legitimacy, according the colonial rule, depended first of all 
on royal descent. In this regard, sons of Tutsi chiefs from the Nyiginya and Bega royal 
41 See André Guichaoua, Destins paysans et politiques agraires en Afrique centrale. Tome 1. L’ordre 
paysan des hautes terres centrales du Burundi et du Rwanda, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1989, p. 23; Faustin 
Rutembesa, “Les autorités indigènes dans la politique coloniale belge au Rwanda de 1916 à 1925”, in 
Cahiers d’Histoire, n°1, avril 1983, pp. 1-22 ; Idem, “La réorganisation administrative et ses conséquences 
au Rwanda entre 1926 et 1931”, in Cahiers d’Histoire, n°2, 1984, pp. 211-226 ;  Mamdani, Citizen and 
Subject, p. 23; and Günther Bächler, “Epreuve éliminatoire sur fond ethnique et écologique. L'exemple du 
Rwanda,” Paper, Fondation Suisse pour la Paix, Berne, 1995, pp. 1-23, p. 10. 
42 Martin Chanock, “Paradigms, Policies and Property: A Review of the Customary Law of Land Tenure”, 
in Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts (eds), Law in Colonial Africa, London, James Currey, 1991, pp. 61-
84, p. 64. 
43 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, pp. 39 and 122. 
44 This school was a secular school created in 1900 ending. It was managed by the White Fathers and taught 
lessons of writing, reading and Swahili language. (Gamaliel Mbonimana et Emmanuel Ntezimana in 
Gurdun Honke et al., Au plus profond de l’Afrique. Le Rwanda et la colonisation allemande 1885-1919, 
Bonn, Peter Hammer Verlag, 1990, p. 134.) 
45 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 1 (54), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1927 ; Rapport sur 
l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1927, Bruxelles, 1928, p. 38. 
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clans were considered as more legitimate. Education was a second condition.46
 
 In this 
process, the Hutu and Twa found themselves progressively excluded from the positions 
of colonial auxiliaries. 
The Belgians believed that the new candidates, both young and educated by them, would 
be more docile and able to follow their policy. In this respect, the Nyanza School was 
considered as a “breeding-ground” of future chiefs having a “civilised mentality” and 
who would become “precious auxiliaries” of the colonial administration.47
 
 
By 1930, the Belgian colonial administration was satisfied about the work of the young 
chiefs and subchiefs who had replaced their fathers during the reform.48
 
 However, this 
administration was not satisfied by the performance of King Musinga, who was depicted 
by both the European rulers and the Roman Catholic Missionaries as resistant. In order to 
complete the replacement of old by young rulers even at the top of the kingdom, among 
other reasons, King Musinga was deposed and relegated to Kamembe in south-west of 
Rwanda in 1931. Rudahigwa replaced his father at the age of 20. He was born in 1911. 
Though the Germans left Rwanda with an administration very close to the precolonial 
one, it is the Belgians who attempted to operate a dramatic change of the power structure. 
However, they followed the principles that the Germans had initiated.49
                                                 
46 See Rapport sur l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1935, Bruxelles, 1936, p. 73. 
 This new 
structure bore the character of domination. Indeed, domination was seen in the fusion of 
political, legislative, executive, administrative and judicial powers in the hands of 
European holders of power and of Tutsi administrative officers from top down. The 
legislative power belonged to the Belgian Parliament, the King of Belgium and the 
General Governor of Belgian Congo, while the executive power belonged to the King of 
47 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 7 (53), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1926. 
48 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 6 (54), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1930. 
49 Jean Rumiya, Le Rwanda sous le régime du mandat belge (1916-1931), Paris, L’Harmattan, 1992, pp. 
162-163, 217 ; Pancrace Twagiramutara, “Ethnicity and Genocide in Rwanda”, in Okwudiba Nnoli, (ed.), 
Ethnic Conflict in Africa, Dakar, CODESRIA, 1998, pp. 105-130, p. 113; Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Le défi de 
l’ethnisme. Rwanda et Burundi : 1990-1996, Paris, Karthala, 1997, pp. 13-14 ; Marcel D’Hertefelt, “ ‘Le 
Ruanda en état de révolution.’ Stratification sociale et structure politique”, Revue Nouvelle, Tome XXXI, 
n° 5, 15 mai 1960, pp. 449-462, pp. 458-459. 
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Belgium who delegated it to the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi. As for the judicial 
apparatus, it progressively became a perfect instrument of colonial domination.50 At the 
national level, that is, from the Resident of Rwanda to the Territorial Administrators of 
Territories and to key technical positions, only Europeans occupied major positions, 
while the Tutsi auxiliaries held minor posts. Despite this, the colonial administration kept 
the name “indirect administration”, which means that “the Native customary authorities 
administer the country under the supervision and direction of the European administrative 
authorities.”51
 
  
Tutsi leaders from the King to the Subchief were appointed and deposed by Belgian 
authorities. In the nomination of chiefs and subchiefs, the King of Rwanda had a say, but 
the last decision belonged to the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi and the Resident of 
Rwanda.52  In the occupation of positions and in the everyday exercise of administrative 
and “developmental” work, the Chiefs and the Subchiefs were closely briefed and 
monitored by the Territorial Administrators. This monitoring was done through a number 
of repressive power instruments such as whipping, fines or destitution.53
 
  
After enumerating several duties of chiefs, Lemarchand shows that the latter were more 
instruments of colonial power than service deliverers for their constituencies:  
 
                                                 
50 Nations Unies, Conseil de Tutelle, Procès Verbaux Officiels, 4e session, supplément N°2, Mission de 
Visite des Nations Unies en Afrique orientale : Rapport sur le Ruanda-Urundi et documents y afférents, 
New York, Lake Success, 1 Septembre 1950, p. 6 ; Baudoin Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son 
effort de développement. Antécédents historiques et conquêtes de la révolution rwandaise, Bruxelles et 
Kigali, Ed. A. De Boeck et Ed. Rwandaises, 1972, pp. 123, 167 ; Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 54. 
51 Nations Unies, Conseil de Tutelle, Procès Verbaux Officiels, 4e session, supplément N°2, Mission de 
Visite des Nations Unies en Afrique orientale : Rapport sur le Ruanda-Urundi et documents y afférents, 
New York, Lake Success, 1 Septembre 1950, p. 6. 
52 Loi de 1925 and Territoire du Ruanda-Urundi, Service des A.I.M.O., Décret du 14 juillet 1952 sur 
l’organisation politique indigène suivi des mesures d’exécution et mis à jour au 31 août 1957, Archives 
Nationales, Doc. n° 1682. Note that the literature and the legal documents of the Belgian rule called the 
Burundi and Rwanda kings in the local language name of Mwami, used even in French texts. This may 
have been an attempt to stress the difference between the King of Belgium and the Kings of those 
colonized countries. 
53 See Jean-Népumuscène Nkurikiyimfura, “Cadres coutumiers et masses rurales du Rwanda au temps du 
protectorat allemand et du mandat belge 1894-1945”, in Les réactions africaines à la colonisation en 
Afrique Centrale, Actes du colloque international d’histoire, Kigali, 6-10 mai 1985, pp. 343-355, p. 352 ; 
Rumiya, Le Rwanda sous le régime du mandat, pp. 228 et 230. 
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In short, the whole system of sanctions and rewards devised by the administration 
was overwhelmingly weighted in favour of bureaucratic standards, so that 
whatever obligations of a traditional nature the chiefs owed to their people tended 
to be superseded by their obligations toward the administration. […] Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine a more rigorous and harassing surveillance than the one 
exercised by the Belgian authorities over the chiefs and the subchiefs. To ‘meet 
the needs of the system’, the chiefs were led to ask considerably more of their 
subjects than had been the case at any time before the advent of colonial rule.54
 
 
The critical position of chiefs and subchiefs made them more and more execrable, as 
colonial duties towards the Rwandan population were growing during the period of 
Mandate and of Tutelage. They are the ones who supervised activities such as the tax 
payment, the execution of compulsory works in agriculture and agricultural 
infrastructure, in road building and maintenance, in the building of churches, schools, 
health facilities, administrative building, and other infrastructures. They had the mandate 
to execute these activities. As a result, they used the instruments such as the beating 
(Ikiboko), the detention, and the fine in order to have any resistance suppressed. Just as 
they became with time docile to the Belgian authorities, they were asked to put the 
population under entire submission. Which to a certain degree they succeeded, for, 
resistance was attempted more in religious domains than in power and economic 
performance.55
 
 
In the colonial task, the Subchief and the Umumotsi appeared in the local landscape more 
than the Chief. The Belgian Territorial Administrator was even more absent, avoiding 
giving unpopular orders. He also faced a linguistic gap, as most Belgian authorities at the 
time did not know the local languages.56 Umumotsi was in charge of calling for 
summons, calling for “meetings”57
                                                 
54 René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, London, Pall Mall Press, 1970, p. 121.  
, collecting prestations (food or other objects) that the 
Subchief was charging from the population, calling the “Hommes Adultes et Valides” 
55 Ntezimana, “Les réactions rwandaises,” pp. 68-69. 
56 Rumiya, Le Rwanda sous le régime du mandat, p. 230 ; Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 74-75. 
57 Meetings of the population with colonial leaders were called “ iperu” in kinyarwanda language, which is 
a deformation of “appel” in French. It was considered by the population to be a kind of summon, because it 
was compulsory to attend it. 
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(able-bodied men58) to go to perform compulsory works, collecting tax, etc. The official 
name of Umumotsi was Ikirongozi (from Swahili: leader, supervisor). Umumotsi was a 
nickname given to them by the population; it comes from the verb “kumoka” (to bark). It 
was a way of describing allegorically the way those ibirongozi used their voices while 
transmitting orders coming from above. In short, they were messengers of the chief and 
subchief. 59 The Umumotsi was not paid, which means that he lived at the expense of the 
population. However, he and his nuclear family members were discharged from doing 
compulsory works and from paying prestations.60
 
 Generally, it appears that the more a 
colonial employee was close to the population the more detested he was.  
 
However, even if the Territorial Administrator was not seen in permanent contact with 
the colonized subjects with the same frequency as the subchief and the chief, he was the 
main leader who controlled the execution of colonial programmes on a regular basis and 
who reported to the Resident of Rwanda. He often visited the chiefdoms and 
subchiefdoms where he settled in temporary shelters for few days, and examined the 
political, economic and social situation that prevailed there. He was the agent through 
which the indirect feature of Belgian administration was transformed into a direct 
executive power.61
1.2.2. Colonial auxiliaries 
  
 
After circumscribing colonial power, its holders at different levels, and the debate as to 
whether this was a direct or indirect mode of rule, it is now necessary to turn to the 
instruments of that power. To begin with, the Chiefs, the Subchiefs and the Abamotsi 
seem to have been one of the channels on which colonial power relied at local level, and 
the King at national level. 
                                                 
58 Patricia Hayes, “The ‘Famine of the Dams.’ Gender, Labour & Politics in Colonial Ovamboland 1929-
1930”, in Patricia Hayes et al. (eds.), Namibia under South African Rule: Mobility & Containment 1915-
1946, Oxford, James Currey, 1998, pp. 117-146, p. 133.  
59 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 5 (53), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1924. 
60 See Wélars Kagambirwa, Les autorités rwandaises face aux pouvoirs européens à Nyanza (1900-1946), 
Mémoire de licence en Histoire, UNR-Butare, Juin 1979, pp. 109-110. 
61 Office de l’Information et des relations publiques pour le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi (éditeur), Le 
Ruanda-Urundi, rapport, Bruxelles, 1959, p. 95 ; Rumiya, Le Rwanda sous le régime du mandat, p. 227. 
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Concerning the docility of “customary authorities”, the United Nations Visit Mission of 
1948 wrote the following:  
 
…Belgium has utilized the Native authorities of Ruanda-Urundi, who are 
generally docile, because “she could not think of changing or abolishing a 
political organization which the masses had accepted and recognized. 
She has certainly succeeded in turning them into valuable and efficient agents, for 
according to the report:  
At the end of 1947 Ruanda had only 31 [European] members in the territorial 
service, and Urundi 33.  
The reason why so small a number of officials have been able to administer a 
Territory of about four million inhabitants is the responsibility laid on the 
customary authorities and the way they have shouldered it.62
 
 
 
This “docility”, though undisputed, is however relativised by a number of minor episodes 
regarding the behaviour of local leaders. For example, in 1940, the Administrator of the 
Nyanza Territory, also a royal capital, was complaining that “loyal collaboration” of 
notables had not yet been attained, and that they were not working with a spirit of 
emulation among them, that “everyone does the least possible” and that “their submission 
is just superficial”.63
                                                 
62 RABRU 1947 : 222 quoted in Nations Unies, Conseil de Tutelle, Procès Verbaux Officiels, 4e session, 
supplément N°2, Mission de Visite des Nations Unies en Afrique orientale : Rapport sur le Ruanda-Urundi 
et documents y afférents, New York, Lake Success, 1 Septembre 1950, p. 9. 
 We are in 1940, about twenty years after the start of the Belgian 
rule, and yet, doubt about total submission is still there. On the other hand, Astrida 
Territorial administrators complained several times about several chiefs and subchiefs not 
having a spirit of public commitment, and caring mostly about their personal interests in 
their everyday duties. Indeed, it is hard to believe how otherwise it could be, while 
working for an administration of a colonial occupation. Furthermore, before 1940, it is 
three or four Chiefs out of nine Chiefs of the Astrida Territory who were appreciated as 
performing well. It is only after 1940, when the Astrida Groupe Scolaire started to 
release Chief candidates who had completed a Secondary Degree education, that these 
were evaluated as more competent. Concerning the Subchiefs, up until the end of Belgian 
63 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 1(93), Résidence du Rwanda, Territoire de Nyanza, Rapport 
politique 1940. 
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colonial rule, those who got “very good” in their annual evaluation never exceeded the 
half for the whole Territory. This less bright evaluation of auxiliaries can be interpreted 
in many ways, either incompetence or lack of will in work, but it is possible to see in it an 
act of passive resistance, at least for some of them.  
 
It is worth noting that by 1940, most Tutsi authorities who had shown resistance either to 
the Belgian administration or to the Roman Catholic Church had been dismissed.64
 
 
Chiefs and Subchiefs understood then that in order to keep their positions, they owed 
allegiance to Belgian authorities and to the White Fathers. One of them, Chief Mutembe, 
who ruled Nyakare from 1934 to 1946, is said to have been a model Christian. One 
annual report described his “Christian faith and practices” in laudatory terms:   
Mutembe, chief of province [is] very well appreciated by the Administration and 
[is a] great friend of the king. Every year at the beginning of November he orders 
thirty masses for the deceased… He gives 50 francs for the propagation of faith, 
two big baskets of food for indigenous labour, 500 francs for the annual funds for 
the parish. He has a chapel at his home where, in reward for the beautiful road 
that he made for the mission, he asks for a priest to come and celebrate a mass in 
which he summons all his subchiefs, about 20, and the whole population of his 
hill. Since many years, he feeds and gives clothes to four young people who 
aspire to go to the seminary or to the postulate of Brothers. He is always at the 
Chiefs’ Inama (meeting) and does not allow any of his subchiefs to be absent 
from this meeting without reason.65
 
 
Secondly, the position of chief and subchief became well paying. Before 1944 the 
subchiefs and chiefs had no salary, but since then they had a good salary and several 
bonuses. So it was hard for them to resist and miss financial and material advantages. For 
that reason, they chose to obey unconditionally, which led their constituents to nickname 
them: “Ndiyo Bwana” (yes, Sir, in swahili) to colonial injunctions.66
                                                 
64 Ntezimana, “Les réactions rwandaises”, p. 85. 
 Rumiya describing 
65 Quoted in Jean Bosco Ntezihigo, Impact socio-politique et économique de la mission de Kansi sur 
MVEJURU 1910-1960, Mémoire de licence en Histoire, Université Nationale du Rwanda, Ruhengeri, Juin 
1990, p. 72. 
66 Jean Gualbert Rumiya, “La révolution socio-politique de 1959”, in François-Xavier, Bangamwabo et al., 
Les relations interethniques au Rwanda à la lumière de l’agression d’octobre 1990. Genèse, 
soubassements et perspectives, Ruhengeri, Editions Universitaires du Rwanda, 1991, pp. 139-183, p. 142 ; 
Rapport sur l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1954, Bruxelles, 1955, p. 33 ; 
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the position of Tutsi colonial authorities, wrote: “The Hutu cries bitterly his 
disadvantageous condition. The favoured Tutsi enjoys his absolutely favourable 
condition. He says that ‘Uhawe ararya – Si jye ni umuzungu…’ [The one who is given 
food, he eats - It’s not my fault, it’s the white’s…]”67 In other words, it is the one who 
gives food who is accountable, not the one who receives it. Or else, the one who eats is 
less accountable than the one who distributes food. In both cases, the ones who “did not 
eat”, that is, the Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa who are not in power, are forgotten. The 
chiefs and subchiefs were so afraid of losing these positions, for, as Newbury and 
Rumiya observe, they provided wealth and respect. 68
 
 
These two reasons, colonial compulsion and material gain, made the local leaders choose 
to keep their positions and obey colonial orders rather than resist and lose them. Thus, the 
degree of agency of these colonial auxiliaries needs to be put into this colonial power 
context. They did not choose to be docile, they were left with that option, and it is clear 
that their position was by far better than the ones of the colonized “subjects”; for, they 
were at least “citizens”69
1.2.3. ‘Customary’ Authorities in the studied region 
. This was, one may argue, the trap of indirect rule. It was a trap 
because, during the decolonization process, it is these colonial auxiliaries who unfairly 
paid the price of colonial exactions.  
 
The Gishamvu Commune was created in 1963 from a combination of former Shori and 
Kibingo Communes and Rwimbogo hill that were instituted in 1960 before the commune 
elections of that year.70
                                                                                                                                                 
Alexis Kagame, Un abrégé de l’histoire du Rwanda, de 1853 à 1972, Tome 2, Butare, Editions 
Universitaires du Rwanda, 1975, p. 204. 
 These two were located in Bashumba-Nyarare chiefdom and a 
67 Lettre de Gitera au Mwami Rudahigwa, du 15 avril 1958, in Rumiya, “La révolution socio-politique”, p. 
155.  
68 Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression. Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1988, pp. 141-142; Rumiya, Le Rwanda sous le régime du mandat, pp. 
161-162. 
69 It is an agency they got within a system that they did not initiate. In this regard, one can say that they 
were not “making their own history.” (Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 10.) It is worth noting that the 
chiefs and subchiefs who were citizens were the ones who had had access to colonial education. 
70 Annexe II, les limites des communes dans la Loi du 15 avril 1963 sur l’organisation territoriale de la 
République, Journal Officiel de la République Rwandaise, Année 2, N° 8, 15 Avril 1963, p. 192. 
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small subchiefdom made by Nyakibanda, Muboni, Kibu and Gikunzi hills was located in 
Nyaruguru chiefdom. The Kibayi Commune which was also created in 1963 was a 
combination of two distinct communes that existed since the commune elections of June-
September 1960, that is, Linda and Saga.71
 
 Linda and Saga were two distinct regions 
located in different chiefdoms during the colonial period. Linda was made by former 
subchiefdoms which were located in Mvejuru chiefdom, whereas Saga was a 
combination of former Runyinya, Saga, Kirarambogo subchiefdoms or hills located in 
Ndara and later in Buhanga-Ndara chiefdom. This means that Gishamvu and Kibayi were 
located more or less in four colonial chiefdoms which are Bashumba-Nyakare, 
Nyaruguru, Buhanga-Ndara and Mvejuru. These chiefdoms were situated in the Territory 
of Astrida that coincided approximately with the precolonial province of Bwanamukari, 
located in the extreme south of the Rwandan kingdom. 
A History of Bwanamukari region is recorded since the mid-18th century during the reign 
of Cyirima II Rujugira. Until the advent of colonial rule, the major source of this history 
is undoubtedly oral traditions. It is in this region that the Rwandan King chose to 
establish permanent military camps. The Nyakare, Nyaruguru, Ndara and Mvejuru, 
among others, were names of militias that were placed at the border with the then 
Burundi kingdom. They later gave their names to the regions they occupied.72
 
 
Court leaders who were sent to these regions came with their families and multiple 
clients. This suggests that this occupation came along with a new migration towards these 
regions. The father of Marie Thérèse Nyirabega is among these immigrants. She narrates 
that her father, Semugwegwe, son of Macumu, was from Gisaka. He was Tutsi, but when 
he arrived in Ndara, he took the ethnic identity of people he found there, that is Hutu. He 
was a client of chief Rwasamanzi son of Ntizimira. Later on he administered a hill and 
became judge until in 1947.73
                                                 
71 Annexe II, les limites des communes, p. 193. 
 
72 Alexis Kagame, Les milices du Rwanda précolonial, Bruxelles, ARSOM, 1963, pp. 57-58 for Nyakare; 
pp. 42-43 for Nyaruguru; pp. 72-73 for Indara; Philippe Leurquin, Le niveau de vie des populations rurales 
du Ruanda-Urundi, Louvain, Editions Nauwelaerts, 1960, p. 170; Ntezihigo, Impact socio-politique, p. 7. 
73 Interview with Marie Thérèse Nyirabega, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
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The region of Ndara got also a wave of immigrants coming from other parts of the 
country fleeing famines. Because the Buhanga-Ndara region was very fertile and was the 
food reserve for the southern part of the country, famines seem to have been easily 
controlled. So people flocked to this region during Kiramwaramwara famine (1907-
1908), Rumanurimbaba famine (1917-1918) during the First World War, and Ruzagayura 
famine (1943-1945) during the Second World War.74 According to Nyirandugu and 
Nyirabega, hungry people were always fleeing to their home (Ndara), and no Ndara 
individual had to flee because of hunger. They also give credit to Subchief Kagabo for 
having been able to fight against Ruzagayura famine.75
 
 This famine was caused by the 
irregularity of rain for about two years. This positive description of Ndara region as being 
wealthy is supported by several other sources. 
This region has been in contact and close relation with Burundi. Many exchanges of 
goods and services occurred between the people of the two kingdoms, including social 
relations. During the colonial period, people from Rwanda living near Akanyaru River 
(Buhanga-Ndara, Mvejuru) went to Burundi to sell their coffee and Burundians came in 
this region with the same motive. According to several colonial reports, Burundians used 
to come to cultivate in Rwanda, while both Burundians and Rwandans used to have 
matrimonial relations.  
 
How colonial rulers and the colonised population evaluated Tutsi auxiliaries 
 
As stated above, in the view of colonial rule, a good colonial administrative auxiliary was 
the one who followed scrupulously the rules of the Belgian colonial authority and of the 
Roman Catholic Church’s White Fathers. Essentially he was evaluated by these two 
powers. While the Belgian authority held the secular state power, the Church retained 
both the secular and spiritual powers, the latter also giving rise to the power of 
influencing and even changing religious features of Rwandan “culture”. Wellars 
                                                 
74 Wellars Kambanda, Evolution politique et économique du Buhanga-Ndara de 1892 à 1954, Mémoire de 
licence en Histoire, Université Nationale du Rwanda, Ruhengeri, Juin 1989, p. 20. 
75 Interview with Suzanne Nyirandugu and Marie Thérèse Nyirabega Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
46 
Kambanda enumerates a number of behavioural features that were needed for a Tutsi 
administrator to be judged as a good collaborator of Europeans: “…to be polite towards 
the whites, especially in public; to follow their injunctions in agricultural [and other 
economic] activities; to behave as a role model; to engage in conversation with whites in 
a pleasant and timid manner; to build a ‘European’ house and live in it à l’européenne, 
etc…”76 It is worth examining how certain Chiefs and Subchiefs in Bashumba-Nyakare, 
Nyaruguru, Buhanga-Ndara and Mvejuru were evaluated.77
 
 Indeed, this evaluation 
appears significantly in the colonial archives and in local narratives about colonialism 
either individually or collectively. 
1° In Bashumba-Nyakare 
 
Chief Mutembe Ildéphonse 
 
By the time Mutembe was appointed as chief, in 1934, he was only 24. Yet, he had 
started to help his father in the administration of Nyakare chiefdom before his formal 
appointment.78 The earlier reports about his beginning of activity describe him as having 
less authority than his father, but that he was promising as he had a good will.79 From 
then onward, his evaluations oscillated around “good” and “medium”. He even got a 
“Mediocre” once.80
 
 But he kept office for he was described as having good intentions 
towards the European Administration and the Church, although his performance was not 
enough as compared to what was expected from him.  
On the other hand, the interviewed people who said something about Mutembe are the 
ones who lived around Liba and Kibingo, where he resided. Their interventions are a 
mixture of a little appreciation and more frequently complaints about hard work 
                                                 
76 Kambanda, Evolution politique, p. 65. 
77 Appendix one offers a detailed list of chiefs and subchiefs from the 1920s up to the early 1960s and the 
time when they kept office. 
 
78 See for example Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 5 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire 
d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1932. 
79 For example Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapports annuels 1935 et 1937. 
80 Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapports annuels 1938-1943. 
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performed during the building of roads, during agricultural activities, the constraints 
about tax payment, and work at the chief’s house.81
 
  
Chief Elie Gitambaro: from 1946 to 1956 
 
Chief Gitambaro seems to have not been appreciated by the colonial administrators. His 
evaluation was “good” in 1947,82 it became “fairly good” in 1952.83
 
 In that year, this is 
what the Territorial Administrator had to report about him:  
[Chief Gitambaro] lacks absolutely energy, he does not answer to questions that 
are formulated and reminded to him several times. The whole work is done 
directly by the subchiefs, the chief being of complete nullity. At the end of the 
year, the Mwami [king] has made an investigation concerning this case and 
expressed his vivid unhappiness about him.84
 
 
Since 1946, when he was appointed as chief, Gitambaro’s personality was judged as less 
imposing, but he was retained to his position because he was still young and “very loyal” 
and “conscious” about his work.85
 
 So the administration hoped that he would improve. 
But until the end of his office, he had not gained the confidence of the colonial 
administration. The people interviewed did not say much about him, except mentioning 
that he was chief. The evaluation of Bashumba-Nyakare subchiefs were in average “fairly 
good” and “good.” One of them is Namahungu.  
Subchief Namahungu: 1936-1959 
 
From 1937 to 1957, Namahungu’s evaluations have ranged between “good,” “fairly 
good,” “medium,” and “mediocre.” That means that he never impressed colonial 
administrators. But he did not lose his office, because that evaluation was the average of 
almost all subchiefs in the country. Although the population considered that the subchiefs 
                                                 
81 Interview with Claude Ngirabega, Théodomir Munyarugamba, Evariste Kabano, Cassien Rwanyange, 
and Jean Berchmans Ntakaraba. 
82 Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1947, p. 30. 
83 Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1952, p. 31-31 bis. 
84 Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1952, p. 35-3. 
85 Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1947, p. 36/10. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
48 
harassed them too much, the Belgian administrators still considered their work to be less 
than their expectations, given especially their low education and the numerous duties that 
they were called upon to execute. Reports from the 1930s until late 1950s point to the 
inferiority of quality of subchiefs as compared to chiefs. 
 
As for the accounts of the population about Namahungu, these are balanced. A number of 
them suggest that Namahungu who administered Bitare, Mukuge, Gishamvu and 
Cyamutumba hills was very appreciated by the population. His son Anonymous 6 starts 
by narrating the career of his father, in relation to other leaders:   
 
I know and remember the history since 1960 and before. I was grown up and 
witnessed it, furthermore my father was a leader at the time. He was a subchief. 
His name was Namahungu. In the subchiedom of Bitare. Now it has become a 
cell. The chiefdom was Bashumba Nyakare. I even know all the people who have 
ruled there. […] My father started first as a commis [administrative employee or 
clerk] in 1932, 1933 he was umukarani, kind of secretary of the whites. They 
were the ones who have completed the school of Bwanakweri at Nyanza. 
Seemingly the king Rudahigwa and others have studied there also. It was the first 
school. They knew Swahili since it is that language that the whites used, the 
Belgians. Until 1934, but then he was an umukarani. He was nominated subchief 
in 1936. I used to see it even in books. He replaced a certain Nyanjwenge, when 
he came to administer Bitare.86
 
 
According to Batura Christophe, people liked Namahungu:  
 
The subchief was Namahungu, […] my father, Eulade Nzibaranga, was his 
ikirongozi. He was his boss. My father was administering Gashiru under 
Namahungu. […] Namahungu had studied, he was a good leader. But Namahungu 
had some opposition from some fellow Tutsi, such as Nyanjwenge from the 
Abaha lineage who wanted to replace him. The King Rudahigwa came to settle 
that case in Bitare. […] The population liked Namahungu.87
 
 
 
Indeed, Some Tutsi of Gashiru hill had accused subchief Namahungu that he had stolen a 
certain quantity of lime and had used it to whitewash his house. The king Rudahigwa 
                                                 
86 Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
87 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
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came to the home of subchief to settle that case; he realised that his house did not have 
lime. So he ruled in favour of him.88
 
 
Many interviewees of Gishamvu assert that Namahungu was a good leader. Others link 
him with colonial injustices, such as the confiscation of cattle and other properties.89 
However, during the “revolution” of 1959, when most Tutsi leaders were ousted and 
attacked, he did not flee outside the country. He fled a little bit inside the province, and 
after the violence, he was allowed by the new Hutu leaders to come back home and 
recuperate his property. The case of Namahungu is an exception, for, most Tutsi leaders 
fled, a number of them were killed, but he managed to keep a good relationship.90
 
 The 
case of Namahungu shows a person who kept the middle ground both on the side of the 
colonial administration and his constituents. It is hard to qualify him either as popular or 
unpopular.  
2° In Nyaruguru 
 
Subchief Gashagaza 
 
Gashagaza, who administered the hills of Nyakibanda, Muboni, Munanira and Gikunzi, is 
another subchief whose evaluations were below the average. He got most of the time 
“Medium” and “Bad.” Until 1952, he rarely reached the evaluations “good,” and “fairly 
good,” although towards the beginning of his office he was described as “a serious young 
man” or “who works with satisfaction.”91
 
 
But the accounts from the population are balanced. A negative depiction is found in the 
account of Joseph Rwandanga:  
 
                                                 
88 Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
89 For example interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
90 But as we shall see in chapter three, the relationship was not always smooth. 
91 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 5 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
annuel 1932. 
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Concerning the life of Gishamvu here, what I remember is about the mode of rule 
of that time [colonial time]. There were the ones we call the Tutsi. They are the 
ones who could rule. We were administered by the subchief Gashagaza son of 
Rugemampunzi. He lived here at Muboni. His chief was Kayihura. He ruled 
Nyaruguru. But my family lived at the border between Nyakare and Nyaruguru. 
[…] Truly speaking Gashagaza ruled with a kind of despotism. In order to affirm 
himself as a leader.92
 
 
According to Hakizamungu, however, subchief Gashagaza was on good terms with his 
subjects: 
 
He interacted with the population very well, because people did not use to run 
away from his ruling area and go elsewhere. Never. When a subchief was bad, 
people were fleeing him and go to seek allegiance to another subchief. Why? 
Because of Ibiboko, the colonial beating. Eight lashes everyday.93
 
 
These statements do not allow us to say whether Gashagaza was popular or not, though 
the expectation is that he would be popular since the colonial masters did not appreciate 
his performance. 
 
3° In Buhanga-Ndara 
 
 
Wilfred Bucyanayandi (or Bucyana) 
 
 
As mentioned above, Bucyanayandi was chief of Ndara from 1934 to 1941. He was the 
nephew of Rwasamanzi and cousin of King Rudahigwa. He had studied at the School of 
Nyanza. He was judged as intelligent and enterprising by Belgian reports, and was 
appreciated for having had a brick house before 1934 in Liba, Nyakare, when he was 
subchief there, and later on in Ndara when he became chief. He is allegedly the first to 
have brought a car in Ndara, and to have had a wife called “Madame,” who was wearing 
skirts like “white” ladies, and to have reared ducks, things that presented him as an 
“umusirimu” (“modernised” person).94
                                                 
92 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
 
93 Interview with Hakizamungu François-Xavier, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
94 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 6 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
politique 1933; Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 8 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, 
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Bucyanayandi is among the few chiefs appreciated by the Astrida Territory Administrator 
from 1935 until the end of his office in 1941. He is described as an “active auxiliary of 
the territorial administration,”95 as a chief who enjoys “a great authority” towards his 
constituents.96 His evaluations were almost always “Very Good.” The report of 1938 
applauds his efficiency in agricultural activities: “Buchyanayande [sic] has been able to 
produce a certain expansion to this region [Ndara] that is hard to govern given the 
presence of a considerable size of Burundian population. We record several progresses, 
notably in the domain of agriculture and tree planting.”97
 
 
The population that mostly talked about Bucyanayandi are the ones who live in 
Runyinya, which was also the capital area of the Ndara chiefdom and the place that the 
chief administered directly (i.e., inyarulembo). They are therefore the ones who 
witnessed on a regular basis his mode of rule. The “great authority” that the colonial 
reports mentioned is described in the mouth of colonized population as “harshness,” 
“violence,” “injustice.”  
 
He is said to have been very harsh towards the population when it came to enforcing 
colonial activities and punishing the ones who resisted, in such a way that he caused 
many people of Ndara to emigrate to Uganda.98
 
 Here is what my informant Marie 
Thérèse Nyirabega said about him:  
(Gashugi) had replaced Bucyanayandi son of Rwidegembya, when we were still 
young. Girls sang a song to insult him: ‘It is high time to hate Bucyana, for even 
the King hates him.’ Rudahigwa removed him and sent him to Gishari. […] He 
was replaced by…who found that Bucyana had destroyed the country: when 
people cultivate sweet potatoes, he gives them to his pigs.99
                                                                                                                                                 
Rapport annuel 1935 ; Interview with Marie Thérèse Nyirabega, Kibayi, 9 May 2007 and with Raymond 
Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
 
95 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 4 (57), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1937. 
96 Rapport sur l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1935, Bruxelles, 1936, p. 74. 
97 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 11 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
annuel 1938. 
98 Kambanda, Evolution politique, pp. 64-66. 
99 Interview with Marie Thérèse Nyirabega, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
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A more elaborate account depicting Bucyanayandi and his misunderstandings with the 
population of Ndara and with the king Rudahigwa comes from Gratien Rwigimba:  
 
Bucyana had been a bad administrator. He was taking over amasambu [individual 
agricultural tenures] of people. See, he confiscated the isambu [singular of 
amasambu] of the father of this person [Vénuste Sindabizera, my other 
informant], his name is Ruvuma. Then after some time, people turned behind his 
back and went to accuse him to the king; people are complex. Especially the Tutsi 
extended family called Abadahumbya. They went to tell the king: ‘Bucyana has 
confiscated all our cattle, yet he was brought here by Rwasamanzi his paternal 
uncle, although we did not like him.’[…] The king said: ‘I remember myself 
having sent Bucyana to do something for me and he disrespected me. Bucyana 
told me that the day I am enthroned as king, he will prefer to go out of the 
country. Now he is mistreating my people?’ Then he came. The king came. He 
had a car. He came secretly, but this news had spread [that he will come]. 
Bucyana had told us that our king will come to visit us. We put on our clothes and 
went to welcome him, but what clothes did we have then? It was impuzu [clothes 
made from umuvumu tree skins] and impu [clothes made from animal skins]. 
Modern clothes had come but they were not widespread all over the country. […] 
Then the king came, people danced for him, then he made a speech in French and 
told his interpreter Sendanyoye to translate in kinyarwanda, I know him very 
well… the king spoke French the way he speaks Kinyarwanda [i.e., 
fluently]…Then that interpreter told us ‘the king said this and this.’ The king said: 
‘I thank you my people, I visited you, but I will come back’. He went and then 
came back. […] Then people accused Bucyana about the faults he commits [like 
not paying them after they worked at the road construction], […] and beating 
women and men after asking them to remove lower clothes; they accused him 
about all that. […] People told us that the king called Bucyana and told his 
interpreter to beat him two slaps. People told us that he was beaten at 
Kabogobogo place.100
 
  
The following account comes from Suzanne Nyirandugu:  
 
The only one who worked very badly is Bucyana. We were cultivating sweet 
potatoes, cassava, beans but were not harvesting them. They were given to the 
Twa who were dancing for Bucyana. You get charged a basket of sorghum, you 
grind it, they get flour for pap, your goat or young bull gets taken, the Twa eat 
them with the pap. […] But those Twa are no longer around. We do not know 
where they disappeared, maybe they went with Bucyana, we never saw even their 
children. […] In fact, the bad person is Bucyana... He was meeting a woman with 
flour, then he puts his feet in it.101
                                                 
100 Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
 
101 Interview with Suzanne Nyirandugu, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
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These accounts enumerate the true or false or exaggerated reasons why the population 
disliked chief Bucyana, the conflict between him and the King, and the way that chiefs 
were also beaten. In the following part of his account, Rwigimba says that the king spoke 
in French because he was with the white Territorial Administrator called Corbusier and 
that he wanted him to understand the message.  “Then the day of removing Bucyana from 
office, the population and the leaders were gathering, the ladies sang the following song: 
‘We have a better king than the strangers. Our king has a very beautiful hair style called 
amasunzu. Rudahigwa was still having amasunzu.’”102 This song seems to have been a 
way of challenging the Territorial Administrator who was the only stranger there. It 
seems, together with the previous one “It is high time to hate Bucyana for even the king 
hates him,” also to have been the product of a campaign strategically orchestrated by the 
colonial administration and by the king in order to restore the authority of the latter. This 
is likely because one letter of the Resident of Ruanda suggested to the king Rudahigwa to 
spend some time in Astrida improving his authority towards the population and the Tutsi 
local auxiliaries to avoid it becoming tarnished by the behaviour of Bucyanayandi.103
 
 
 
The conflict between chief Bucyanayandi and the king Rudahigwa has been narrated in 
various versions. According to one version, “Bucyanayandi behaved as a small king of 
Ndara; he kept for himself the king’s allowances. Worse, he has been so insolent that he 
had given to his dogs the same names of the king and queen-mother, namely Rudahigwa 
and Kankazi.”104
 
 Another version, close to the previous, comes from Mr. Dessaint, the 
Belgian Delegate to the king Rudahigwa in Nyanza. It shows that Bucyanayandi had 
chosen to obey the Belgians, that is, the most powerful rulers, and to forget about the 
king:  
The investigation that I have undertaken brought me to the following conviction: 
This chief is very intelligent, hard worker, obtains remarkable results, but at the 
same time, he is civilized, very arrogant and he does not bear the authority of the 
                                                 
102 Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
103 J. Paradis, Résident du Ruanda, Lettre confidentielle à Monsieur le Délégué près le Mwami, à Nyanza, 
Objet: Chef de Province BUCYANAYANDI, Réf. N° 1719/P.I., Kigali, le 26 septembre 1941. 
104 Kambanda, Evolution politique, p. 67, note (1). 
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king. He ridicules the Mwami [king], his mother, and all the old traditions 
concerning the ibgami [royal court or monarchy]. This is inadmissible on the side 
of a chief, even of Europeans who work in the Territory. […] Bucyanayandi has 
tried to convince some other chiefs of the Territory to follow his example, that is, 
to execute scrupulously the orders of the Europeans, but to disregard the king.105
 
 
In his conclusion, this delegate suggested that Bucyanayandi be removed from office. 
Bucyanayandi, having sensed that his chances of winning the case against the King were 
little, he decided to resign in October 1941 and suggested to the Belgian authorities to 
send him to Burundi as a chief there. The Belgian administration refused that idea, since 
it could still jeopardize the relationship with the King of Ruanda and the Belgians. Yet 
that relation had taken about ten years to strengthen. Indeed, until 1941, the King 
Rudahigwa was well evaluated. Then Bucyanayandi asked to go in exile in Gishari, 
Congo. As the report of the Residency of Ruanda notes, “the rebel [Bucyanayandi], 
having fallen in his own trap, asked and obtained the permission to go in exile with his 
cattle in the lands of Gishari [in Congo].”106 As for three Subchiefs who were related to 
Bucyanayandi and who asked to go with him, that is, Rwasamanzi, Nkorota and Gakuba, 
the Belgian administration judged as prudent to refuse their resignation, and keep them in 
office and in Rwanda, since it could look like sedition.107
 
  
The Belgian authorities were so supportive of Bucyana that after his departure to Gishari, 
one year later, that is in 1942, they appointed him as chief of Rwandese immigrants to 
Gishari, Congo, in replacement of chief Bideri who was there before. The Gishari 
province accommodated Rwandans who were moved there in order to be used in 
agricultural plantations for European settlers’ benefit.108
 
 The population of Ndara 
interpreted this transfer as a punishment. 
                                                 
105 Dessaint, Le Délégué du Résident près le Mwami, Lettre à Monsieur le Résident du Ruanda-Urundi, 
Objet : Buchyanayandi, Réf. : N° 712/P.I., Nyanza, le 26 août 1941. 
106 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 5 (58), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1941. 
107 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 14 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
annuel 1941, p. 9. 
108 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 15 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
annuel 1942, p. 9. On the experience of Chief Bucyanayandi and Rwandan emigrants in Gishari, Congo, 
See Hakiza Rukatsi, L’intégration des immigrés du Rwanda: le cas des personnes originaires du Rwanda, 
Thèse de doctorat en Sciences Sociales, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Novembre 1988, pp. 71-172. 
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The episode of Bucyanayandi (called also Bucyana) confirms the assertion that when a 
chief was on good terms with the colonisers, he had by the same token to be unpopular to 
his constituents. It also shows how the colonial power used to settle misunderstandings 
between local leaders, this time between the King and a chief. Most of the time, the lower 
leader had to be sacrificed in favour of the higher. For example, when subchief Kagabo 
of Runyinya was in conflict with chief Gashugi who replaced Bucyanayandi, it is Kagabo 
who was transferred in Gisanze, Mvejuru. In most other cases, subchiefs were just 
dismissed in case of such conflicts with their superiors.  
 
Chief Justin Gashugi of Buhanga-Ndara (1941-1959) 
 
Justin Gashugi, son of Muyogoro, from a Nyiginya-Bashambo clan, made history in 
Buhanga-Ndara for having lasted a long time in this chiefdom. He was born in 1906 (or 
1910). After completing his primary education at the Save Missionary School, he was 
appointed as administrative clerk from 1924 to 1928. From 1928 to 1938 he was subchief 
in Rwamiko in Nyaruguru chiefdom, and in Mugombwa of Mvejuru chiefdom. Then in 
1938, he was appointed as chief of Buhanga until 1941 when he was again appointed to a 
higher position of chief of the two chiefdoms combined of Buhanga and Ndara.109
 
 This 
successful professional trajectory shows that he was ‘a man of whites,’ as they were then 
called. The Report of Astrida Territory in 1947 depicts his psychological behaviour in 
following terms:  
The chief Gashugi, calm, energetic, and full of bounce, is the chief who is 
convenient to the chiefdom of Buhanga-Ndara, country of savannah, of cattle, of 
immense size, and of a sedentary population. He knows very well the country, its 
morals and customs, and has a strong grip to make himself obeyed. With the 
disappearance of Kagabo, transferred to Mvejuru…one can hope that a good 
understanding will be realized between him and his subordinates.110
 
 
                                                 
109 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 11 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
annuel 1938 ; Belgique, Archives Africaines, RWA (8), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Fiche 
biographique de Gashugi Justin, Astrida, le 17 juin 1939 ; Kambanda, Evolution politique, p. 95. 
110 Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1947, p. 36/20. Kagabo was 
subchief of Runyinya in Ndara chiefdom and then subchief of Gisanze from 1946 to 1959. 
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Gashugi enjoyed higher evaluations in his office. For example, from 1950 to 1954, his 
average evaluation was about 80%.111 In several years, his evaluations were “very good”. 
In 1944 and 1945, he was considered as “the best element of the political cadre of 
Astrida.” for having among other reasons been able to fight against the Ruzagayura 
famine that had killed around 300,000 people in the whole country.112 Moreover, unlike 
Bucyanayandi, Gashugi maintained a good relationship with the king Rudahigwa. People 
say that he was a close friend of the king.113
 
 As a result of this double support, he gained 
the prestigious position of President of the Territorial Tribunal. 
Even the population of Buhanga-Ndara seems to have appreciated his mode of rule. He is 
said to have been a good leader who has forbidden beating, who has encouraged the 
reform of abolition of Ubuhake clientship (clientship based on cattle), and who had 
taught the population how to fight laziness.114 My interviewees who were contemporary 
to him did not say much about him, except mentioning him in passing. See for example 
this passage: “Gashugi received reports from subchiefs, that is he was chief. The ones 
who executed for him were Kagabo son of Rubibi here (Runyinya), and him was 
answerable to the whites, to the commissary, commissary is Mburamatari…”115
 
 The 
population tended to dwell on a chief or subchief who was either very unpopular or very 
well admired. The others were considered as routine leaders, hence they did not insist on 
them too much in their narratives. 
The case of Gashugi shows that it was possible to be well evaluated by the colonial 
administration and to keep a neutral image from below. But he owes this image to the 
colonial reforms of the 1950s, namely the abolition of Ubuhake clientship, of the 
whipping, etc. Leaders who were in office during this time of reform or who were 
                                                 
111 Kambanda, Evolution politique, p. 96. 
112 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 17 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
annuel 1944, p. 36/4 ; Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 2 (59), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport 
annuel 1945, p. 71. 
113 Kambanda, Evolution politique, pp. 96-97. 
114 Kambanda, Evolution politique, pp. 97-99. 
115 Interview with Marie Thérèse Nyirabega, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
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appointed at that time seem to have been less unpopular, as the harshness of colonial rule 
was progressively receding. 116
 
  
Subchief Médard Kagabo  
 
Subchief Médard Kagabo is among the few Subchiefs who enjoyed a higher evaluation 
by the Belgian colonial rule. He had for several years “good” and “very good.” He had 
worked in Bashumba before coming to Runyinya of Buhanga-Ndara. Here is one 
description of him in a colonial report by the time he was subchief of Muhambara hill in 
Bashumba in 1932: “Médard Kagabo, […] former pupil of Nyanza [school] […]. He is 
very active and very authoritarian.”117
 
 
Subchief Kagabo is reported to have been both harsh and competent. His harshness 
towards the population is not depicted as despotism, but as an effort to reach efficiency. 
According to Hakizimana, “… the population was afraid of Kagabo. When the Abamotsi 
were accusing someone to him, he was not doing an investigation at first, people say that 
instead he was putting someone down and beat him.”118
 
 The account of the old man 
Rwigimba is more detailed:   
Kagabo also beat people, especially those who refused to cultivate. But he is the 
one who fought against Ruzagayura [famine, from 1943 to 1945]. […] He fought 
against that famine, in such as way that no one was able to attack us and take over 
our food stocks. […] Kagabo fought against the famine, but he was beating us. 
Especially he was against the Tutsi who settled in a small area of Kibayi. He 
mistreated them […] because they were refusing to work. […] Kagabo, was a 
Tutsi but from a Hutu mother.119
 
  
The old lady Nyirabega becomes more explicit on this: 
 
                                                 
116 Interviews with former subchiefs Sehene Froduald, Sayinzoga Etienne and Mugengana Joseph, in 2000. 
On these reforms of the 1950s, see below. 
117 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 5 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
annuel 1932. 
118 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
119 Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
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The name reflects the person’s behaviour. Kagabo was a man. […] He went to 
seek a poison to kill wild animals, wild pigs which were destroying food from 
fields of people from that area of Mvejuru and Ndara. He went to Astrida, 
collected the poison from the Administrator, brought it to Kibayi and called his 
subordinates and population to participate in the hunting. Few days later, no pig 
came back to destroy food in the fields. The population was very happy about 
that. When they called the population with the sound of the horn, they thought 
they were going to be beaten, so they slept with fear. But it was just for trapping 
the pigs. Then Kagabo laughed, and the population laughed when they saw that 
all the wild animals were dead. […] The other thing Kagabo did, he sensitized the 
population to cultivate a lot, in such a way that they did not suffer the severity of 
the Ruzagayura famine. He brought new seeds of cassava, of beans, of sweet 
potatoes, which grew fast and gave a good harvest. As a result, people became 
rich.120
 
 
The use of poison to destroy wild animals in that Kanyaru forest that surrounded Ndara 
and a part of Mvejuru is confirmed by Wellars Kambanda. The population were using 
several methods of hunting to reduce these animals, but it is the poison given to the 
population by the colonial administration that proved effective in destroying those 
animals.121
 
 But the interviews on subsequent decades indicate that the population 
continued to hunt animals in that area, which means that the animals were not by then 
exterminated.  
The case of Kagabo is very interesting in that it shows that when a leader administered a 
rich and fertile area, he could be less unpopular, for people were not hungry. But it also 
unveils a powerful mention of colonial punishment, which surprisingly does not lead to 
the unpopularity of the one executing it. However, it is more accurate to say that this is an 
analysis made by informants in the present time, while thinking about the colonial time. 
For, most people of this region say that during the colonial time, life was good, because 
land, food and climate were more available and better than in the present time due to 
current demographic increase, progressive reduction of fertility and size of land and 
climate change. 
 
Subchief Kibwana 
                                                 
120 Interview with Marie Thérèse Nyirabega, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
121 Kambanda, Evolution politique, pp. 84-86.  
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Kibwana was subchief in Nyakare, and then in 1941 he was transferred to Mvejuru 
chiefdom. He came to administer Runyinya to replace Kagabo who was not on good 
terms with the Chief of Buhanga-Ndara, Gashugi. Like Namahungu from Bashumba-
Nyakare, Kibwana is another subchief who did not flee in 1959. He ruled Runyinya in 
Ndara from 1947 until 1959. His colonial evaluations are not very impressive, because 
they oscillated around “good.” The fact that he held office for a long time suggests that 
the Belgian administration’s interests were at least not threatened by his performance.  
 
On the other hand, all the very old interviewees of Runyinya said good things about him.  
Rwigimba had this to say: “Then Kibwana came and became Kibyeyi. We called him 
Kibyeyi, because he spoiled us, we lived very well with him. Kibyeyi means to be in 
good terms with everyone. He ruled us very well.”122
 
 
The case of Kibwana is complex, for, he is said to have satisfied both his masters and 
constituents. It is however hard to understand how he achieved this complicated outcome. 
 
Subchief Urayaha  
 
Subchief Urayaha was illiterate but started his career in 1932 in helping his father, 
Rusengamihigo, who was very old, on the position of subchief of Runyinya.123
 
 From 
1937 to 1948 when he ceased to work as subchief, his evaluation include “very good” 
“good” and “fairly good.” 
 
Urayaha was subchief of Saga, Muganza and Kirarambogo hills since 1942. He was 
subchief elsewhere since 1934. Here is what Wellars Kambanda wrote about him:  
 
                                                 
122 Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. Normally, Kibwana means a baby dog, whereas 
Kibyeyi comes from umubyeyi which means a parent, mostly a father, a mother. So, from an injurious 
name (“their dog”), they gave him a dignified name (“their father”). 
123 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 5 (64), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
annuel 1932. 
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Of all the subchiefs only one retains our attention. It is the subchief Urayaha. 
Though illiterate, Urayaha was able to keep his office from 1934 to 1948. He was 
appreciated by his superior employers and by his subjects. The testimony of … is 
eloquent: ‘Our subchief Urayaha was wise; he brutalized no one, but he wanted 
that every healthy person works. He was himself a hard worker; he preached by 
the example, for, sometimes he also took a hoe and showed us how we should 
cultivate. Everyone loved him and respected him. When the White arrived, he 
removed his hat and greeted him with respect as we were clapping hands for the 
White. Urayaha was the best friend of chief Gashugi who congratulated him and 
encouraged him in our presence.’124
 
  
Hakizimana Raymond, who was the first Hutu subchief of Magi, in Mvejuru following 
the “revolution” of November 1959, also corroborated this version: “Urayaha 
[administered] in Saga. Urayaha is said to have been a very good leader who was in good 
terms with the population. People were cultivating for each other, and shared 
together.”125
 
 
This case, together with the one of Kibwana, show us that certain Tutsi auxiliaries were 
less oppressive. In fact, as Lemarchand put it, the Belgian colonial system was in general 
tyrannical, but this does not mean that all chiefs were “tyrants.” However, given the 
nature and character of colonial rule in general, at the national level, those who were not 
tyrants were the exception.126
 
 
4° In Mvejuru 
 
 
Chief François Rusagara (1946-1959) 
 
 
Chief François Rusagara was also very appreciated by the colonial masters. He had 
completed his studies at the Astrida high school that produced chief and subchief 
candidates among other colonial auxiliaries. One report of Astrida Territory presented 
Rusagara as the best chief of the territory: “Rusagara collaborates with devotion to the 
                                                 
124 Kambanda, Evolution politique, p. 102. 
125 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
126 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 124. 
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building of indigene houses, to the creation of local roads, sport fields in order to 
surround the urban city with rural cities that are to be used to settle indigene workers of 
European economy. His tribunal is one of the best in the territory.”127 In 1952, his 
evaluation was “very good.”128 In 1956, he became Vice-President of the Territory 
Council, a prestigious post that shows the trust he had from the Territorial Administrator 
and the respectable position he enjoyed vis-à-vis other chiefs.129 In 1957, he got the top 
evaluation of “elite.”130
 
 
One report of the Territory of Astrida also dwelled on his psychology:  
 
The chief François Rusagara is doubtless the best element of the Territory of 
Astrida. Very balanced, enthusiastic of character, at the same time cheerful and 
thoughtful, Rusagara has been able to impose clearly his authority to all the 
notables of his chiefdom. With calm, punctuality, and firmness, he gives 
instructions, monitors the execution of his orders, and displays an intense activity 
on his hills, sacrificing himself, and moving without hesitation according to the 
needs to all directions of his province.131
 
 
Not much is said about him by my informants about how he related to his constituents, 
neither about his predecessors, probably because he lived far from areas where the 
interviews were conducted (Magi and Linda). 
 
As we have seen, these narratives on customary authorities highlighted the fact that chiefs 
and subchiefs in their multiple and varied personalities and performances, behaved 
differently vis-à-vis the subjects. They range from the harsher to the less harsh. But, a 
careful reading of the statements made on each authority mentioned above suggests that 
they above all describe them as enforcers of colonial compulsions. This is the picture that 
colonial rule left to them. This is how they are still remembered in local recollections.  
                                                 
127 Ntezihigo, Impact socio-politique, pp. 43-44. 
128 Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1952, p. 35-3. 
129 Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1952, p. 44. 
130 Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1957, p. 9 bis. 
131 Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1947, p. 36/7. 
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1.3. ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION 
 
During the colonial period, Rwanda has been exploited in several ways. The colonial 
power controlled the country’s resources, the population’s labour and assets. In this 
section, I mention only labour and things that Rwandans produced in favour of the 
colonial enterprise. These are the ones often mentioned in local narratives in Gishamvu 
and Kibayi. 
  
1.3.1. Labour 
 
Rwandans were required to produce cheap or free labour for the benefit of the colonizers, 
of the European settlers and of the colonial auxiliaries. Rwandans were also required to 
pay tax, and other contributions, in money or in kind. 
 
a) Work for the colonial programmes 
 
The arrival and installation of the Germans and first missionaries, towards the 1890s until 
the 1940s implied the extraction of labour such as the carrying of men, of luggage, and of 
construction materials (wood, bricks and stones) for the construction of the first colonial 
and church buildings. The porterage continued until when towards the 1940s lorries 
started to be widespread in the country. Other works included the making of bricks and 
the construction of those buildings. The abatware (chiefs) were required to provide the 
manpower for this labour.132
 
   
The advent of Belgian colonial rule brought about another set of works. First, since 1925, 
the Belgian administration enforced compulsory cultivation of cassava and sweet 
                                                 
132 Ntezimana, “Les réactions rwandaises”, pp. 61-94, p. 76 ; Jean Rumiya, “De la résistance à la 
soumission. Quelques exemples du comportement rwandais vis-à-vis de la corvée à l’époque allemande”, 
in Les réactions africaines à la colonisation en Afrique Centrale, Actes du colloque international d’histoire, 
Kigali, 6-10 mai 1985, pp. 465-478, p. 468 ; Interview with Suzanne Nyirandugu, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
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potatoes in order to fight against famines which had become endemic.133 Every peasant 
was required to cultivate 10 acres of cassava or potatoes depending on the suitability of 
regions. These 10 acres were to be added to his other fields.  Other crops included 
groundnuts, and cash crops such as coffee, tea and pyrethrum. In order to fight against 
erosion, a programme of reforestation was initiated and carried out along with 
compulsory crops. Those crops came to bear the name amashiku, (literally from 
gushikuza, i.e., to harvest in a hurry; it was a way of describing how this work was 
enforced arbitrarily) whereas the whole set of colonial compulsory works were called 
“Akazi” (i.e., work, from Swahili).134
 
  
There was also engineering work, the draining of marshes and the cultivation of marsh 
land. In Mvejuru, that work had started in July 1947 and 60 ha were cultivated in that 
year. 135
 
 
Concerning the building of roads, this started in the 1920s, but it was in 1929 that 
Belgians put a substantial budget towards this activity. It benefited also from the 
abundant manpower of Rwanda in this regard.  The road construction involved a number 
of people such as white engineers, chiefs for provision of manpower and supervisors. 
Their presence in the area of construction required the building of their accommodation 
and the provision of their subsistence food. All that came from the population living in 
the vicinity of the site of road construction. By 1934, Buhanga-Ndara was linked to 
Mvejuru by roads that had been built using local manpower.136 A number of people 
living near the road from Astrida to Kanyaru towards Burundi interviewed have also 
worked on that national road.137
                                                 
133 See Roger Botte, “Rwanda and Burundi, 1889-1930: Chronology of a Slow Assassination”, 
International Journal of African Historical Studies,[Part 1] 18, 1, 1985, pp. 53-91.  
 For example, Chief Sezikeye of Nyakare is remembered 
in colonial reports as the one who had helped a lot the Belgian administrator in providing 
134 Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son effort de développement, p. 130 ; Kambanda, Evolution 
politique, p. 83 ; Interview with Hakizamungu François-Xavier, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Nkurikiyimfura,  
“Cadres coutumiers”, pp. 352-353. 
135 Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1947, p. 36/7. 
136 Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son effort de développement, p. 126 ; Kambanda, Evolution 
politique, p. 88. 
137 For example Munyantore worked on this road. 
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the manpower for the construction of this road. After the completion of the roads, people 
who lived at less than 5 km from the road were obliged to maintain these roads by 
removing grasses and cleaning them. This work was performed for free until 1949, when 
teams of regular workers were put in place and were paid.138
 
 
Astrida benefited also from the building of a number of schools, a scientific centre and an 
aerodrome during the Second World War. The informant Segatashya recalls having 
worked both at the construction of the  aerodrome and of the Institute Saint Jean, in 
which children of Belgians were studying during the Second World War, and which 
became the National University of Rwanda in 1963. They were working for two weeks 
per month and then replaced, and after a break of two weeks they went back to do akazi 
again.139
 
 
While the economic importance of crops and infrastructure was undisputed, it was the 
form of execution of these works that was resented by the population. First, their normal 
hours of work underwent a dramatic change. Having been used to work without stress as 
Rumiya puts it, they were required to fulfil a number of hours that exceeded their 
ordinary daily workload. Secondly, the colonial system was not explaining to them before 
enforcing those works, so as to stimulate participation. Furthermore, a number of 
peasants were required to cultivate far from their homes, which made this activity 
unpractical.140 Again, it was a compulsory work, so sick people were not spared; there 
was no way of discussing with abamotsi and subchiefs about one’s availability. The white 
agronomist who seems to have been very unpopular and who remained in the memory of 
peasants in Astrida is Languy, nicknamed Kurimpuzu or Kurimpuzu Rusharaza.141
                                                 
138 Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son effort de développement, p. 171. 
 For 
139 Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son effort de développement, p. 127 and 172 ; Interview with 
Segatashya Gérard. 
140 Kagame, Un abrégé de l’histoire, p. 204. 
141 Rumiya, Le Rwanda sous le régime du mandat, p. 223 ; Interview with Marguerite Nyirabititaweho, 
Gishamvu, 19 April 2007 ; Interview with Anonymous 11, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007; Interview with 
François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
Kurimpuzu means “remove impuzu clothes”, so that the person gets beaten while half naked. 
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the roads, the complaints of the population were about not being paid, when a certain 
payment was promised. 142
 
 
It is all able-bodied men who were required to perform Akazi. People who refused to 
execute this work were severely punished. The chiefs and the subchiefs had the duty of 
monitoring the execution of all those public works. Sometimes, the Territory 
Administrator also checked those who did not work and instructed the chiefs to punish 
them. For instance, on 30 January 1947, Reisdorff, the then Territory Administrator of 
Astrida, wrote letters to two chiefs Gitambaro of Bashumba-Nyakare and Rusagara of 
Mvejuru, sending them a list of people who escaped from doing akazi and telling them to 
punish those people: “Below are the names of akazi workers who escaped doing akazi. 
Here are the instructions that I give you: […] Punish them because they disrespected, 
they refused to work…”143
 
 
However, there existed some exemptions. European settlers and Christian churches had 
applied for a special exemption from akazi of Rwandan people who worked for them. For 
example, between 1937 and 1943, Bishop Classe negotiated for his followers and 
workers [catechists, students, bakuru b’inama (heads of local church councils)] in order 
not to perform Akazi and Uburetwa (work for Tutsi authorities).144
                                                 
142 Rumiya (“La révolution socio-politique”, p. 146) indicates that in 1939 that payment was 0,50 franc per 
day, while the poll tax was 36,75 francs per annum.  
 My informant from 
Liba, Gishamvu, Gaston Nzabamwita says that his father Casimir Butare did not do 
Akazi, because he had been a client of priests, he had worked as messenger of priests at 
Kansi Mission at the time of Father Classe. The brother of Nzabamwita, Grégoire 
Kamugisha, became a priest.  He was a Seminary student during the Akazi time. So his 
father got a note allowing him not to do Akazi. Claude Ngirabega, my other informant, 
worked at the Seminary as well. As a result, he did not have to do Akazi. In March 1947, 
the Territory Administrator of Astrida wrote a letter to all chiefs informing them about 
143 Reisdorff, I., Administrateur Territorial d’Astrida, Lettre au Chef Gitambaro en Kinyarwanda, Astrida, 
le 30 janvier 1947, Archives Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida ; Reisdorff, I., 
Administrateur Territorial d’Astrida, Lettre au Chef Rusagara en Kinyarwanda, Astrida, le 30 janvier 1947, 
Archives Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida. 
144 Ian Linden, Christianisme et pouvoirs au Rwanda (1900-1990), Paris, Karthala, 1999, pp. 278-279. 
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measures to take in favour of people who worked for white settlers, Arabs145 and Indians: 
“I told you that the employees are not being absent, they are working in companies of 
Whites, Arabs and Indians for 20 days per month. They have been freed from agriculture 
works and from ubuletwa. Their wives also must not be required to perform any of these 
works, they must take care of their amasambu [fields].” 146
 
  
b) Works performed in favour of white colons 
 
Thousands of Rwandans were recruited to go and work in settlers’ companies in Rwanda 
and Congo. By 1939, workers going to work in MINETAIN (Mines d'Etain du Ruanda-
Urundi) were signing a contract and were given a health certificate before starting to 
work. They were also given some equipment that included uniforms. Those uniforms 
included tee-shirts or pullovers; hence people going to work there were called abapira 
(from imipira: tee-shirts or pullovers).147 In this regard, the “accoutrement” gave them an 
identity.148
 
 Unlike for akazi, people who worked for white settlers got paid:  
When I grew up after having the intelligence age, people who were going, were 
not fleeing abroad, they were going to MINETAIN, to wear uniforms (imipira) 
and to dig gold and tin mineral (cassitérite). When they complete a two, three 
year contract, they come back and join their wives and children. […] They got 
paid by those whites who took them. […] I did not have the age of going there at 
MINETAIN. They were taking strong and adult people.149
 
 
Workers started to be recruited and sent to Congo from 1925. They worked in agriculture 
and in mining companies. The transfer of those populations to Congo was not directed by 
                                                 
145 The identity “Arabs” included a diverse range of Arabic people who came from various regions that 
include Middle East, North Africa and East Africa. 
146 I. Reisdorff, Administrateur Territorial, Lettre à tous les Chefs, Astrida, le 4 mars 1947, en kinyarwanda, 
Archives Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida. 
147 Ministère des Colonies, Plan Décennal pour le développement économique et social du Ruanda-Urundi, 
Bruxelles, les Editions  de Visscher, 1951, p. 39 ; Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire 
d’Astrida, Rapports annuels 1939-1940, Archives nationales, Document n° 819 ; Interview with Evariste 
Kabano. 
148Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, 
2001, p. 32. 
149 Interview with Gaston Nzabamwita, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. See also interview with Hakizamungu 
who worked for a white person as carpenter, and Ntakaraba who worked for the Roman Catholic Church’s 
carpentry workshop. 
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the intention to solve the overpopulation of Rwanda. It was led by the need for manpower 
for the European settlers in Congo.150
 
 
When I asked a question about the work performed for European settlers, I got answers 
revolving around two words: abapira - the recruited people to mining companies, as 
mentioned above - and Lugaravu.  
 
Lugaravu was a Belgian dealer who was in charge of delivering meat that was consumed 
in mining companies in Rwanda and Congo since the 1930s until 1948. His true name is 
de Borchgrave. According to Nkurikiyimfura who attempted to reconstruct the activity of 
cattle selling, de Borchgrave got the monopoly of delivering meat from the government 
administration and used it to extort cattle owners. He used subchiefs to get the cattle 
delivered to him by force. Nkurikiyimfura indicates that at first the price for a cow was 
40,50 F and that it is de Borchgrave who had the right to fix the price. The cow purchased 
underwent branding on its ear in order to be recognized.151 According to Kagame and my 
informant Rwigimba, the peasants who delivered their cattle to the subchiefs received the 
ridiculous sum of 5 francs, which was, according to Rwigimba, not a price, but the value 
of the transport of that cow. The cow was then sold to the white companies' markets at a 
price reaching 5,000 francs.152
 
 This matter was so resented that in 1948 one petitioner 
complained about it to the United Nations Visiting Mission:  
Extermination of the cattle of Ruanda by the Belgians: The cow is in Ruanda what 
money is in Europe. It is the wealth of the Native of Ruanda. Thousands and 
thousands of cows were forcibly taken by M. De Bolgrave [sic] […], Count of 
Alténa, at a sum that could not even be called a price, which was only paid for the 
sake of appearances. How can a country be saved by abolishing its capital without 
replacing it by an equivalent?153
 
 
                                                 
150 Ministère des Colonies, Plan Décennal pour le développement économique et social du Ruanda-Urundi, 
Bruxelles, les Editions  de Visscher, 1951, p. 39 ; Rukatsi, L’intégration des immigrés, pp. 71-72, 77. 
151 Nkurikiyimfura,  Le gros bétail, 1994, pp. 177, 179, 210. 
152 Kagame, Un abrégé de l’histoire, p. 208. 
153 Anonymous Petition, dated 31 July 1948 (received at Kigali on 4 August 1948), in Nations Unies, 
Conseil de Tutelle, Procès Verbaux Officiels, 4e session, supplément N°2, Mission de Visite des Nations 
Unies en Afrique orientale : Rapport sur le Ruanda-Urundi et documents y afférents, New York, Lake 
Success, 1 Septembre 1950, p. 106. Italics in original. 
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Cattle businessmen from Nyaruguru and Ndara chiefdoms were progressively 
discouraged from purchasing and selling around the border with Burundi as de 
Borchgrave was collecting by force all the cattle of Astrida, and the administration was 
collecting other cattle for effort de guerre during the Second World War. Indeed, during 
the Second World War, the Belgian administration obliged the subchiefs to bring more 
cattle for the war effort.154 As a result, the sacrifice of the Rwandans who owned cattle 
became severe: « The Tutsi had already suffered a great deal before the war because of 
repetitive requisitioning of their cattle in order to supply meat and milk. Realizing that 
their herds were being decimated by sickness, a number of them committed suicide. […] 
During the war, the requisitioning of cattle enriched the Belgian intermediaries and 
impoverished the owners of cattle.” 155
 
  
To the question as to what else he recalls about the colonial period, Munyantore told me 
the experience of Lugaravu (de Borchgrave):  
 
There was a programme of burning cows on the cheek. It is whites who did that. 
Then every cow burned was sent to the white Lugaravu who lived at Muyogoro in 
Butare. Lugaravu took those cows and slaughtered them and sent meat at his 
home. Then some people in Congo sang a song saying that people should lament 
to Mutara the king that Lugaravu has finished the cattle, pretending to cure them 
from Malaria. Rudahigwa heard those lamentations and ruled that no other cow 
should go to be burnt.156
 
  
Indeed, king Rudahigwa became so angry about the extortion of de Borchgrave that he 
beat him one day at the market of Nyanza according to Nkurikiyimfura and Kagambirwa, 
and at Muyogoro, Gihindamuyaga, according to my informant Rwigimba. My informant 
Nyirabitaweho says the king expelled de Borchgrave. On the other hand, Kagame 
indicates that two among those who were extorting cattle got jailed but he did not 
mention their names.157
                                                 
154 Nkurikiyimfura, Le gros bétail, 1994, pp. 178, 180, 183. 
 This account leaves a number of questions. For example, how 
155 Linden, Christianisme et pouvoirs, p. 277. 
156 Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
157 Nkurikiyimfura, Le gros bétail, 1994, p. 177; Informateur dans Kagambirwa, Les autorités rwandaises, 
p. 125 ; Kagame, Un abrégé de l’histoire, p. 209; Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007; 
Interview with Marguerite Nyirabititaweho, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
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could the king be able to beat a white person given the power relations that prevailed 
during the colonial rule? 
 
c) Work for Chiefs and Subchiefs 
 
The work for the Tutsi auxiliaries was part of duties of the subjects towards their patrons 
in several clientship institutions that existed before, such as Ubuhake (guhakwa kw’inka 
and guhakwa kw’ubutaka and guhakwa k’ubutegetsi), Uburetwa and Ibikingi. But the 
colonial rule made Ubuhake and Uburetwa clientships more exploitative.  
 
Rumiya explains that before 1944 chiefs and subchiefs did not have a formal salary. In 
order to get some income, the Belgian administration obliged every Hutu person to 
provide labour for a number of days in favour of the chief and the subchiefs in return for 
land acquisition. This implied that those people became land clients of the chiefs and 
subchiefs.158 My informants refer to this type of labour as umubyizi w’ukwezi (a day of 
labour per month) for the subchief and umubyizi w’umwaka (a day of labour per year) for 
the chief per adult man.159
 
 This regulation increased the weight of the Uburetwa that 
existed since the 1880s; it obliged then only agricultural land clients’ lineages in the 
centre, south and eastern parts of the country to perform two days of labour per week for 
their patrons. During the Belgian period, this type of constraint was generalized for the 
whole territory of Rwanda and for single individuals. 
In 1939 the Uburetwa works were converted into payment in cash, but until the 1950s 
some people were still working for the Tutsi auxiliaries. Though the conversion had 
progressively reduced the number of people performing labour at the subchief and the 
chief, it did not ease life for them, for, as explains Ian Linden, those freed from Uburetwa 
were recuperated to perform Akazi as they gained more free time.160
 
  
                                                 
158 Rumiya, “La révolution socio-politique”, p. 142. 
159 Interview with Jean Berchmans Ntakaraba, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007 and others. 
160 Linden, Christianisme et pouvoirs, p. 245. 
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Ubuhake ties also became widespread as more people sought this type of clientship 
following the suppression of the army institution in the 1926-1931 reforms.161 In order to 
get protection against the new chiefs and subchiefs who had a fused executive and 
judiciary power, following the administrative colonial reform, people entered Ubuhake in 
greater numbers than before. They performed such works as to build the fences, to look 
after livestock, domestic work, etc. in return for a cow and especially for protection. They 
spent weeks, sometimes months at the shebuja (patron)’s home working. But, as some 
interviews suggest, some ubuhake clients to the chiefs and subchiefs obtained cows while 
others did not.162 In the contemporary language, guhaka – that is, to have someone as 
ubuhake client – became synonymous with to administer, to rule. This semantic shift was 
perhaps caused by the fact that almost all new chiefs and subchiefs following the 
administrative reform of 1926-1931 had ubuhake clients. For instance, a Tutsi leader who 
was popular was referred to as: “a kind ubuhake patron” (ahaka neza), and the contrary 
as “ahaka nabi” (he is a bad ubuhake patron) (bad leader).163
 
 
Finally, Nkurikiyimfura contends that the more people became workers to white men 
(settlers, church clergy or administrators), the more they became freed from ubuhake 
ties.164
 
 In the same vein, colonial reports of the Residency of Ruanda and of Astrida and 
Nyanza Territories that I consulted point out that the more Hutu and poor Tutsi people 
got money, the less they paid court to the high ranking Tutsi, that is, those who had 
power and wealth during the colonial period. 
According to Rumiya, chiefs and subchiefs started to forbid their populations to move 
freely from area to area because they needed to extract labour from them for their own 
benefit and for akazi. But my interviews suggest that some exceptions existed. Indeed, a 
number of people used to flee the harshness of one subchief and go to another hill 
                                                 
161 Kagame, Un abrégé de l’histoire.  
162 Interview with Anonymous 9, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007; Interview with Cassien Rwanyange, 
Gishamvu, 26 April 2007; Interview with Emérite Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with 
François Mukezamfura, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
163 Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007 and others. 
164 See Nkurikiyimfura, Le gros bétail, 1994, p. 214. 
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administered by another subchief, and then come back when that subchief was 
removed.165
 
 
The colonial rule did not just extort labour, it also seized material things from colonized 
subjects. 
1.3.2. Economic constraints 
 
a) Colonial Taxes 
 
The first thing the colonial rule collected from income’s people was tax. This was in 
multiple forms: poll tax, cattle tax and polygamy tax. During the 1920s, the amount of tax 
was very small, and increased significantly during and after the Second World War as 
Rwandans’ effort de guerre contribution.166
 
 
The year 1940 is very important because it coincides with the time of the Second World 
War. So the Belgian colonial administration was expected to deliver a great deal for its 
mother country. It is the time when the former King Musinga was totally removed from 
Rwanda, and taken to Moba, Congo, on 20 July.167
                                                 
165 Rumiya, “La révolution socio-politique”, p. 144; Interview with Léopold Muremangando, Gishamvu, 23 
April 2007;  Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
 It is the time when the Belgian 
colonial administration also checked for loyalism or lack of loyalism once again. 
Loyalism was calculated by what the population said in rumours, how leaders behaved 
towards the Belgians and how the population paid the war effort. The effort de guerre 
was estimated in cash to the amount of 65,000 francs paid by the population and the 
chiefs in Astrida in 1940; to 660,000 francs for the whole Rwanda in 1941, that is, 1.60 
franc per person as the report calculates. According to the Belgian administrators, this 
amount was paid willingly because Rwandese were saying they are giving it to their 
166 On the amounts, see Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son effort de développement, pp. 114, 158 ; 
Nkurikiyimfura, Le gros bétail , 1994, pp. 165-166 ; Nations Unies, Conseil de Tutelle, Procès Verbaux 
Officiels, 4e session, supplément N°2, Mission de Visite des Nations Unies en Afrique orientale : Rapport 
sur le Ruanda-Urundi et documents y afférents, New York, Lake Success, 1 Septembre 1950, pp. 34-35. 
167 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 3 (58), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1940, p. 64. 
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“parents.”168 In 1944, the Belgian administration was ready to recognize that the Tutsi 
and the Hutu populations were undergoing a general malaise about the suffering that the 
war effort has caused them materially and they started to complain openly about it.169 As 
Bézy wrote, the severity of Ruzagayura famine was located also in the context of the 
payments of the effort de guerre.170
 
 
The colonial administration was so interested in tax collection that subchiefs and chiefs 
put those who did not pay it in detention.171 The account of Munyarugamba indicates that 
extreme measures were sometimes taken to have the tax paid: “There was a family 
member of mine from Ndorwa. [He was in prison for not having paid tax.] Then he died 
in the prison. It was during the time of Mutembe [chief] [i.e., before 1946]. […] They 
asked my brothers to go and pay for him, otherwise they will beat the dead body. They 
put the dead body there. Then, my older brothers paid.”172 Also the evaluation of the 
performance of the Tutsi leaders and the proportion of their salary depended on their 
capacity to collect as much tax as the number of adult men who were in their area.173
 
 One 
understands then to what extent much endeavour was put into this activity. 
 
b) Things given to abamotsi, subchiefs, chiefs and Europeans 
 
Things in kind were also collected from the population. The most notable are agricultural 
and livestock products to be consumed by the Europeans – administrators or technicians, 
by the Tutsi administrators or technicians, the abamotsi and the catechists. Europeans 
who came to visit chiefdoms had accommodation during their travel. Black technicians 
on the other hand did not have such passage accommodation; hence, whenever they 
arrived, the chief had to move one inhabitant who had a decent house and accommodate 
the visitor. During their stay, they required food (beef, goat, mutton, chicken meat, eggs, 
                                                 
168 Résidence du Ruanda, Rapports annuels 1940-1941. 
169 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 1 (59), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1944, pp. 45-46. 
170 Fernand Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989 : Bilan socio-économique d'un régime, Louvain-la-Neuve, Institut 
d'Etudes du Développement, Janvier 1990, p. 7, note 1. 
171 Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
172 Interview with Théodomir Munyarugamba, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
173 See Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 120-121.  
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beans, peas, sorghum, etc.) and drinks (alcohol and milk) which were provided by the 
subchiefs. But it is mostly the abamotsi who collected these from the population’s fields 
and livestock and brought them to the upper level leaders.174 Nkurikiyimfura stresses 
cases of abuse and exploitation by colonial masters about the collections of cows to be 
milked for them. These spent some weeks up to a month with the white administrator. 
The subchief was obliged to collect these cows from the population and deliver them to 
the Belgian administrators. He was punished in case he failed to get milking cows to 
deliver.175 The same is repeated by Ngirabega: “When a white comes at Liba where 
Mutembe [chief] was living, they ask you a cow for umugogoro, that is, for providing 
milk. Your cow will spend there a month providing milk for the white, the chief or the 
subchief. […] You had to give a cow to the subchief so that you survive…”176
 
 
The abamotsi, because they were not paid, paid themselves through food and drink 
collections from the population as well. People who wanted to enjoy some peace had to 
befriend the abamotsi - and the subchiefs, when possible. In that case, they could be 
spared from doing akazi, uburetwa or from providing these things.177 These collections of 
things by and for abamotsi came to be considered as corruption. This “corruption” bore 
the names “bituga, bitugukwaha, and inyoroshyo.”178
 
  
The account of Batura Christophe concerning the work of his father as ikirongozi 
(umumotsi) explains how umumotsi was paid:  
 
My father, Eulade Nzibaranga, was an ikirongozi. The work of Ibirongozi was to 
check how the colonial work is being performed. Amashiku, forest planting, 
coffee planting. It was Akazi. [compulsory work] […] Their salary was drinks, in 
fact they were taking corruption. They survived from offers. It is the population 
that paid them. Their other advantage was to be welcomed in the power structure, 
                                                 
174 Kambanda, Evolution politique, p. 89-90 ; Ntezimana, “Les réactions rwandaises” , pp. 77-78 ; 
Interview with Evariste Kabano, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
175 Nkurikiyimfura, Le gros bétail, 1994, pp. 192-196. 
176 Interview with Claude Ngirabega, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
177 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
178 Interviews with Munyantore, Hakizamungu, Rwandanga, Batura, Munyarugamba. See also Gaspard 
Cyimana, “Plaidoyer pour le menu peuple au Rwanda-Burundi, article du 15 mars 1959”, dans Fidèle, 
Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, les dossiers du C.R.I.S.P., 1958-1960, Bruxelles, CRISP, 1961, 
pp. 55-68, p. 60. 
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to be known by the abajyanama [councillors]. Also them and their children were 
spared from doing akazi.179
 
 
c) Land 
 
Land is among the things that were contested during this time. First, the abolition of the 
Igikingi institution occurred during the time of the administrative reform of 1926-31. The 
Belgian administration ruled that ibikingi (grazing domains) be distributed by the 
subchiefs to the peasants as plots for agricultural purposes. While this redistribution 
weakened the owners of those ibikingi, it gave immense material powers to the new 
subchiefs following the administrative reform.  For example, some individuals from the 
south who were in conflict with the subchief could flee to other hills or to Burundi. Their 
lands were to be redistributed to people who paid allegiance to the subchief. In other 
areas, the subchief granted himself the right to drive the detested individual out of his 
land.180 According to Paternostre, certain chiefs and subchiefs who resisted this reform 
were removed from office and replaced by new ones.181 According to Rumiya, the new 
redistribution also undermined the communal lands which were also redistributed for 
individual property, because, when an individual was chased away, his land was not 
given back to his lineage but was controlled by the subchief’s administration. This new 
policy destroyed the “traditional” land system. Moreover, the subchief and other 
wealthier Tutsi kept the right to grazing lands for their cattle.182
 
 
Yet, in the 1930s, land was already becoming scarce because of the pressure of 
demographic growth. Ian Linden reports that some young Tutsi who had money 
attempted to buy land, but were forbidden, under the allegation that the land belonged to 
the king according to the customary law and that it could not be purchased. There was a 
                                                 
179 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
180 Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, p. 133; Catherine  André, “Rwandan Land : Access, 
Policy & Land Reform”, Working Paper by the Centre for Development Studies (Antwerp University), 
publication No. 29, December 1998, pp. 1-36, p. 3; Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007; 
Rumiya, “La révolution socio-politique”, p. 141; Sophie Ontzeele, Burundi 1972/Rwanda 1994 : L’  
“efficacité” dramatique d’une reconstruction idéologique du passé par la presse, Tome 1, Thèse de 
doctorat en Changement Social, Université des Sciences et Technologies de Lille, 2004, p. 72. 
181 Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son effort de développement, p. 130. 
182 Rumiya, Le Rwanda sous le régime du mandat, p. 225-226. 
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belief that this could undermine the authority of the king, the chiefs and the subchiefs.183
 
 
The report of the Astrida Territory of 1947 comes back to the land scarcity issue:  
One of the social problems that is being evident in Astrida Territory is the 
agrarian or land issue. Land for agriculture is lacking in this overpopulated 
country; the struggle to keep a plot of land has become fierce. The scarcity of 
available patches of land and the necessity of the young households to acquire a 
place to settle have opened the door to a great deal of speculations. The more 
clever people have realized the need to have more land, and despite the absence of 
individual land property in the old customary law, they get an argument to grant 
themselves the ownership of land that they cannot be able to occupy or exploit 
themselves but that they will rent with benefit to the ones who do not own land. 
[…] Everywhere in hills surrounding Astrida in a large radius, one can find 
indeed people who do not have land but who are just renting. Others have become 
purely and simply agricultural workers. […] Sometimes one witnesses a genuine 
constitution of a new serfdom contract based not on cattle but on land. […] Are 
we going to allow this new form of serfdom to replace the previous one?184
 
 
 
The colonial administration presents itself here as a helpless agent observing and being 
overwhelmed by a dramatic shift of which Rwandans are represented as the main and 
sole ‘active’ agents. Nowhere in this passage does it mention the colonial political 
economy and its role in this predicament.  
 
Hence, in Gishamvu and Kibayi, a number of people went to seek Ubuhake clientship to 
the subchiefs and the chiefs in order to receive land. This Ubuhake, as I was told by my 
informants in Kibayi commune, was not concerned about working for the patron and 
receiving a cow at last. It was about the client giving a cow to the patron who happened 
to be a political leader or an umumotsi or a councillor, when the councillors were 
established, and then the latter provides an isambu (individual agricultural tenure). But 
some new recipients of land were clients in the ordinary sense of Ubuhake. 
 
During the early 1950s, a number of people migrated to the hill of Shyombo in Kibayi to 
settle there. This hill was then a forest. Most of them acquired the permission to clear the 
                                                 
183 Linden, Christianisme et pouvoirs, p. 246, see also explanation on note 18 of this page ; see also Notules 
sur le Ruanda-Urundi, 1960, Archives Nationales, Doc. 8639, p. 10. 
184 Ruanda-Urundi, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1947, pp. 36/3-36/4. 
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forest and get a portion of land from subchiefs. The most mentioned is Ruzindana. This 
became a new wave of immigrants coming to settle in this area, following other 
immigrants who arrived during previous famine times. It is worth mentioning some of the 
experiences of my informants’ families.  
 
Ildéphonse Bisamaza was born in Baziro, Muganza in 1951, but his parents moved to 
Kibayi, Shyombo in 1953. His father went there to seek land, because his land in 
Muganza was small. Shyombo was then forest, as he explains; therefore, many people 
moved there around 1952-3, whereas Muganza was populated. “You had to do ubuhake, 
you apply for land, and then you clear the forest yourself. They had to do ubuhake to the 
bajurunga, those are abamotsi of that time, then these send them to the subchief. Then 
the latter tells the abamotsi to go to serve them.”185
 
 
As for the father of Vianney Uwimana, he was given land by subchief Ruzindana in 
1952: “My family arrived in this area around 1952, it came from Nyaruhengeri. When 
they came they took over the remaining amasambu [individual agricultural tenures].”186
 
 
The following explanation of Uwimana corroborates the point made in the report of 1947 
as quoted above: 
People we found here did not know the importance of land. The original people 
here [Hutu and Tutsi] arrived here around 1920, 1930. If you analyze the 
situation, you realize that they are the ones who do not have land now, because of 
their ignorance. They refused to offer a cow to the leader so that they could get 
land. In fact, they thought the land will always be available. […] We, we knew 
the importance of land, because you see there [where they come from] it is town, 
people from there travelled, arrived at Cyarwa and witnessed the way the people 
are overpopulated, then they projected that that situation will occur elsewhere. 
When my family arrived here, there were wild pigs which were destroying the 
plants of people. They killed them, and then food started to be available.187
 
 
So, Uwimana describes his father as a clever man, for having anticipated that land will be 
scarce and for having accumulated it through allegiance to the subchief. 
                                                 
185 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
186 Interview with Vianney Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
187 Interview with Vianney Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
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The grandfather of François Shirubute had been an ubuhake client of subchief Nyarwaya 
of Cyarwa (Mvejuru). “Papa got an isambu which was a forest; he did not go to apply for 
a land belonging to the Tutsi gone (in 1959). Because the one land he had was sufficient 
for him. He got it when Kibayi was still a forest. Many people who settle here are from 
Nyaruguru, Gikongoro, Gishamvu, Nyakare, who came here to take over forests. […] 
Even the grandfather I told you about got a forest to clear; he did not get an isambu of the 
Tutsi. Because during the time of the Bikoramucyi [leader], to get an isambu you had to 
struggle, to enter clientship relations in order to get it.”188
 
 
The father of Christophe Nyandwi arrived in Nyakazana, Shyombo in 1954, and his 
mother and children joined the father around 1956. Nyandwi came while a child. They 
came from Gishamvu.189
 
  
The family of Anonymous 17 arrived in Shyombo in 1950; it was originally from 
Kibirizi, where Anonymous 17 was born in 1948. “They came in 1950, they got an 
isambu, their home had been destroyed by the church, for, they were established where 
the Kibirizi church is located now.” According to this informant, Runyinya was occupied 
by the native people, Joma was half occupied before the 1950s, and Shyombo is occupied 
by new people.190
 
 
Ladislas Nyirisenge moved from Gikongoro to Saga in 1952. He was working for 
Ntamanyoma Bonaventure who was Tutsi, and builder of houses of the white man 
Campion at Ibis hotel. Nyirisenge was his umuhereza (assistant) and domestic cook. They 
also came at Musha to build the medical dispensary which is at Gisagara. He was his 
umugaragu (ubuhake client) as he calls himself. He got two cows from his chief, one as 
dowry and one for his household. He also got land from him. According to Nyirisenge, 
Ntamanyoma was brother-in-law of chief Gashugi of Buhanga-Ndara.191
 
 
                                                 
188 Interview with François Shirubute, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
189 Interview with Christophe Nyandwi, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
190 Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
191 Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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Finally, the parents of Ignace Gatabazi went in Congo before 1949, for Gatabazi was 
born there in that year. They came back to Rwanda in 1950. In stead of going home at 
Kibirizi, where land was small, they chose to go to Rwamiko, Ndara where the shebuja 
(ubuhake patron) of his father called Rwasamanzi rwa Ntizimira, had been a leader. His 
father went to seek ubuhake to the new Rwasamanzi rwa Gatunzi who gave him a bigger 
land. His father had gone to Congo, Masisi, to work there for white settlers. He had 
married his mother there, who was from Bwishaza.192
 
 
 
1.4. SOCIAL REPRESSION 
 
As we have mentioned above, the colonial rule chose to use the Tutsi as their auxiliaries. 
Since John Hanning Speke’s hamitic hypothesis, the Tutsi were presented as a special 
race, a conquering race, made of intelligent blacks, born to rule. The White Fathers relied 
on this assumption and chose to promote the Tutsi.193 They conceived and implemented a 
policy of ethnic differentiation through education. Since the first school of Nyanza, 
children of Tutsi aristocrats were to be privileged in terms of admission and quality of 
education. Wealthy Hutu who were able and willing to pay for school expenses for their 
children failed to get them admitted to this Nyanza School.194 According to Gamaliel 
Mbonimana, this Nyanza School did not have a discrimination policy during the time it 
started around 1902-1907 during the German rule, though the White Fathers wanted it to 
be a school of children of the chiefs who they thought were Tutsi. It is in 1919 that the 
Belgians opened in Nyanza a school that privileged the Tutsi children’s recruitment. This 
school operated until 1935.195
                                                 
192 Interview with Ignace Gatabazi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. Later on, during the genocide, Gatabazi was 
considered as an outsider as well, because from Kibirizi, hence his ethnic identity was in doubt. 
 Other schools were opened progressively in other 
provinces. 
193 See for example Claudine Vidal, Sociologie des passions (Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda), Paris, Karthala, 
1991, p. 25.  
194 Pierre Erny, L’école coloniale au Rwanda (1900-1962), Paris, L’Harmattan, 2001, pp. 101-102 ; 
Rumiya, Le Rwanda sous le régime du mandat, p. 160. On the elementary level of this colonial education 
and the role of white fathers in education, see Isidore Ndikumana, An Investigation of the Role played by 
Education in the Hutu- Tutsi relations in Rwanda, 1916-1959, Masters Mini-thesis, University of the 
Western Cape, December 2005, pp. 30-36. 
195 Gamaliel Mbonimana, Amwe mu matariki y'uburezi 1907-1954, Unpublished paper, without date, pp. 1-
2, p. 1. 
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Education functioned as a tool of racial, ethnic and gender differentiation. Whites were 
more privileged. Children from mixed couples of white and black were treated in the 
same status as the legitimate children of Tutsi chiefs. Both enjoyed a status higher than 
the one of Hutu children. Their selection criteria were softer than the ones for the Hutu 
children.196 Even after completing their respective education, the Tutsi stood more 
chance to get employed than the Hutu.  The latter could not compete for the same posts as 
the Tutsi.197 Women also had little chance to study. As Erny observes, the education of 
girls evolved very little.198 In fact, many parents did not understand the importance of 
educating their girls, since no leadership position could be provided to them after they 
complete their education. Hence, even when the authorities were sensitizing parents to 
send their daughters to school, few parents responded to this call. Many considered it a 
waste of time.199 When schools for girls and ladies were created, they taught skills for 
housewives of “évolués” (civilized) citizens, and women school teachers. Some few 
women benefited from this elementary education.200 As a result, men studied more than 
women, and children of Tutsi aristocrats studied more than the rest. However, this 
education discrimination was not practised in schools of Protestant Churches and in 
Roman Catholic Seminaries.201
 
 It is in these schools that some few Hutu intellectuals 
studied. 
The Belgian administration instrumentalised race and ethnicity in politics through the 
reform of 1926-31. As mentioned above, this reform excluded the Hutu and the Twa and 
kept Tutsi aristocrats in local leadership positions. Ethnicity was transferred to society as 
well. During the population census that occurred during the time of administrative 
reorganization in the early 1930s, the Adult Men got identity books that mentioned for 
                                                 
196 See Erny, L’école coloniale, pp. 108-109; Interview with Anonymous 2, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
197 Erny, L’école coloniale, p. 103. 
198 Erny, L’école coloniale, p. 105. 
199 Interview with Marie Thérèse Nyirabega, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
200 See Gertrude Tshilombo Bombo, “Existe-t-il un féminisme africain”, in Philipe Denis et Caroline 
Sappia (dir.), Femmes d’Afrique dans une société en mutation, Louvain-La-Neuve, Bruylant – Academia, 
2003, pp. 17-26, pp. 20-21. 
201 Gamaliel Mbonimana, Amwe mu matariki y'uburezi, p. 2. 
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the first time the identities of hutu, tutsi and twa.202 As Twagiramutara indicated, “[t]he 
feeling of ethnic belonging gradually eclipsed that of clanic identity as the main basis of 
reference in the identification of people.”203
 
 
 
Colonization did not solely affect the status and identity of subjects. It also reshaped and 
even disturbed the everyday social life. Colonized people were humiliated by the beatings 
administered. The existing division of labour within the nuclear and extended family 
underwent a dramatic change. The movement of people migrating to neighbouring 
countries caused social destabilization and family disintegration.  
 
The punishment of whipping (ikiboko) became an institution during the colonial period. 
The subchiefs and the abamotsi are the ones often cited as having implemented this 
corporal punishment. This is one of the reasons why they became so unpopular. Though 
their frequency of administering this punishment differed in time and according to the 
individual’s behaviour and acquaintance with the subjects, records show that until the 
early 1950s people were still beaten. A UN report of 1950 wrote: “…it may be deduced 
from the almost unanimous reaction of those questioned that whipping still survives and 
is commonly practised by chiefs and sub-chiefs, Native subordinates and even some 
European officials, especially in connection with agriculture and forced labour on 
roads.”204
 
    
Just as adult men were the ones who paid tax, who performed akazi, they were the ones 
who were punished when their duties were not carried out. As Mbembe wrote, 
colonisation, through its decentralized structures, did something to the body of the 
colonized.205
                                                 
202 African Union, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, Addis Ababa, IPEP/OAU, 2000, p. 13. 
 Rodney and Mamdani symbolized it as ‘one armed bandit’ and ‘clenched 
203 Pancrace Twagiramutara, “Ethnicity and Genocide in Rwanda”, in Okwudiba Nnoli, (ed.), Ethnic 
Conflict in Africa, Dakar, CODESRIA, 1998, pp. 105-130, p. 111. 
204 Nations Unies, Conseil de Tutelle, Procès Verbaux Officiels, 4e session, supplément N°2, Mission de 
Visite des Nations Unies en Afrique orientale : Rapport sur le Ruanda-Urundi et documents y afférents, 
New York, Lake Success, 1 Septembre 1950, p. 44.  
205 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, p. 28. On the beating see also Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 123-
124. 
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fist’.206 The people interviewed mentioned the atrocity of beating, while at the same time 
noting some nuances. For example, they said that women were not beaten. They also 
mention strategies used in order to escape this corporal punishment. These included 
running away to another hill administered by a different subchief, providing a gift to the 
umumotsi in order to befriend him, becoming a known client of the subchief and chief, 
etc. Those who could not afford these means had the option of resignation or exile to East 
Africa. The statistics indicate that most accepted the fate of resignation until when the 
beating was abolished.  A number of old people interviewed who were born in the early 
1930s, did not get beaten that much, but saw their parents beaten and going to Uganda 
into exile. But during the 1950s, the inhumane practices had softened; the beating was no 
longer practised by administrative leaders, it was transferred to tribunals. Some say it is 
the king Rudahigwa who abolished it, others that it is the Belgian administration.207
 
  
Exile also disintegrated the social life. People emigrated temporarily or permanently for 
many reasons. These include going into exile to work in order to get the money for 
paying tax, to seek land there for landless people, to get money for marriage for young 
men, to escape the whipping, akazi and uburetwa, etc. 208
 
 
Rwandans and Burundians who had settled in Buganda were about 30,000 in 1931, 
200,000 in 1948 and 500,000 (350,000 among these were Rwandans) in 1959. In 1959, 
around 35,000 Rwandans had settled in Tanganyika. These numbers included permanent 
and temporary migrations.209
                                                 
206 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, London and Dar-es-Salaam, Bogle-L’ouverture 
Publications and Tanzania Publishing House, 1972, p. 205 and Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 54. 
 Between 1935 and 1949, a total of 94,016 Rwandan 
207 See for example Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007;  Interview with Gérard 
Segatashya, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 11, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007; Interview 
with Marguérite Nyirabititaweho, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 
May 2007. 
208 See Leurquin, Le niveau de vie, p. 25. 
209 Jean-Pierre Chrétien cité dans André Guichaoua, Destins paysans, p. 32 ; David Newbury, “Returning 
Refugees: Four Historical Patterns of ‘Coming Home’ to Rwanda”, Society for Comparative Study of 
Society and History, 2005, pp. 252-285, p. 268. 
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workers went into exile in the Congo.210 This number reduced in the following years, for, 
about 54,896 went to Congo between 1949 and 1960.211
 
 
According to Wellars Kambanda, a number of persons from Buhanga-Ndara were 
influenced by the Belgian administration to go to Gishari, Congo, where agriculturalists 
were mostly encouraged to go there in order to work in European settlers’ farms. But a 
number of them came back to Rwanda after spending some time in Congo.212 Sometimes, 
those migrations were done by force, when they were the result of the Belgian project. 
Moreover, the Belgian administration promised to Rwandans who were willing to go to 
Congo some land property there.213 In 1937 about 20,000 Rwandans were sent to Gishari. 
They got about 37,000 ha of fertile land for agriculture. Ten years later they had reached 
the number of 25,000.214
 
 
 
But these voluntary as well as forced migrations did not significantly reduce the 
population size of Rwanda. The estimates of Guichaoua suggest that the density for 
Ruanda-Urundi was respectively 55 inhabitants per km2 in 1923 and 92 in 1960.215 In 
1957, Astrida Territory had 446,190 Rwandans under customary law (subjects) and the 
population density was 158.67 hab/km2. The density of the Rwandan population was then 
of 93.10 hab/km2.  The Mvejuru chiefdom already had the density of 300 inhabitants per 
km2 in 1954.216
 
  
Colonialism was also a androcentric institution. It excluded women. Tax, compulsory 
work (akazi) and work for the “customary” authorities (uburetwa) were fulfilled by men. 
This situation is said to have changed the way the Rwandan household’s division of 
                                                 
210 Ministère des Colonies, Plan Décennal pour le développement économique et social du Ruanda-Urundi, 
Bruxelles, les Editions  de Visscher, 1951, p. 39. 
211 Randal Baker, “Reorientation in Rwanda”, African Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 275, April. 1970, pp. 141-154, 
p. 146. 
212 Kambanda, Evolution politique, pp. 93, 107 et 108. 
213 Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, pp. 143-144; Rukatsi, L’intégration des immigrés, pp. 83-84. 
214 Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son effort de développement, p. 131 ; Linden, Christianisme et 
pouvoirs, p. 276. 
215 Guichaoua, Destins paysans, p. 40. 
216 Office de l’Information et des relations publiques pour le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi (éditeur), Le 
Ruanda-Urundi, rapport, Bruxelles, 1959, p. 34 ; Leurquin, Le niveau de vie, p. 170. 
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labour was shaped before. The increase of constraints (labour and things to provide) on 
men during the colonial period made women increasingly left alone in the provision of 
food and children’s education.217 When money was introduced into the colonial 
economy, it is again men who got in charge of it, since they are the ones who were 
cultivating cash crops, who were paying tax, who were receiving minor wages. Leurquin 
argues that it is at this crucial moment that men started to control the household’s budget 
as it was becoming increasingly dependent on cash, since new products – clothes, kitchen 
utensils, modern medicine, etc. – were being introduced in the market. 218
 
  
Women in their “social differences” – race, class, ethnicity, marital status, having 
children or not, age, generation, etc. – worked, struggled for a space and played an active 
role in the colonial rural and urban economy.219 But this marginalization of women made 
them one of the forgotten agents: “…both inside and beyond the ‘domestic sphere’ 
women’s actions carry political weight; they marshal considerable creative power. But 
‘their’ history was missed as newly gendered divisions of labour grew up in the later 
colonial economies that excluded women from the powerful roles of trader, cash cropper, 
and wage earner.”220 For example, any discussion or plan about the development of 
women during the 1950s was about their social associations, art craft, their role as 
housewives, and not about their political voice.221
 
 
But women were not the only forgotten ones, children’s role or suffering is also absent in 
the colonial history. Yet, sons used to help their fathers to perform colonial works and 
clientship labour.222
                                                 
217 See David L. Schoenbrun, “A Past Whose Time Has Come : Historical Context and History in Eastern 
Africa’s Great Lakes”, History and Theory, Vol. 32, No. 4, Beiheft 32: History Making in Africa, 
December 1993, pp. 32-56, p. 34. 
 My informant Rwandanga replaced his father at akazi works under 
the order of subchief Gashagaza. My other informant Cassien Rwanyange replaced his 
218 Leurquin, Le niveau de vie, pp. 251-252. 
219 Hayes, “The ‘Famine of the Dams’”, pp. 117-146 ; Odile Goerg, “Femmes et hommes dans les villes 
coloniales : l’illusion du déséquilibre permanent”,  in Denis et Sappia (dir.), Femmes d’Afrique, pp. 27-48. 
220 Schoenbrun, “A Past Whose Time Has Come,” p. 45. 
221 See for example Rapports sur l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant les années 1953, pp. 
147-149 ; 1954, pp. 191-194 ; 1955, pp. 160-164 ; 1956, pp. 176-181 ; 1957, pp. 190-193. 
222 Nkurikiyimfura, “Cadres coutumiers”, pp. 352-353.  
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father at chief Mutembe’s home for ubuhake clientship labour. Both were not yet adult 
when they were doing these forms of work. 
 
1.5. COLONIAL REFORMS OF THE 1950s 
 
Although colonial rule was characterized by so many regular territorial reforms, changes 
and adaptations of the “legal” frameworks, it can be said that only two major reforms 
have been registered: the administrative reorganisation of 1926-1931 and the political 
reforms that occurred after the Second World War, especially since the early 1950s. 
These later reforms of the 1950s intended to soften the repressive features of colonial 
rule, and to provide the opening of political space, but they failed to address major issues 
that colonial rule had created or exacerbated. In the view of Shillington, the colonial 
policy remained exploitative:  
 
Colonial governments were generally too intent upon ordering and instructing 
rather than consulting and supporting local African initiatives. With an eye to 
European’s needs, colonial postwar economic initiatives were still mainly 
concerned with developing Africa as an exporter of raw materials and an importer 
of manufactured goods. There was certainly no intention in the 1940s of 
developing African self-reliance in preparation for economic and political 
independence from Europe.223
 
 
 
Colonial reforms did not come as a will of the colonial government. They were dictated 
by the context of the moment: the end of the Second World War, populations asking for 
more freedom. Then, the colonial government responded by reforming a number of its 
earlier key policies, especially the ones challenged. As early as 1944 and 1945, colonial 
reports already pointed out the spirit on the side of the population, whether Hutu or Tutsi, 
of reclaiming their dignity, their freedom, an evolution that is said to have disoriented at 
                                                 
223 Kevin Shillington, History of Africa, Revised Edition, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1995, p. 373. In the 
same vein, Mudimbe (1988: 1) observes that “…colonialism and colonization basically mean organization, 
arrangement.” Italics in original. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
85 
first the “customary” authorities, who took it as a challenge against the existing power. 224
 
 
By 1948, that will was well formulated: 
In the political arena, the Rwandese aspires to not be given orders, to not be 
punished, constrained. He wants to be the master [of himself] to organize his 
work and above all his leisure time. In a word, he wants to be free, free to go, free 
to stay, free to cultivate at will, free from the whipping, free from sanctions, free 
from corvées, free from the morning summon, etc.225
 
 
 
The reforms of the 1950s were also the result of the new policy under which Rwanda was 
placed, namely the Tutelage system since 1946-1948. Belgium managed Rwanda and 
Burundi as Tutelage territories of the United Nations. The first UN visit mission asked 
the Belgian authority to open up the political space by allowing more and more 
Rwandans to take up positions of responsibility and to set up an administration based on 
councils rather than on individuals. Following this request, the decree of 14 July 1952 
was instituted. It announced the creation of councils of subchiefdoms, chiefdoms, 
territories and the Superior Council of the Country. Members of these respective councils 
were to be elected. In accordance with this decree, two elections took place, in 1953 and 
in 1956. Both elections kept the Tutsi as majority leaders from subchiefdoms to the 
Superior Council of the Country. Moreover, these councils were consultative; they had no 
power of decision. They did not also change the administrative structure into a service 
delivery one for the population. This structure remained a powerful tool for serving 
Belgian rule and protecting Belgian interests. Although councillors of subchiefs were 
functioning following their election of 1953 and 1956, the personality of the subchief 
remained the determining factor. Indeed the report of the Belgian administration of 
Ruanda-Urundi of 1956 notes that in certain territories the councillors behaved like the 
assistants of the subchief rather than as the representatives of the people.226
 
 
                                                 
224 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 1 (59), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1944, pp. 45-47 ; 
Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 2 (59), Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport annuel 1945, p. 50. 
225 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 4 (65), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
annuel 1948, p. 35/8. 
226 Ministère des Colonies, Rapport sur l’Administration Belge au Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1956, 
Bruxelles, 1957, pp. 29-30. 
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Another fact that shows that the 1950s epoch was not yet smooth is the continuation of 
migrations. The first phase of emigrations to Kivu had taken place from 1937 to 1945. 
The second major phase was from 1949 to 1956. The departures to East Africa also 
continued. This movement was encouraged by many reasons that included the weight of 
the tax which had increased significantly. 227
 
 
However, it can be said that the chiefs, subchiefs and abamotsi who administered after 
1945 were less harsh than the ones who worked before the time of colonial reforms 
initiated during the Tutelage period following the Second World War. Things were still 
far from satisfactory, but had improved. For example, it is during this period that ubuhake 
clientship, uburetwa works, the corporal punishment and the abamotsi position were 
abolished. 
 
As early as 1945, the king Rudahigwa and the Superior Council of the Country had 
proposed the abolition of ubuhake ties between the patrons (shebuja) and the clients 
(abagaragu). But the Belgians were reluctant to implement such a reform, fearing that it 
could lead to other implications.228 Following the request of king Rudahigwa, the 
abolition of ubuhake was finally implemented as part of the programmes undertaken in 
the Ten-year Plan of Socio-Economic Development (1951-1960) for Ruanda-Urundi.229
 
  
 
The measure to stop ubuhake was published by the king in April 1954. It was followed 
by another measure in 1956. Article 3 of the 1954 measure stipulated that the shebuja 
(patron) was obliged to divide cows with the heirs of the deceased mugaragu (client) if 
the umugaragu happened to have been dead by the time of division of cows. Article 4 
fixed the proportions to divide: the patron got 1/3 and the client 2/3.230
                                                 
227 See A. Habimana, Les migrations des Rwandais (1924-1998), Mémoire de licence en Histoire, UNR, 
Butare, 2004, p. 48 ; Pie Bimenyimana, Evolution du système économique au Rwanda 1900-1994, Mémoire 
de licence en Histoire, UNR, Butare, 1999, p. 62 et D. Mbonitegeka, La politique fiscale au Rwanda (1912-
1962), Mémoire de licence en Histoire, UNR, Butare, 2003, pp. 92 et 94. 
 Until 1958 the 
228 Jean-François Saucier, The Patron-Client Relationship in traditional and contemporary Southern 
Rwanda, Thesis, June 1974, p. 178. 
229 Rapport sur l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant les années 1945-1946, Bruxelles, 1948, 
p. 31 ; Nkurikiyimfura, Le gros bétail, 1994, pp. 252-259. 
230 Arrêté du Mwami du Ruanda n°1/54, 1 Avril 1954, suppression progressive de l’Ubuhake. 
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division of ubuhake cows between the shebuja and the bagaragu was still going on, for at 
that year, about 280,000 cows had been divided. 231
 
  Legally, the Ubuhake institution was 
definitively abolished on 21 May 1960. 
Saucier who has done research in the south of Rwanda on the evolution of ubuhake 
reports that clients welcomed this move with a vivid joy: “The reform was acclaimed in 
certain circles as the realization of ‘the most outstanding social progress’ ever 
accomplished since the beginning of the white rule.”232
 
 My research too confirmed this 
reaction. Here is one account:  
For those who claim to have put away the colonial rule, it is Rudahigwa who has 
started that process. […] He abolished ubuhake, where a person could spend 4 to 
6 years before he gets a heifer. […] Isn’t it the Tutsi who were ruling? They 
became unhappy. Can you be happy about someone removing milk from your 
mouth? They got angry. They started to say: ‘this time the king is no longer the 
king of the country, he has become the king of the Hutu.’ That’s where you get 
that proverb saying: ‘It is from the King’s decision that the Abatwa get 
promoted.’ ‘He becomes a king of the Hutu, he frees the abagaragu [clients] from 
us, how will I work for myself whereas I used to have someone to work for me?’ 
[…] On the other hand the lower classes like us who are helpless and survive 
from cultivating became happy, arguing that ‘there is no better King than this 
one.’233
 
 
Another account comes from Ntakaraba:  
 
In fact, among all those rulers, Rudahigwa is the one who did the good thing for 
us in Rwanda. […] My parents were abagaragu at Mutembe’s house. We shared 
the cattle in the abolition of ubuhake. […] We welcomed very well that reform. In 
fact, that was the beginning of democracy.234
 
 
Many more pointed to this move as a positive reform for them. Anonymous 6 says that 
his father, subchief Namahungu, left all the cattle to the clients and did not take any 
share. Munyarugamba corroborates this behaviour also: “There were some who were 
kind enough and gave the whole number of cattle to their bagaragu without allocating 
                                                 
231 Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son effort de développement, p. 184.  
232 Saucier, The Patron-Client Relationship, pp. 200-201. 
233 Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
234 Interview with Jean Berchmans Ntakaraba, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
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any to themselves.”235 One informant says that he got a cow from the patron of his father 
because his father had died by the time of the sharing of cattle.236
 
  
But this romanticised view is not generalised. Some others point out that certain clients 
hid the true number of cattle so that they could divide a small number of cattle and keep 
the hidden one.  For example, they reported the mature cows and hid calves that the 
patron did not know about before.237 Some people from Buhanga-Ndara had not reported 
the true number of their cattle; as a result, the census of cattle in Buhanga-Ndara for the 
year 1954 showed a smaller number of cattle than for 1953.238
 
  
All my informants who spoke about the abolition of ubuhake gave credit to king 
Rudahigwa.239
 
 They did not consider it to be part of the Belgian programme. They did 
not understand that without the approval of the colonial power, the king would not have 
been able to implement such a considerable reform regardless of his good intentions. 
Concerning the abolition of Uburetwa, since 1939, the Belgian administration had 
replaced the work due to the chiefs and subchiefs by a formal cash payment by the 
subjects. This measure was applied in 1939 mainly to people who earned money then. 
These included administration employees, as well as contract workers, catechists, and 
herders who owned more than ten cattle. Then this measure was applied to all taxpayers 
since 1945 and became obligatory since 1949.240 In 1957, the amount of replacement of 
work for the king was 3 francs per tax payer, it was 91 for the chief and the subchief.241
 
   
 
                                                 
235 Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Théodomir Munyarugamba, 
Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
236 Interview with Anonymous 9, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
237 Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
238 Kambanda, Evolution politique, p. 129. 
239 See for example Interview with Emérite Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Gérard 
Segatashya, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; 
Interview with Théodomir Munyarugamba, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
240 Ruanda-Urundi, Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapports annuels 1939-1940, Archives 
nationales, Document n° 819 ; Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son effort de développement, p. 121. 
241 Arrêté n° 27/56 du 19 décembre 1956, Contributions coutumières 1957. 
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But the available literature reports that people continued to work for the chiefs and 
subchiefs even after the measures to transform this work into cash payment had been 
published. This seems to have continued until the “revolution” of 1959.242 However, 
some of my informants point out that in the 1950s, the subchiefs and chiefs used to pay 
people who worked for them, suggesting that working for free was being progressively 
abolished.243
 
  
 
Concerning the reform of corporal punishment, the measure to remove the right to 
punishment from the colonial administrators was taken since 1948, probably after the 
remarks of the first UN mission to Rwanda.244 In order to have the population work, 
those refusing were reported by administrative leaders to the justice system. As a matter 
of fact, about 5,137 sentences were pronounced in 1950 in matters regarding colonial 
economic and agricultural production in Astrida.245 This is a lot if one considers that the 
Able-bodied men in that Territory were by then 62,900. This means that many people had 
started to refuse to work, thinking that compulsory labour was already abolished. The 
whipping continued in the 1950s, but it was enforced in the tribunals, not by 
administrative employees. For example, one letter from Ruanda informed the Governor 
of Ruanda-Urundi about the number of beatings inflicted on prisoners in 1951.246
 
 
According to a number of colonial reports in the 1950s, colonial auxiliaries did not adapt 
to these new reforms: The right to punish had been removed from them and transferred to 
local tribunals. As their authority and their evaluation depended on the use of that force in 
order to enforce the payment of tax, the agricultural corvées, most of them were unable to 
                                                 
242 See Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, p. 146; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p. 114; 
Gaspard Cyimana, “Plaidoyer pour le menu peuple au Rwanda-Burundi, article du 15 mars 1959”, dans 
Fidèle, Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, les dossiers du C.R.I.S.P., 1958-1960, Bruxelles, CRISP, 
1961, pp. 55-68, p. 59. 
243 Interview with Mélanie Nyiramariza, Kibayi, 10 May 2007; Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 
17 May 2007; Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Gaston 
Nzabamwita, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
244 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 4 (65), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
annuel 1948, p. 35/10. 
245 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 6 (65), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
annuel 1950, p. 35. 
246 Dessaint, M., Résident du Ruanda, Lettre à Mr. Le Gouverneur du Territoire du Ruanda-Urundi, Objet : 
Peines du fouet, Réf., N° 753/R.A., Kigali, le 20 février 1952. 
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enforce these works through collaboration and persuasion. Chiefs and subchiefs were no 
longer evaluated by their use of force but on the basis of their capacity to work in groups, 
to work in subchief and chiefdom councils, and therefore on the basis of their capacity to 
compromise. This dramatic shift became hard especially for those auxiliaries who were in 
office since long time ago. This explains in part the reason why the councils failed to 
become “democratic” forums in most subchiedoms and chiefdoms.247 It can be said that 
the suppression of ikiboko eroded the authority of subchiefs because the latter was 
previously depending on violence. But this was not authority as colonial reports have it. It 
was fear of sanctions. Once that fear is gone, so is also respect to leaders. Hannah Arendt 
was right: violence can create power, but for power to be sustained in the form of 
authority, it must not resort to violence. Several of my informants give the credit for the 
reform of corporal punishment to king Rudahigwa. They also confirm that towards the 
1950s local authorities were no longer beating their constituents.248
 
  
Another reform concerned the abolition of abamotsi position that occurred following the 
proposal of the Superior Council of the Country, in October 1956.249 The position was 
then abolished by 1957.250
 
 
All these reforms notwithstanding, the land issue persisted. Once Ubuhake was abolished, 
clients who then owned cattle needed grazing land. Most of them had been using 
pasturages of their patrons. Now that the clientship relationship was ended, they needed 
full ownership of pasture land and not the continuation of land clientship. Some went as 
                                                 
247 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 7 (61), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
annuel 1956, pp. A.I.- 9 bis – A.I.- 11 ter. 
248 Interview with Jean Berchmans Ntakaraba, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007; Interview with Claude Ngirabega, 
Gishamvu, 26 April 2007; Interview with Evariste Kabano, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007; Interview with 
Marguerite Nyirabititaweho, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 4, Gishamvu, 23 April 
2007. 
249 See Gamaliel Mbonimana, Ingingo zagize uruhare muri politiki y'u Rwanda kuva mu mwaka wa 1952 
kugeza 1962, Unpublished Paper, July 1998, pp. 1-11, p. 2. 
250 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 10 (65), Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport 
annuel 1958, pp. A.I. – 7 (1)– A.I. 7 bis. 
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far as to propose that the land be divided in the same proportion as the ubuhake cattle, 
namely 2/3 for the client and 1/3 for the owner of the land.251
 
  
As a result, they started to reclaim land from colonial authorities. A number of Tutsi land 
owners, fearing that their pasture land (ibikingi) could be taken away when land was 
already scarce, wrote a letter to the Superior Council of the Country, suggesting the 
alternative of giving to landless people the unoccupied land available in the country. They 
warned that should such sharing happen, it could lead to uprisings that would cause the 
killing or the emigration of owners of land and landless alike.252  The King also had 
doubts about sharing land.253 Unfortunately, this debate quickly became ethnic and 
dualistic between the Hutu, the vast majority of whom did not own land, and the Tutsi, 
that included some owners of large portions of land. It became a powerful tool of the 
Hutu intellectuals in 1957 who wrote “the Bahutu Manifesto,” to reclaim the end of the 
inequalities created by the colonial rule.254 Since then Hutu intellectuals continued to 
emphasize the land issue in newspapers and other organs of expression.255
 
 
The land issue is believed to have been one of stimulants of the “revolution” of 
November 1959. Hutu leaders were able to rally the support of a big majority of Hutu 
peasants who impatiently aspired to land redistribution following cattle redistribution.256 
As early as March 1959, the word “revolution” was already used by a Hutu 
intellectual.257
                                                 
251 Adriaenssens, cité dans Kambanda, Evolution politique, p. 4 ; Marcel D’Hertefelt, “Le Ruanda en état 
de révolution. Stratification sociale et structure politique”, Revue Nouvelle, Tome XXXI, n° 5, 15 mai 
1960, pp. 449-462, p. 460. 
 Hutu peasants became disappointed because of shortage of land for 
grazing. The few Hutu intellectuals on the other hand had been frustrated by the colonial 
252 “Deuxième écrit de Nyanza, au Mwami, Mutara Rudahigwa et aux Membres du Conseil Supérieur du 
Pays, lettre du 18 mai 1958, signé par Kayijuka et al.”, dans Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, pp. 
36-37, p. 36. 
253 Saucier, The Patron-Client Relationship, p. 201. 
254 “Le manisfeste des Bahutu”, dans Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, pp. 20-29, pp. 23, 25 ; 
Linden, Christianisme et pouvoirs, p. 329. 
255 See for example Aloys Munyangaju, “Aspects des problèmes importants au Rwanda-Burundi, le 30 
janvier 1959”, dans Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, pp. 51-54, pp. 52-53 ; See Kayibanda in 
Kinyamateka Church newspaper, etc. 
256 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 131-132; Notules sur le Ruanda-Urundi, 1960, Archives 
Nationales, Doc. 8639, p. 10 ; Linden, Christianisme et pouvoirs, p. 309. 
257 Cyimana, dans Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, p. 55, see also p. 67. 
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masters for not having acquired jobs equal to their education levels, jobs that were given 
to privileged Tutsi. It became a sort of solidarity created by the suffering. 
 
During this debate, the Belgian authority on the other hand did not take a major decision. 
It had entered into complicity with the Hutu intellectuals and in conflict against Tutsi 
auxiliaries since 1957, as we shall see in the following chapter. It waited until after the 
unrest of 1959 to pass the decree of 2 May 1960 that suspended former Tutsi political 
authorities from having access to ibikingi (grazing land) and to fallow lands of 
agricultural holdings. The decree of 11 July 1960 on the other hand recognized individual 
ownership of land through both customary and written laws.  Furthermore, the Edict of 28 
January 1961 that came into effect on 26 May 1961 abolished Ubukonde clientship that 
prevailed in the North-western part of the country.258 All these decrees were taken in 
favour of farmers who were in the majority of clients before.259
 
 Thus, the Belgians were 
able to put these land reform measures to the credit of Hutu “revolutionaries,” unlike the 
abolition of Ubuhake that had made the king Rudahigwa and some Tutsi chiefs famous. 
CONCLUSION 
 
From the point of view of the colonized, colonialism was what one can call a “bad 
policy”260. This policy was bad both at the top level of decision-making (high politics) 
and at the local level of experiencing it (deep politics).261
                                                 
258 André, “Rwandan Land”, p. 6 ; Notules sur le Ruanda-Urundi, 1960, Archives Nationales, Doc. 8639, p. 
10. 
 At the top level it was what 
Mamdani called “decentralized despotism,” that is, a kind of power where the colonial 
masters resorted to one segment of the colonized population in order to enforce their 
despotic rule. At local level, colonialism was also bad in that it created and perpetuated 
domination, exploitation and repression.  
259 André, “Rwandan Land”, p. 5. 
260 I use this expression in referring to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s concept of “bad history” which is said to be 
“dangerous”. (Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 97.) 
261 For “high politics” and “deep politics” concepts, see John Lonsdale, “Political accountability in African 
history”, in Patrick Chabal (ed.), Political Domination in Africa. Reflections on the Limits of Power, 
African Studies Series, 50, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 126-157, p. 138. 
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When the colonial reforms following the Second World War were addressed, and the 
decolonization process started (as we shall see in the next chapter), this is partly why the 
former colonial “customary” authorities immediately strove to get the power that the 
colonizers had. That is, to cease to be ‘assistants.’ In reclaiming autonomy, and then 
independence, it represented a classic example of the argument made by Frantz Fanon.262
 
 
On the other hand, the Hutu intellectuals, who had been excluded from power structures, 
acquired a forum to complain about their fate and ultimately addressed their grievances, 
using by way of argument, the inequalities that colonialism had created at all levels of 
society, but in “racial” or “ethnic” terms. At local level, these grievances were understood 
in terms of what had been lost or what was envied and what was therefore to recover, that 
is, freedom, recovery of labour rights, and scarce economic resources.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
262 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, New York, Grove Press, 1968. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE “REVOLUTION” OR THE DECOLONIZATION PROCESS 
 
More than any other development, the Rwandan genocide 
is testimony to both the poisoned colonial legacy and the 
nativist nationalist project that failed to transcend it.1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, I uncover the process that led to independence. I do so by looking at 
political developments as well as social relations. I try to reconstruct events at the 
national and at the local level. I show political choices and actions of different actors, 
Belgians and Rwandans, which were formulated in the programmes of political parties 
that were created in 1959 and the context of those multiple choices. I also try to 
reconstruct, as a reminder, the unfolding of the episodes of violence of November 1959, 
1960 and 1961 at the national as well as at the local levels, the election process, and the 
power shift from the Tutsi auxiliaries to the Hutu new leaders, a shift operated mainly by 
colonial rule. It is this process that has come to bear the name “revolution.” 
 
In addition to the uncovering of events, I show multiple debates and fractures among 
actors, whether political figures or ordinary Rwandans, and strive go beyond the colonial 
explanation of these events in binary terms – Europeans versus Africans, Hutu versus 
Tutsi, intellectuals versus peasants, etc. In this regard, I dwell on heterogeneities and 
contradictions. These are found either in the choices and actions of actors before, during, 
and in the aftermath of the 1959-1961 phases of violence and power or asset competition. 
They are also found even in the management of the effects of the “revolution.” As we 
shall see, these debates happen to be both semantic and social.  
 
                                                 
1 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, 
Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 38. 
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2.1. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE 1959 
 
Two opposite phenomena, one negative, the other positive, provided an intriguing 
background for the “revolution” of 1959: the colonial exactions and the small hope of 
positive change created by colonial reforms of the 1950s. The Belgian system of indirect 
rule and the reform of 1926-31 had fused the power of chiefs and subchief in the hands of 
a single person. This despotism favoured abuses of power.2 Colonial exploitation through 
the regular request of cheap or free labour, and the payment of prestations (in kind and in 
cash) by subjects were among things that the majority of Rwandans resented. From the 
mid-1950s onwards, it became easy for the Hutu intellectuals to rally the support of this 
majority of rural Rwandans against colonial power.3
 
  
But why did this happen in the mid-1950s and not before or after? This period was 
crucial in that it coincided with the time when the “Hutu-Tutsi problem” started to be 
addressed openly in the debates held in the Superior Council of the Country (Conseil 
Supérieur du Pays) meetings and also in several written documents emanating from 
different actors. This council had started its work in February 1954 following the 1953 
election of councils for the first time in the colonial period.4 The position of king 
Rudahigwa and of the majority of this Superior Council was that the “Hutu-Tutsi 
problem” was nonexistent and therefore irrelevant. In a meeting in June 1958 they 
negated the existence of this problem.5
                                                 
2 René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, London, Pall Mall Press, 1970, pp. 119-120. 
 However, the position of a number of Hutu 
intellectuals was that that problem was key to addressing the injustices that prevailed 
then. These two opposing views transpired in two official documents that were produced 
by each group in early 1957. The first, entitled “La mise au point” was written by the 
Superior Council of the Country and addressed to the Colonial Administration. It was 
submitted to the United Nations Visiting Mission on 22 February 1957. It reclaimed 
3 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 125-126 and Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression. 
Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960, New York, Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 181. 
4 See a rich chronology of this period in Gamaliel Mbonimana, “Ingingo zagize uruhare muri politiki y'u 
Rwanda kuva mu mwaka wa 1952 kugeza 1962”, Unpublished Paper, July 1998, pp. 1-11, pp. 2-8. 
5 Dans Fidèle Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, les dossiers du C.R.I.S.P., 1958-1960, Bruxelles, 
CRISP, 1961, p. 37. 
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mainly the grant of more autonomy, the increase of more power to indigenous Rwandans 
and the reduction of power exercised by Belgian authorities. An extract reads as follows:  
 
The implementation of indirect administration requires that two partners 
collaborate. […] Collaboration can exist only if the autochthonous government is 
efficient, well constituted and holding real responsibilities. If one admits that the 
current elite is not yet able to lead itself politically, because of lack of sufficient 
administrative ability, one must admit that small children learn to walk by 
standing up on their own feet. It is time to train the elite about the management of 
their own duties…6
 
  
A month later, on 24 March 1957, nine Hutu intellectuals signed a document entitled: 
“Note sur l'aspect social du problème racial indigène au Ruanda” (Note on the social 
aspect of the racial indigenous problem in Ruanda) that came to be called “the Hutu 
Manifesto.” This document instead addressed the issue of inequality between the Tutsi, 
understood as leaders, and the masses, understood as the majority Hutu. It also made a 
slight mention about the poor Tutsi but hastened to underscore that these have also 
benefited from the colonial administration.  
 
One other prominent document that addressed the issue of inequality in Hutu-Tutsi binary 
terms was “La lettre pastorale” of Bishop André Perraudin, who was appointed since 25 
March 1956.7 This letter was released in April 1959 and its content was very close to the 
Hutu Manifesto. It grosso modo presented inequality in Rwanda as the one between the 
Hutu and the Tutsi seen as two different races. It remained silent on the role and position 
of Europeans, and policies that had accentuated this inequality.8
                                                 
6 “Mise au point du CSP” in Chronique de Politique Etrangère, Décolonisation et Indépendance du 
Rwanda et du Burundi, volume XVI, numéros 4-6, Juillet-Décembre 1963, pp. 546-554, p. 548. 
 As Paul Rutayisire has 
argued, addressing the issue of inequality in a deeper way would mean calling into 
question holders of power and of colonial benefits who include the Belgian 
administrators and settlers, Church missionaries and Tutsi leaders from strong lineages. 
7 Mbonimana, “Ingingo”, p. 2. 
8 Mgr André Perraudin, Vicaire Apostolique de Kabgayi, Lettre Pastorale pour le carême de 1959, extraits. 
For a comment of this letter and the Hutu Manifesto, see Faustin Rutembesa, “Eglise catholique et société 
rwandaise ou la traversée des ambiguïtés”, in Faustin Rutembesa, et al. (dir.), Rwanda. L’Eglise catholique 
à l’épreuve du génocide, Greenfield Park (Canada), Les Editions Africana, 2000, pp. 15-41, p. 22. 
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So, in order to simplify this issue, they called it a binary ethnic or racial inequality.9
 
 This 
binary categorisation also remained silent on the fate of the third ethnic group in Rwanda, 
that is, the Twa.  
Indeed, the colonial administration effected a rupture by shifting from the choice of Tutsi 
auxiliaries to the one of Hutu counter-elite. This rupture came as a response to Tutsi 
authorities’ demands for more autonomy, demands that were addressed in the “Mise au 
point” document. The colonial administration responded to it by supporting the Hutu 
intellectuals and by defining the conflict as ethnic and not political or colonial.10 As Jean-
Pierre Chrétien wrote, “…the fracture of society was chosen on a line proposed by the 
colonial regime, and that line was ‘race.’”11
 
 From then on, the Hutu intellectuals had the 
Belgian administration as their ally and the Tutsi colonial auxiliaries chose the UN 
mission as the new force to resort to in their claims for autonomy and independence. But 
as the situation revealed later, political developments gave more chance to Hutu 
intellectuals than to Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs. 
This period preceding the “revolution” was also a period during which certain significant 
reforms were occurring. Between 1954 and 1956 the decrees to abolish the Ubuhake 
clientship were passed, and until the end of the 1950s clients and patrons were still 
dividing the cattle. This was also the time when whipping was progressively abolished. 
However, following the sharing of Ubuhake cattle, land did not get shared as desired by 
clients who happened to be new owners of cattle but not of grazing land (Ibikingi). The 
latter remained under the ownership of former Ubuhake patrons.12
                                                 
9 Paul Rutayisire, “L’Eglise catholique et la décolonisation ou les illusions d’une victoire”, in Faustin 
Rutembesa, et al. (dir.), Rwanda. L’Eglise catholique à l’épreuve du génocide, Greenfield Park (Canada), 
Les Editions Africana, 2000, pp. 42-74, p. 55. 
 This lingering issue of 
land for grazing formed one of the core arguments in the claims of Hutu intellectuals and 
10 In earlier times, the colonial archives had pointed out the existence of class. This category stressed 
clearly that the categories Tutsi and Hutu were not congregate ones. In 1945 and 1946, for example, some 
colonial reports showed that among the Tutsi, there were for instance leaders, rich cattle owners, small 
cattle owners, and poor cultivators. (Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 2 (94), Résidence du Ruanda, 
Territoire de Nyanza, Rapport annuel 1945, pp. 35-36 ; Belgique, Archives Africaines, RA/RU 2 (65), 
Résidence du Ruanda, Territoire d’Astrida, Rapport annuel 1946, pp. 34-36/1.) 
11 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Le défi de l’ethnisme. Rwanda et Burundi: 1990-1996, Paris, Karthala, 1997, p. 35. 
12 Those reforms are developed in chapter one. 
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intense debate in the political arena. Once again, just as colonial injustices strengthened 
the cause for change, the partial reform did this too. It ironically also became an 
ingredient for “revolution.” 
 
It is also during this period that in addition to elections of 1953 and 1956, several 
organisations and associations started to emerge and a number of these were transformed 
into political parties when a law allowed their creation in September 1959. The elections 
and the authorisation of parties can be considered a major political reform following the 
request of the United Nations Visit of 1948 to increasingly open the political sphere by 
including Rwandans in public affairs. Three tendencies emerged from these associations. 
Some belonged to Tutsi customary authorities, some to Hutu intellectuals and some to 
moderates who included Hutu as well as Tutsi intellectuals who were either customary 
authorities or colonial state or Church clerks. 
 
Jean-Paul Kimonyo has offered a seminal contribution by suggesting we go beyond the 
interpretation of the conflict as merely ethnic in binary terms. He noted various 
tendencies that divided the Tutsi leaders as far as these political developments were 
concerned: there were conservatives who were mostly old; progressive democrats who 
happened to be younger and close to the Belgian administration; and opportunists. He 
also showed to what extent by April 1959, King Rudahigwa started to initiate a strategy 
of approaching Hutu intellectuals in order to convince them to join his side. He was 
shifting from the earlier stand of considering them as merely subversive and divisive, and 
was apparently taking their claims seriously. He was attracting them in order to isolate 
more and more the Belgian administration.13
                                                 
13 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, Paris, Karthala, 2008, pp. 40-42. 
 The analysis of society and political 
affiliations made by Vansina in the aftermath of the death of King Rudahigwa also 
pointed out regroupings found in Kimonyo’s analysis: an amorphous mass, a faction of 
hardcore conservative Tutsi who had been excluded by the colonial regime, and who had 
become poor in the process, the “évolués” (both Tutsi and Hutu) who were prone to a 
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democratic regime, and who were moderate, and some Hutu organizations that were 
“anarchic.”14
 
 
This complexity is also found in the position taken by Tutsi students who were studying 
at Lovanium University (Congo). They took a different standpoint from the Tutsi 
members of the Superior Council. They acknowledged that inequality existed, but as 
social and not racial:  
 
We are the first to admit that there is a problem. A social problem indeed, but that 
is considered as racial by the [Belgian] Administration with some indigenous 
people. We say it is a social problem, because had it been racial, it would mean 
that all Hutu have been oppressed and all Tutsi have been their oppressors. Yet 
we realise that the great majority of Tutsi (99,9%) are part of the mass that do not 
enjoy any political, social, cultural… privileges, contrary to what some like to 
say. 
As for the few privileged ones [Tutsi from powerful families], they could not be 
able to enjoy political, social and cultural monopoly without the connivance of the 
[Colonial] Administration.15
 
 
 
As we shall see later at local level, those Tutsi colonial authorities who were not expelled 
following the violence of 1959 were the ones who either collaborated with new Hutu 
leaders or were not strong members of the monarchist party. This suggests that alliances 
between Rwandan elites transcended their ethnic identity.  
 
Lemarchand also showed the complexity that lay in the group of Hutu intellectuals, for 
neither were they a conglomerate or united group. There was the upper group of 
Gitarama region top intellectuals, those who had completed their studies in the Roman 
Catholic Great Seminary. There were other Hutu intellectuals based in the northern part 
of the country who had aspirations and hopes different from the ones from the Centre. 
                                                 
14 Jan Vansina, Institut pour la Recherche Scientifique en Afrique Centrale, Centre d’Astrida, Note sur la 
mort du Mwami Mutara et la nomination du Mwami Kigeri – L’acculturation politique rwanda, Astrida, le 
31 juillet 1959. 
15 “Lettre des étudiants Batutsi de Lovanium au Ministre du Congo Belge et du Rwanda-Burundi, 27 
novembre 1959”, dans Fidèle Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, pp. 107-108, p. 107. 
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But there were also small elites based in rural areas comprising teachers, catechists, 
workers who earned a salary, etc.16
 
 
And at the wider level of society, Tutsi intellectuals who were not united in their 
tendencies, had also lived a different experience from Tutsi peasants who happened to be 
the majority. The same applies to Hutu intellectuals (in their differences) who had not 
experienced colonial exactions to the same degree as Hutu peasants. These intra-group 
differences as well as inter-group alliances became patent during the formation of 
political parties.  
 
One major source of disagreement and heavy argument in intellectuals’ debates revolved 
around the privileges of some and a way for others to attain them. For example, after 
noting privileges of the Tutsi on power, based on their education and selection by the 
Belgian administration, Makuza suggested in May 1959 that the Hutu masses be urgently 
given education, as the only way to gain a wealthier position in society, and as a way to 
have their own elites in greater number in future.17 A year before, the ‘Comité de l’Etude 
de l’aspect social Muhutu-Mututsi’ had met several times to discuss the issue of 
inequality among the Hutu and the Tutsi. Hutu representatives claimed that the Hutu 
should be appointed at the levels of chiefs and subchiefs, and in judicial positions, 
because they were then very few in those positions. It was a discourse of demanding 
posts for intellectuals Hutu. Positions varied from extremists and moderate, both Hutu 
and Tutsi, but in general it was a matter of asking a share in the political arena.18
 
 
The law of 8 May 1959 authorised the creation of political parties; that ruling became 
effective on 15 June 1959. UNAR (Union Nationale Ruandaise) was the party to which 
King Kigeri V Ndahindurwa belonged. He had been enthroned following the 
‘mysterious’19
                                                 
16 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 102-103; 140-141. 
 death of King Mutara III Rudahigwa on 25 July 1959. Several members of 
17 See Anastase Makuza, Membre du Conseil Supérieur du Pays, Nécessité d’une formation accélérée des 
Elites Hutu, Kigali le 10/5/1959. 
18 Comité de l’étude de l’aspect social Muhutu-Mututsi, Rapport des séances tenues à Nyanza le 31/3/1958 
et les 1, 2 et 3 avril 1958. 
19 Up until now the cause of death of King Rudahigwa has not yet been ascertained.  
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the Superior Council of the Country, Chiefs and Subchiefs were also members of UNAR. 
It was officially recognised on 3 September 1959. Its president was Hutu, his name was 
François Rukeba. UNAR’s political aim was the gaining of autonomy in 1960 and 
independence in 1962, with democracy and constitutional monarchy.20
 
 
Another party was RADER (Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais). It included Tutsi 
and Hutu intellectuals, mostly clerks in the Belgian administration. These were opposed 
to UNAR. It was created on 14 September 1959. It declared its gratitude for the role of 
the colonial power and wished to get autonomy later in 1964 and independence only in 
1968. Like UNAR, it supported a regime of constitutional monarchy. Like 
PARMEHUTU, it was in favour of private property of land.21
 
 
PARMEHUTU (Parti du Mouvement pour l’Emancipation des Bahutu) regrouped 
Gitarama Hutu intellectuals who worked for the Roman Catholic Church and some for 
the Belgian Administration. It was created on 18 October 1959 but it was the 
continuation of the association “Mouvement Social Muhutu” that existed since 1957. 
PARMEHUTU claimed independence only after the “colonisation of blacks by blacks” 
would be abolished. Like UNAR, PARMEHUTU had its own formula of what it believed 
to be democracy. It rejected inequality in salary and chose private ownership of land.22
 
 
APROSOMA (Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse) was a party from the 
south of the country. Initially, it defined itself as the party of the masses, but in 1960 it 
radicalised its discourse around the definition of that mass as the Hutus. APROSOMA 
had become a party from the association bearing the same name that existed since 1 
November 1957. It was based at Save in Mvejuru chiefdom, which was also the home of 
its president, Joseph Habyarimana alias Gitera. It regrouped Hutu intellectuals from the 
                                                 
20 See “Charte de fondation du Parti ‘Unar’ ” (réunion du 15 août 1959), and “Manifeste du Parti politique 
‘Abashyirahamwe b’u Rwanda’ ” (Union Nationale Ruandaise) in Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, 
pp. 93-101. 
21 See “Manifeste du R.A.D.E.R.” in Fidèle, Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, pp. 127-132 ; 
Baudoin Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son effort de développement. Antécédents historiques et 
conquêtes de la révolution rwandaise, Bruxelles et Kigali, Ed. A. De Boeck et Ed. Rwandaises, 1972, p. 
212. 
22 See “Manifeste-Programme du Parmehutu” in Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, pp. 113-121. 
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south: Munyangaju, Nzeyimana, Gasingwa, etc. The party and its programme were 
unstable.23
 
  
All these parties were created between September and October 1959, with the exception 
of APROSOMA that was created slightly before. They all supported democracy but 
defined it differently. Immediately in September the party campaign meetings started. 
Violence during the early campaign arose between party members, and also conflict 
between UNAR leaders with the colonial administration. The Belgian administration 
refused to be called a “colonialist regime”24
 
 and went into overt opposition against 
UNAR which presented itself as a nationalist party. 
So the simplification around the binary divide of Hutu versus Tutsi was an intellectual 
product of the colonial archive. Here is where one realises that indirect rule was a trap. 
For the colonial regime came to be considered as the Tutsi regime. For example, Ian 
Linden writes that colonel Logiest, who was appointed as first Military Resident of 
Rwanda, during the violence of November 1959, and thereafter Special Civil Resident of 
Ruanda, “was convinced that the Tutsi regime was oppressive.”25 Guy Logiest in his 
memoir written in 1988 also talked about this period as the period of Tutsi rule: “The 
Tutsi, lords and masters of the country, could not tolerate any slight sign of resistance of 
the Hutu.”26
                                                 
23 See for example “Manifeste-Programme du parti Uhuru”, in Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, pp. 
258-261. 
 In other words, the monopoly of those handful of Tutsi in power came to be 
confused with all Tutsi, which was not the reality. This trap thus led to a generalisation 
which became indeed fatal for the Rwandan society as a whole. In this process, the 
Belgian administration was able to hide its leading role as the main agent. 
24 See Jean-Paul Harroy, Rwanda: De la féodalité à la démocratie, 1955-1962, Bruxelles, Hayez, 1984, pp. 
290-291, see also pp. 289-291. 
25 Ian Linden, Christianisme et pouvoirs au Rwanda (1900-1990), Paris, Karthala, 1999, p. 357. 
26 Guy Logiest, Mission au Rwanda. Un blanc dans la bagarre Tutsi-Hutu, Bruxelles, Didier Hatier, 1988, 
p. 23. 
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2.2. THE “REVOLUTION” 
 
The event or the process that came to bear the name “revolution” was in reality a series of 
jacqueries (i.e. uprisings provoking violence, peasant revolts), campaign meetings for 
parties, violence during those campaigns, killings, expulsions, burning of houses, looting 
of property, elections, and the establishment of a new political order. 
 
The violence heralding the jacquerie emerged from the immediate context of 
confrontations between parties. On the 1 November 1959, a rumour spread that one Hutu 
subchief from Ndiza in the Central part of the country, Dominique Mbonyumutwa, had 
been killed by the youth of UNAR. In fact, he had been attacked by these youths. The 
following day, violence started there. On the 3rd of November, The chief of Ndiza, 
Haguma was attacked and his coffee and banana plants were partly destroyed. He fled. 
However, on the following day, one subchief in Marangara, Ruhinguka and his son, 
Mututsi, were killed. Another three former authorities, two subchiefs and one judge, were 
also murdered. Then violence spread: houses of the Tutsi were burnt in several parts of 
the country. According to Logiest, who became later the first Military Resident to 
Rwanda and then Civil Special Resident of Rwanda on 3 December 1959, wrote that the 
burning of Tutsi houses by Hutu fighters was a message of expulsion. On the 5th 
November, the Vice-Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, Jean-Paul Harroy, and the Resident of 
Ruanda, Preud’homme, met with the president of PARMEHUTU party, Grégoire 
Kayibanda in Gitarama, and thereafter went to Nyanza to meet the King Kigeri 
Rutarindwa with a delegation of the UNAR party. That meeting was not however 
productive, for the violence continued. On the evening of the 7th November, UNAR 
members started to defend themselves, in attacking APROSOMA fighters. The military 
intervention of the Belgian administration came only on 8 November. On that day, a mob 
in Bufundu identifying itself as monarchist fatally attacked a certain Polepole Mukwiye 
from APROSOMA party. The following day saw the spread of violence in Bufundu, 
Marangara and Kibuye regions where 50 APROSOMA members were killed and houses 
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burnt. On the 10th November, violence occurred in Kisenyi in the North where the 
Territorial Administrator shot and wounded six people. In Musambira, more than 10 
people were killed by the Gendarmerie. From the centre, violence had spread principally 
in the North. According to Hubert, a Belgian who had investigated these incidents, on the 
4 and 5th November violence was extended to the whole of Gitarama, reaching Ruhengeri 
and Kisenyi on the 6th November, and Biumba and Kibuye on the 7th. Finally, on 9 and 
10 November the territories of Nyanza and Kigali were drawn in. But the incidences of 
setting fire by Hutu did not reach Astrida, Shangugu and Kibungu. This violence came to 
an end on 12 November 1959.27
 
  
While it could be ascertained that this violence was characterised by the attack on 
monarchists, counter-attacks by the monarchists, the deaths and casualties resulting from 
these attacks, with the burning of mostly monarchists’ houses in order to expel them, it 
became hard to establish the numbers of deaths and casualties. While Belgian authorities 
pointed out that this “revolution” was not a bloody one, various authors rejected statistics 
given by the officials. The UN mission recorded more than 200 people killed.28
 
 
But the agency in violence was also debated. According to a Belgian official, General 
Janssens, it was the Tutsi and the Twa who were main perpetrators, the Hutu being 
depicted as main victims. Alexis Kagame rejected this assertion and proved its 
impossibility, basing his evidence on the census numbers of those respective groups: the 
first groups being about 16% and the latter the remaining 84%.29 The same author 
concluded that this confrontation was at its initial phase more between political parties 
than ethnic groups.30
                                                 
27 On these chronicles, see Nkundabagenzi (éd.), Rwanda politique, pp. 141-157; Jean.-R. Hubert, La 
Toussaint rwandaise et sa répression, Bruxelles, ARSOM, 1965, pp. 31-32 ; Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, 
pp. 39-40, 45-46; Antoine Mugesera, Imibereho y’abatutsi kuri Repubulika ya mbere n’iya kabiri (1959-
1990), Kigali, Les Editions Rwandaises, 2004, p. 39. 
 According to the Hutu leader Anastase Makuza, who based his 
argument on the “ethnic census” as well, had the Hutu had an order to kill the Tutsi, it 
would be easy to defeat them, since, according to him, Tutsi were only 14% against 85% 
28 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 167. 
29 Alexis Kagame, Un abrégé de l’histoire du Rwanda, de 1853 à 1972, Tome 2, Butare, Editions 
Universitaires du Rwanda, 1975, p. 272. 
30 Kagame, Un abrégé de l’histoire, p. 276. 
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of the Hutu mass.31
 
 It is worth noting that the monarchists’ counter-attacks or self-
defence actually started on 7 November, but was stopped by Belgian military 
intervention. 
Socially speaking, the November uprising became indeed complex, in that it did not 
always respect the ethnic divide in a ‘primordial’ sense. The attack against the monarchist 
UNAR party saw Hutu, Tutsi and Twa monarchists attacked indiscriminately. 
Furthermore, some Tutsi went to fight on the side of PARMEHUTU members, just as 
some Hutu were fighting on the side of UNAR and RADER.32 Again, not all people got 
involved in the violence. And not all targeted group individuals got attacked.33 According 
to Claudine Vidal, it was mostly educated people who were more involved in the 
jacquerie than rural people. However, Antoine Mugesera contends that those who were 
active were mostly few in number.34
 
 
Just after the jacquerie, Hutu parties realised that they had gained from the dispersal of 
prominent UNAR party members that included a number of Chiefs and Subchiefs. Then 
they progressively radicalised their discourse along the Hutu-Tutsi divide. For example, 
Kayibanda, the president of PARMEHUTU, asked for the UN to divide the Rwandan 
territory in two: a hutuland and a tutsiland. In a note written on 24 November 1959, the 
President of RADER, Prosper Bwanakweri, explained his disapproval of this suggestion, 
which he deemed “anti-democratic” and “racist.”35 However, the separation between 
those two parties occurred only in July 1960.36
 
Following the jacquerie of November 1959 and the death, exile or jailing of some Tutsi 
chiefs and subchiefs, the Resident of Ruanda Logiest took the opportunity to replace a 
 
                                                 
31 Anastase Makuza, Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice, Révolution antiraciale au Rwanda, Kigali, le 
10 juin 1963, p. 25. 
32 See Antoine Mugesera, “Une approche analytique et critique”, Dialogue, Spécial, No 137, Novembre-
Décembre 1989, pp. 144-168, p. 158. 
33 Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 43. 
34 Mugesera, “Une approche”,  p. 158. 
35 Note du Rader remise à M. le Ministre du Congo Belge Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi, rédigée le 
24/11/1959, in Sixbert Musangamfura, Le parti M.D.R. PARMEHUTU : Information et propagande, 1959-
1969, Mémoire de licence en Histoire, Université Nationale du Rwanda, Ruhengeri, 1987, p. 182. 
36 Musangamfura, Le parti M.D.R. PARMEHUTU, p. 183. 
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number of Tutsi customary authorities with Hutu leaders. He asked the Territorial 
Administrators to do this.37 According to him, these replacements gave to the Hutu 
people the hope that change was occurring.38 The report of the Trusteeship Council of 
1960 noted that on 1 November 1959, at the beginning of the jacquerie, all chiefs in 
Rwanda were Tutsi but that on 1 March 1960 there were about 22 Hutu chiefs and 22 
Tutsi chiefs. As for subchiefs, on 1 November 1959 there were 549 Tutsi subchiefs and 
only 10 Hutu subchiefs. On 1 March 1960, there were about 217 Tutsi subchiefs and 297 
Hutu subchiefs, the majority of whom were newly appointed.39
 
 
The colonial authorities also made some institutional changes. It abolished the Superior 
Council of the Country and replaced it with a new structure called Provisional Special 
Council which was created on 6 February 1960. This new Council was made of eight 
members who emanated from four major parties: PARMEHUTU, UNAR, APROSOMA, 
and RADER. Each party had two members.40
 
  
On 10 November 1959, the Belgian administration issued “the Government Declaration” 
that articulated a new policy towards Ruanda-Urundi. In this respect, the colonial 
administration decided to organise Commune elections in Rwanda in June 1960. Debates 
about dates arose. But once the principle was agreed between the UN and Belgium, 
political parties started to do campaign meetings preparing for these elections. 
 
It is mostly during the campaign for Commune elections, in mid-1960, that political 
discourse in ethnic terms spread in the public sphere. First, PARMEHUTU operated an 
ideological shift by declaring itself republican against monarchy. To emphasize that shift, 
it adopted the new name of MDR-PARMEHUTU on 8 May. By the same token it ceased 
to use the title of king, mwami, to address the King of Rwanda. It chose the term “sultan” 
to describe the king. It is also during that time that PARMEHUTU, acknowledging the 
                                                 
37 Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, p. 59.  
38 Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, p. 107. 
39 Nations Unies, Conseil de Tutelle, Rapport sur le Ruanda-Urundi et résolution y afférente du Conseil de 
Tutelle, 26ème session (14 avril-30 juin 1960) supplément n°3, New York, 1960, p. 32. 
40 Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son effort de développement, p. 221, and Logiest, Mission au 
Rwanda, p. 127. 
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support of the Belgian administration, equated the Tutsi with colonialists and argued that 
Tutsi colonialism was worse than Belgian colonialism, for, “it had lasted several 
centuries.” It even openly thanked the Belgian administration:  
 
The second type of colonialism in Ruanda is the European tutelage. This has been 
judged by the people as surely more preferable than the feudal colonialism, 
absolutist, tyrannical, and sanguinary of the tutsi regime. As we interpret here our 
people, we want to render a solemn homage to Belgium and to her functionaries 
of the local administration for the services they have done to the populations of 
Ruanda-Urundi.41
 
  
One scholar who favoured this interpretation of Tutsi domination as having been harsher 
than the Belgian colonisation is J. J. Maquet. Interpreting the 1959 jacquerie, he wrote:  
 
This clash between Hutu and Tutsi is prepared on the eve of year 1960, during 
which seventeen countries got their independence in Africa.  
It may seem strange to notice that the Rwandan opinion was not preoccupied 
about independence then. It was not indifferent to independence, but the end of 
about sixty years of European colonisation was less problematic than the 
questioning of an ancient domination.42
 
 
In addition to the depiction of Tutsi as “ancient colonisers”, Hutu parties called them 
“‘colonialists from the Ethiopian race’ who were invited to return ‘to their forefathers in 
Abyssinia.’”43 A number of Hutu leaders who include Grégoire Kayibanda called Hutu 
people “Bantu” as a way of stressing their difference to the Tutsi defined as “Hamite 
invaders” and as foreign as European settlers.44
 
 In order to attract the attention of rural 
people, the argument of PARMEHUTU in the campaign across the country also focused 
on the issue of land for grazing.  
Violence occurred again during the campaign for Commune elections of 1960. It came 
from both sides. According to the Resident of Rwanda, it was Tutsi bands that provoked 
                                                 
41 “Appel du ‘Parmehutu’ nouvellement dénommé: ‘Mouvement Démocratique républicain’ à tous les anti-
colonialistes du monde”, Gitarama, 8 May 1960, in Nkundabagenzi (éd.), 1961, Rwanda politique, pp. 247-
253, quotation on p. 249. See also Linden, Christianisme et pouvoirs, p. 357 ; Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 49. 
42 Jacques J. Maquet, “La participation de la classe paysanne au mouvement d’indépendance du Rwanda”, 
Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, Vol. 4, No. 16, 1964, pp. 552-568, p. 564. 
43 Linden, Christianisme et pouvoirs, p. 357.  
44 Linden, Christianisme et pouvoirs, pp. 357-358 ; Chrétien, Le défi de l’ethnisme, p. 35. 
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it and then Hutu groups reacted. He says that this violence led to more deaths and 
casualties than those registered during the jacquerie of November 1959.45
 
 The view of 
UNAR was contrary to that interpretation. However, UNAR, following the threat from 
the scale of that violence against their members, announced its withdrawal from 
Commune elections. This party had been geographically split into two groups, the one 
located outside the country due to the exile of its members since November 1959, and the 
ones who remained in the country. So the outside branch of UNAR declared that any 
member who did not conform to this withdrawal would be excluded from the party. That 
declaration was signed by Michel Rwagasana, who was a member of the Comité 
Directeur. The UNAR members who had remained in the country obeyed this order not 
to participate.  
Violence resumed again in March 1960. On 25 July 1960, the King Kigeri Ndahindurwa 
fled. In preparation for Commune elections, in June 1960, an administrative reform 
occurred. It changed the 544 subchiefdoms into 229 communes. 
 
The results of the Commune elections became favourable for PARMEHUTU who 
enjoyed the full support of the Belgian administration. It won 70,4% of the overall 3,125 
seats of Commune Councillors, who in turn elected Burgomasters, while APROSOMA 
got only 7,4%, RADER 6,6%, UNAR 1,7% though it had withdrawn from the election, 
and the remaining small parties got 7,9%. In Astrida, the turnout was 75%. There were 
537 seats in contention. PARMEHUTU got 237 of them and APROSOMA got 223, 
RADER 28, UNAR 0 and other small parties 49. These results show that though 
PARMEHUTU was the most dominant party at national level, it had a strong opponent in 
Astrida, namely APROSOMA.46 Altogether, Hutu-aligned parties controlled 211 among 
the 229 communes.47
 
 
Following communal elections, colonial Territory Administrators undertook programmes 
to train newly elected burgomasters. In Astrida, the then Territorial Administrator, A. 
Peeters, planned visits for Mvejuru chiefdom communes from 5 to 7 December 1960. 
                                                 
45 Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, p. 130. 
46 Nkundabagenzi, 1961, Rwanda politique, p. 272. 
47 Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, p. 169. 
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The agenda to develop included the following issues: new governmental institutions, 
peace-making, and the explanation of the Commune law.48 From 12 to 13 December 
1960, he planned to visit communes located in Buhanga-Ndara chiefdom and to develop 
the above issues in addition to rights and duties of burgomasters and councillors, and 
upcoming legislative elections.49
 
 So, this was an intense moment of stabilising newly-
established Commune structures. 
The law n° 222/275 instituted a Provisional Special Council and Provisional Government 
under the proportion of the results of those Commune elections. In the Council, instituted 
on 18 October 1960, PARMEHUTU obtained 31 seats, RADER 7, APROSOMA 6, and 
AREDETWA 1.50
 
 And the Provisional Government was set up on 26 October 1960. It 
had 10 ministries under the leadership of Gregoire Kayibanda as Prime Minister. In this 
Government, ministers were Rwandans and the deputy ministers were Belgians. 
Belgian authorities, just after the institutionalisation of the Provisional Special Council 
and the Provisional Government, hastened the preparations around the upcoming 
legislative elections. The Rwandan Interior Minister wanted the Communes to be ready 
with logistical preparations by 15 December 1960. So, the Assistant Belgian Territorial 
Administrator of Astrida instructed the Burgomasters in his Territory to start setting up 
the voting places.51  UNAR applied for the permission to organise a meeting on 15 
January 1961, but the then Territorial Administrator refused to grant them that 
authorisation, alleging that the Resident of Rwanda would have to first set a date for the 
beginning of campaign meetings.52
 
 
                                                 
48 A. Peeters, Administrateur de Territoire, ff, Lettre aux Bourgmestres de Mvejuru, objet : Visite des 
Communes, N° 6110/P.I., Astrida, le 30 novembre 1960. It is worth noting that the commune laws written 
between 1960 and 1962 were numerous. See Bulletin Officiel du Ruanda-Urundi, 1960-1962. 
49 A. Peeters, Administrateur de Territoire, ff, Lettre aux Bourgmestres du Buhanga-Ndara, objet : Visite 
Communes, N° 6200/P.I., Astrida, le 7 décembre 1960. 
50 Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, p. 171.  
51 A. Bier, Administrateur de Territoire Assistant, pour l’Administrateur de Territoire, Lettre à tous les 
Bourgmestres de Bufundu et de Busanza, objet : Elections législatives, N° 6085/PI.3.06., Astrida, le 28 
novembre 1960. 
52 J. Naegels, Administrateur de Territoire, ff, Lettre à Monsieur le Président du Comité Local de l’UNAR à 
Astrida, objet : Réunion à caractère politique, N° 178/SEC I0., Astrida, le 13 janvier 1961, Archives 
Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida.  
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As far as political developments are concerned, a colloquium was organised from 7 to 14 
December 1960. It was attended by delegations from political parties and discussed 
among other issues the dates for the following legislative election. The initial date to 
which PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA subscribed was 15 January 1961. UNAR and 
RADER delegates nevertheless suggested the postponing of that date. As no compromise 
was reached, the UN Commission organised another conference at Ostende on 7-12 
January 1961. The resolution 1579 (XV) of the UN General Assembly decided that the 
date of 15 January would be postponed for the legislative elections.53
 
  
As PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA were unhappy about the postponement of the date 
of legislative elections, they used their powers in the new institutions to organise a coup. 
The General Resident’s law of 25 January 1961 following the one of 15 January1961 had 
granted powers of autonomy to Rwanda. During this coup, which occurred on 28 January 
1961, the provisional government, together with other institutions including all Commune 
burgomasters, proclaimed the Republic, abolished the monarchy and elected the 
president, an Assembly, and the Prime Minister of that government was empowered to 
form a government. Even a Constitution was prepared. This event was known under the 
respective labels “The Gitarama coup,” and “the Proclamation of the Republic.” 
However, the UN Trusteeship Council rejected those institutions, a decision that 
discontented both the Hutu parties and the Belgian administration.54 In this respect, 
describing the political developments in Rwanda in year 1961 in his book, Jean-Paul 
Harroy, who was the then General Resident of Ruanda-Urundi, called the year 1961 “a 
year of democratisation thwarted by the UN.”55
                                                 
53 Nkundabagenzi (éd.), 1961, Rwanda politique, p. 378. 
 Nevertheless, the General Resident in 
respecting the order of the UN, found himself obliged to suspend the government born 
54 See “Les autorités intérimaires au Burundi, le Coup d’Etat de Gitarama au Rwanda”, in Chronique de 
Politique Etrangère, Décolonisation et Indépendance du Rwanda et du Burundi, volume XVI, numéros 4-
6, Juillet-Décembre 1963, pp. 461-462. 
55 Jean-Paul Harroy, Rwanda: De la féodalité à la démocratie, 1955-1962, Bruxelles, Hayez, 1984. On the 
critique of this book, see a review of René Lemarchand, “J.P. Harroy: Rwanda, de la féodalité à la 
démocratie, 1955-1962”, in Dialogue, n°114, février 1986, pp. 95-104. 
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from the Gitarama coup. The powers of this government went back to the Belgian and 
UN authorities.56
 
 Analysing the impact of this event, René Lemarchand wrote:  
The coup was revolutionary in two senses: it destroyed the old monarchical 
regime and led to a de facto republican system of government, and it created the 
conditions for further accelerating the revolution ‘from below’.[…] After the coup 
of Gitarama…, the Hutu elites were able to gain partial control over the levers of 
the administration. And now that they enjoyed virtually unlimited discretion to 
use violence as they pleased, they had relatively little difficulty in carrying the 
revolution to its ultimate stage, to the stage where the republic would receive 
official, de jure recognition from the United Nations.57
 
 
 
The period of campaign for legislative elections also saw a further escalation of violence. 
Hundreds of people died during this time and others were wounded. More houses were 
burnt and a new wave of refugees fled to parishes, and outside the country.58
 
 A relative 
calm was restored towards mid-September 1961. This allowed for the organisation of 
legislative elections on 25 September 1961. 44 seats for the Legislative Assembly were to 
be competed for by the various parties. The results were as follows: PARMEHUTU 
gained 35 seats. UNAR which had participated in these elections (unlike the previous 
ones) gained 7 seats. As for APROSOMA, it had already started to divide itself into 
multiple parties and got only 2 seats. One of its allies, APROSOMA-RWANDA-UNION 
got, together with other 11 small remaining parties, only 1,7% of the results. The 
referendum about the fate of the monarchy was also organised the same day. 80% voted 
against it, and in favour of the Republican system. 
In relation to both Commune elections of 1960 and legislative elections of 1961, a 
number of old people interviewed in Gishamvu and Kibayi remember multiparty 
experiences in hierarchical and chronological terms. In this southern region, they say that 
                                                 
56 “L’exécution de la résolution 1605 ; les élections legislatives”, in Chronique de Politique Etrangère, 
Décolonisation et Indépendance du Rwanda et du Burundi, volume XVI, numéros 4-6, Juillet-Décembre 
1963, pp. 464-467. 
57 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 115-116.  
58 On the account and numbers of victims and perpetrators of this violence, see Filip Reyntjens, Pouvoir et 
droit au Rwanda. Droit public et évolution politique, 1916-1973, Tervuren (Belgique), MRAC, 1985, p. 
299; Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 195; Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, pp. 195, 197 et 198.  
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APROSOMA was the strongest party, then PARMEHUTU became strong only later.59
 
 
The results corroborate their analysis: The Commune elections of 1960 showed the 
strength of APROSOMA over PARMEHUTU in this region. However, the legislative 
elections of 1961 already revealed the rapid rise of PARMEHUTU even in the south.  
On 26 October 1961, the elected Legislative Assembly voted Gregoire Kayibanda as 
President of the Republic to replace Dominique Mbonyumutwa who was president since 
the Gitarama coup. It is under these circumstances that Belgium granted independence to 
Rwanda on 1 July 1962 after Hutu rule was established. Unlike in Congo where 
independence was followed by violence against Belgians, in Rwanda, the formal transfer 
of power from the coloniser to the colonised went smoothly between the Belgians and the 
Hutu intellectuals. The Special Resident appreciated the fact that at the festivities of that 
day the army of the coloniser paraded together with Rwandans and was applauded by 
them.60
 
 
2.3. THE UNFOLDING OF THE “REVOLUTION” IN GISHAMVU AND KIBAYI 
2.3.1. Early violence 
 
A few incidents of attacks and burning of houses by APROSOMA members, and 
retaliation by the UNAR monarchists, did happen from 7 November 1959 onwards. But 
severe confrontation occurred in 1960. A form of violence that could be linked with 
jacquerie as described above was reinforced in my region of study only later in early 
1960. Documented records as well as interviews confirm this.  
 
A number of attacks occurred in November 1959. For example, in Nyaruguru but far 
from Gishamvu, the Abahebyi group fighters were said to have been sent by Chief 
Mbanda to kill Kanyaruka, the Secretary of APROSOMA and cousin of Gitera, president 
of that party. Kanyaruka had fled to Burundi to his brother Renzaho. The killers found 
                                                 
59 Interview with Jean Berchmans Ntakaraba, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 6, 
Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
60 Rapport sur l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1961, Bruxelles, 1962, p. 44 ; 
Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, p. 206. 
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them in Burundi and killed both of them under the supposed order of Mbanda. These 
killings occurred on 10 November 1959. Chief Mbanda was accused of having organised 
that attack, for the meeting organising that killing is said to have taken place at his home. 
He was jailed for about twenty years.  
 
In Buhanga-Ndara, chief Gashugi and his brother were also accused of having 
participated in the violence on 11 November 1959, by allegedly putting a tree on the road 
and attacking the Hutu of Ndara. But the ‘Conseil de guerre’ decided that Gashugi’s 
accusation was unfounded.61 Nonetheless, former chief Gashugi was summoned to 
appear in court on 23 December 1959 on the basis of murder charges.62 He was again on 
the list of arrested people on 19 November 1959.63 He was ultimately sentenced to eight 
years in prison and officially demoted on 17 October 1960.64 On 29 December 1960, 
Mbanda, Gashugi and Rusagara were among the chiefs who were officially demoted.65
 
 
In Bashumba-Nyakare also a small confrontation occurred between the Hutu and the 
Tutsi. At Gashiru and Bitare hills the Tutsi, who happened to be a majority there, resisted 
attacks of APROSOMA members. As a result, very few Tutsi from that area fled. 
Describing one battle, Tharcisse Karengera from Sheke said that while people were 
fighting, the Belgian troops came to stop them: “The Tutsi were gathered at Sheke at a 
place called Makaba. After taking their weapons, the battle seemed to reach an end. In 
order to stop the battle, the whites (Belgian commando) came at Gashiru where those 
people were fighting, and told the Hutu fighters to withdraw and go. They did not 
understand that, so the whites shot around five Hutu persons because they refused to 
withdraw. The Tutsi on the other hand withdrew, and as a result no one was shot.”66
                                                 
61 Ministère des Colonies, Rapport sur l’Administration Belge au Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1959, 
Bruxelles, 1960, p. 26 ; Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 166 ;  Mugesera, Imibereho, pp. 41-42 ; 
Hubert, La Toussaint rwandaise, pp. 37, 83-85.  
 The 
62 In Rudipresse, n° 148 du 19 décembre 1959, p. 2. 
63 Belgique, Archives Africaines, RWA (82) 12, Rapports de l’Administration de Territoire d’Astrida, Liste 
des arrestations au 19/11/1959. 
64 Guy Logiest, Colonel BEM, Résident Spécial du Ruanda, Décision du 19 octobre 1960 à l’encontre de 
Gashugi Justin. 
65 L.R. Reignier, Résident-Adjoint du Ruanda, Lettre à Monsieur l’Administrateur de Territoire (…), 
Objet : Décision de révocation Autorités indigènes, Réf. : N° 9.475/A.I., Kigali, le 29 décembre 1960. 
66 Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
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shooting of Hutu fighters by Belgian troops is also confirmed by Munyantore who 
indicates three deaths.67
 
 It is hard to know whether this fighting occurred in November 
1959 or in 1960, because the informants did not remember dates with precision. 
According to them, violence occurred in this area later than elsewhere, especially in 
1960. 
Another person who was killed in early 1960 is Mutembe who had been Chief of 
Bashumba-Nyakare from 1934 to 1946. Accounts about his assassination are varied. 
According to one of them, it is Father Paul Klep who headed the Kansi Mission who beat 
him with an axe and then another person, Nyabyenda, finished him off:  
 
The first victim was chief Mutembe. Because his killing was planned by Father 
Klep, […] he took some Abakuru b’Inama [Heads of Local Church Councils]. He 
brought them into the attack. When they arrived there, they found that it was their 
chief, they got afraid to kill him. Then he took an axe and beat him, he fell, […] 
he did not finish him off, so he told a certain Nyabyenda to kill him, he did it. As 
you can understand, it is the priest who killed him, since he is the one who 
brought them.68
 
 
Another version does not mention the priest; it highlights the role of Léopold Nyabyenda 
who was neighbour to Mutembe at Liba hill, for having killed Mutembe with that axe. 
They were allegedly having disputes over land.69 A number of others say that Father 
Klep was just supporting those who came to kill Mutembe.70
                                                 
67 Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
 This explanation is also 
given by Ntezihigo who did research on the Kansi Mission. He says that almost all his 
informants assert that Father Klep was accomplice in the killing of Mutembe. He 
indicates that Mutembe sold some of his belongings in order to flee, then he gave a sum 
of 60,000 Francs to Father Klep to keep it for him, since he was his confidant. The people 
involved in that killing have depicted Father Klep as their leader, but Ntezihigo doubts 
68 Interview with Vincent Kanamugire, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
69 Interview with Elias Karengera, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
70 Interview with Anonymous 1, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Damien Rwarinda, Gishamvu, 
23 April 2007. 
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this information.71 We also learn from Ntezihigo that this killing occurred in early 1960 
during the campaign for Commune elections. Two other people got killed in Bashumba-
Nyakare: Rutambika, who had been a leader, and Karibushi.72
 
  These varied versions 
show to what extent it is hard to uncover violent events. 
In Mvejuru, a few attacks occurred around 7 and 8 November 1959 against the Tutsi. The 
latter, together with their Hutu fellows defended themselves until 10 November. Chief 
Rusagara together with a number of his subchiefs fled, while others got imprisoned.73 
The burning of houses resumed again in this area in June 1960.74 In Buhanga-Ndara, 
Chief Gashugi may have attempted to attack APROSOMA members on 11 November 
1959. 75
 
 Gashugi was latter accused, but he fled to Burundi. 
The defensive capacity of monarchists went on diminishing in 1960 as compared to 1959 
because Tutsi leaders were progressively dismissed, jailed and exiled. A number of them 
had also been killed. Also political developments were reducing the number of people 
keen to fight on the side of the monarchists who were progressively losing their 
leadership capacities.76 According to Hakizimana, the burning was organised by 
APROSOMA, and later by PARMEHUTU. He also says that no person died in Mvejuru 
of Kibayi.77 But some people got injured as a result of shooting by the Belgian soldiers 
who were stopping fighters.78 Rape was also mentioned during this time, but only two 
female informants talked about it. Some Hutu fighters are said to have raped daughters of 
attacked people.79 But in addition girls feared Congolese troops who allegedly were also 
committing rape.80
                                                 
71 Jean Bosco Ntezihigo, Impact socio-politique et économique de la mission de Kansi sur MVEJURU 
1910-1960, Mémoire de licence en Histoire, Université Nationale du Rwanda, Ruhengeri, Juin 1990, pp. 
142-143. 
 
72 Interview with Gérard Segatashya, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
73 Ntezihigo, Impact socio-politique, p. 136 ; Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 40. 
74 Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 51. 
75 Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 41. 
76 Mugesera, Imibereho, pp. 41-42. 
77 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
78 Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
79 Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
80 Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli. 
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2.3.2. Violence during the campaign for Commune elections 
 
The period that is remembered to have been particularly violent, however, is the one that 
coincided with the campaign for Commune elections of June-July 1960. In April 1960, 
violence in Mvejuru and Buhanga-Ndara chiefdoms caused “the burning or destruction of 
several hundreds of huts belonging to the Tutsi.” That violence occurred all through that 
month.81  From June to September 1960, the whole Astrida was criss-crossed by 
violence.82 While in April only a few injuries were reported, the bulk of it concerning the 
burning of houses, the looting of property and the chasing of monarchists, on 22 June  
200 Tutsi attacked military forces who retaliated by killing 22 among them and injuring 
35. 83
 
 
In a moralising tone, the then Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare, Cajetan Bisumbukuboko, 
wrote several letters to the population of his chiefdom, instilling in them the importance 
of not attacking each other. At the same time, he told them that the Belgian state did not 
condone such violence, that they should not accept what politicians were telling them 
about using violence during the campaign.84 He insisted that people should not follow 
rumours from political party leaders who lie to them that it is him who sent them to attack 
people.85 In fact, in general, colonial leaders were afraid of what they called “rumours,” 
that is, any information coming from a third party that was not associated with them, or 
who was  associated with them but spreading information they did not authorise.86
 
  
                                                 
81 Rapport sur l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1960, Bruxelles, 1961, p. 27 ; in 
Rudipresse, n° 165, du 16 avril 1960, p. 11 ; and in Rudipresse, n° 166, du 23 avril 1960, p. 9. 
82 Hubert, La Toussaint rwandaise, p. 53. 
83 Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son effort de développement, p. 223. 
84 C.M. Bisumbukuboko, Ad interim Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare Chiefdom, Letter to the population of 
Bashumba-Nyakare, N°81/60.CH.-, Maraba, 13 June 1960, National Archives, Correspondence, Territory 
of Astrida. 
85 C.M. Bisumbukuboko, Ad interim Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare Chiefdom, Letter to the population of 
Bashumba-Nyakare, N°82/60.CH.-, Maraba, 15 June 1960, National Archives, Correspondence, Territory 
of Astrida. 
86 On the problematization of rumour in history, see Luise White, Speaking with Vampires. Rumor and 
History in Colonial Africa, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000, pp. 56-86. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
117 
Bisumbukuboko had difficulty in instilling these pacific measures. Some Hutu 
constituents interpreted them as messages intending to stop the “revolutionary” process, 
because this chief was also a Tutsi. So they considered that he was protecting his fellow 
Tutsi. At one time, in order to be more convincing to the people who were keen to use 
violence, he advanced an argument which was more political and to some extent 
geographical about his chiefdom: 
 
Remember that you are located at the border of Rwanda. If you destroy it, you 
will be doing wrong to your forefathers who sacrificed their blood so that the 
foreign countries do not occupy the country. These are the reasons that are not 
supporting an ethnic group but the Chiefdom, which I am protecting against 
cowardice and critics who will be recorded in history in future… this advice I am 
giving you, think about it and do as God would wish…87
 
 
Indeed, in each letter, Bisumbukuboko emphasized the issues of God and religion, 
explaining that to kill, to injure people and to loot their property was a sin. Though he 
was Tutsi, he was retained by the Belgian administration during the time of replacing the 
Tutsi ‘customary’ authorities by Hutu ones. His discourse shows that he was on the side 
of the Moderate Tutsi, who were also still befriended by the Belgian administration. It is 
worth noting that he was also a prominent member of RADER, a party that the Belgian 
administration considered as moderate. In a letter he wrote a day before the unfolding of 
the Commune election in Astrida Territory, he again urged the population to avoid 
violence in party propaganda; he warned that any leader who continued to divide the 
constituents by spreading “rumours” against the Belgians was acting against the country 
and against the King:  
 
There are people who are telling you distorted news about the Congo, attempting 
to rejoice about how whites are being refugees, claiming that this event may 
undermine the unfolding of the election, and precipitate the date of independence. 
Let me tell you the truth about the Congo developments: It is true that whites are 
fleeing from there as a result of their being expelled from Congo. This does not 
mean that they have been militarily defeated, they are just fulfilling their 
gentlemanly behaviour of avoiding fighting against a country that they just gave 
                                                 
87 C.M. Bisumbukuboko, Ad interim Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare Chiefdom, Letter to the population of 
Bashumba-Nyakare, without date, National Archives, Correspondence, Territory of Astrida. 
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independence to a few days ago. So they decided to keep peace despite the wrong 
they are undergoing.88
 
 
 
Seemingly, the context of July 1960 in Congo was having some effects in Rwanda too. 
The above letter of Bisumbukuboko shows that the colonial administration was 
sensitizing the population so that they would not be anti-Belgian, as was becoming the 
case in neighbouring Congo. So, the success of the unfolding of Commune elections in 
Rwanda was meant to at least create a stable position for Belgium in Rwanda, which it 
lacked in neighbouring Congo, due to the conflict that arose there just a week after 
independence. Belgium was willing to transfer power to partners who would ensure them 
this peaceful transition. Later, when Hutu parties won the election, Logiest, the Special 
Resident of Ruanda, celebrated that success as an attenuation of the failure that Belgium 
underwent in Congo.89
 
 
As expected, the Commune elections took place from 17 July 1960 onwards in Astrida. 
Bashumba-Nyakare voted on 25 July. Five communes had been created in this chiefdom. 
The chief Bisumbukuboko congratulated the population of his chiefdom for having voted 
in calm and peace, and for having participated in substantial numbers. He celebrated the 
fact that him and the new Territorial Administrator, Lees, had crossed the whole territory 
of the chiefdom and did not find any violent act.90
 
 APROSOMA won most of seats of 
burgomasters in the area studied. Joseph Karengera of Shori, Servilien Nzabakira of 
Kibingo were in APROSOMA; Raymond Hakizimana of Linda and André Hitimana of 
Saga were also in APROSOMA. But they shifted to PARMEHUTU as soon as this party 
strengthened and APROSOMA weakened. 
However, after the Commune elections, violence escalated again in this region. For 
example, in September 1960, the new burgomaster of Kurukara in Bashumba-Nyakare 
                                                 
88 C.M. Bisumbukuboko, Ad interim Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare Chiefdom, Letter to the population of 
Bashumba-Nyakare, N°I35/60.CH.-, Maraba, 16 July 1960, National Archives, Correspondence, Territory 
of Astrida. 
89 Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, p. 159. 
90 C.M. Bisumbukuboko, Ad interim Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare Chiefdom, Letter to the population of 
Bashumba-Nyakare, N°I49/60.CH.-, Maraba, 26 July 1960, National Archives, Correspondence, Territory 
of Astrida. 
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reported to the Territorial Administrator, Lees, that a “war” was occurring in his 
commune at a place called Vumbi and Rwimbogo. In a letter, the Territorial 
Administrator was complaining about the non-intervention of the burgomaster to stop the 
fighting between people from Rwimbogo and those from Shori.91
 
 
Violence continued in Shori commune in September, in such a way that the Chief wrote a 
long letter to the population of Shori sensitizing them not fight, not to use lethal weapons, 
and not to divide themselves ethnically. He warned those who were dividing the 
population and who were in both Tutsi and Hutu groups to stop doing that, otherwise he 
would take legal measures against them. He advocated to the burgomaster of Shori to use 
all means including the police, the councillors and the population to keep peace.92 This 
violent situation continued, in such a way that in October 1960, the whole Astrida 
Territory was under fire. In Bashumba-Nyakare particularly houses of Tutsi were 
burning.93
 
 Rusanganwa recalls one Hutu person who was killed during this time:  
No one died in our area except a protestant called Ntabashwa who taught at 
Mubumbano and who was shot because he was mistakenly confused with a 
Councillor called Fabian Sefigi. He was carrying books in his hands, so they 
thought it was Sefigi. A white policeman shot him at Sholi near a tree that exists 
till today. […] People from Mubumbano had killed a policeman called Mahema, 
so the white policeman decided that any ruler of Mubumbano caught will be also 
shot. […] Sefigi was a Hutu councillor.94
 
  
In Kibingo, on 16 and 17 October, 1960, about 80 houses were burnt and there were three 
Tutsi and one Hutu deaths, with two other unidentified victims. From 18 to 24 of the 
same month, the burning of houses occurred and the Military killed one person.95
 
 This 
information may well be describing the same situation as the preceding interview.  
                                                 
91 Ch. Lees, Administrateur de Territoire d’Astrida, Lettre à Monsieur Musirikare, Bourgmestre de 
Kurukara, chefferie de Bashumba-Nyakare, Astrida, le 12 septembre 1960, Archives Nationales, 
Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida. Here “war”means some kind of open violence. 
92 C.M. Bisumbukuboko, Ad interim Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare Chiefdom, Letter to the population of 
Sholi Commune, Maraba, l4 September 1960, National Archives, Correspondence, Territory of Astrida. 
93 Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 53. 
94 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
95 Rapport sur l’administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 1960, Bruxelles, 1961, p. 28.  
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Some other killings had occurred during this period, but it was hard to establish the dates. 
These include Rutambika who had been a subchief. He is said to have been shot by 
Belgian soldiers as he was fighting against them.96 The father of my informant 
Mukagitoli was also shot by Belgian soldiers, but some people also say that he was shot 
by a priest, Father Gatseri,97 an allegation she doubts.98 Another person who is said to 
have been killed by a priest (also Father Gatseri) is Ntambabazi.99 Other people were 
killed who include Rwigimba, Bwandagara, Mukama, Budengeri who were Tutsi and 
Semunanira who was Hutu. An informant indicates about the latter that “they killed him 
because he liked the Tutsi.”100
 
  
Other people who were killed include a man Sebutuna of Gashiru who was killed at 
Mvejuru as he was fleeing, and they killed him at Rwanyanza. Also a young man 
Sematama of Mukuge died during that time.101
 
 But these were not associated with 
colonial power. In November 1960, violence had stopped for a while. 
As noted above, on 26 October 1960, new institutions following Commune elections 
were set up, in which a partial autonomy was granted to Rwanda. Since Chief 
Bisumbukuboko had performed well in favour of the Belgian authority, despite the fact 
that he was Tutsi, the colonial administration accepted and supported his candidature to 
be the autochthonous deputy Territorial Administrator.102
                                                 
96 Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
 The case of Bisumbukuboko is 
revealing in that it breaks with the general trend whereby Tutsi leaders were being 
expelled during this very time of his enjoyment of support from the Belgian 
administration. But it is not surprising because he was a member of RADER party, hence 
considered as a moderate by the Belgian rule. One informant, who lived at the border of 
Bashumba-Nyakare and Nyaruguru, indicates that though Chief Bisumbukuboko 
97 I am not sure about the spelling of this name, I noted it in following the way it was pronounced in 
Kinyarwanda language.  
98 Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, Gishamvu. 
99 Interview with Justin Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
100 Interview with Damien Rwarinda, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
101 Interview with Vincent Kanamugire, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
102 Rwanda, Archives Nationales, Territoire d’Astrida, A. Peeters, Administrateur de Territoire d’Astrida, 
Lettre à Monsieur le Résident Spécial du Ruanda, Guy Logiest, objet : Conversion activité des Chefs de 
chefferie, N° 5937/Bat., Astrida, le 16 novembre 1960. 
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continued to sensitize the Hutu and the Tutsi to remain united and not to follow the 
national trend of turning against each other, this policy failed, because violence against 
the Tutsi continued. “Bisumbukoboko ultimately fled himself. […] thereafter a decision 
stated that all Tutsi were to be driven out of their houses.”103
 
 
Violence resumed during the campaign for legislative elections. In August 1961, the 
burning of houses was recorded in Linda commune in August 1961, whereas on the 10 
September 1960, at Nyakibanda hill, Sholi commune, in Bashumba-Nyare chefferie, a 
group of Hutu was said to have arrested a Tutsi and tortured him to death. In October 
1961, just after the legislative elections of 25 September 1961, violence was seen again in 
Shori and Kibingo communes.104 It also seems that powerful Tutsi were targeted first, in 
such a way that their houses were burnt early in 1960. The poor Tutsi started to be 
attacked later, especially after the Commune elections, when PARMEHUTU had won 
and had started to crystallise its discourse around clear ethnic division. As one informant 
reconstructed this sequence of events around house burnings, “at first the burning 
targeted the powerful Tutsi, and at last the poor ones were also targeted.”105
 
 
Concerning the burning, Gashiru is said to have experienced fewer attacks. Tharcisse 
Karengera, who fled to Burundi in 1961 and then came back in early 1962, says that not 
more than 20 houses had been burnt in Gashiru.106
2.3.3. Party developments at local level 
 
 
As was the case at national level, most of the conflict at local level was occurring within 
the framework of political party competition. This is confirmed by a number of 
informants. Those active in the burning of houses of Tutsi or monarchists were also the 
                                                 
103 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
104 Hubert, La Toussaint rwandaise, p. 104 ; Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 57. 
105 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
106 Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. Here is his account: “Then Schmitz (the 
Anglican Pastor who was helping fugitives) gave them a car to take them to Burundi. This car took me to 
Burundi also. When we arrived at Nyaruteja, some cultivators threw stones to our car. […] Then we fled, it 
was in 1961. But I did not last there, my father had stayed in Rwanda, so in 1962 I came back to Gashiru. 
My home did not be burnt, in such as way that at our hill they burnt no more than 20 houses.” 
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ones active in parties. Also those Tutsi who fought against people who were burning 
monarchists’ houses were active members of UNAR.107 The conflict became ethnic 
mostly in 1960 and especially after PARMEHUTU had won the Commune elections, that 
is, when it started to articulate its discourse along lines of ethnic division. It is worth 
noting that this area which I am studying was also the place of origin of a number of 
well-known Hutu leaders. For example, Isidore Nzeyimana was part of nine Hutu 
intellectuals who had signed the Hutu Manifesto in March 1957. He had studied at the 
Centre Universitaire de Kisantu (Congo) and had started to work as a clerk in 1955. He 
became a member of the Special Provisional Council that replaced the Superior Council 
of the Country and Secretary of State of Education in the National Government that was 
formed on 26 October 1960 following Commune elections.108 He was also the elder 
brother of Raymond Hakizimana who became burgomaster of Linda Commune from 
1960 to 1963 and then burgomaster of Kibayi commune from 1963 to 1971. Their other 
brother, Théotime Simogomwa became burgomaster of Saga commune in 1962 to 1963. 
All of them were in APROSOMA and shifted to PARMEHUTU later, when 
APROSOMA started to become weaker already by 1961. Other southern Hutu leaders 
include François Sezirahiga, Augustin Ndayambaje and Amandin Rugira. They had 
contributed to the strengthening of APROSOMA in the south since its creation in 
1957,109 and became renowned political figures after independence at national and 
regional levels. PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA appeared united during the 1959 
‘revolution’. But after the Commune elections, which saw a notable victory of 
PARMEHUTU and a small result for APROSOMA, the latter started to take a distance 
from the first. By January 1961 during the time of proclamation of the Republic, this 
division had become patent.110
 
 
One letter showed that Raymond Hakizimana had shifted to PARMEHUTU in early 1961 
and that the latter party was in open conflict with APROSOMA. Propaganda for 
                                                 
107 Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007; Interview with Claude Ngirabega, Gishamvu, 
26 April 2007; Interview with Vincent Kanamugire, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007; Interview with Justin 
Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
108 Curriculum Vitae d’ Isidore Nzeyimana, in Rudipresse, n° 197, du 12 novembre 1960, p. 9. 
109 Ntezihigo, Impact socio-politique, pp. 132-134. 
110 See Musangamfura, Le parti M.D.R. PARMEHUTU, pp. 168-175. 
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Legislative elections had started; so Hakizimana and a number of his councillors were in 
competition with APROSOMA people who were also doing propaganda meetings in his 
area. These leaders claim that APROSOMA party leaders wanted to kill them:  
 
Nowadays, APROSOMA is working day and night, using all means, what it 
wants is this: it is to kill all those who are in PARMEHUTU in the Burwi area. 
Dear Minister, we always address this issue asking for rescue, but you seem to 
think that is just a joke, or else you think that it is just hatred that we have against 
our fellows… On 15 March 61 people from Save came at our place in 
Mugombwa to do propaganda, wanting to kill several of us, and to do harm to 
others, we urge you to intervene and rescue us quickly.111
 
 
This shows that competition for power was also acute even among parties that shared 
ethnic identity. Furthermore, this competition was not just verbal or using ideas, it too 
bore a threat to kill, which reveals how tense the situation was. 
 
The Church also got involved in these developments. It is worth noting that the local 
clergy behaved in the same way as the clergy at national level. The Roman Catholic 
Missionaries had chosen the side of the Hutu intellectuals by supporting PARMEHUTU. 
In Gishamvu, at the Nyumba Mission, Father Noti was among the missionaries who 
supported the Hutu side, that is, the ‘revolution.’ At the Kansi Mission, it is mostly Father 
Klep who worked actively in favour of Hutu parties and who was even cited as having 
become involved in violence. 112
 
 But at the same time, the church intervened in favour of 
victims in giving them shelter during the time when they were internally displaced. Most 
attacked people fled to churches and missions such as Kansi, Nyumba, Nyakibanda and 
Mugombwa where they were protected. 
As for the role of the local population, it appears to have been ambivalent. On the one 
hand the population from various parties tended to follow leaders’ injunctions or general 
trends. But on the other, they also acted according to the existing social ties that they had 
                                                 
111 Raymond Hakizimana, Bourgmestre ; Gaëtan Habimana, Conseiller ; Télésphore Iraguha, Assistant 
Médical ; Philippe Balihutu, Conseiller ; Vénuste Gahukingwe, Conseiller ; Lettre au Ministre de 
l’Intérieur, J.B. Rwasibo, Mugombwa, le 18/3/1961. 
112 Rutayisire, “L’Eglise catholique”, pp. 42-74, p. 65 ; Ntezihigo, Impact socio-politique, pp. 141-142. 
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vis-à-vis each other, as far as party affiliations and ethnic identities are concerned. Some 
also acted in purely practical ways dictated by the new situation. Here are some cases. 
Amidst acts of burning, some Hutu people saved their fellow Tutsi, helped them while 
fleeing, brought food to them at places to which they fled.113 Hutu people who had been 
clients of Tutsis and who had been in good terms with them tended not to take part in the 
burning activity.114 Consequently, houses of some people who had given cows to their 
Hutu friends did not get burnt. Those Hutu protected them.115 Also houses of some Hutu 
people who were acquainted with Tutsis were also burnt.116 People who had intermarried 
with the Hutu did not take flight as frequently. This situation is said to have occurred at 
Busoro place in Gishamvu.117 Furthermore, collective accusations seem to have been 
avoided at some point: Tutsi people who were active in UNAR saw their houses burnt 
and themselves expelled. But their nuclear or extended family members could remain in 
Rwanda. For example, Rwarinda was warrior-like (umuvumbantambara) as he describes 
himself, so the APROSOMA members expelled him but his father remained in 
Rwanda.118 Munyarugamba also was active in UNAR propaganda, as a result, he was 
expelled, while a number of his other family members remained in Kibingo.119 The father 
of Bucyabutata had been an umumotsi, he was expelled, but his wife and children 
remained in Rwanda.120 Families disintegrated in the process, some going into exile and 
others remaining in the country.121 Concerning political rational choice, some Tutsi 
people who agreed to join APROSOMA were spared from the attacks.122
 
 This does not 
mean however that all those who were attacked had refused to join APROSOMA. 
                                                 
113 Emérite Kubwimana and her husband brought food to a number of Tutsi families from their place who 
had fled at the Mission. Haruna Bizimana says also that Hutu people were giving sweet potatoes to 
refugees of Nyumba and Nyakibanda in Gishamvu, as they were not used to the food distributed by the 
Church. See also Mugesera, “Une approche”, pp. 158-159. 
114 Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, with Ladislas Nyirisenge, and Gaston Nzabamwita. 
115 Interview with Justin Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
116 Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
117 Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
118 Interview with Damien Rwarinda, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
119 Interview with Théodomir Munyarugamba. 
120 Interview with Bucyabutata. 
121 Interview with Evariste Kabano, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
122 Cases of the father of Christophe Batura and the family of Godeberthe Mukagitoli ; Ntezihigo, Impact 
socio-politique, p. 137. 
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In addition to these social ties, cultural features of “conviviality”123 broke the rules of 
ethnic and political divide. The reason why violence against the Tutsi was not severe, 
explain a number of informants, is that the culture or practice of “igihango” was still 
practised. This practice comes among others from the Kubandwa ritual included in 
Ryangombe religious or belief practice. According to it, a Tutsi member had a Hutu as 
godfather in the Kubandwa membership and vice versa. Kubandwa is often compared to 
baptism is Christian religion. There was then a belief that a person who has shared 
igihango, that is, a kubandwa pact or alliance with you, you cannot harm or mislead him 
or her.124 During the colonial period, though the church was fighting against this practice, 
many people were still observing it. This practice continues up until today, though the 
numbers of those practising it go on decreasing. Also there is a tradition in favour of 
rescue that was still respected, which says that “when someone is pursuing an animal in 
the hunting process and that animal seeks refuge in your house, you do not sacrifice it to 
the hunter. You save it, since it has sought your safe place.” This implies that any person 
who was seeking refuge in a house of a person was to be granted this refuge and not to be 
sacrificed to the attackers.125
 
 However, it is hard to know the degree of the observance of 
this convivial practice. 
2.4. THE EFFECTS OF THE “REVOLUTION”  
2.4.1. A New Political Order  
 
This “revolution” brought about fundamental changes in the power structures. First, Hutu 
leaders gained power through a number of means: appointment by the colonial authority, 
elections, partial autonomy and independence. All these power allocations occurred 
during the time of colonial rule ending and in the context of decolonisation. They were 
the result of competitions and negotiations between several parties: Belgian authority, the 
                                                 
123 Achille Mbembe, “Provisional Notes on the Postcolony”, Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1992, pp. 3-37, pp. 10, 25-26. 
124 Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007; Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, 
Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. On Kubandwa and godfathers and ethnic relations herein, see Gurdun Honke et 
al., Au plus profond de l’Afrique. Le Rwanda et la colonisation allemande 1885-1919, Bonn, Peter Hammer 
Verlag, 1990, p. 105.    
125 Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
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Tutsi auxiliaries, the Hutu intellectuals and the UN Trusteeship Council. As far as 
political bargainings are concerned, it was a period of party as well as individual 
positionings. The position of parties or individuals depended on their capacity to 
negotiate with powerful partners, who appear to have been the colonial administration 
and the Church.  
 
Secondly, this period was difficult to manage. Newly appointed leaders fought together 
as well as against each other either to strengthen the party or personal gain. At local level, 
several trends appear. With the exception of two leaders, the rest did not survive the 
competition, for, by 1963, most lost office. In what came to be Gishamvu, that is the 
communes Shori and Kibingo, two leaders were elected during the commune elections of 
July 1960: Joseph Karengera for Shori and Servilien Nzabakira for Kibingo. The first 
kept office only until 1962 and was then removed for a number of reasons. These include 
the fact that he married a Tutsi lady, behaviour that is said to have shocked a number of 
his councillors. Yet the latter are the ones who were electing the burgomaster. Other 
informants talk about the conflict Joseph Karengera had with one councillor. So they 
removed him from office and appointed another councillor called Elias Karengera who 
was not as educated as Joseph Karengera.126 This one had been a teacher, had had some 
secondary education, whereas Elias Karengera had just primary education.127
 
 Nzabakira 
Servilien kept office until 1963, which implies that he lasted longer.  
Another who enjoyed more stability is Raymond Hakizimana, who kept office until 1971, 
a situation that arose from many factors. First, he was able to keep the confidence of 
councillors. Secondly, he was brother to Isidore Nzeyimana who was a national political 
figure. It is only after Nzeyimana was disavowed in PARMEHUTU by 1968 that 
Hakizimana also started to be discredited at local level.128
                                                 
126 Interview with Anonymous 2, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 
April 2007; Interview with Célestin Bangambiki, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. Bangambiki was Secretary and 
family member of Joseph Karengera. He latter became himself a councillor for a long time. 
 On Saga commune, from 1960 
to 1963, two people succeeded each other: Théotime Simugomwa and André Gatanazi. 
127 Interview with Elias Karengera, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
128 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
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Both had been councillors before, as one letter states.129
2.4.2. Some Lingering Effects 
 In 1963, Saga and Linda 
communes became combined to create a single commune of Kibayi, that was led then by 
Hakizimana. In Gishamvu, neither Elias Karengera of Shori nor Servilien Nzabakira of 
Kibingo obtained that position. It is Emmanuel Munyarugano who was elected in 1963. 
Elias Karengera complained about his removal from the list of election, alleging that 
police violence was used to make him stay away from candidates. 
 
A number of developments changed almost forever the social landscape in Rwanda 
following the “revolution.” Indeed, this was the first time that an open conflict in the 
form of a “war” between the Hutu and the Tutsi occurred in the history of Rwanda. That 
itself is a fundamental fact. Then there was the exile of a big number of the Tutsi and 
other monarchists. This was followed by a policy of expropriation. All these 
developments had a lingering effect, for most of them were perpetuated in Rwandan 
politics until 1994.  
 
a) The Exile 
 
 
A number of scholars have already attracted our attention to the refugee issue.130
 
 It is 
when analysing this issue at local level that one sees its acuteness, longevity and 
everydayness. Since at least 1960, the burgomasters and their constituents were dealing 
with it on an everyday basis.  
It is however difficult to reconstruct the unfolding of exile either at the national level or at 
my local level, for a number of reasons. First, there were several places to which people 
fled: public and private. Among the public, there were churches and administrative areas, 
inside and outside the country. Second, there were different times of flight: those who 
                                                 
129 André Hitimana, Burgomaster of Saga Commune, Buhanga-Ndara Chiefdom, Letter to the Territory 
Administrator of Astrida, Re: Councilors who have other positions, Ref. No. 69/60. TP, Saga, 4 October 
1960.  
130 See Guichaoua 1988, 1995, Mugesera 2004, Kimonyo 2008. 
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fled in 1959 and then came back home; those who fled in the 1960-1961 election 
campaign violence; those who fled in 1962 following independence and subsequently. 
Third, there were also several frequencies or sequences of flight: being expelled and 
coming back; being expelled forever outside the country; fleeing outside the country and 
being called back to the country. Fourth, there were also the consideration of status and 
agency: those who are chosen to come back home from sites of internal displacement and 
those who are expelled from those places in reference to their colonial statuses, agencies 
or personal negotiations; those who were not expelled but fled and never came back; 
those who were never allowed to come back but who returned illegally, etc. Therefore, 
any attempt at recounting this episode is only a tentative one; it will definitely not do 
justice to local narratives which were very detailed on this issue. 
 
1° The places of temporary refuge, permanent refuge and external asylum 
 
The choice of the place where to flee depended on several factors. For example, the 
intensity of the attack undergone obliged the people who were fleeing to choose a place 
relatively close by. On the other hand, the imitation factor obliged a number of other 
people in flight to go where others were going. This increased the likelihood of a large 
number of people going to public places such as administrative offices, church or school 
sites. Also some others chose to go to those places because they had had information that 
a certain humanitarian service had been organised to cater for them. A few Tutsi also 
went to hide in the houses of Hutu family members or friends or former clients. Some of 
these went thereafter to seek refuge in public areas in order to benefit from some 
humanitarian intervention. 
 
In Gishamvu, public places where the monarchists obtained refuge include the Nyumba 
mission and the Nyakibanda Great Seminary. Some few people from Gishamvu also fled 
to the Kansi mission, which is close to some areas of Gishamvu such as Liba, Kibingo, 
and Buvumu.131
                                                 
131 Interview with Damien Rwarinda and with Gaston Nzabamwita. 
 Flight to church mission stations was motivated by a number of factors. 
Since churches were believed to be sacred places, there was hope of not being attacked 
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there. Furthermore, the clergy used to provide some humanitarian help. So many people 
aimed for safety and survival there. However, some Hutu people continued to help their 
displaced fellows by bringing them food at the missions. Here is one account:  
 
The war reached here (Gishamvu) in 1960. Some people fled, others stayed in 
their homes. Some went to Nyumba, I saw it. That is when I gave birth to my first 
born. I used to come here to Nyumba in the first mass, carrying sweet potatoes in 
a basket, and sorghum flower, bringing it to old people from Nyanza in Kibingo, 
my place of birth. Then people became angry of it; my husband advised me to tell 
the displaced people to come and collect the food themselves at my place.132
 
 
According to two accounts, the food distributed to the displaced people was different 
from the one they used to consume in their households. So an exchange occurred: “Those 
who fled [to Nyumba and Seminary] were receiving food from the Red Cross, such as 
rice, but were not having sweet potatoes, whereas they were used to these. They used to 
give us rice, and we give them sweet potatoes.”133
 
 
In Kibayi, public places of accommodating refugees include the Commune office and the 
Mugombwa Mission. Some people from Saga arrived in Mugombwa by their own means 
and once there, they had to get food from their home provisions kept by their Hutu 
friends and relatives.134 Some benefited from colonial state transport means to arrive at 
the Mugombwa Mission. These include Tutsis who lived in Shyombo, which is a bit far 
from Mugombwa as compared to Saga. They first arrived at the Commune office and got 
transportation from there. “As you hear now that people died in the parishes and in the 
commune offices, it was because of previous events.”135
                                                 
132 Interview with Emérite Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
  Indeed, most of the places to 
which people fled in the 1994 genocide were also places where the Tutsi and other 
monarchists had fled in 1959 and afterwards. As they escaped attacks during those 
moments, the memory about those sites being safe places was kept alive. In 1994, the 
same scenario was repeated again, and people under attack thought that they could 
133 Interview with Haruna Bizimana, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. See also interview with Emérite 
Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
134 Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
135 Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
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survive by fleeing to those places. But unfortunately, as we shall see further, they did not 
survive. They were attacked and the bulk of them were murdered. 
 
The Anglican Church Mission in Astrida also became a shelter for many people in flight 
coming from various corners of the Territory. A number of people from Gishamvu and 
Kibayi narrate how a pastor called Schmidt provided them with shelter in Butare and 
from there he gave them transport to flee outside the country, mainly to Burundi.136
 
 
The catering and humanitarian services were done by many agents. The colonial 
administration was a key agent among them.137 Indeed, as Astrida witnessed violence 
since early 1960, the budget of the Territory proved insufficient. In early 1961, the 
Accountant of the Astrida Territory wrote a letter to the Minister of Refugees based in 
Kigali asking for supplementary credit of 385,000 francs in order to balance the year 
1960’s expenses. Those expenses came from reclamations from various missions and 
Territorial services which were intervening in favour of refugees’ provisions.138 The 
United Nations, the Red Cross, the Caritas Catholica, the Oxford Committee and others 
helped the displaced people as well.139
 
 
As displaced people spent several weeks in those assembled areas, the Belgian authorities 
undertook a programme of moving them back to their communities or outside the 
country. It progressively started to close those places. It did so even when the displaced 
people did not yet feel safe to go back home. This was led by financial motives. It wanted 
also to vacate those buildings so that business could continue as usual.140
                                                 
136 Interview with Tharcisse Karengera; Interview with Anonymous 1; Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge. 
 This happened  
in 1959, 1960 but also in 1961. In this respect, in November 1960, a leader of UNAR, 
Gisimba, asked to the Territorial Administrator a favour for the victims in order to spend 
more time in places of refuge in Ngoma, Astrida, because at their places security was not 
137 See for example Hubert, La Toussaint rwandaise, p. 56. 
138 P. Sierens, Comptable Territorial d’Astrida, Lettre à Monsieur le Ministre des Réfugiés à Kigali, objet : 
Crédits réfugiés, N° 170/FIN., Astrida, le 13 janvier 1961, Archives Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire 
d’Astrida.  
139 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères du Rwanda, Toute la vérité, p. 9. 
140 See Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 76-78 and interviews. 
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yet established. The Administrator refused to let the refugees remain in Ngoma 
settlement, alleging that land, housing and work were not available for them in Ngoma. 
So he required that all refugees who were not expelled by commune authorities return to 
their homes. 141
 
 
A number of people who were expelled from their homes had been sent to Nyamata in 
the centre-southern part of Rwanda by late November 1959, just after the very first 
jacquerie and in later waves of violence and flight. The first refugees to be sent to 
Nyamata were mainly from the north. This region had been very active in the November 
1959 jacquerie against the Tutsi. For example, between 24 November 1959 and 29 April 
1960, there were more than 5,000 refugees from Ruhengeri and more than 700 refugees 
from Byumba. On the other hand, the refugees from Astrida were slightly more than 800 
in May 1960.142
 
   
Exceptionally, some people did not flee at all to public places. Some hid at Hutu fellows’ 
homes, others remained in their homes and were not attacked, because they had some 
Hutu people to protect them. These cases were found both in Gishamvu and Kibayi.143 
Others assembled at Bitare hill and Bisi mountain in Gishamvu in 1960. The Bitare group   
defended themselves against the “revolution” fighters and a large number of them did not 
flee. The ones from Bisi were sent to Nyumba and Nyakibanda missions thereafter.144
 
  
Bitare and Bisi also became refuges in 1994. Almost all these places that provided shelter 
for victimised people in 1959-62, also became places to which the Tutsi fled in 1994. 
                                                 
141 A. Peeters, Administrateur de Territoire, ff, Lettre à Monsieur Gisimba J. Ch., Représentant de l’UNAR 
à Astrida, objet : Réfugiés de Ngoma, N° 6139, Astrida, le 2 décembre 1960.  
142 See Ministère des Colonies, Rapport sur l’Administration Belge au Ruanda-Urundi pendant l’année 
1959, Bruxelles, 1960, p. 27 ; Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, p. 63 ; Hubert, La Toussaint rwandaise, p. 57. 
143 Interview with Béatrice Yambabariye, Kibayi, 9 May 2007; Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, 
Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; Interview with François Mukezamfura, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
144 Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
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They had become “lieux de mémoire”145 of survival for more than 30 years, but in 1994 
they became “places of annihilation.”146
 
 
2° The times of exile 
 
The timing of flight was conditioned by the violent events. Each wave of a major attack 
against the Tutsi and monarchists – 1959, early 1960, all along 1960, and during the 
propaganda campaign of 1961, even on the eve of independence in 1962 (see section on 
violence) - was followed by a wave of flight, both inside and outside the country.   
Secondly, at the church missions and at administrative places where temporary shelters 
were located, the victims would spend several weeks there. One informant recalled the 
time spent at Nyumba mission as “not less than three months.”147
 
  
3° The complex movements of exile: places of refuge inside the country and 
several different external countries of exile 
 
As far as individual and family experiences are concerned, it is hard to date flight 
experiences since they varied greatly. It was a back and forth experience, since for most 
waves of flight to public places, there were also processes of selecting the ones to come 
back home and the ones to be expelled. Furthermore, a number of people fled to Burundi 
in 1960 and 1961, and then came back in late 1961 and 1962.148 There is even one who 
went to Uganda in 1961 and then came back in 1962.149
                                                 
145 See Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations, No. 26, 
Special Issue: Memory and Counter-Memory, Spring 1989, pp. 7-24.  
 A number of those returnees 
146 This point is developed in chapters six and seven. 
147 Interview with Callixte Kanyamugenga, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
148 Following informants went to Burundi and then came back to Gishamvu and Kibayi: Tharcisse 
Karengera, the father of Augustin Nemeye, the family of Ildéphonse Bisamaza, the family of Domitille 
Niyonsaba, Innocent Nahayo, family of Théodosie Kanyanja. 
149 It is the informant Anonymous 4. Here is his narration of his experience as a refugee: “I was a student at 
Byimana when imvururu (upheavals) started. Then we heard that it started at Byimana. […] Imvururu 
continued in 1960. During that time I had left Byimana and went to Save. APROSOMA was strong there 
because Gitera, the president of that party, was from there. Then we saw houses burning there, then we 
went back home during vacations. We narrated to our parents what we saw, but they knew it also since they 
had heard news. Here at Sheke and Bitare, the revolt arrived in 1960. […] Then I stopped studying. During 
that time, any person who had studied some few years could get a job in the administration.[…] But me I 
did not get a job, because discrimination (against Tutsi) had started. Then in 1961, From Sheke I went in 
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from outside were suspected of being accomplices of the Inyenzi (refugee fighters) 
group, formed in exile; as a result, they were jailed and then released. But some others 
did not face any judicial procedure. These returnees from outside had come back as a 
result of a state communiqué that encouraged them to return by a certain date. Those who 
felt brave enough to come back or who were too young to suspect any subsequent 
intimidation came back. The burgomasters also sent messages to exiled people who were 
in Burundi to come back. However, it seems that only those who were friends of the new 
Hutu leaders came back. In Kibayi these include former subchiefs Urayaha and 
Kibwana.150
 
 In this process, families disintegrated, since some members fled, and others 
stayed in the country. Some had fled together but a number of them came back while 
others decided to remain abroad. It was an imbroglio.  
 
4° Identity, status and agency in exile 
 
After the November 1959 jacquerie and in 1960 and 1961, the colonial state organised a 
programme of bringing back the people who had fled to missions and administrative 
places. That programme was made possible thanks to the colonial order to the new 
authorities to sensitize their constituents about peaceful welcoming of the Tutsi who had 
fled. The majority of poorer Tutsi, that is, those who were peasants and who had suffered 
the same fate as the Hutu and Twa during the colonial period, were welcomed back to 
their homes. By the same token, the colonial state decided to expel individuals who were 
deemed unwanted by the new PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA power and by the local 
population.151
                                                                                                                                                 
exile abroad in Uganda. I became a refugee. But I did not last there. […] I went to a region called Toro near 
Lac Albert. I worked there, and then they gave me a leave of two months. I came back to Rwanda in 
February 1962, I encountered many problems on my way back, (being arrested, uncomfortable 
transportation until Sheke, suspicion). […] Luckily enough I found my parents alive, but I was in touch 
with them while abroad through correspondence. I found that many people had lost their houses because of 
fire. […] It became impossible for me to go back to Uganda, then I remained in Rwanda that way.  […] I 
found a new Burgomaster, Joseph Karengera who had studied at Byimana as well some years ahead of 
me.” 
 These include any Tutsi, powerful or not, who had been a UNAR active 
150 Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
151 Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, p. 125. 
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member, who had fought on the side of UNAR during the violence or who was deemed 
socially undesirable by certain Hutu parties.  
 
The implementation of this selection programme was done through what was called the 
“revolutionary tribunal.”152 This included the authorities as well as the local population. 
Antoine Mugesera, who has been a witness of these events and who has written a book 
about them, says that two levels of meetings were organised in order to decide on who to 
allow to come back and who to expel from the country. The first meeting was between 
the Territorial Administrator and the Burgomasters and then the second was between the 
Burgomasters, their Commune Councillors and their constituents.153
 
 
My research confirms this information and shows complex trends during this process of 
choosing (gutoranya) the “good” and the “bad” ones, as they were called by the 
informants; the good ones being allowed to come back to their homes, and the others 
being expelled outside the country (bagacibwa), that is, they get expelled. A combination 
of status, identity, interpersonal negotiations or mediations and conjunctural behaviours 
seem to have accounted for the Tutsi being allowed to stay in Rwanda or being expelled. 
Furthermore, these same patterns accounted also for the Tutsi accepting or refusing to 
come back after being given permission. 
 
Identity counted to some extent in the criteria of those who could come back or not. For 
example, the Tutsi who were from a mixed family stood more chance of being chosen 
than the ones who were not. The Hutu who were among those making the selection 
tended to negotiate the reintegration of their Tutsi relatives.154
                                                 
152 See the account of lieutenant-colonel Bruneau in Logiest, Mission au Rwanda, p. 145. 
 Furthermore, a Hutu who 
was acquainted with the Tutsi could be confused with them, even undergo their fate, but 
also be tolerated. Such is the case of my informant Nyirisenge. He was not Tutsi, was not 
153 Mugesera, Imibereho, pp. 80-81. 
154 See for example the family of my informant Théodosie Kanyanja, interviewed in Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
See also Interview with Gaston Nzabamwita, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. According to Nzabamwita, “they 
(the Tutsi) went to Kansi mission, then the new burgomasters and the party members went to choose them. 
They used to tell some one ‘you you will go back home’, caused by the fact that some of them had 
intermarried with those Batutsi. Then they rebuild their destroyed houses.” 
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in UNAR, but saw his house burnt, just because he was acquainted with the Tutsi 
Ntamanyoma who was expelled. He also fled to Mugombwa Mission. He says that the 
Hutu confused him with Tutsi people. As a result, he sought refuge in Mugombwa at the 
mission. But he was selected among those who could come back, for being Hutu, as he 
says.155
 
  
Status was also important. As Raymond Hakizimana, who was burgomaster during that 
time, observes, Tutsi former leaders were targeted to be driven out. Some had gone long 
before the selection process, but the remaining ones got expelled. Kabisa, Kanamugire, 
Ruzindana and Ruvebana were former subchiefs. They had gone to exile. Only Kibwana 
and Urayaha were allowed to remain in the country and were reintegrated.156  In 
Gishamvu, also most authorities were expelled. The one who remained at home was 
Namahungu. Other Tutsi who were wealthy got driven out as well. It is only the poor 
Tutsi who were allowed to remain home.157 As one other informant described them, 
“those are people who have suffered like us.”158 Another one went far as to say that since 
they have suffered, they were not Tutsi: “they [the authorities] said the one who was 
beaten and who did Akazi during the colonial period, who was beaten, who has cultivated 
amashiku, that one is not a Tutsi, therefore he was not to be expelled.”159 Here one 
notices that status160
 
 could interfere with or reject identity.  
But agency, that is interpersonal relations, negotiations and mediations in the past and 
present, could surpass identity and status, though the latter looked more durable and 
grounded. Tutsi people who had been friends with Hutu stood more chance of remaining 
at home: “They did not expel us, because my father, Léonidas Rushingabigwi, had done 
nice things to the Hutu. So they liked him very much, others regretted having burnt our 
house, they said it was a mistake, they would have not done that.”161
                                                 
155 Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
 Some who had even 
156 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
157 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; Interview with Justin Munyankindi, 
Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
158 Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
159 Interview with Anonymous 11, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
160 The analytical category class seems close to what I am calling here status. 
161 Interview with Callixte Kanyamugenga, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
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gone into exile outside the country used to come back, as they had some Hutu friends 
among the new authorities to protect them. They had become like ‘clients’ of those 
Hutu.162 Another informant narrates: “I remember that my dad had a Hutu Godfather 
whose name was Kadogi. Then we fled here at Nyakibanda Seminary. We lived there. 
Then they decided that we should come back home. Then we went back home and lived 
with the Hutu very well, then we ate, we became wealthy, the bad time came again in 
1994.”163
 
 The same is confirmed by the informants who were on the side of the 
“choosers”. Here is one account: 
I was a neighbour to the one who was called imfura (noble, nice person). Then I 
consider the fact that we lived and socialised together, he gave me milk, cow, he 
gave a living to my wife and children, he must come back, then I go to collect 
him, to choose him. For example, there was an old lady who lived near to our 
home, her name was Mukamusana. She left her belongings when she fled. She left 
even her cows at my father’s house. We were neighbours. Then when the time to 
go and choose them arrived, it is my father who went to give her a hand; he 
removed her from the group of refugees in the Seminary, and brought her back at 
home. He gave her back the barrel of beans and other stuff that she had left at our 
home. They lived together again. The others who did not have folks to go and 
choose them to come back continued their way to exile. That is the history of that 
time.164
 
 
The case of Justin Munyankindi’s family shows that status could be overcome by agency:  
 
After choosing the ones who will be expelled abroad from Nyumba, they returned 
the others to their homes, the ones whose houses were burnt people helped them 
to repair their houses, the ones whose houses were intact they reintegrated them. 
[…] As for us our house was not burnt, because there were two men that our 
family had given cows. They are the ones who protected our house, except my 
elder brother whose house was burnt. Because he was a teacher, they had in fact 
expelled him but the burgomaster Karengera intervened in his favour because 
they had studied together. That is why he did not flee. He only died in the 1994 
genocide.165
 
  
                                                 
162 Interview with Anonymous 2, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. The bulk of those who came back were from 
Burundi, because this region is close to the border with Burundi. Very few are said to have come back from 
Uganda or Congo. 
163 Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
164 Interview with Anonymous 3, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
165 Interview with Justin Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
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The former subchief Namahungu also managed to remain home because among other 
reasons he had given cows to some Hutu who were in the new power structure. Those 
intervened in favour of him in ‘choosing meetings.’ As a result, he did not have his house 
burnt and was not expelled outside the country.166 In the same vein, Urayaha, former 
subchief of Saga, is said to have given a calf to André Hitimana (alias Kiramoto), the new 
burgomaster of Saga, when he returned from exile. In return, he gave him back the land 
of his extended family which was located at Kirembwa. Urayaha ultimately became a 
“friend” of Hitimana André.167
 
 
From all these accounts, it appears that the gift of a cow was a significant way to cement   
interpersonal relations. Indeed, in the Rwandan “culture,” it signified and still signifies 
the most outstanding gesture of friendship between two individuals and families. Besides 
giving cows, social utility was also important. Families of old women who have the skills 
to deliver babies (midwives) were protected during violence and were reintegrated 
home.168  Apart from interpersonal relations, political collaboration also gave the Tutsi 
more chance of being chosen. The father of Godeberthe Mukagitoli had joined 
APROSOMA; as a result, his family got reintegrated home.169
 
 
We already saw how the Tutsi who had been active in party politics and in fighting had 
been targeted during the time of burning houses. During the time of choosing, they were 
also targeted to be expelled. That was the time when the Hutu leaders found the occasion 
to retaliate against them: Munyarugamba who had been an active member of UNAR got 
expelled:  
 
They came and burnt houses, we fled, we came here at Nyumba in the mission, 
others went to the seminary, others in Kansi. Then they came to expel. Some were 
expelled, others chosen to go back home. They said ‘the expelled ones are the 
violent ones’ then they sent us in exile. [They expelled me] because allegedly I 
                                                 
166 Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
167 Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
168 Interview with Esther Kanyambo, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
169 Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
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was violent. I was young, I had my first born; in my understanding I refused their 
mode of rule because it was contrary to the life reality.170
 
 
Some informants said also that people considered as witches, regardless of their identity 
and status, were expelled during this time.  It was an occasion to settle previous 
misunderstandings.171
 
 
As the selection process was decentralised thought the “revolution” tribunals, the Hutu 
population at local level felt empowered because they could decide on the fate of their 
Tutsi neighbours.172 As it appeared later, the ones chosen became friends or clients or 
protégés of the ordinary or powerful Hutu and had to keep their relations with Hutu in a 
good direction so as to live in relative peace.173
 
 
The case of abamotsi is particularly revealing. The ones who were Tutsi tended to be 
expelled.174
 
 But the ones who were Hutu were forgiven for their identity. Here identity 
surpassed their colonial role status:   
The leaders say: ‘You so and so come here to choose; what do you say 
about so and so?’ We answer: ‘Pu, pu, pu, that one was umumotsi, he 
ruled badly, we don’t like him. […] The abamotsi were both Tutsi and 
Hutu. But you understand, the Hutu did not flee, it was only the Tutsi. […] 
The Hutu used to beat him saying that he misbehaved, but because he was 
our fellow Hutu, they said: ‘Stay here with us there is no problem.’ Yes, 
but there are also many Hutu who fled together with the Tutsi.175
 
 
The last sentence of the above informant shows how complex was identity in this exile 
matter.176
                                                 
170 Interview with Théodomir Munyarugamba, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
 The example given by Godeberthe Mukagitoli confirms this above explanation 
too:  “There was one umumotsi called Bamanza, he was a Hutu. But because he was very 
171 Interview with Elias Karengera, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007; Interview with Esther Kanyambo, Gishamvu, 
24 April 2007. 
172 Interview with Gérard Segatashya, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
173 Interview with Anonymous 16, Kibayi. 
174 For example the father of my informant Augustin Bucyabutata. 
175 Interview with Gérard Segatashya, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
176 In the following part of his account, Segatashya says that the Tutsi who lived at Busoro, his area, did not 
get attacked during this time, did not flee: “They were killed only in 1994.” 
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arrogant, they beat him too much. He used to say: ‘I am not a Hutu, I am a Tutsi.’ They 
beat him during1960. They had burnt his house and they cut his banana trees. But they 
did not expel him, they forgave him.”177
 
  
The ones who were allowed to go back to their homes were helped by the Hutu 
population to rebuild their houses. Most of those who had kept their belongings returned 
them, and life continued again: “What shows that the Hutu and the Tutsi were still having 
good relationship is that the Hutu helped them to rebuild their houses, helped them to 
cultivate and to recover economically slowly and slowly.”178
 
 
Finally, concerning the numbers of refugees who were allowed to come back home and 
those who were expelled, there is a disagreement. Colonial officials say that the majority 
were allowed to come back to their communities.179 In Burundi itself, by July 1962, the 
government of Burundi was counting about 40,000 Rwandan refugees and was urging the 
UNHCR to help them.180
 
 Lemarchand also disagrees with the colonial estimate, pointing 
out that only few were welcomed back. But it is from 1963 onwards that the number of 
refugees grew significantly:  
From about 7,000 at the end of November 1959, the total number of refugees rose 
to 22,000 by April 1960. Of these, about 7,000 were installed at the Nyamata 
camp of refugees, in the Bugesera, while the remaining 15,000, distributed 
through the territories of Biumba, Gisenyi and Astrida, found temporary asylum 
in mission stations and government buildings or wandered over the countryside in 
a vain quest for food, shelter and security. Only a small percentage of the total 
refugee population was allowed to return to their homelands after the events of 
November 1959, and many of those who did lived to regret it. Most of them 
eventually chose to resettle in neighbouring countries – Burundi, the Congo, 
Uganda and Tanzania. From a mere trickle, the number of refugees who sought 
asylum abroad grew rapidly after 1960: from approximately 1,500 in late 1960, 
approximately 130,000 Tutsi had left the country by the end of 1963.181
                                                 
177 Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
 
178 Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. See also Interview with Marguerite 
Nyirabititaweho, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
179 Logiest, Mission au Rwanda; see also the accounts of burgomasters during this time: Elias Karengera 
and Raymond Hakizimana. 
180 Nathaniel H. Goetz, “Towards self sufficiency and integration: an historical evaluation of assistance 
programmes for Rwandese refugees in Burundi, 1962 – 1965”, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working 
Paper No. 87, March 2003, pp. 1-26, p. 2. 
181 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 172. 
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Until the late 1960s, the Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries had reached a 
number of about 300,000.182 They became “the most ancient refugees in black Africa.”183
 
 
b) Property 
 
 
The people who were expelled had left some of their movable assets, and the whole of 
their non-movable property, that included houses and land. Those who fled without 
leaving their livestock and food stocks with people to take care of for them, simply lost 
their property. It is mainly the attackers who looted them. Most of those who fled after 
leaving their belongings to some of their Hutu friends and neighbours to keep and protect 
them got their things back when they were allowed to return to their homes. Most 
informants who were among the victims assert today that at that time, there still prevailed 
a ‘good culture’ of helping those in danger. They even mention names of Hutu people 
who kept their or others’ belongings and once back gave them back those things.184
 
 
However, some movable property had been also destroyed inside houses while the latter 
got burnt.  
As for the unmovable property, most houses had been burnt. Redistribution concerned 
mostly land. In 1960-61, the government of Rwanda issued a communiqué calling the 
people who had fled out of the country and who were not undesirable to come back. The 
existing power ruled that “anyone who will not come back by a certain date, his isambu 
will be redistributed to others. Then people waited for them to come back, they did not 
come back. Then the Minister of Agriculture and Breeding ruled that anyone who fled, 
his isambu must be given to others. […] Then the burgomasters followed that rule and 
redistributed the land. […] I also did that job of redistributing.”185
                                                 
182 Goetz, “Towards self sufficiency”, p. 2. 
 Raymond Hakizimana 
183 Claudine Vidal et José Kagabo, “L'extermination des Rwandais tutsi”, Cahiers d'études africaines, 
Année 1994, Volume 34, Numéro 136, pp. 537 – 547, p. 539. 
184 Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 
21 April 2007; Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. The names of Hutu people 
who helped the Tutsi in that way include the following: Rwangabo, Kanani and John Nyambwana who was 
a teacher. 
185 Interview with Elias Karengera, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
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who was also burgomaster at that time confirms the explanation of former burgomaster 
Elias Karengera. The redistribution did not happen immediately. At first, the government 
identified those lands that had been vacated, set people to look after them until the time 
of redistribution. Those people in charge happened to be mostly newly elected commune 
councillors following the Commune elections of 1960. According to the official version, 
this measure was taken, so that “the population could not fight over that land.”186 Those 
people in charge had usufruct rights over the monitored land, or could lease it in the 
meantime.187
 
 
The first redistribution programme occurred later around 1960-61. It was the Commune 
Council made of the burgomasters and the councillors that was in charge of redistributing 
land of those who were expelled or who fled and never came back. “Every councillor was 
establishing the list of those applying for land. Then the commune committee meet and 
select those who will receive land. […] There was even a written statement given to the 
new beneficiaries of amasambu, and this was recorded in the commune register, so that 
anyone coming could check the accountability of this activity. […] That is how it 
happened at that time.”188 The Minister of Local Government ordered that even coffee 
plants “abandoned can be redistributed after a certain time (two to three years) to the 
inhabitants of [the] commune. However, that redistribution must be written in a special 
register.”189
 
 
Concerning those who were entitled to receive that land, the official version stated that 
poor people, that is, the landless, were the priority. According to former burgomaster 
Hakizimana, the Commune authorities who had many children also got additional land, it 
is in that regard that the Commune council gave to Hakizimana also land, but later on.190 
For ordinary people, there was at first an investigation to check if they were in need.191
                                                 
186 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
 It 
187 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
188 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
189 J.B. Habyarimana, Préfet d’Astrida, Lettre à tous les Bourgmestres, objet : Entretien des cultures 
diverses, N° 475/Agri.9.0I, Astrida, le 10 février 1961. 
190 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
191 Interview with Elias Karengera, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
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is mostly Hutu people who stood more chance of receiving this land, since they are the 
ones who are believed to have won the ‘revolution’. However, certain Tutsi individuals 
who were courageous enough to approach the new authorities also received a share of 
land. They received mostly a part of land that formerly belonged to their family members 
gone into exile: “Concerning the Tutsi, when I went to give the land of their parents, I 
made sure that I gave them a field at first.”192
 
  
The people interviewed who were among the peasants give some nuance to this ‘official’ 
description of events. They say that it is mostly rich Hutu people who got land, and that 
only a few Hutu poor people benefited from this redistribution.193  Others say that both 
the poor and the non-poor received some land during the redistribution. Some Hutu who 
were former clients of Tutsi subchiefs and who had received land did not have a chance 
to get land,194 while others still managed to negotiate a new friendship with the new 
authorities and get additional land.195
 
  
If the land to be redistributed happened to be large, it was divided among two or more 
new recipients.196 This suggests that the number of new land owners increased. One 
example of a piece of land divided among many people is the isambu that belonged to 
former subchief Gashagaza who lived at Muboni. His isambu was taken over and then 
redistributed by the commune council that met on 7 December 1962. This council gave 
that land to four people: Nkundabagenzi, Matabaro, Misigaro and Nzabonaliba. It also 
redistributed the land of other four refugees of Muboni to nine people.197
 
 
Most Tutsi informants confirmed that during this first redistribution certain Tutsi had 
received a portion of land belonging to their family members who had fled outside the 
                                                 
192 Interview with Elias Karengera, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
193 Interview with Athanase Kumuyange, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, 
Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
194 See for example informant Gaston Nzabamwita, see also the father of informant Joseph Baritunga, and 
the father of François Shirubute. 
195 See for example the informant Gratien Rwigimba who got isambu from burgomaster André Hitimana, 
alias Kiramoto. 
196 Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
197 Elie Karengera, Burgomaster of Sholi Commune, Minutes of the meeting of the Commune Council that 
took place on 7 December 1962, Copy, Sheke, 9 February 1963. 
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country.198 Those are the few who could have enough courage to face the new authorities 
and apply for land.199 The Tutsi who had been displaced to Nyamata and elsewhere 
inside the country, though they were not refugees, lost their property rights over land left 
where they were previously established.200
 
 
 
Some informants criticized the way the selection was done: The redistribution was as 
follows: “The councillors started to give themselves the land, then saw others they like, 
they give them. If they do not like you they could not give you.”201 Friends or clients of 
the new burgomasters stood more chance to get served in the first place.202 Politically, the 
redistribution programme became an occasion to reward those who had been strongly 
active in the ‘revolution’ either by fighting, burning houses or by doing propaganda for 
the Hutu parties: “Land was given to those who allegedly had worked very well. It 
became like ingororano (a reward).”203… “It is the abarwanashyaka [propagandists] who 
got land.”204 Some even considered this activity as a self-serving one in favour of 
authorities. 205 Only one person described this activity in laudatory terms: “the poor also 
received land in the redistribution. […] It was Nzabakira who started the redistribution. 
He was nicknamed Inyagira, that is rain [i.e., the rain does not discriminate people it falls 
on, meaning a kind, fair person].”206
 
 
Indeed, to be poor was a necessary but not sufficient condition in order to be entitled to 
land redistribution. One had first to approach leaders and apply for land. In practice, a 
person in need of land had first to identify in his vicinity a piece of land that was 
available, that had once belonged to those who had fled. Then he could approach his 
close councillor or go immediately to the burgomaster to submit his application. 
According to former burgomaster Elias Karengera, only those who came to apply had 
                                                 
198 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza; with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, and Vincent Kanamugire. 
199 Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
200 Mugesera, Imibereho, pp. 87-88. 
201 Interview with Justin Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
202 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
203 Interview with Vincent Kanamugire, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
204 Interview with Anonymous 9, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. See also interview with Augustin Gakuru. 
205 Interview with Gaston Nzabamwita, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 9, 
Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
206 Interview with Cassien Rwanyange, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
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their case examined.207 One had to “consult”208 the authority. What was the meaning of 
this ‘consultation’ or, to put it differently, what were the requirements in this process of 
‘consultation’? Several informants said that one had to bring something to the councillor 
or the burgomaster while introducing one’s demand. This kind of bribe was in the form of 
drink, or sometimes a different gift, and more rarely a cow. The names for this bribe were 
inyoroshyo, igiturire, and bitugukwaha.209
 
 
This condition for application was so important that some poor people, who did not have 
anything to offer, did not try their chances and go to apply.210 Furthermore, the type or 
quality of land to receive depended on one’s status and one’s level of negotiation with the 
local authorities. The poor, who did not have anything to offer or who offered little, also 
received little, that is, unfertile land,211 land located on top of mountains and that was 
previously used for grazing (umukenke). 212
 
 Whereas most of the wealthy ones or the ones 
who had managed to be close to new leaders received fertile land, including land that 
once belonged to former Tutsi colonial authorities. 
The gifts received led some burgomasters to direct intimidation against some Tutsi 
constituents who were not their friends. The motivation was that once they flee, the 
burgomaster would have more land to redistribute, hence more redistributive power and 
more gifts and patronage.213
                                                 
207 See also Interview with Innocent Nahayo, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
 Therefore, those who had fertile and substantial land were 
likely to face the danger of being expelled: “When independence came, people slandered 
me saying: ‘This old Twa is a sorcerer!’ I was beaten twice. It was a way of obliging me 
208 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
209 Interviews with Anonymous 2, Anonymous 5, Anonymous 17, Athanase Kumuyange, François-Xavier 
Hakizamungu. Thérèse Mukangwije, Tharcisse Karengera.  See also Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 
pp. 186-188, 274; Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 106. 
210 Such is the case of the father of informant Vénuste Sindabizera, who “did not have the social status 
necessary to approach leaders.” As the informant Tharcisse Karengera observed, “in Kinyarwanda 
language, there is a proverb that says: “An empty mouth kills its owner.” 
211 Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
212 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; interview with Tharcisse Karengera, 
Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
213 See Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 184-185. 
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to leave my lands. […] I had a big land, that is why I was mistreated.”214 In the same 
vein, this early redistribution, since it happened when the Tutsi and other monarchists 
were still fleeing violence, may have reduced the number of poor Hutu peasants helping 
the Tutsi. “They understood very well that assisting the Tutsi in any manner was a way of 
giving up to their land.”215 So, land involved very high stakes not just after the conflict, 
but even during its unfolding. As Hubert writes again, “…the revolution has given 
cultivating fields to the people…”216
 
 
Some cases of intimidation were registered in my area of study. A number of people saw 
their property confiscated and redistributed whereas they had not yet gone abroad. Some 
of these often made claims towards the Territorial Administration. These claims occurred 
mostly from May 1960 onwards, which means during the campaign for the Commune 
election around June-July 1960. As we saw above, this time was also characterised by 
widespread violence. For example, the following people were also stripped of their 
property and wrote a collective letter to the Territorial Administration, asking for justice: 
Nkundabagenzi, Rekeraho, Nyagasega, Nzigiye…Rwabigwi, Rukerakurora, Matabaro, 
Kwitegetse, and Gashagaza.217 A lady called Nyirambibi also wrote a letter to the 
Territorial Administration claiming the isambu of his father-in-law who went abroad, 
arguing that she needed that land in order to raise her children who were orphans.218
                                                 
214 José Kagabo et Vincent Mudandagizi, “Complainte des gens de l’argile. Les Twa du Rwanda”, Cahiers 
d’Etudes Africaines, XIV, 53, 1974, pp. 75-87, p. 87. Marie Thérèse Nyirabega says that her family 
brothers fled, and those who remained in the country were called tutsi and threatened in order to leave their 
property. But ultimately, they were not expelled.  
 A 
few days later, another person claimed his land that was confiscated, whereas he had not 
gone into exile: “I accuse Mr. Nzabakira [Burgomaster of Kibingo] of having stripped me 
of my property on 21 July 1960. When I went to claim it […] his policemen came to my 
house at night, beat me and brought me to prison, I spent a night there and on the 
following day as there was no reason to imprison me, you have released me. I beg you, 
Mr. Territorial Administrator to rescue me and inform me about what I can do in such a 
215 Hubert, La Toussaint rwandaise, p. 58. 
216 Hubert, La Toussaint rwandaise, p. 61. 
217 Nkundabagenzi, Rekeraho, Nyagasega, Nzigiye…Rwabigwi, Rukerakurora, Matabaro, Kwitegetse et 
Gashagaza, Lettre collective à l’Administrateur Territorial, Nyumba, le 29/5/1960. 
218 Euphrasia N.Mbibi, habitant de Bashumba-Nyakare, Lettre à l’Administrateur de Territoire d’Astrida, 
Mubumbano, le 4/7/1960, Archives Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida. 
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situation.”219 Almost the same situation happened to Claver Mugenzi.220 Another person 
wrote to the Territorial Administrator explaining that he had been expelled from Mvejuru 
where he lived, then he fled to Shori commune where he got also driven out. So he was 
asking for a permission to get settled in Astrida town located also in Mvejuru 
chiefdom.221 In November 1960, the Tribunal of Astrida confirmed in writing that two 
people, Semutwa and Mukamusoni were insolvent because they had lost their houses and 
property.222 In the following month, the Territorial Administrator asked the Burgomaster 
of Kibingo Commune, Nzabakira, to take into consideration the case of a lady called 
Nyiravara who was claiming the property of her father.223 While most of the above 
people were writing to the Territorial Administrator hoping to get their case examined in 
the Kibingo Commune, maybe because they believed the Belgian Territory Administrator 
to be fairer or more neutral, there is one case of a person who wrote to the burgomaster: 
“You know very well that I am in prison, I would like you to inform me if it is you who 
has redistributed my property.”224
 
 
These claims continued even in the following cases of redistribution. Munyarugano, who 
was burgomaster of Gishamvu from 1963 to 1969 is said to have redistributed most of the 
land that had remained unredistributed, since he is the one who lasted in power unlike the 
previous burgomasters. He is also remembered to have confiscated land of Tutsi who had 
kept the land of their family members, he left them a small portion.225
 
 Anonymous 5 is 
more explicit:  
For example a Tutsi person could hide the property of his parent or sibling. Then 
during the rule of Munyarugano, he discovered that his predecessors did not 
                                                 
219 Rukara, habitant de la Colline Kibingo, Chefferie Bashumba-Nyakare, Requête du 17.8.1960 à 
l’Administrateur du Territoire, Archives Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida. 
220 Claver Mugenzi, habitant de la Colline Kibingo, Chefferie Bashumba-Nyakare, Requête du 17.8.1960 à 
l’Administrateur du Territoire, Archives Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida. 
221 Bakomeza, habitant de la Colline Munazi, Chefferie Mvejuru, Requête du 18.10.1960 à l’Administrateur 
du Territoire, Archives Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida. 
222 F. Gakwaya, Huissier, Territoire d’Astrida, Lettre à Monsieur le Gérant de l’Estaf, objet : ESTAF contre 
Semutwa et Mukamusoni, Astrida, le 18 novembre 1960. 
223 A. Peeters, Administrateur de Territoire, ff, Lettre à Monsieur le Bourgmestre Nzabakira, Commune 
Kibingo, objet : Affaire Nyiravara, N° 6125/A.I.I0.-, Astrida, le 1 décembre 1960. 
224 Bukininkware, Lettre au Bourgmestre Nzabakira de Kibingo, Astrida, le 16/3/1961. 
225 Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
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redistribute all the Tutsi’s land properties. Then he resumed the redistribution. 
They restarted the process by taking over that land and redistributing it. That is 
when some became unhappy about that taking over of land and decided to go into 
exile again. Some went again to Burundi, others to Tanzania by 1967-1968. 
 
But according to Anonymous 5, they were few. No one expelled them, they decided to go 
because their land was reduced.226 Indeed, after the first redistribution, the local 
authorities continued to check land ownerships and redistribute. This process continued 
until Kambanda who ruled from 1970 to 1994.227
 
 Land redistribution and claims became, 
as we shall see in following chapters, part of the everyday life both for local leaders and 
constituents. 
2.5. WAYS OF NAMING THE “REVOLUTION” 
 
In the account and interpretation of the event that came to bear the name “revolution” of 
1959, two levels of debates arose in Rwandan historiography. At the first level, there was 
a discussion about whether this event was a revolution in the true sense as compared to 
other revolutions recorded across history, or not. At the second level, even those who 
contended that it was a ‘revolution’ suggested different qualifiers for it: ethnic, social, 
antiracial, peasant, etc. 
 
Reyntjens called it a jacquerie, so did Lemarchand. But the latter explained that though it 
was the Belgians who called it a revolution, who made the Hutu intellectuals believe that 
their contestations were revolutionary and who logistically helped make it possible to 
oust the Tutsi former ‘customary’ authorities, it later became what he termed “la 
revolution téléguidée.”228
 
 
Mugesera called it Muyaga in referring to how Rwandans called it during that time. In 
my area of study, some used the word “revolution,” others “imyivumbagatanyo” (which 
suggests upheavals). 
                                                 
226 Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
227 Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
228 René Lemarchand, “Review Article: A History of genocide in Rwanda”, Journal of African History, 43, 
2002, pp. 307-311, p. 308. 
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Those who argued that it was a revolution fall into two groups. The first is constituted by 
the Hutu intellectuals themselves. These use words such as the social revolution, the 
Rwandese revolution,229 the anti-racial revolution,230 peasant revolution,231 ethnic 
revolution,232
 
 etc. The second group includes scholars who revisited the history of this 
period: Catharine Newbury, Helen Codere, Peter Gravel, etc. One notices that they do not 
doubt this was a revolution. 
Emmanuel Ntezimana has demonstrated that the borrowing of concepts from the French 
Revolution by a number of Rwandan intellectuals (“évolués”) had originated from the 
colonial education programme.233 Moreover, Mugesera argued that Kayibanda failed to 
address the masses’ issues as he focused only on the Hutu masses and ignored others. 
Therefore, concludes Mugesera, Kayibanda did not do social class analysis of the 
Rwandan society,234 a critique that can be used with regard to the concept “social 
revolution”. As for the concept “ethnic revolution,” Newbury found it only partly 
accurate, but insufficient to fully account for what happened in Rwanda in 1959-1962. 235
 
  
But whatever it was called, it is important insofar as it led to several changes that brought 
about ruptures in the ways in which the Rwandan society viewed itself, and in the ways 
in which the power structure was going to be organised after independence. It was, in the 
Derridian sense, a major event. Indeed, never in the past did an open conflict occur 
between a group called Tutsi against another called Hutu, as became the case in 1959. 
And after that, the crisis continued under the structural violence and ultimately escalated 
into genocide. Therefore, though I keep using the term revolution in brackets in the 
                                                 
229 Donat Murego, La révolution rwandaise, 1959-1962, Essai d’interprétation, Louvain, Institut des 
Sciences Politiques et Sociales, 1975. 
230 Anastase Makuza, Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice, Révolution antiraciale au Rwanda, Kigali, 
le 10 juin 1963. 
231 Antoine Nyagahene, “La révolution rwandaise de 1959 fut-elle bourgeoise ou paysanne?”, Dialogue, 
Spécial, No 137, Novembre-Décembre 1989, pp. 135-143, p. 136. 
232 Nyagahene, “La révolution rwandaise”, p. 138. 
233 Emmanuel Ntezimana, “Les causes de la révolution rwandaise. Les causes lointaines”, Dialogue, 
Spécial, No 137, Novembre-Décembre 1989, pp. 35-49, pp. 45-46. 
234 Mugesera, “Une approche”, p. 151. 
235 Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, pp. 181-182. 
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Rwandan case to show that there is still a debate concerning it, I agree with Mamdani that 
this event needs to be taken seriously.236
 
 
But Mamdani’s concepts in his analysis of the “revolution” in Rwanda must be viewed 
with caution. Two renowned authors on African History, Mamadou Diouf and René 
Lemarchand, have criticised the uses of “native” and “settler” terms to mean respectively 
the Hutu and the Tutsi. The first observed that “…in qualifying the Revolution of 1959 a 
revolution of the ‘autochthonous’ Hutu against the ‘allochthonous’ Tutsi, Mamdani has 
ignored the role of Belgian administrators and of the Catholic Church…”237
 
 
Lemarchand has his own critique of the use of terms such as ‘native’ and ‘settler’ in the 
Rwandan case:  
 
It is easy to see why the author, a Ugandan citizen of Asian origin, should be 
sensitive to the plight of settler minorities confronted with ‘native’ majorities […] 
About the racialization of Tutsi and Hutu identities by the European colonizer 
there can be no doubt. Here Mamdani is on firm, if well-trodden, ground. But 
whether the settler metaphor applies to the case at hand, either as a conceptual 
derivative of the Hamitic myth, or as an overarching explanatory frame to account 
for the killings of Tutsi, is where questions are likely to arise. One would be hard 
put to detect in the discourse of Hutu revolutionaries in the late fifties references 
to Tutsi as settlers (as distinct from ‘feudalists’ or ‘monarchists’ or ‘feudo-
monarchists’). The ‘great nativist revolution’ of 1959 is indeed better described as 
a revolution téléguidée, which owed a great deal more to the tutelle authorities 
than to Hutu ‘nativism’. That it occurred when the Belgians were still in charge of 
the Trusteeship suggests as much. It was largely inspired, engineered and assisted 
by Belgian administrators, in Brussels and Kigali, acting in close collaboration 
with the Catholic Church. It came about hard on the heels of a Hutu jacquerie 
directed not against the monarchy, much less against the Tutsi as a group, but 
against the chiefs and subchiefs, who were seen by the Hutu masses as the 
principal source of their misery. To speak of ‘nativism’ in this context is 
singularly inappropriate.238
 
 
                                                 
236 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. 
237 Mamadou Diouf dans Florence Bernault, “L’écriture scientifique en temps de crise (Rwanda, Côte-
d’Ivoire, Mali). Dossier coordonné par Florence Bernault ; textes et interventions de Pierre Boilley, 
Danielle De Lame, Mamadou Diouf, Jan Vansina, Claudine Vidal”, Afrique et Histoire, n° 2, 2004, pp. 
267-294, p. 285. 
238 Lemarchand, “Review Article”, p. 308. 
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But a careful reading of the Mamdani’s work suggests that his uses of ‘native’ and ‘alien’ 
on the Rwandan context are not literal. This means that the critique of Lemarchand on 
this ground must be taken with some moderation.  
 
Some 35 years before the above review, Lemarchand had shown to what extent the use of 
the term revolution in African countries, then emerging as independent nations, was 
strategic in the sense of propaganda, though in certain cases that include Rwanda, it was 
to be taken seriously. 239
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter stressed the violent and conflictual convulsions Rwanda went through 
during the decolonization process. While this process led to the redefinition of the 
political arena, it also caused social disintegration. Indeed, violence produced murders, 
and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans (mostly Tutsi) who became 
refugees. The political discourse used during this time influenced to some degree the 
ways in which Rwandans viewed themselves in terms of identity, and how they related to 
each other in the ensuing period.   
 
Belgium finally granted independence to Rwanda in 1962, the same year UNAR was 
asking for independence in its 1959 party programme. But Belgium gave this 
independence to the partners it wanted: particular Hutu leaders. This was the beginning of 
the postindependence period, a complex and challenging period as we shall see in the 
next chapters.  
 
 
 
                                                 
239 René Lemarchand, “Revolutionary phenomena in stratified societies: Rwanda and Zanzibar”, 
Civilisations, Vol. XVII, No. 1-4, 1967, pp. 16-51. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE POSTINDEPENDENCE REPUBLIC IN RURAL AREAS: 
BETWEEN LEGACY AND AGENCY IN THE EVERYDAY 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter studies the First and Second Republics in Gishamvu and Kibayi. It examines 
how political leaders ruled society as well as the economy, and how local authorities and 
local population interacted in their responses to the state policies. The three first sections 
of the chapter show the combination of colonial legacies and postindependence agencies. 
I show this combination in the authoritarian type of government, in the lingering issues of 
the decolonization process in the postcolony, and in the establishment of structural 
violence. The three last sections are about power performance and representation in the 
everyday life at local levels. In the whole chapter, I give enough space to primary sources 
(archives and interviews) that show the multiple but unequal agencies at local level. I do 
so, because these sources are absent in the existing literature on Gishamvu and Kibayi. 
 
3.1. AUTHORITARIANISM: BETWEEN COLONIAL LEGACY AND 
CONTEMPORARY AGENCY 
 
Since independence, a number of African countries gradually embraced authoritarian 
types of government. Both in principle and in practice, leaders tended to concentrate 
major powers in the hands of a few, mostly in the executive organ, and often in the hands 
of heads of states. That was in part a legacy of colonialism, where certain forms of 
despotic power emerged.1
                                                 
1 See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, New York, Grove Press, 1968, p. 118; Marina S. Ottaway, 
“The Crisis of the Socialist State in Africa”, in Ergas Zaki (ed.), The African State in Transition, New 
York, St. Martin’s Press, 1987, pp. 169-190, pp. 172-174; Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 
Kampala, London, Fountain Publishers, James Currey, 1996; April A. Gordon and Donald L. Gordon 
(eds.), Understanding Contemporary Africa, Third Edition, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, p. 
57. 
 And, as has been seen, most postindependence African 
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regimes borrowed administrative features of colonialism. Power was more and more 
centralized and decision-making was a top-down process. The late colonial attempts to 
establish liberal democratic constitutional regimes failed, and the state appeared more and 
more as a property of the dominant class and stood in opposition against society.2 
Concerning the relationship between state and society, a number of postindependence 
states were considered as “soft”, for, though they had been able to control opposition, 
they failed to capture society as a whole. As a result, they relied on, or rather chose to 
favour, certain groups of citizens (ethnic, regional, or religious), who happened to be 
clients of rulers, at the expense of others. This behaviour was called at first 
patrimonialism or factionalism3, and later neo-patrimonialism.4 Patrimonialism or neo-
patrimonialism or personal rule are terms used to describe the kind of rule that targets 
personal interest in a public state system.5 In its mode of functioning, personal rule in 
Africa manifested itself in a relation of clientelism and patronage between state holders 
and co-opted members of society. Heads of state chose their clients which they gave 
power. In turn, these chose lower clients and the process continued down to the bottom of 
society. Those clients at different levels enjoyed the benefits of public good, called 
patronage, and in exchange supported the existing regime.6 In most cases, clients were 
chosen from ethnic groups or regions of the heads of the state.7
 
 
                                                 
2 L. Gray Cowan , The Dilemmas of African Independence, Completely Revised Edition, New York, Walker 
and Company, 1968, pp. 26, 29, 34, 39-40; Jean-François Bayart, “Civil Society in Africa”, in Patrick 
Chabal (ed), Political Domination in Africa. Reflections on the Limits of Power, African Studies Series, 50, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 109-125, p. 116; Claude Ake, “The State In 
Contemporary Africa”, in Okwudiba Nnoli (ed.), Government and Politics in Africa: A reader, Harare, 
AAPS Books, 2000, pp. 57-65, p. 57; Rotimi Suberu, “Governance and the Ethnic Factor”, in Goran 
Hyden, Dele Olowu and Hastings w.o. Okoth-Ogendo (eds.), African Perspectives on Governance, 
Asmara, Africa World Press, Inc., 2000, pp. 123-151, p. 131. 
3 Otwin Marenin, “The Managerial State in Africa: A Conflict coalition Perspective”, in Zaki Ergas (ed.), 
The African State in Transition, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1987, pp. 61-85, p. 65; Zaki, Ergas, 
“Introduction”, in Ergas, Zaki (ed.), The African State in Transition, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1987, 
pp. 1-22, pp. 5-7; René Lemarchand, “The Dynamics of Factionalism in Contemporary Africa”, in Zaki 
Ergas (ed.), The African State in Transition, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1987, pp. 149-165; Alex 
Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics, London and New York, Routledge, 2000, p. 100. 
4 Goran Hyden, “The Governance Challenge in Africa”, in Goran Hyden, Dele Olowu and Hastings w.o. 
Okoth-Ogendo (eds.), African Perspectives on Governance, Asmara, Africa World Press, Inc., 2000, pp. 5-
32, p. 21. 
5 Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics, pp. 107-108. 
6 Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics, p. 111. 
7 Gordon and Gordon (eds.), Understanding Contemporary Africa, pp. 69 and 74. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
153 
In Rwanda, during the First Republic (1962-1973), authoritarianism and patrimonialism 
came to be strongly established. Although after independence Rwanda enjoyed a 
multiparty system, the PARMEHUTU party that was leading the country attempted to 
annihilate all other parties, and had significant success. It did so by co-opting top 
members of other parties. It destroyed the APROSOMA party by convincing the 
burgomasters of that party, who were mainly established in Butare, to cancel their 
membership from APROSOMA and enrol in PARMEHUTU. The main agents of this 
operation were the Prefects and the propagandists.8 One political figure of Butare who 
also was very active in convincing the APROSOMA Burgomasters to move to 
PARMEHUTU is Amandin Rugira, who was Secretary of PARMEHUTU in Butare. The 
shift of the Burgomasters to PARMEHUTU was to be followed by the move of the 
population making the same choice.9 As for UNAR and RADER leaders, a number of 
them were killed following the December 1963 attack of Inyenzi.10
 
 Afterwards, these 
parties failed to sustain themselves both in the political arena and in the election of 1965. 
By 1965, PARMEHUTU was the sole party that won all positions in the legislature and 
the presidency. It became a de facto single party. 
The same explanation given by colonial powers to justify their autocratic system, i.e., the 
pursuit of development,11 was also given by the Kayibanda regime: the country being 
poor, efforts ought to be united rather than divided among opposition parties. Therefore, 
it ruled, no opposition was to exist. One contemporary author even wrote that it was a 
luxury for a poor country like Rwanda to have multiple political views.12 In fact, 
proponents of Kayibanda considered his move as a pragmatic one.13
 
 
                                                 
8 René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, London, Pall Mall Press, 1970, p. 234. 
9 Filip Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda. Droit public et évolution politique, 1916-1973, Tervuren 
(Belgique), MRAC, 1985, pp. 449-450 ; Sixbert Musangamfura, Le parti M.D.R. PARMEHUTU : 
Information et propagande, 1959-1969, Mémoire de licence en Histoire, Université Nationale du Rwanda, 
Ruhengeri, 1987, p. 200. 
10 On the Inyenzi invasion, see infra. 
11 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit, pp. 511-512. 
12 Michel Mubashankwaya, Le Rwanda depuis 1959. Evolution politique, Economique et Sociale, Thèse de 
Doctorat de 3e Cycle, Université de Provence, 1971, p. 102. 
13 See Mubashankwaya, Le Rwanda depuis 1959, p. 97 and Baudoin Paternostre de la Mairieu, “Pour vous 
mes frères !”, Vie de Grégoire Kayibanda, Premier Président du Rwanda, Paris, Téqui, 1994, pp. 183-185. 
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Concerning patrimonialism, the First Republic maintained the policy of ethnicity. It 
justified this move as a way of correcting the errors of the past, where the Tutsi were said 
to have enjoyed more education and more job opportunities. It promised to promote the 
Hutu in spheres of education, labour and power. But, from 1963 to 1968, the regime 
attempted another exclusion, that of key Hutu leaders from Butare (South) and from the 
north.14 As a result, power remained concentrated among Gitarama politicians. That 
means that besides ethnicity regionalism was also instrumentalized. In the view of 
Reyntjens, the colonial regime and the First Republic were both regimes of 
authoritarianism, since they empowered a few at the expense of the majority. At one time 
it was few Tutsi leaders, at another it was few Hutu leaders.15
 
 
On top of that, president Kayibanda attempted to personify his power. Since 1961, a 
systematic campaign of singing praise to his persona was set up and that he enjoyed 
several symbolic qualifications such as “Republican Mwami”, “Father of Democracy”, 
etc.16 The personality cult of African heads of states was then a widespread practice.17 In 
order to reach this campaign, the party used the propagandists who worked from top to 
down. These are said to have been ambivalently effective, both in mounting the 
monopolization of power of PARMEHUTU, in demonizing those who were targeted for 
exclusion at certain times, but also in creating a widespread resentment of the population 
against the party, because of their abuse of power and their terrorisation of the 
population.18 They even created regular tensions with the Burgomasters at local level.19
 
 
By 1969, the political arena was so divided that the Gitarama dominating branch failed to 
strengthen the party that was weakened by ethnic, regional and interpersonal divisions. In 
early 1973, Kayibanda attempted to reunite the Hutus by redefining the prevailing 
                                                 
14 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Rapport annuel 1968, p. A.P. – 5 (I) ; Musangamfura, Le 
parti M.D.R. PARMEHUTU, pp. 234-235 ; André Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994: Les politiques du génocide à 
Butare, Paris, Karthala, 2005, p. 24. 
15 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit, pp. 515, 521. 
16 Musangamfura, Le parti M.D.R. PARMEHUTU, p. 192 ; Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit, p. 514. 
17 See Robert H. Jackson, and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, 
Tyrant, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982. 
18 Musangamfura, Le parti M.D.R. PARMEHUTU, pp. 193-195. 
19 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 247. 
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leadership crisis as merely ethnic. In this regard, a systematic campaign against Tutsi 
students and employees was launched and resulted in ousting them from schools and 
jobs. This escalated in the violence of February- March 1973, and ultimately in the coup 
d’état against Kayibanda in July 1973. 
 
The military officers who took over power, under the command of Major-General 
Habyarimana, justified their act as one of “rescue”, because they allegedly acted in order 
to stop the PARMEHUTU propagandists’ violence.20 Habyarimana’s initial discourse 
was one of appeasement. It proclaimed unity and peace for all Rwandans and this 
effectively reassured all previously threatened persons who believed that a new era had 
come. But soon after, the regime instituted a single party system, by creating the MRND 
(National Revolutionary Movement for Development) in 1975. This was claimed not to 
be a party, but a Movement, that is, “a Movement open for all, that strives to introduce a 
political and social renewal [and of which] every Rwandan is de jure a member…”21
 
 
Power decisions were more and more concentrated in the hands of party leaders and 
mostly in the Head of State’s office. The Assembly that existed since 1978 was an 
instance of deliberation rather than of major decision-making.22 In the same vein as 
Kayibanda, as early as 1977, Habyarimana also instituted a personality cult, under the 
disguise of live cultural performances programmes called in French “Animation” that 
organised weekly sessions of singing and praising party programmes and the head of the 
state.23
 
  
The Habyarimana regime also pursued a practice of clientelism, by concentrating power 
in the hands of politicians located in the North of the country around the presidential 
                                                 
20 Republic of Rwanda, Butare Prefecture, Minutes of a meeting that was held in the Butare Prefecture, led 
by the His Excellency Major General Juvénal Habyarimana, President of the Republic and President of the 
Comity in charge of Peace and Unity, on 13 May 1975, p. 9. 
21 République Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Intérieur et du Développement Communal, Bilan des 25 ans 
d’indépendance du Rwanda : 1962-1987, Kigali, Juillet 1987, p. 144. 
22 Fernand Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989 : Bilan socio-économique d'un régime, Louvain-la-Neuve, Institut 
d'Etudes du Développement, Janvier 1990, p. 10. 
23 See République Rwandaise, C.I.C. Ministériel en matière de politique, d’information et de sécurité, 
Evaluation du système et de la situation politiques du Rwanda, Kigali, Juin 1990, pp. 23-24. 
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family.24 It reinstituted the ethnic quota policy that claimed to allocate admissions at 
school and at work of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa individuals allegedly in the proportions of 
their demographic size at national level.25
 
 
In 1990, when major political changes were occurring, and when the political arena was 
being challenged to open up more political space, the MRND structure made its auto-
critique by suggesting the correction of a number of authoritarian policies within the 
party. It proposed the suppression of the live performances for the party, and the 
separation of power between the party and the existing administrative structure, since the 
party organs were fused with state organs. It proclaimed openly that corruption had been 
widespread in the administrative arena and that it should be corrected.26
 
 
Leadership at local level was the reflection of the one at national level. During the First 
and the Second Republic, the Prefect of Prefecture appeared to be the representative of 
central power at local level. The Prefect was appointed by the President and only 
accountable to the Central administration. The Burgomasters of Communes reported to 
the Prefect who in turn reported to the Minister of Local Government.27  From 1960 to 
1971, burgomasters were elected, with different electoral systems,28
 
 but from 1973 until 
the end of the Second Republic, they were appointed by the head of state. 
By law, the Burgomaster was the paramount authority of the commune, assisted by the 
Commune Council. The latter was made of elected Councillors who administered 
between 500 to 1,000 voters since 1963, or a territorial subdivision of the Commune 
called Sector, created since 1974. The Burgomaster was in charge of managing the 
                                                 
24 André Guichaoua, L’administration territoriale rwandaise, Rapport d’expertise rédigé à la demande du 
Tribunal Pénal International des Nations Unies sur le Rwanda, Arusha, Tanzanie, Août 1998, pp. 33-35. 
25 This point is developed infra in the section on structural violence. 
26 République Rwandaise, C.I.C. Ministériel en matière de politique, d’information et de sécurité, 
Evaluation du système et de la situation politiques du Rwanda, Kigali, Juin 1990, pp. 35-38, 49, 53. 
27 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 273; République Rwandaise, C.I.C. Ministériel en matière de 
politique, d’information et de sécurité, Evaluation du système et de la situation politiques du Rwanda, p. 
56. 
28Chronique de Politique Etrangère, Décolonisation et Indépendance du Rwanda et du Burundi, volume 
XVI, numéros 4-6, Juillet-Décembre 1963, p. 481 ; Baudoin Paternostre de la Mairieu, Le Rwanda, son 
effort de développement. Antécédents historiques et conquêtes de la révolution rwandaise, Bruxelles et 
Kigali, Ed. A. De Boeck et Ed. Rwandaises, 1972, p. 296. 
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Commune property and income and of development activities. He was in charge of tax 
and levies collection and was allowed to punish with coercive detention anyone who 
failed to pay his annual levies within 15 days. He held police powers which permitted 
him to control security in the Commune and jail unlawful people within seven days or 
fining them. The Burgomaster together with the Prefect held power on the engagement 
and resignation of Commune office personnel. The law of 1974 instituted two 
Commissions that worked hand in hand with the Burgomaster and the Commune 
Council: the Technical Commission and Development Council.29
 
 During the Second 
Republic, although the Burgomaster worked in close collaboration with the Commune 
Council, the latter was accountable to him, who appeared to be the only one responsible 
for the commune territory. In this respect, the Minister of Local Government issued an 
instruction that read as follows:  
I remind you that the burgomaster is accountable for every thing that occurs in the 
commune of which he is in charge. Those who say that the Sector has got a 
Councillor for it, so there is no need to go to the Commune are mistaken. In the 
Sector, the Councillor is a representative of the Burgomaster, he does not replace 
him there.30
 
  
In principle at least, the Burgomaster appeared to be the main leader at local level. He is 
not answerable to the population, but to the central power that put him in office. So are 
other employees of the Commune: “There is no room at all for independent behaviour by 
commune personnel, and even less by the population. Commune personnel are not even 
remotely accountable to the population but solely to a vertical structure from which they 
receive detailed marching orders.”31
 
  
                                                 
29 Loi du 23 novembre 1963 portant organisation communale, Journal Officiel de la République 
Rwandaise, Année 2, N° 23, 1 Décembre 1963 ; Décret-loi du 26 septembre 1974 modifiant le titre premier 
de la loi du 23 novembre 1963 portant organisation communale, Journal Officiel de la République 
Rwandaise, Année 13, N° 20, 15 octobre 1974. 
30 Alexis Kanyarengwe, Minister of Local Government, Instructions concerning the work of executive 
committees of the communes, Kigali, 31 July 1975. 
31 Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence. The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, WestHartford, Conn, Kumarian 
Press, 1998, pp. 24-25. See also Catharine Newbury, “Rwanda: Recent Debates Over Governance and 
Rural Development”, in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (eds.), Governance and Politics in Africa, 
Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, pp. 193-219, p. 206. 
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Lemarchand has compared prefects, burgomasters and propagandists of the First 
Republic to the former colonial Chiefs, Subchiefs and Ibirongozi, because of the way 
they behaved in relation to their constituents.32 Reyntjens also observed that the reason 
why the PARMEHUTU party leaders excluded more and more people is because 
profitable positions were scarce.33 This is in line with Bayart’s point that in Africa 
politics is more about wealth than about power.34
 
 
3.2. THE LINGERING ISSUES OF DECOLONIZATION: LAND, REFUGEES 
AND VIOLENCE 
 
Many scholars of Rwanda have identified the refugee issue as well as violence as 
lingering factors that perpetuated tension until the 1994 genocide.35 On this list, it is 
possible to add the land problem as an unresolved issue too.36
3.2.1. Land  
 And, as we shall realize, 
these three issues are interrelated.  
 
 
The land issue became an everyday predicament for both leaders and constituents due to 
both political decisions that were taken on land redistribution and structural conditions. In 
the previous chapter, I mentioned land redistribution following the departure into exile or 
the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans. Some refugees were coming back 
and reclaiming their belongings. Also, some of the family members of those who went 
into exile used to reclaim the land of their siblings and parents. This continued during the 
1960s and the 1970s. Furthermore, during this time, commune leaders continued to 
identify some lands held by certain Tutsi peasants but that were said to have previously 
                                                 
32 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 274.  
33 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit, p. 454. 
34 Bayart, “Civil Society in Africa,” p. 123 and also Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa. The Politics 
of the Belly, London and New York, Longman, 1993. 
35 Kimonyo, José Kagabo, Guichaoua, etc. 
36 A First significant attempt to do this has been by Mugesera 2004 and Jean Bigagaza et al., “Land 
Scarcity, Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda”, in J. Lind and K. Sturman (eds.),  Scarcity and Surfeit: The 
Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts, Nairobi ACTS PRESS/Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2002, pp. 50-
82. 
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belonged to their family members who were in exile. Those lands were subjected to 
redistribution again, and to reclamations via tribunal as well.  
 
In 1966, a Presidential Decree stated that “[t]he refugee who returns has no right 
whatsoever of reclaiming land that he or she occupied before, if this land has been 
occupied by someone else or had been taken over by the public power.”37 But this decree 
did not stop reclamations, for those who reclaimed were proving that they had never been 
“refugees,” which implied that their land would not be targeted for redistribution. 
Sometimes the Commune office won cases and sometimes it lost. In 1968, for example, 
the Prefect of Butare Prefecture was complaining that cases lost by the Communes had 
become numerous.38
 
 In the same vein, during the mandate of Burgomaster Athanase 
Mujyambere, I collected 13 letters of constituents who reclaimed their land which had 
already been redistributed to other people. They were trying to prove that they were not 
refugees so that the decree of 1966 would not apply to them, but the commune council 
proved that they were refugees. The content of some other reclamation letters is worth 
mentioning here:  
- Namahungu, former subchief, reclaimed a land covered by trees as his private 
property. The Gishamvu Commune on the other hand proved to the court that that 
land and those trees located at a place called Rwamunyoha had been just 
administered by this former subchief, and that they were not his private property, 
since the trees had been planted using corvées.39
                                                 
37 Rwanda, Arrêté présidentiel n°25/01 du 26 février 1966 portant mesures pour réintégration des réfugiés, 
annexe 5 in André Guichaoua, (dir.), Exilés, réfugiés, déplacés en Afrique centrale et orientale, Paris, 
Karthala, 2004, pp. 801-803. 
  The same applies to Sekiromba, 
former ikirongozi, who claimed that a portion of land in one valley belonged to 
him. He was answered that no private property existed in the valley. After losing 
38 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport annuel 1968, p. A.P. – 9 (I). 
39 Athanase Mujyambere, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to Mr. Kanonko Pr., attaché at the 
Bureau des requêtes at the Tribunal of Première Instance of Butare, Re: The Problem of ex-subchief 
Namahungu, Ref.: No. 147/C./G./70/, Gishamvu, 12 August 1970. 
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this case, Sekiromba was however allowed to keep some land for grazing that was 
on top of a hill.40
- In 1971, the Gishamvu Commune had taken over the land of Sebarenzi and 
Rugumiliza located at Buvumu and gave it to Claver Ngabo and Etienne 
Mbonyumuvunyi. The commune office justified this decision by the Presidential 
decree (law) No. 25/01 of 26 February 1966 concerning the property of 
refugees.
 
41
- The following year, a lady called Nyirandinkabandi reclaimed the land of his 
husband, Ndereye, who was considered as refugee, a claim that made his land 
eligible for redistribution to other people.
 
42 In the same year again, Mr. Kabutura 
reclaimed an isambu that belonged to his relative Nyirakaticwa and that the 
Commune Council had given to Etienne Mbonyumuvunyi from Buvumu Sector.43
- One person whose land reclamation lawsuit lasted for a long time is Cassien 
Nyakayiro who sued the Gishamvu Commune for having confiscated his isambu 
located at the Busoro area. In order to justify the confiscation of his land, the 
Commune Council alleged that Nyakayiro became a refugee. It confiscated his 
land in 1969, and the Prefect of Butare Prefecture gave his consent to that 
confiscation. However, Nyakayiro, in his letter to the Prefect in 1969, had not 
stressed that he ever fled, which makes the application of the Decree of 1966 to 
his case a complex one. Instead he notes that in 1966 the Gishamvu Commune 
confiscated his isambu that he had acquired in 1956.
 
44
                                                 
40 Athanase Mujyambere, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Circular Letter to Mr. Minister of Local 
Government and Minister of Justice, Re: lawsuits of the Commune with the Constituents, Ref.: No. 
116/C.G./70/, Gishamvu, 30 June 1970. 
 
41 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to Mr. Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Concerning a land isambu redistributed in Buvumu, Ref.: No. 250/C/G/71/, Gishamvu, 2 November 1971. 
By 1971, Claver Ngabo had become Councillor under Kambanda. (See for example Pascal Kambanda, 
Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Minutes concerning the burning of bulletins of the election 
organized on 18 July 1971, Ref.: No. 253/C/G/71/, Gishamvu, 4 November 1971.) 
42 Elie Kamonyo, Subprefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Ref.: N° 
257/F 7, Butare, 16 February 1972; André Sebarera, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Letter to the 
Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Ref.: N° 30/F.7/, Kibayi, 29 February 1972. 
43 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Ref.: 
213/C/G/71/, Gishamvu, 8 September 1971. 
44 Cassien Nyakayiro, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Injustice on my land, Butare, 25 
March 1969; Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Minister of Local 
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During the Second Republic, new instructions over the land matter were issued by the 
Minister of Local Government to all Prefects. The redistributive power of the 
Burgomaster over land became again enforced:  
 
Nevertheless, the Commune has the power to give a vacant property to one or 
several persons who are in need. It is the Commune that will determine the 
opportunity.  
I would wish that by next July every abandoned property had had a destination 
and that a detailed report be communicated to me as soon as the end of that 
month.45
 
   
These new instructions still did not stop reclamations.  
 
- In February 1975, the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune sent a list of 
properties left by the Tutsi who went into exile. He explains that the reason why 
those properties were not yet redistributed is that the parents of the fled people 
had hidden them so they could not be identified. The list includes the name of the 
person who left that land and the person who held it in 1975. In Gikunzi Sector, 
there were 12 land properties, Liba Sector had 12 also, Sholi Sector had 7, none 
for Mubumbano Sector, Mukuge Sector had 14; Kibingo Sector had 19; 
Nyakibanda Sector had 7; Sheke Sector 65. These happen to be a lot because 
Sheke was populated by a big number of Tutsi population.  Gishamvu Sector had 
11, Buvumu Sector had 28. This created a conflict between parents of those Tutsi 
(or Hutu or Twa) who fled against the local authorities who wanted to confiscate 
them and give them to new Hutu peasants.46
                                                                                                                                                 
Government and Public Employment, Kigali, Re: Lawsuits of the Commune with the Constituents, Ref. No. 
334/04.07, Gishamvu, 12 September 1974. 
 
45 Ministre de l’Intérieur et de la Fonction Publique, Alexis Kanyarengwe, Lettre à tous les Préfets, objet : 
destination des biens abandonnés par les réfugiés, Kigali, le 22 mai 1975. 
46 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
the Property left by the Refugees, List, Ref. No. 199/04.09.01/14, Gishamvu, 27 May 1975. 
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- In August 1975, the Burgomaster of Gishamvu proceeded with the redistribution 
of 15 more properties that had been newly identified as belonging to those who 
had gone to exile.47
-  In October 1975, the Subprefect allowed the Burgomaster of Gishamvu 
Commune to redistribute the land of two persons, Tete and Kanyangira: “Tete and 
Kanyangira have fled, so it is understandable that the inheritances [land] of those 
who have fled must be redistributed as the law stipulates…”
 
48
- The citizen Edouard Munana had several lands (amasambu): one located at 
Kigote in Sholi and another located at Cyamutumba and another located at 
Mubumbano. Then the Burgomaster obliged him to choose one among those. The 
authorities chose for him the Cyamutumba one, and others got redistributed to 
other people. But Munana went to work in Butare town as a teacher in the Ngoma 
commune, so he did not occupy even the land given to him. Subsequently, when 
he wanted to obtain some of his lands, he went to the tribunal and the Acting 
Judge asked clarification to Burgomaster Munyarugano in 1965.
  
49 In 1975 
Munana reclaimed again his land and got a negative response from the 
Burgomaster Kambanda.50
- Sebasoni son of Sezikeye and Nyirahorana went to the Prefecture office to accuse 
the Burgomaster to having confiscated his father’s land whereas he did not flee, 
that is, did not become a “refugee”. The Subprefect requested the Burgomaster to 
investigate this case and send to the Prefecture office a written report of this 
investigation.
 
51
                                                 
47 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Report concerning the redistribution of land properties left by the refugees, Ref. No. 369/04.09.01/14, 
Gishamvu, 22 August 1975. 
 
48 N. Mujyakera, Subprefect of the Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, 
Re: Concerning the case of Tete and Kanyangira, Ref.: No. 1350/03.05/3, 3 October 1975. 
49 Emile Mpambara, Acting Judge and Auditor of Requests, Tribunal of First Instance of Butare Prefecture, 
Letter to Mr. Munyarugano Emmanuel, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Re: The problem of Mr. 
Munana, Ref.: No. 843/D.04/Req., Copy, Butare, 31 July 1965. 
50 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to Mr. Munana Edouard, Teacher in 
Butare, Ngoma Commune, Re : Reply to the Munana Edouard’s letter dated 12 September 1975, Ref. No. 
430/03/.05/3, Gishamvu, 10 October 1975; Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la Commune Gishamvu, A 
Monsieur le Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, Objet: Réponse de la lettre n° 1310/03.05/3 du 23 sept. 
1975, n° 431/03.05/3, Gishamvu, le 10 Octobre 1975. 
51 N. Mujyakera, Subprefect of the Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, 
Re: Concerning the case of Sebasoni, Ref.: No. 1429/03.05/3, 18 October 1975. 
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The majority of these cases are for Gishamvu commune, but it is likely that even in 
Kibayi Commune they occurred. These cases show us that the land redistribution and 
reclamations continued even after 1966 and that the 1966 Decree did not stop 
reclamations. They show that confiscation by an authoritarian regime did not stop 
populations from attempting to reclaim what they thought to be their property right.  
 
Moreover, as the population size continued to increase, land became more and more 
scarce. As a result, new lists of people consulting the Commune Councils for land 
allocation became numerous. In Commune meetings of the Commune Council, of the 
Development Council and of Technical Commissions, cases of application for land from 
individuals continued to be debated. Depending on the availability or planned use of 
communal land, decisions were taken either in favour or against applicants. Applicants 
were from various strata of the population: peasants and non peasants, youth needing land 
for founding a family, or just old people, poor and wealthy, etc. To a number of people, 
the existing administration gave the option of moving to villages, organized in order to 
create a demographic decongestion of overpopulated communes towards less populated 
ones, during the 1960s and 70s. 
 
For example, in Kibayi in 1968, a number of people applied for land, for wood, for pieces 
of land in the forest and some of them received a positive reply, while others were 
refused.52 In Gishamvu Commune in 1975, a number of people asked for land. One of 
them is Jean Baptiste Kabiligi. Here is a portion of the content of his application letter: “I 
have the honour to apply for a land that is located in the Gishamvu commune precisely at 
the Rwimbogo hill. This property once belonged to one brother of Kamanzi, but the latter 
is a refugee since the events.”53
                                                 
52 Raymond Hakizimana, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune and Ruhigira, Mathieu (Secretary), Minutes of 
the Commune Council Meeting held on 31 March 1969. 
 One son of the previous Burgomaster, Emmanuel 
Munyarugano, who was also a soldier, Corporal Vénant Ndemeye, applied for land: 
“Dear Burgomaster, … we haven’t met, and I always wish to come and see you. I am 
asking you to try and get a field for farming for me, so that I can have a place to settle, 
53 Jean Baptiste Kabiligi, Lettre au Bourgmestre de la Commune de Gishamvu, du 30 septembre 1975. 
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even if it can be a small piece of land. […] In case you receive this letter, please give the 
answer to my father Emmanuel Munyarugano who will inform me about it.”54 Another 
letter is from a soldier asking for an isambu: “I write to you and the Commune council, in 
order to apply for an isambu among those amasambu that you are currently redistributing. 
[…] I inform you that at Ndanga’s place there are three amasambu: his, and the ones of 
Karama and Kabishinga, who are his sons. All these have fled, or else you can give me 
the one located elsewhere.”55
 
 
Besides the allocation of land in the commune where applicants lived, the Rwandan 
government also planned for land allocation in villages (paysannats). Certain people were 
settled in these places during the 1970s. For example, in 1970, the Gishamvu Commune 
made a list of 97 men, probably heads of families or singles, wishing to go to Kibungo 
(East of the country) in order to settle there.56 Thereafter, the Burgomaster of Gishamvu 
Commune made a list of 61 people, men and women, who by February 1971 had 
effectively gone to live in the village of Rusumo.57 But the policy of village settlement 
existed before 1970. For example, Joseph Karengera, who was the first Burgomaster of 
Sholi Commune that was part of Gishamvu from September 1960 to January 1963, 
applied for a piece of land within the existing forest in Gishamvu. He was given the 
following answer: “Concerning your letter dated 12 August 1964, I inform you that the 
Commune Council does not have the power to destroy the forest so that it can settle 
people there. You can apply for an isambu located in the paysannat (village).”58
 
 
The average size of land used for agriculture was about 1.21 ha per household at national 
level since 1987, which suggests that compared to the availability of land, demographic 
                                                 
54 Vénant Ndemeye, Caporal, Rwandan Army, P.O. Box 42 Kibungo, Letter to the Burgomaster of 
Gishamvu Commune, written on 6 September 1975 and received on 16 September 1975. 
55 Alphonse Semanyenzi, Soldier, in Rwandan Army, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, 
Nyanza, 7 September 1975. 
56 Athanase Mujyambere, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, (Signed by the Secretary Oscar 
Nkundizera), Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: the list of those wanting to go in the village 
(paysannat) of Rusumo in Kibungo Prefecture, Ref.: No. 133/C./G./70/, Gishamvu, 24 July 1970. 
57 Athanase Mujyambere, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to Mr. Prefect of Kibungo 
Prefecture, Re: List of people from Gishamvu Commune who moved in the Village of Rusumo, Ref.: No. 
31/C/G/71/, Gishamvu, 3 February 1971. 
58 P.D. Nkezabera, Minister of Agriculture and Breeding, Letter to Mr. Joseph Karengera, Commune 
Gishamvu, Butare, Ref.: No. 11/860/AGRI., Kigali, 4 September 1964. 
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size had increased by far, and that the peasants were struggling to meet just subsistence 
needs.59 However, that average size hid considerable inequalities: according to one 
estimate of early 1990s, 43% of poor farmers occupied 15% of arable land, while 16% of 
the richest families held 43% of arable land. Indeed, those who had cash to purchase land, 
i.e., government officials or businessmen, had bigger portions of land, while poor 
peasants were left with insignificant portions. As a result, around the half of peasants 
across the country were obliged to lease land in order to meet food production needs, 
which means that life in rural areas had become precarious.60
 
  
By 1991, there was no reserve of arable land, which means that new redistributions were 
quasi impossible. Farmers would access land by inheritance from the family land, by 
purchase or by leasing.61 The research of Pottier carried out in Butare shows that by 
1986, there was “no more arable land to be distributed” and that there was “only one way 
forward: agricultural intensification.”62 But, despite this, some people continued to apply 
for land donations even in 1991. One of them, not even a poor person, was Dr. Bruno 
Ngirabatware, working at the University Hospital of Butare. The Burgomaster of 
Gishamvu Commune answered him that there was no land available to give him and that 
the Commune Council could not even give him a portion of the forest located at 
Mubumbano Sector.63
3.2.2. Refugees  
 
 
                                                 
59 David C. Clay and Jim McAllister, “Family Development Cycle, Social Class, and inequality in 
Rwanda”, Rural Sociology, 56, 1, 1991, pp. 22-40, p. 30 ; Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989, p. 38. 
60 Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989, pp. 27, 39 ; James Gasana, “La guerre, la paix et la démocratie au Rwanda”, 
in André Guichaoua, (sous la direction de), Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994). 
Analyses, faits et documents, 2è édition, Paris, Karthala, 1995, pp. 211-237, pp. 214-215; Jan Gorus, “The 
State as an Instrument of Ethnicity. Ethnic Construction and Political Violence in Rwanda”, in Ruddy 
Doom and Jan Gorus (eds.), Politics and Identity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region, 
Brussels, VUB University Press, 2000, pp. 175-189, p. 183. 
61 Clay and McAllister, “Family Development Cycle”, p. 30. 
62 Johan Pottier, “Three’s a Crowd: Knowledge, Ignorance and Power in the Context of Urban Agriculture 
in Rwanda”, Africa, 59, 4, 1989, pp. 461-477, p. 461. 
63 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to Dr. Ngirabatware Bruno, Hôpital 
Universitaire de Butare, Ref.: No. 642/04.09/3, Gishamvu, 13 August 1991. 
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Some attempts to resolve the refugee issue, though given less attention by the national 
media during the 1970s and the 1980s, had occurred both at the state and individual 
levels. At state level, negotiations did not attract much attention because on the one hand 
they were done kind of secretly, and on the other hand they did not bear positive results. 
On the side of Rwanda and Uganda, as early as 1974, the Habyarimana regime had just 
launched talks with their Ugandan counterparts. On the side of Burundi, as early as 1967, 
François Rukeba, who had been a renowned leader of the UNAR party in exile, got in 
contact with the Rwandan Minister of Defence. He also contacted the UN in 1970. 
However, these talks became futile because the Habyarimana regime lacked the political 
will to solve the refugee issue in a sustainable way. It posed more constraints, imposed 
more conditions on the refugees and promised less rights to them. It failed to take into 
consideration the requirements of the refugees. The refugees were required to behave 
politically in a manner that would not disturb the political line of Rwanda; they were 
asked not to reclaim their goods left while they fled and to be economically useful to the 
country; and they were asked not to engage in social conflict at local level. The regime 
often repeated the famous explanation that the country was too overpopulated to find a 
free space for all the refugees who were outside the country.64
 
  
At individual level, many refugees continued to cross the border and come to visit their 
relatives in Rwanda. In the process, some of them went back to their asylum countries, 
some remained in Rwanda, and some were caught by the local administration which 
either allowed them to settle or deported them back to their country of asylum.65
                                                 
64 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, Paris, Karthala, 2008, pp. 65-76; Théo 
Karabayinga et José Kagabo, “Les réfugiés, de l’exil au retour armé”, Temps Modernes, Juillet-Août 1995, 
n° 583, pp. 63-90. 
 Though 
the number of these refugees is not statistically significant, it is important qualitatively, 
because it teaches us that certain individuals did not passively accept the government 
line. In other words, individual agency becomes important as a field of investigation in 
the consideration of the refugee issue. The few cases that I came across in my research 
area include people who came to visit their relatives and went back to their asylum 
65 See Antoine Mugesera, Imibereho y’abatutsi kuri Repubulika ya mbere n’iya kabiri (1959-1990), Kigali, 
Les Editions Rwandaises, 2004. 
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countries; people who came and thereafter were reported to the local administration that 
sent them to the office of the Prefecture of Butare for further investigation; and cases of 
people who were effectively driven out of the country again.  
 
Around 1978, my informant Théodomir Munyarugamba crossed the border from Congo 
(then Zaire) and came to visit his family members who had remained in Rwanda when he 
went in exile in 1961 or 1962. He arrived at the Commune Office, chatted with the 
Burgomaster Kambanda and was allowed to visit his siblings. He ultimately went back to 
Congo after his visit.  
 
A number of other people came to settle in Rwanda. Some were authorized to return, 
others were refused. For example, in January 1969, one young man whose name is not 
mentioned in the letter was authorized to enter and live with his parents.66 For the 
following case, the decision was still pending, but the attitude of the Butare Prefect 
seemed in the direction of giving more decision room to the Burgomaster: “I am asking 
you if the refugee Joseph Ruganintwali, son of Sebizeze (sic?) and Gashikazi from Bitare 
Cell can have access to his land and settle in it in Bitare, and that if by settling in Bitare 
this cannot disturb the security and peace of the population.”67  Here is another case 
where the decision of authorities was not yet taken: “Referring to your letter […] 
informing me about the return of Joseph Kayuku, I ask you to send me this person 
together with all papers that he brought from Tanzania, with your interrogation with him 
when he arrived in the country.”68
 
 
In July 1969, the Butare Prefect issued a letter to all Burgomasters in which he ordered 
them to be more vigilant towards refugees who crossed the border with the intention to 
return to Rwanda. The attitude in this letter seems to be one of suspicion against those 
refugees:  
                                                 
66 Elie Kamonyo, Subprefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Ref.: 
No. 131/C.395./, Butare, 24 January 1969. 
67 Tharcisse Karuta, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Ref. : 
620/C.395./, Butare, 25 March 1969. 
68 Elie Kamonyo, Subprefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Ref.: 
No. 88/C.395./, Butare, 16 January 1969. 
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Nowadays, several refugees are coming back in our Prefecture without respecting 
the Presidential Decree No.25/01 of 26 February 1966. Those refugees are 
returning clandestinely crossing on paths that are illegal and cross the border 
[Akanyaru river] at night. That proves that they come back with the attitude and 
ideology that they had while fleeing. No one can tolerate this return which does 
not respect the authorities of the country. That is why I remind you to close the 
customs and put there security surveillants who will forbid those entering in the 
country without immigration and emigration papers. […] You must remind the 
populations especially those who live near the borders, to forbid those crossing 
the Akanyaru river and to inform the authorities about anyone crossing. Anyone 
who will be caught helping refugees to cross in an unlawful manner (due to bribes 
or friendship), catch him or her, bring them to me, they will be severely 
punished.69
 
 
 
In January 1971, one lady, Vestine Kamanzi, returned to Gishamvu. Here is the 
interrogation text of her case: 
 
Q: Who advised you to come back to Rwanda?  
A: No one, it was because my husband had already died, and that there was no 
one else that we knew there, then we advised ourselves [her and her three 
children] to come back to Rwanda.  
Q: Indeed, when they [the authorities] told you to come back to the country, why 
didn’t you come back?  
A: We did not come back to Rwanda because we were with my husband, who was 
not willing to come back, then when he died, as we realised that we could do 
nothing, we decided to return.  
Q: Can’t you go back to where you were, ask papers allowing you to come to 
Rwanda, then you come back and settle?  
A: Official documents are given to men who pay levies, they cannot give them to 
us. Moreover, we cannot come from a grave and return into it again, we cannot go 
back there again.70
 
 
Another case is about two individuals who returned to Rwanda in October 1971 and 
thereafter were expelled back to Burundi. The first is Mrs. Nyiramuramuko Emma-Marie. 
The Burgomaster interrogated her and wrote to the Prefect the following interrogation 
report:  
                                                 
69 Tharcisse Karuta, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Confidential, Circular letter to all Burgomasters, Ref.: 
No. 1437/B.6./, Butare, 26 July 1969. 
70 Oscar Nkundizera, Secretary of Gishamvu Commune, Interrogation made by the Gishamvu Commune 
official to Mrs. Vestine Kamanzi, daughter of Nyagahakwa and Nyiraburere who were living in 
Mubumbano (before fleeing), Ref.: No. 23/C/G/71/, Gishamvu, 25 January 1971. 
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We send you this lady called Nyiramuramuko Emma-Marie daughter of 
Ndakorerwa and Nyirabakata who came from Burundi on Saturday, 9 October 
1971, now she is in Kibingo in Gishamvu commune, this lady went to Burundi as 
a refugee, now we send her to you so that you can examine her case: these are 
some of the words I asked her:  
Q: When did you go to Burundi?  
A: I went with others as we were fleeing.  
Q: In what year did you go? 
A: I do not know the year.  
Q: With who did you go?  
A: I went with my husband, then we separated and I spent six years in that 
separation.  
Q: Now where does your husband live?  
A: I do not know his whereabouts.  
Q: With who did you come from Burundi? What was your way of crossing?  
A: With no one, I crossed at the Kanyaru bridge.  
Q: You crossed it at what date?  
A: I crossed there on Saturday and I arrived at my home the same day.  
Q: How?  
A: I passed there by foot on a market day of Nyanza of Nyaruteja at the lower 
bridge [Kanyaru bas].71
 
  
 The second is Mr. Augustin Kanamugire who also crossed the border of Burundi and 
came back to Gishamvu and joined his family members. After the investigation of the 
two cases, the Prefect decided to expel both Nyiramuramuko and Kanamugire. The 
Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune executed that decision to expel them on 19 October 
1971. Here is what he wrote to the Customs Officer: “I ask you to verify for me these two 
refugees Kanamugire and Nyiramuramuko, that I give to the policemen to send them 
back to Burundi, if really they made them cross the border so that they can return to 
where they came from.”72
 
 But, few weeks after, the Burgomaster noticed that 
Kanamugire had again “illegally” come back to Gishamvu. So, he informed again the 
Prefect about this:  
I inform you that I did a serious investigation in his neighbours and found out 
that he fled in 1962, he allegedly went following his elder brother called 
Twabagira who went as a refugee. Since that time of 1962, he did not come back 
                                                 
71 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, (the 
date and the reference number are not clear). 
72 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Chief of Customs office, 
Gishamvu, 19 October 1971. 
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to Rwanda, the last time he returned was in October 1971, when he came with his 
sister Mukankundiye Immaculée, who also went there without emigration papers. 
Mr. Prefect, as you had requested us in your letter […] that we must expel him 
and he must go back to where he was, we expelled him, and accompanied him 
until the customs office, but after some time we saw him coming back again. I 
would like to hear from you what we must now do, concerning Kanamugire who 
is now at his father’s house, and her sister who went to collect him without having 
official papers to travel outside the country; she is lying saying that her brother is 
not a refugee.73
 
  
Another person who is mentioned by one informant as having been expelled from 
Gishamvu is the wife of Nkeramihigo, but the date is not ascertained: “There is a man 
who had fled in 1960. […] His wife was from Nyakibanda. Then she wanted to reclaim 
her isambu [land] from Nyakibanda. Munyarugano analysed the case, and told the 
policemen to go and deport the lady to Burundi, so that she could join her husband, and 
not come back here.”74 However, this lady, as she is said to have had some influential 
people as friends of her husband, did not cross the border. She came back by force and 
contacted those friends from Kigali who negotiated her return. Thereafter, this wife of 
Nkeramihigo was sent back to Mubumbano and Burgomaster Munyarugano lost the 
case.75
 
 
In 1975, the Burgomaster Kambanda sent an old lady Mukankundiye to the Prefect of 
Butare in order to decide whether the lady can be allowed to come back in Gishamvu or 
re-expelled. He sent her along with an interrogation report. The lady said that she went to 
Tanzania in 1961 with her husband, that she came back to Gishamvu on 5 February 1975, 
that they were staying in Mubumbano before fleeing to Tanzania, that she intends to stay 
at Sholi with the Munyezamu family, Munyezamu is her son-in-law. “Will you pursue in 
justice the belongings you left while fleeing with your husband?” asked the Burgomaster. 
“I will not waste my time and energy doing that, because I came here in order to be and 
                                                 
73 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
The issue of Augustin Kanamugire who came from Burundi, Ref.: 259/C/G/71/, Gishamvu, 8 November 
1971. 
74 Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
75 Interview with Anonymous 4, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
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die in Rwanda, she replied.” This gave her more chance to be accepted since she 
guaranteed not to sue the Commune about her land.76
 
  
On 5 January 1988 the officer Responsible for Intelligence Service in Butare Prefecture 
visited the Gishamvu Commune in order to investigate the case of two refugees, namely 
Jérôme Burabyo from Nyakibanda and Mathilde Uwihoreye from Muboni. Those 
refugees wished to be reintegrated in Gishamvu, so the Intelligence service wanted to 
take an ad hoc decision.77
 
  
This shows that until late 1980s, some refugees were still striving to come back to 
Rwanda. Rwanda represented for them the ideal home, both materially and symbolically. 
Asylum countries were symbolised as worst places, graves to use the term of one above 
refugee. And the ancestors’ land was the best place to rest on, as the old lady 
Mukandutiye stressed in her interrogation answers. It is interesting to see how both men 
and women were outstanding agents in this effort to come back to Rwanda by means not 
authorized by the state.  
3.2.3. Violence 
 
It is ironic that each postindependence regime in Rwanda, whether the First Republic or 
the Second, started in the wake of mass violence. The First Republic came after 
independence struggles which included violence. The second followed violence against 
the educated Tutsi.  
 
A number of refugees formed a rebel group called Inyenzi (cockroaches).78 That group is 
said to have started attacking Rwanda in 1961.79
                                                 
76 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, 
Interrogation report of Mukankundiye daughter of Gatoyi and Nyirabugasu who came from Tanzania after 
having gone as a refugee, Ref.: No. 89/04.09.01/14, Gishamvu, 11 May 1975. 
 The Inyenzi made small but 
77 Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Gishamvu, A Monsieur le Préfet de la Préfecture de 
Butare, Rapport administratif 1er trimestre 1988, N° 429/04.17.01, Gishamvu, le 13/05/1988, p. 3. 
78 It is not well established whether this name was nicknamed to them as in insult, or if they gave 
themselves that name. According to Mubashankwaya, it was a nickname given to them because of their 
clandestinity and night surprise attacks. (Mubashankwaya, Le Rwanda depuis 1959, p. 77.) According to 
Shyirambere, they called themselves that way, in order to prove their force. (Shyirambere J. Barahinyura, 
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geographically scattered attacks that seriously disturbed the colonial state and then the 
postindependence state. If the numbers of their victims were not very considerable, the 
psychological effect that their attacks created was very significant. It is in December 
1963 that they launched a major offensive at Bugesera on the border of Rwanda with 
Burundi. The Inyenzi were able to control the Gako military base for few days, after 
which the Garde Nationale, as the New Rwandan Army was called, together with 
Belgian troops were able to defeat them. Immediately after the defeat of the Inyenzi, the 
military engaged in retaliatory acts against the Tutsi population across the country. The 
President ordered Prefects all over the country to take whatever measures they deemed 
appropriate in order to counter the Inyenzi operations. Extreme violence started on 23 
December 1963, a week after the Inyenzi invasion, and went on until January 1964. In 
Gikongoro itself, between 2,000 and 10,000 Tutsis were massacred, and that corpses 
were seen flowing in the Akanyaru river and were seen on the side of Burundi, which led 
to international media coverage. Violence in Gikongoro occurred from 24 to 27 
December 1963, under the leadership of the Prefect André Nkeramugaba, who according 
to Reyntjens benefited from the Tutsi elimination by capturing land that belonged to 
thousands of them, and that that act did not jeopardize his political career. Numbers of 
the overall estimate of victims during this violence for the whole country are disputed. 
Reyntjens and Lemarchand suggest an estimate of between 10,000 to 14,000 Tutsi killed, 
while Antoire Mugesera calculates between 25,000 and 35,000 Tutsi killed.80 Following 
the December 1963 Inyenzi attack, 15 Tutsi political figures from UNAR and RADER 
were assassinated. Whether they shared the same political ideology with the Inyenzi or 
not, they were accused of being accomplices of this rebel group.81
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Rwanda. Trente deux ans après la révolution sociale de 1959, Frankfurt Am Main, Editions Izuba, 1992, p. 
38.) But Antoine Mugesera who has done an extensive research on the Inyenzi attacks, contends that it is 
not possible to know whether that group called itself Inyenzi or whether the name was given to them by 
their opponents. (Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 133.) 
79 Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 55. 
80 On a detailed account of  Inyenzi military activities, see Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit, pp. 456-471; 
Mugesera, Imibereho, pp. 133-204. On an official version about some counter-attacks of Rwandan army 
against the Inyenzi group, see Théoneste Lizinde, La découverte de Kalinga ou la fin d’un mythe. 
Contribution à l’histoire du Rwanda, Kigali, SOMECA, 1979, pp. 141-152. See also Lemarchand, Rwanda 
and Burundi, pp. 225-226 and Chronique de Politique Etrangère, Décolonisation et Indépendance du 
Rwanda et du Burundi, volume XVI, numéros 4-6, Juillet-Décembre 1963, p. 534. 
81 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit, p. 462-463. 
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After this attack of December 1963, the Inyenzi rebels launched other small attacks in 
1964 at Bugarama in the South-Western part of the country, and in July 1966 at Kibungo 
(East), Ngenda in 1966 ending, Bweyeye and Nshili in November 1966.82
 
  
One feature of this mass violence is that the Rwandan government used not just the 
regular security apparatuses, which are said to have been few, about 1,200 soldiers for the 
whole country, but also the civil population: “…after the terrorist incursions triggered by 
at the end of December 1963, the government resorted to “hill self-defence” whereby all 
able-bodied men are always equipped with their spears and bows, either in their homes 
and at workplace, they do the guard, inform about any suspect movement and are ready 
to directly intervene.” 83 As this document continues, “[t]his emergency measure created 
a real danger concerning the legality of methods used for the securing order and rendered 
hard its control by public powers.”84
 
 
The Inyenzi group stopped its attacks in late 1966, but the reasons are not clearly known. 
It is either because the Inyenzi were “weary of seeing Tutsis slaughtered every time they 
attacked,”85 or because they came to be “aware that it is impossible to regain power 
militarily.”86 Another version points out that in 1966-1967, the government of Rwanda 
was in contact with the government of Burundi and that both reached an agreement of 
neutralizing armed groups of Rwandan refugees.87 The end of rebel attacks was 
celebrated in the 1966 Butare Prefecture report as having brought back peace and 
tranquillity.88
 
 
                                                 
82 Mugesera, Imibereho, pp. 183-184. 
83 Chronique de Politique Etrangère, Décolonisation et Indépendance du Rwanda et du Burundi, volume 
XVI, numéros 4-6, Juillet-Décembre 1963, p. 531. 
84 Chronique de Politique Etrangère, Décolonisation, p. 532. 
85 Philip Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families. Stories from 
Rwanda, New York, Farrar Strauss and Giroux, 1998, p. 66. 
86 Filip Reyntjens, L’Afrique des grands lacs en crise. Rwanda, Burundi : 1988-1994, Paris, Karthala, 
1994, p. 142. 
87 André Guichaoua, (dir.), Exilés, réfugiés, déplacés en Afrique centrale et orientale, Paris, Karthala, 2004, 
p. 87. 
88 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Rapport annuel 1966, p. A.P.-5 (1). 
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Another feature of this violence is that it created suspicion against all the Tutsi population 
living in the country in general, and the ones established in communes located near the 
borders in particular. This suspicion went on for a long time, although from 1967 until 
1990 no more attacks were launched against Rwanda. In my area of study, I came across 
testimonies of harassment and even imprisonment of some Tutsi people, following the 
Inyenzi attack of Nshili (Gikongoro) that occurred in November 1966. Informants 
enumerate the names of following people as having been put in prison: François 
Munyantore, Denis Senyange, Laurent Minani, Vincent Musoni, Joseph Muragwashaka, 
Laurent Ruhinguka, Sabizeze and university students who included Alexis Rwamwaga. 
The majority of them were teachers, hence considered as wealthy.89 According to 
Munyantore who is my informant and who is one of those who were jailed, they were 
imprisoned in Butare town. Concerning time spent in jail, it appears that they spent some 
months there, as one archival document on Denis Senyange establishes.90
 
 They were 
ultimately released with no proof of connection with the Inyenzi. 
In addition to arrests, suspicion was directed mostly against Tutsi people who used to 
travel: “… they chose us, and we came to live with them, but without much peace, 
because whenever the Inyenzi invade the country, we were to answer for those actions, 
we underwent verbal irony. […] If you travel somewhere where they do not know, they 
assume that you were among the Inyenzi, they book you to jail.”91
 
 This is confirmed by 
Innocent Nahayo as well:  
…the existing power used to suspect the ethnic group of Tutsi, alleging that it is 
the Tutsi who send logistical support to their fellows, they are the ones who help 
them. Munyarugano disliked anyone going to Burundi, even if it is a Hutu, 
                                                 
89 Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 2, 
Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with 
Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 
2007. 
90 “I have received your attestation of good behavior of 2 June concerning Mr. Senyange Denis, candidate 
at the Training of CFCCA (Centre de Formation des Cadres Pour les Coopératives Agricoles). This 
attestation mentions that the concerned person has been released from prison in 1967. Can you please 
inform me the reasons why he was in jail?” (C. Sanz, Responsable du Centre de Formation des Cadres Pour 
les Coopératives Agricoles (CFCCA), Lettre à Monsieur le Bourgmestre de la Commune Gishamvu, 
Préfecture de Butare, Ref. : 509, Kavumu, 15 July 1969.) 
91 Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
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especially when he knows that the latter cooperates with the Tutsi. Any person 
who put his feet in Burundi, Munyarugano [Burgomaster] was jailing him. 92
 
  
This informant gives an example of a Hutu man from Kayongwe area called Kayongoka 
Harerimana who had kept two cows of a refugee called Munyengango. The cows became 
three. Then he went to Burundi to give them back to Munyengango who rewarded him by 
giving him one of those cows.  This informant contends that there were many Hutu who 
had kept some cows of the Tutsi who had fled to Burundi. Some of them used to take 
back those cows to the owners. They became suspicious as well, as they were in good 
relationship with people considered as enemies of the country. 
 
Written documents about this suspicion are also available. I was able to find a few, which 
are worthy of note here.  
 
This young man Léonidas Karekezi who was living in Buvumo [sic, Buvumu] in 
Gishamvu Commune was caught at the Kanyaru [river, also frontier with 
Burundi], now a policeman brought him here at the Office of the Prefecture, so I 
send him to you after allowing him stay in the Commune at his alleged place of 
Buvumo, but you are requested to closely check his behaviour in the commune, 
his conversations with other constituents, and he must remain within the Sector 
boundaries, he must not go anywhere else.93
 
 
 
Suspicion was not directed towards men only. Even women were closely monitored, 
especially if they happened to travel.  
 
Referring to your letter (…) informing me about the lady Teresa Mukangwije who 
comes from Burundi, I inform you that if you know very well that she went there 
but she was not a refugee, and that her parents did not flee and behave well in the 
Commune, and are patriotic, you can give her relevant papers, so that we can also 
issue her the passport.94
 
  
This is one of my informants.  She was easily permitted to travel because her parents did 
not flee, so she was not suspected of collaborating with Inyenzi in Burundi.  
                                                 
92 Interview with Innocent Nahayo, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
93 Elie Kamonyo, Subprefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Re: 
Repatriation of Joseph Kayuku, Ref.: No. 85/C.395./, Butare, 16 January 1969. 
94 Elie Kamonyo, Subprefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Ref.: 
No. 132/C.395./, Butare, 24 January 1969. 
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The Prefect of Butare suspected another three ladies and sent the following message to all 
Burgomasters of the Butare Prefecture:  
 
After receiving this letter of mine, I ask you to check in your commune the 
following people living there: Sinandugu Mukarwego, Elisabeth Nyirasakwekwe 
and Cécile Nyiraminani. These people regularly go to Burundi. Search 
everywhere in your commune, and if you find them, please send them to the 
Office of the Prefecture.95
 
 
The Subprefect also inquired about one lady from Sheke Sector, in Gishamvu: “…I 
request you to inform me about the behaviour of Mukagashugi who recently came from 
Bujumbura (Burundi), now she is in Sheke in Gishamvu Commune. That is, [her 
behaviour] since she arrived in the Commune you administer.”96 The same applied to 
Marthe Mukamugema who is said to have travelled to Burundi as well and then came 
back.97
 
 
Finally, in February 1973, another major bout of violence occurred. The Kayibanda 
regime targeted mainly the Tutsi who either studied in secondary and tertiary schools, or 
who were employed. Lists of those to sack were made in advance and sent to heads of 
schools and employers.98
 
 It was a way of recreating the ambiance of 1959-1962 where 
the attack against Tutsi seemed to unite the Hutu. In that particular moment of extreme 
division within the PARMEHUTU party, Kayibanda hoped to regain his previous 
popularity by instrumentalizing ethnicity again. As the situation turned out, however, this 
violence led also to the overthrow of Kayibanda. 
The Second Republic was also responsible for political violence against former leaders. 
President Kayibanda with a number of his ministers were imprisoned. Some of them got 
                                                 
95 Tharcisse Karuta, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Confidential, Circular letter to Burgomasters, Ref.: 
561/B.6./, Butare, 18 March 1969. 
96 Elie Kamonyo, Subprefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Ref.: 
No. 739/C.395./, Butare, 11 April 1969. 
97 Elie Kamonyo, Subprefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Ref.: 
No. 763/C.395, Butare, 15 April 1969. 
98 On this violence, See Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit, Mugesera, Imibereho, and Claudine Vidal, “Situations 
ethniques au Rwanda”, in Jean-Loup Amselle et Elikia M’Bokolo (dir.), Au cœur de l’ethnie. Ethnies, 
tribalisme et Etat en Afrique, Paris, Editions la Découverte, 1985, pp. 167-184, pp. 168-169. 
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assassinated. From 1974 to 1976, President Kayibanda was sequestered at his home of 
Kavumu in Gitarama, where he lived in extreme poverty and ultimately died of sickness 
on 15 December 1976.99 The death of Kayibanda in very bad conditions together with a 
number of his former government members was reminiscent of the fall of African leaders 
since the beginning of the 1960s, where assassination and use of political violence has 
tended to predominate as a way of power changing hands, rather than by way of election. 
This was the result of their authoritarian nature and character. As Ali Mazrui rightly 
notes, “[w]here authority is too personified, challenge to authority also tends to take the 
form of personal violence. The possibilities of assassination are maximized.”100
 
 
3.3. STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE 
 
In addition to what has been said above about the First and Second Republics, it is worth 
noting that they became regimes of multiple exclusions. The most documented are 
ethnicity and regionalism, but there are many others. These can be considered as part of 
what is called structural violence, that is, a violence “built into the structure of a society” 
and that manifests itself in the forms of “unequal life chances” caused by “great 
inequality, injustice, discrimination, and exclusion […] needlessly limiting people’s 
physical, social, and psychological well-being.”101
3.3.1. Ethnic and Regional discriminations 
 
 
The First Republic considered that promoting the Hutu and discriminating the Tutsi was a 
way of doing social justice, since the Tutsi were considered as having been favoured 
during the colonial period. Schooling was one priority, but the target was that once the 
Hutu increased their numbers of educated people, they would take over the control of the 
                                                 
99 Paternostre de la Mairieu, “Pour vous mes frères !”, pp. 226-235. 
100 Ali A. Mazrui, “Thoughts on Assassination in Africa”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 1, 
March 1968, pp. 40-58, p. 42. 
101 Uvin, Aiding Violence, pp. 103 and 105. For similar definitions of structural violence, see Gregg Barak, 
Violence and Nonviolence. Pathways to Understanding, London, Sage Publications, 2003, p. 113 and 
Habermas in Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror. Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas and 
Jacques Derrida, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 2003, p. 35. For another concept 
close to structural violence called routine violence, see Gyanendra Pandey, Routine Violence. Nations, 
Fragments, Histories, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 2006, p. 1. 
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administration and other economic activities. President Kayibanda considered that 
education should be “democratic”, that is, it should have the Hutu as the majority 
beneficiaries at all levels: “Schools must be democratic, inevitably. What does that mean? 
- Children of the People might attend both elementary and tertiary education. - Instruction 
must be truly democratic. - In Schools, the Hutu, the Twa and the Tutsi must be 
represented proportionally with their percentage in the population, that means, 86% of the 
Hutu, 14% of the Tutsi and 1% of the Twa.”102 In order to control the education sector, 
President Kayibanda had nationalized schools in 1966, so that church control over 
education would decrease.103
 
 
When in 1973 the Kayibanda government decided to wage war against the educated 
Tutsi, it accused them of occupying 50% of secondary education or more.104 However, 
available statistics had pointed out a smaller percentage: According to Mugesera, the 
statistics of Tutsi in Secondary school had gone down from 36.0% in 1962-1963 at 
independence to 11% in 1972-1973 when the Kayibanda regime was attacking the 
Tutsi.105 According to him again, the Tutsi were 8.5% in the Butare University, which 
means that, if these figures are reliable, they were under-represented according to their 
demography.106 These figures are fairly close to what is suggested in Hanf’s book: in 
1971-1972, Tutsi were 19.7% in secondary school, Hutu were 79.8% and Twa were 
0.03%.107 The statistics of the Education Ministry say that the Tutsi occupied 15.8% of 
places in secondary schools, whereas they were 11.4% in the population.108
 
   
                                                 
102 Procès-verbal du séminaire de formation du M.D.R. PARMEHUTU, Kigali 1972 cité dans Theodor 
Hanf et al., Education et développement au Rwanda. Problèmes – Apories – Perspectives, München, 
Westforum Verlag, 1974, p. 140. 
103 République Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Enseignement Primaire et Secondaire, Dynamique des équilibres 
ethnique et régional dans l’enseignement secondaire rwandais. Fondements, Evolution et Perspectives 
d’avenir, Kigali, Mai 1986, pp. 14, 20. 
104 Paternostre de la Mairieu, “Pour vous mes frères !”, pp. 225-226. 
105 Mugesera, Imibereho, pp. 266-267.  
106 Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 272.  
107 Hanf et al., Education et développement, p. 140. 
108 République Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Enseignement Primaire et Secondaire, Dynamique des équilibres 
ethnique et régional dans l’enseignement secondaire rwandais. Fondements, Evolution et Perspectives 
d’avenir, Kigali, Mai 1986, p. 20. 
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Two authors contend that Kayibanda was more discriminatory than Habyarimana when it 
came to Tutsi exclusion.109 However, a close examination suggests that though started by 
Kayibanda110, this policy of ethnic and regional quota was systematized by Habyarimana 
who gradually excluded the Tutsi and the Twa in the public sector in areas of education 
and work.111 This policy put forward “hereditary statuses,” that is ethnic or regional 
belonging, rather than “individual merit.”112
 
  
During the First Republic, the central region was favoured as it was the place of origin of 
President Kayibanda and most of the PARMEHUTU politicians who had survived the 
divisions of that party. The Second Republic favoured the Northern regions of Gisenyi 
and Ruhengeri over the rest of the country. This entails that Tutsi and Hutu of regions 
other than the ones of ruling elites, during both regimes, were like second-class citizens, 
to use Pandey’s term.113
 
 
Though the Habyarimana regime started with a discourse of reconciliation, it kept up the 
ethnic politics. In this regard, ID books and official documents continued to bear ethnic 
identities. Furthermore, during the Major National Census of 1978, instructions to collect 
ethnic identities were given. According to these instructions, children bore the ethnic 
identity of their parents. In case the parents had different ethnic identities, the child could 
bear the identity of his or her father. In case the latter was not known, the child could bear 
the ethnic identity of her mother.114 Kimonyo argues that a number of Tutsi became 
afraid to report their ethnic identification, because they thought it could again be used 
against them.115
                                                 
109 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 143; Scott Straus, The Order of 
Genocide. Race, Power and War in Rwanda, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2006, p. 23.  
 I came across this phenomenon as well. The preparation of the census of 
1978 happened to be problematic in communes located at the border with Burundi. In 
110 Paternostre de la Mairieu, “Pour vous mes frères !”, p. 180. 
111 Mugesera, Imibereho, p. 310. 
112 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Le défi de l’ethnisme. Rwanda et Burundi : 1990-1996, Paris, Karthala, 1997, p. 
82. 
113 Pandey, Routine Violence, p. 10. 
114 République Rwandaise, Présidence de la République, Bureau National de Recensement, Recensement 
Général de la Population et de l’habitat, 1978, Vol. IV : Ménages et habitat, Archives Nationales, 
Document n° 5511, p. IX. 
115 Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, pp. 84-85. 
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Kibayi, it was noticed that many people were Burundians who had arrived in that area 
long time ago, even before independence. Some of them even had Rwandan IDs.116 Even 
the Burgomaster Nyamigango was said to be a Burundian. Yet he was the one to handle 
this issue. So, those suspected to be Burundians were afraid of being expelled. The Tutsi 
also became afraid, because before the launching of this census, there were rumours that 
said that this census intended to identify some people to send to Tanzania into exile. The 
authorities dismissed such rumours, but this dismissal did not calm down those who were 
afraid.117 Some Tutsi of Saga are said to have been afraid to be identified as such, and 
curious about the reasons behind this identification, but the authorities calmed them 
down, explaining that there was no danger of being identified ethnically during the 
census.118 After all, this census came just five years after the expulsion of Tutsi in 1973, 
which means that those who remained in the country were still remembering the violent 
effects of ethnicity. This control through checking IDs and through organizing the census 
– and as seen above through checking their whereabouts – is reminiscent of Foucault’s 
analysis of the techniques of surveillance over certain members of society: registering 
them,119 locating them,120 and observing or visualizing them.121
 
 
At local level, this ethnic and regional policy created not just a social malaise but also 
psychological suffering. Life histories of Tutsi and a number of Hutu informants are full 
of episodes of discrimination in areas of education and employment. Education seems to 
have attracted the attention of more informants than employment. Informants remember 
themselves or some or their family members having been refused access to first year 
secondary school after their state exam of 6th primary school year. Some of them say that 
they succeeded, attained higher marks but were surprised to notice that some of their 
                                                 
116 Mathieu Ruhigira, Minutes of Commune Council held on 25 November 1977, No. 197/03.04/2, Kibayi, 7 
December 1977. 
117 Epaphrodite Nyamigango, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Minutes of General population meeting 
held on 2 June 1978, Ref.: No. 86/03.04/1, Kibayi, 6 June 1978. 
118 Epaphrodite Nyamigango, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Minutes of Commune Council meeting 
held on 14 June 1978, Ref.: No. 146/03.04/2, Kibayi, 17 June 1978. 
119 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, New York, Vintage Books, 1995, p. 
196. 
120 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 143. 
121 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 195-228. 
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colleagues who received lower marks were admitted while they were excluded.122 One 
record that I found in the Gishamvu archives for 1975 shows that of 88 students of the 
secondary school from Gishamvu, 17 were Tutsi and there were no Twa. This shows that 
the Tutsi were 19.3%, whereas the Tutsi population was 27.98% of the total population in 
that year. This is an imbalance if one considers the percentage of the Tutsi and the Twa in 
Gishamvu.123 According to one informant, certain Tutsi pupils, once excluded from the 
list of admission to secondary school, chose to go to Burundi to study in a refugee High 
School located there.124
 
 This means that exclusion in education also created exile. 
In education, discrimination was at the level of admission as shown above, but also at the 
level of treatment. Those who had been students recall having been asked by some of 
their teachers to identify themselves ethnically. This identification was recorded at school 
because it was resorted to in order to determine admission in secondary school later. 
However, it is not clear why the teachers had to ask children their ethnic identity, 
whereas it was easy to get it through the ID books of their parents. Certain narratives 
reveal that it was a way of bringing that awareness among pupils themselves. This 
identification is said to have made pupils uncomfortable, because either they did not 
know what to answer, since some of them did not know their ethnic identity, or else 
because they found out that they were different from the ones with whom they thought 
they were the same. Also, some of those who were fewer, that is, the Tutsi and the Twa, 
say that they felt more insecure.125
 
 
Concerning employment, all interviewed people take the example of employment at the 
level of the commune administration and point out that almost all Councillors were Hutu 
and that it was only at the level of the cell that the Tutsi were included albeit to a minor 
                                                 
122 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Anonymous 4, Anonymous 1, Thérèse Mukangwije, Eugénie 
Nikuze, Théodosie Kanyanja, Epaphrodite Ndibaze, Fortunée Mujawamariya, François Ntukabumwe, and 
Drocèle Uwimana. 
123 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune (Signed by Councillor Joseph Rwandanga who 
replaces the Burgomaster), Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, List of Students enrolled in 
Secondary Education who are from Gishamvu Commune, Ref., No. 374/04.09.01/9, Gishamvu, 26 August 
1975. 
124 Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
125 Interviews with Anonymous 12, Ladislas Harerimana, and Jean Marie Vianney Hategekimana. 
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extent. They narrate how the majority of Tutsi who had completed their secondary 
education were admitted only in the teaching profession and that in administrative 
positions at the Commune office they were allowed to be only employees in charge of 
youth organisation126, a post that employed only one person per commune. For example, 
in 1976, among the personnel of the Gishamvu Commune, there was only 1 Tutsi, the 
agriculture supervisor (Moniteur Agricole), a very small position out of 29 employees, 
and there were no Twa.127 The Tutsi in particular stood less chance of being in the 
military or in the police.128
 
 However, in both Gishamvu and Kibayi Communes, Tutsi 
were numerous in teaching positions at primary education. 
The strategies of survival in this form of exclusion included changing the ethnic identity. 
The research of Antoine Mugesera shows that this trend was a national one.129 
Furthermore, the Tutsi created amicable ties as well as matrimonial ties with the Hutu, 
especially the ones who were powerful, and who allowed them access to education or 
jobs.130
 
 
3.3.2. Rural Exclusion 
 
During the Kayibanda and the Habyarimana regimes, officials always claimed to be 
promoting the masses and especially the rural people. However, the First Republic failed 
to articulate a policy of economic recovery that could reach the rural areas.131
                                                 
126 Interview with Théodosie Kanyanja and Anonymous 12. 
 The Second 
Republic made development its main policy, but because of authoritarianism in control of 
127 Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la Commune Gishamvu, A Monsieur le Préfet de  Préfecture de 
Butare, Objet : Réponse de la lettre n° 1062/03.01.02 “Personnel Communal Commune Gishamvu”, N° 
416/03.01.02, Gishamvu, le 6 Octobre 1976. 
128 Interview with Christophe Nyandwi, Drocèle Uwimana, and Anonymous 17. 
129 Mugesera, Imibereho, pp. 283-289. 
130 This is the case of my informant Domitilla Nsabimana from Kibayi who studied thanks to the help of 
her relative Bishop in Butare, and got a job as teacher at Primary School in Kibayi after marrying a Hutu 
man, my other informant, Christophe Nyandwi, who was then the Inspector of Schools in Kibayi and 
Muganza Areas. Other interviewed people who lived or witnessed similar experiences include Césarie 
Uwambajimana and Anonymous 16. 
131 See Gorus, Politics and Identity, pp. 175-189, p. 181. 
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cooperatives and economic projects, these gave more benefit to state employees of 
projects than to the local population for whom they intended to work.132
 
  
The urban areas benefited from more investments to the detriment of rural areas. As a 
result, the gap between the rural and the urban, the peasants and the money-makers - 
leaders, state employees and businessmen – went on widening in favour of the latter.133 
This gap became a serious indicator of inequality. Furthermore, political decisions and 
projects in agriculture and livestock production failed to take into account the views of 
peasants, and were sometimes against their interests, and even worse, did not consider 
peasants as partners.134 As Jean-Pierre Godding put it eloquently, these projects “target 
things, ‘agricultural production’, and forget human beings, that is, ‘the producers’ as 
these are not quantified [in project drafts]. – They target the objectives to reach though 
they do not know clearly what to do. As a result, there is no particular interest to express 
the needs of the peasants (who are supposed to have been studied in the first place) […] 
Therefore, it is not a ‘ thought with’ but ‘a power above’, and therefore a scorn of the 
peasant who is considered as an object, but not a subject of his or her development.”135
 
 
Yet in the rhetoric, peasants are described as the ultimate beneficiaries of projects:  
Internally, the Rwandan government has frequently reaffirmed its interest in 
promoting rural development to ameliorate rural living conditions. […] Although 
the commitment to rural areas is still embedded in political rhetoric, it sometimes 
appears more rhetorical than real. This tendency has increased as contradictions 
have appeared between the government’s announced commitment to improving 
the lives of peasant producers and the economic ideology of “planned liberalism” 
officially adopted in 1980.136
 
  
                                                 
132 Uvin, Aiding Violence, pp. 176-178.  
133 Reyntjens, L’Afrique des grands lacs, pp. 222-223; Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989, pp. 27, 29; Lisette 
Caubergs et al., L'emploi rural au Rwanda. Une analyse de la politique de promotion et des interventions 
en faveur de l'emploi rural non-agricole au Rwanda jusqu'en 1994, Leuven (Belgique), ATOL, 2003 
(1997), p. 31. 
134 Reyntjens, L’Afrique des grands lacs, p. 224. 
135 Jean-Pierre Godding, “Les grands projets de développement rural et le développement des communes”, 
in Augustin Nkundabashaka et Joachim Voss (organisateurs), Les projets de développement rural : 
Réussites, échecs et stratégies nouvelles, Séminaire, UNR/CIAT, Butare, UNR, 4-6 mai 1987, pp. 85-98, p. 
91. See also Philip Verwimp, “Development ideology, the peasantry and genocide: Rwanda represented in 
Habyarimana’s speeches”, Journal of Genocide Research, 2, 3, 2000, pp. 325-361, p. 338. 
136 Newbury, “Rwanda: Recent Debates”, pp. 201-202. 
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In reality, those who benefited from projects were the financial organizations, the foreign 
experts and national employees of those projects.137 In the view of Bézy, “the rural areas 
produce and the town consumes…”138
 
 
Concerning infrastructure construction, one government report noted that buildings were 
concentrated mainly in the Kigali city from 1979 to 1988, and that in 1988, 73% of 
construction authorizations were in Kigali, whereas Gisenyi had 11%, Ruhengeri 7% and 
Butare 4%.139
 
  
Verwimp has showed the relationship between political loyalty and economy, through the 
monitoring of coffee production and revenue. From this, one understands how the 
existing Habyarimana power valued the peasants at national level, i.e., what they 
represented to his regime. It follows that they were nothing but producers and givers of 
loyalty to the leader. They seemed to have no other value.140
 
 
Finally, the state strove to stop the rural exodus to towns. It used all police and 
administrative forces to restrict the rural populations to their territory, a measure that was 
not always beneficial to them: “…this anti-urban policy benefited people already living in 
the cities, the so-called ‘elite’.”141
                                                 
137 Godding, “Les grands projets”, pp. 94-96. 
 Indeed, in order to move from one commune to 
another, a citizen had to apply for a letter of permission to move. And in order to 
permanently change their address, such as for people who migrated or who got married in 
a different place, this change of whereabouts was closely documented for both the 
commune of origin and the commune of destination. As a result, major cities of Rwanda 
and headquarters of Prefectures never grew to become big cities. As Verwimp observes, 
in 1973, 95% of the population lived in the rural areas, while twenty years later it was 
still the same percentage. However, it would be an exaggeration to assert that no 
138 Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989, p. 44. 
139 République Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et des Forêts, Migration permanente de 
la population agricole au Rwanda, Document de Travail, Division des Statistiques Agricoles, Par Jennifer 
M. Olson, Daniel C. Clay et Jean Kayitsinga,  Kigali, Juillet 1990, p. 16. 
140 Verwimp, “Development ideology”. 
141 Verwimp, “Development ideology”, p. 339. 
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movement to town occurred. As we shall see later, a number of people attempted to move 
to town. It is more accurate to say that the movement was minor.  
3.3.3. Gender Inequality 
 
In addition to ethnic, regional and rural-urban disparities, there was also gender 
inequality. Women had been much less represented in decision-making apparatuses, 
though they were demographically around half of the population. They were among the 
main producers in agricultural and household activities.142 Towards the 1980s, an effort 
had been undertaken by women’s organisations to promote the rights of women, but in 
practice they remained less represented.143 The research of Danielle de Lame and Villia 
Jefremovas show that women did struggle to get some economic progress, and that 
indeed they made some headway. But, in general, they did not reach the so desired 
equality with men.144
3.3.4. Structural Violence against Youth  
 
 
In 1987, 65% of the Rwandan population were below 25. Yet development projects did 
not consult this population, and the majority of them were not land owners. So, this group 
was among the forgotten ones.145 The education sector during the Second Republic 
remained elitist: it was admitting around 10% of primary school pupils in secondary 
school, and less than 1% in Tertiary education, which means that the rest were left 
uneducated. Nothing captures this impasse more than my interview with Karengera Elias, 
former Burgomaster in the early 1960s about the despair of Sholi youths not attending 
school, including his own children.146
                                                 
142 République Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et des Forêts, Division des Statistiques 
Agricoles, Le rôle de la femme dans l’agriculture rwandaise, Kigali, juillet 1990, pp. i et 1. 
 As a result, most of the unadmitted youths had to 
143 See Caubergs et al., L'emploi rural au Rwanda, pp. 23-24. 
144 Danielle de Lame, “Changing Rwandan Vision of Women and Land, in the Heart of the House, at the 
Outskirts of the World”, Africa Focus, Vol. 15, No. 1-2, 1999, pp. 3-12; Villia Jefremovas, “Loose 
Women, Virtuous Wives, and Timid Virgins: Gender and the Control of resources in Rwanda”, Canadian 
Journal of African Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1991, pp. 378-395. 
145 Godding, “Les grands projets”, pp. 90-91. 
146 As we shall see in following chapters, this insufficient literacy has been a tool in political manipulation, 
since the youth were used in militia parties, party violence and later in genocide. 
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return to the rural homestead and work in agriculture. They had to struggle to get an 
infrastructure that would allow them to get married, such as land and a house. Yet, if it 
was still possible to redistribute land to the youth of marriageable age during the 1960s 
and 1970s, this process became increasingly difficult from the 1980s onwards.147
 
  
Indeed, the youth were helped as a group, socially and economically, but were not given 
a political voice as agents. They were given collective land or natural resources such as 
clay for bricks, marshland for agriculture, but only as cooperatives or associations.148 At 
the Commune level, there was a service in charge of organizing the youth in associations, 
but this service suffered from the lack of sufficient human resources in quantity and 
quality. One employee was not sufficient for more than 50% of the population of the 
Commune. Communes wished to get at least one employee in charge of youth 
organization per Sector. 149
 
 
Few attempted to go to town illegally, that is, without the consent of the existing national 
policy,150 but only a tiny number of them were able to improve their lives that way.151 A 
number of the rest became associated with crime, violence and prostitution in town and 
rural areas.152
                                                 
147 André Guichaoua, Destins paysans et politiques agraires en Afrique centrale. Tome 1. L’ordre paysan 
des hautes terres centrales du Burundi et du Rwanda, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1989, pp. 127 et 129. 
 The movement from town to rural and vice versa, from home to outside, or 
to prison, is close to “geographies of delinquency” or “geographies of resistance” as 
analysed by Mamadou Diouf. In this regard, the youth’s disobedience, banditry, crisis are 
148 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara 
Subprefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune Council held on 9 May 1984, Ref.: 152/04.04/2, Kibayi, 23 
May 1984. 
149 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune 
Gishamvu, Année 1989, Gishamvu, 1990, p. 16. 
150 See République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune 
Gishamvu, Année 1986, Gishamvu, février 1987, p. 28. 
151 Jef Maton, Développement économique et social au Rwanda entre 1980 et 1993. Le dixième décile en 
face de l’Apocalypse, Gent, Oktober – November 1994, p. 22. 
152 On the girls and ladies going to town from rural areas and becoming prostitutes, as early as the 70s, see 
Marijke Vandersypen, “Femmes libres de Kigali”, Cahiers d'études africaines, Année 1977, Vol. 17, No. 
65, pp. 95 – 120. 
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to be put in a wider structural context of the failure of the state to secure hopes it once 
gave through the nationalist discourse.153
 
 
Thus, several Prefecture and commune reports indicate how the youth of Gishamvu and 
Kibayi were constantly brought back to their commune after committing some crime in 
Butare or Kigali towns; were forbidden to play urusimbi (sort of illegal lotto or 
gambling), to consume drugs, but the structural reasons why this youth felt despair and 
engaged in these activities were not deeply tackled.154
 
 
These categories – ethnicity and regionalism, rural-urban disparities, gender inequality 
and youth exclusion – may not be the sole underpinnings for structural violence, but they 
appear to be among the most significant.  
 
After looking at the nature and character of postindependence power, its unresolved 
issues and structural violence, and their connections to the colonial legacy, it is now 
necessary to turn to what local leaders achieved economically and how their constituents 
represented them in their everyday relations. This, I believe, is important in order to 
understand the interrelation between leaders and constituents during the 
postindependence period and later on during the political crises leading to genocide.   
 
 
3.4. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
 
Since colonial times, the evaluation of economic growth was always a major concern for 
leaders in Rwanda. The link between economic production and demographic growth 
appeared to be a very important indicator of that economic growth. In this respect, 
                                                 
153 Mamadou Diouf, “Engaging Postcolonial Cultures: African Youth and Public Space”, African Studies 
Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, September 2003, pp. 1-12, pp. 4-5 and 9. 
154 See for example Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of 
Butare Prefecture, Elements for the Report of 1987 Activities, Ref.: N° 490/04.17.04, Kibayi, 17 December 
1987; Frédéric Karangwa, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomasters of Communes, Ref.: No. 
2469/04.09.01/4, Butare, 7 November 1989; République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, S/Préfecture 
Gisagara, Commune de Kibayi, Rapport trimestriel Janvier, Février, Mars 1990, Commune Kibayi, 7 Mai 
1990, p. 4. 
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censuses were organised at all times and revealed an always growing population size. 
From 2,000,000 inhabitants in 1913, the population became close to 3,000,000 in 1964, 
close to 5,000,000 in 1978 and more than 7.5 million inhabitants at the end of 1991. As 
for Butare Prefecture, it had more than 300,000 inhabitants in 1964. That number reached 
approximately double in 1978 census, and nearly triple, that is, 908,273 inhabitants in 
1991.155 In 1934, the rate of demographic growth was 2.25 percent per annum; it 
increased up to 3.99 percent in 1989.156 The reasons seem to be the continuous decrease 
of the mortality rate157
 
 and of course the stabilisation of the birth rate.   
The Butare Prefecture was among the three most densely populated Prefectures of 
Rwanda in 1991, together with Ruhengeri and Gisenyi. As compared to other communes 
of the Butare Prefecture, Gishamvu and Kibayi were in 1986 of medium population size, 
because Kibayi was 11th out of 20 communes, while Gishamvu was 12th. The majority of 
this commune population was young, surpassing half the total number. Indeed, in Kibayi, 
the population of age between 1 and 25 was 51.6% while it was 55% in Gishamvu, for 
the year 1989.158 Tables 1 and 2 provide the evolution of the population in Kibayi and 
Gishamvu from 1968 to 1991 for Kibayi and from 1968 to early 1994 for Gishamvu. In 
these tables, it already appears that the census categorises the population according to 
ethnic groups.159
                                                 
155 Guichaoua, Destins paysans, p. 38 ; République Rwandaise, Bureau National de Recensement, 
Recensement général de la population et de l’habitat 1978. Résultats préliminaires, Kigali, Octobre 1978, 
pp. 7-8 ; Office National de la Population, Monographie démographique préfectorale. La population de 
Butare en chiffres, Kigali, Octobre 1991, pp. 2-4. 
 
156 République Rwandaise, Office National de la Population (ONAPO), Le problème démographique au 
Rwanda et le cadre de sa solution, Vol. 1 : Interrelations Population – développement, Rapport, Kigali, 
1990, p. 17. 
157 République Rwandaise, Office National de la Population (ONAPO), Le problème démographique, p. 25. 
158 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Commune de Kibayi, Monographie de la Commune de 
Kibayi 1989,  Mars 1990, p. 14 ; République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Commune de Gishamvu, 
Monographie de la Commune de Gishamvu, Année 1989, Gishamvu, 1990, p. 16.  
159 These estimates must be considered as approximate, and not absolutely accurate. Indeed, they contain 
relative errors, because among other reasons not all births, deaths and population movements were reported 
to the census office at the commune level. 
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Table 1: Population of Kibayi Commune 
 
Year Surface Hutu 
population 
Tutsi 
population 
Twa 
population 
Total 
population 
Density 
1968 120 Km2 25 189 712 40 25 941 216 
1969 120 Km2 32 166 951 72 33 189 277 
1971 120 Km2 34 444 987 76 35 507 296 
1973 120 Km2 34 111 2 096 95 36 302 303 
1975 120 Km2 35 007 2 154 90 37 251 310 
1976 120 Km2 35 374 2 123 91 37 588 313 
1979 120 Km2 36 448 2 235 62 38 745 323 
1981 120 Km2 37 631 2 396 66 40 093 334 
1982 120 Km2 38 535 2 464 79 41 078 342 
1983 120 Km2 39 599 2 555 85 42 239 352 
1984 120 Km2 41 142 2 722 85 43 949 366 
1985 120 Km2 41 899 3 111 85 45 095 376 
1986 120 Km2    46 087 385, 11th 
1987 120 Km2 43 875 3 006 97 46 978 391 
1988 120 Km2 44 485 3 039 98 47 622 397 
1989 120 Km2 45 977 3 128 98 49 203 410 
1991 120 Km2    50 400 420 
 
Sources: Butare Prefecture and Kibayi Commune reports, monographs and censuses, 
from 1968 to 1991.  
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Table 2: Population of Gishamvu Commune 
 
Year Surface Hutu 
population 
Tutsi 
population 
Twa 
population 
Total 
population 
Density 
1968 98 Km2 16 201 7 602 175 23 978 245 
1969 98 Km2 16 805 7 185 106 24 096 246 
1970 98 Km2 17 644 6 945 111 24 700 252 
1973 98 Km2 19 153 7 530 131 26 814 273 
1975 98 Km2 19 909 7 788 129 27 826 284 
1976 98 Km2 20 368 7 916 127 28 411 290 
1977 98 Km2    29 345 299 
1978 98 Km2    29 887 304 
1979 98 Km2 21 906 7 398 184 30 488 311 
1980 98 Km2 22 481 8 619 185 31 285 319 
1981 98 Km2    32 105 327 
1982 98 Km2    33 285 339 
1983 98 Km2 24 654 9 354 204 34 212 349 
1984 98 Km2 25 053 9 531 203 35 053 357 
1985 98 Km2 26 089 9 746 205 36 040 367 
1986 98 Km2 26 771 10 034 204 37 009 377, 12e 
1987 98 Km2 27 364 10 240 204 37 808 385 
1988 98 Km2 27 721 10 347 203 38 271 390 
1989 98 Km2    38 670 395 
1991 98 Km2    37 676 384 
1992 98 Km2 29 636 11 054 201 40 891 416 
November 
1993 
98 Km2 30 535 11 075 199 41 809 427 
January 
1994 
98 Km2 30 614 11 108 199 41 921 428 
 
Sources: Butare Prefecture and Gishamvu Commune reports, monographs and censuses 
from 1968 to 1994.  
 
 
The predicament for leaders at different epochs was to balance this growing population 
with the economic growth. More than 90% of the Rwandan population lived from 
agriculture, which means that they badly depended on arable land.160
                                                 
160 See République Rwandaise, Enquête démographique et de Santé 1992, Office National de la 
Population, Kigali, Rwanda ; Macro International Inc., Calverton, Maryland, USA, Février 1994, p. 3. 
 As a result, the 
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constant growth of the population size impacted on the availability of arable land 
resources. As mentioned earlier, by 1991 no arable land was left unexploited, and the 
majority of those who had land had a small size, not to mention inequality within land 
ownership.  
 
Furthermore, soil erosion was still attacking a certain percentage of that arable land. As 
Rwanda is overwhelmingly a mountainous country, soil protection was and is paramount. 
Yet, according to Bézy, in 1990, 63 % of land was unprotected.161 But that situation had 
exceptions: for example, in Gishamvu, on 8,200 ha that needed anti-erosion protection, 
94.7% of it had been protected.162 Furthermore, fertilizers remained scarce: by 1981, 
Rwanda was cited as the country using the least fertilizer in the world.163
 
  
As a result, it was frequently hard to cover food needs.164 For example, towards the end 
of the 1970s, the density of population in Butare was above 300 inhabitants per km2; as a 
result, almost everyone was obliged to resort to the market in order to cover food needs, 
which means that what households produced was no longer enough for food self-
sufficiency.165
 
 In this food insufficiency, there was also a considerable inequality, an 
inequality that went on growing until 1994, when, as Maton has demonstrated, the 
situation had become unbearable. 
In order to solve the issue of imbalance between population growth and availability of 
resources, a number of strategies were initiated. They concerned both birth-rate control 
and increased economic production. The institution in charge of the population growth 
campaign (ONAPO) was created in 1981. It focused its attention on educating the 
population about birth control. Indeed, in 1983, Rwanda was top in the world in terms of 
the number of live births per woman: 8.6 on average.166
                                                 
161 Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989, p. 40. 
 Furthermore, this average varied 
162 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune 
Gishamvu, Année 1988, Gishamvu, février 1989, p. 10. 
163 Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989, p. 40. 
164 Guichaoua, Destins paysans, p. 66. 
165 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport annuel 1979, p. 194. 
166 Daniel C.Clay and Nan E. Johnson, “Size of Farm or Size of Family Which Comes First?”, Population 
Studies, 46, 1992, 491-505, pp. 496-497. 
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from town to rural areas, the latter having more live births.167 But until 1990, 
sensitization towards family planning in order to reduce the number of births per family 
had not yet borne significant results. By 1988, only 3 to 4% of women at risk used 
modern contraceptive methods. As a result, the percentage of births per family remained 
high.168
 
  
Faced with the issue of land scarcity, many Rwandans resorted to internal migration since 
as early as the 1960s by joining the villages (paysannats). By the late 1970s, unoccupied 
lands were already full, though the spontaneous movement of populations in need of land 
continued through to 1980 towards Kibungo.169 In Kibayi, the population migrated 
temporarily to Mayaga and Bugesera resettlements in order to seek agricultural jobs 
during coffee harvest, and that some even went to Tanzania.170 But this temporary 
internal migration also occurred elsewhere.171 According to one study, internal 
migrations in rural agricultural regions were widespread between 1960 and 1971, then 
from 1972 to 1976, the movement towards town was initiated; it intensified in the 
following period of 1977 until 1980.172 Rural migrants targeted mostly but not solely 
land, while urban migrants were the ones who had acquired some education, so they 
targeted mostly monied jobs.173
 
 
 
As resources remained scarce and the population high, the bulk of experts in agriculture 
in Rwanda towards the 1980s came to the conclusion that diversifying economic 
production in Rwanda was a priority, since not every peasant could live anymore on 
                                                 
167 République Rwandaise, Enquête démographique et de Santé 1992, Office National de la Population, 
Kigali, Rwanda ; Macro International Inc., Calverton, Maryland, USA, Février 1994, p. 27. 
168 John F. May et al., “Family Planning in Rwanda: Status and Prospects”, Studies in Family Planning, 
Vol. 21, No. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1990, pp. 20-32, p. 21.  
169 Daniel C. Clay, Theobald Kampayana, and Jean Kayitsinga, “Inequality and the Emergence of Non-
farm Employment in Rwanda”, s.d., pp. 1-26, p. 2. 
170 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Commune de Kibayi, Monographie de la Commune de 
Kibayi 1986,  p. 10. 
171 République Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et des Forêts, Migration permanente de 
la population agricole au Rwanda, Document de Travail, Division des Statistiques Agricoles, Par Jennifer 
M. Olson, Daniel C. Clay et Jean Kayitsinga,  Kigali, Juillet 1990, p. 4. 
172 République Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et des Forêts, Migration permanente, 
pp. 8-12. 
173 République Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et des Forêts, Migration permanente, 
pp. 8-12. 
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farming. In order to survive in rural areas, a considerable number of peasants started to 
engage in non-agricultural production, especially in craft industry and in commerce.174 In 
order to regulate the commerce at local level, the state officials reduced the number of 
markets and set up schedules of those markets, most of which were not permanent. These 
markets were places established by the existing authorities where buyers and sellers met 
at certain days of the week to exchange goods and cash. The reasons behind the reduction 
of the number of markets included the following: some markets had few products, others 
attracted only women and children, others were accused of hiding a disguised 
unemployment.175 In 1976, officially recognized markets numbered two in Kibayi and 
Gishamvu: Mugombwa market for Kibayi, opening two days per week: Wednesday and 
Saturday, and Busoro market for Gishamvu, opening on Wednesdays and Sundays.176 
Towards the mid-1980s, the number of these markets was doubled. Gishamvu had two 
markets: Busoro opening on Wednesday and Sunday, and Kibingo market opening on 
Friday 177, while Kibayi had the Kibayi Market for Wednesdays and Saturdays, and 
Gatunda market, on Sundays. 178
 
 
In the 1980s, both Busoro in Gishamvu and Kibayi centre in Kibayi had become small 
business centres. In particular, the Kibayi centre had been developed, having a bigger 
number of buildings and businessmen as compared to Gishamvu.179 In 1980, one set of 
business meeting minutes enumerated a list of 14 businessmen in Kibayi180
                                                 
174 , République Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et des Forêts, Migration permanente, 
p. 4 ; Daniel C. Clay, Theobald Kampayana, and Jean Kayitsinga, “Inequality and the Emergence of Non-
farm Employment in Rwanda”, s.d., pp. 1-26, pp. 8-9. 
, but 
interviews revealed a much bigger number of them, while for Gishamvu, the only one 
175 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport trimestriel d’activités, du 1er Juillet au 30 Septembre 
1975, p. 44. 
176 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport trimestriel d’activités, du 1er Janvier au 30 Mars 
1976, p. 33. 
177 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune 
Gishamvu, Année 1987, Gishamvu, février 1988, p. 19. 
178 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Kibayi, Lettre à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
de la Banque Nationale du Rwanda, Kigali, Ref. : N° 234/04.05/1, Kibayi, le 13/8/1984. 
179 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Commune de Kibayi, Monographie de la Commune de 
Kibayi 1985, Juin 1986, pp. 26-27. 
180 Epaphrodite Nyamigango, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, 
Minutes of the Meeting of Businessmen of the Business Center of Kibayi held on 1 June 1980, Ref.: No. 
86/03.09.01/6, Kibayi, 13 June 1980. 
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renowned businessman seems to have been a certain François Mukimbiri.  But at the 
Prefecture level, commerce was developed only around the 1980s. As late as 1979, there 
was no wholesale importer in Butare Prefecture.181
 
 
In this economic uncertainty, Communes, as they enjoyed the status of financial 
autonomy, had to struggle in order to balance their functioning budget and to get funding 
for their development projects. The commune finance income came from various sources, 
internal and external. Internal ones included tax and levies, various dues from population, 
commune property exploitation, tourism income, and Umuganda contributions. During 
the 1960s, the levies were collected on the adult population [Minimum Personal Levy 
(CPM)], on cattle and on women from polygamy relations.182 Since 1965, the central 
government left a certain percentage of those levies to the commune administration. They 
became entirely given to the commune administration from 1976 onwards.183
 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the extent of collection of taxes and levies depended on the 
charisma and coercion capacity of the leaders in general, and in particular of the 
Burgomasters, and on the economic situation prevailing at that moment. In Kibayi, before 
Nyamigango was in office, there were allegedly many adult people who escaped paying 
tax. When he came into office, in 1973, he focused on the use of police and force, and 
was able to make people pay tax. The same situation is reported for the advent of 
Kambanda into office since 1971 in Gishamvu.184
                                                 
181 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport annuel 1979, p. 195. 
 In general, communes were able to 
balance their expenses as compared to their income. But towards the mid-1980s, when 
the whole country started to experience economic crisis due to the decrease of coffee and 
mineral prices, at the commune level, the financial crisis was witnessed as well. For 
example, in 1985, the Kibayi commune council was in a financial uncertainty, in such a 
way that after calculating its expenses in relation to its income, it decided every time to 
182 See for example République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Rapport annuel 1964, p. A.P.-3 (1) ; 
République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Rapport annuel 1966, p. A.P.-3 (1). 
183 Alberto Basomingera et al., Etude sur les potentialités de développement des communes du Rwanda. 
Cas des communes de la Préfecture de Butare, Rapport, UNR, Août 1987, p. 14. 
184 See below. 
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increase its income by raising more levies and taxes.185 Commune employees had a delay 
of salary payment of about five months in May 1985. Strategies taken in order to solve 
this imbalance included the increase of endeavour in the collection of commune income, 
the reviewing of expenses, and the reduction of some employees.186 In 1986 again, the 
financial situation was not good. As a result, the commune council decided among other 
strategies to reduce the number of administrative and police personnel.187 For example in 
the first quarter of 1990, Kibayi commune had only 7 policemen, whereas it used to have 
12 in 1981.188 The Gishamvu commune officials reported to have registered a financial 
loss in 1985 as well, and were unable to pay all the salaries. In 1987 it also reduced the 
number of its personnel.189 Concerning police in Gishamvu, in 1974, this commune had 
14 policemen, this shows that economic conjuncture was good at that time.190 The 
number went on decreasing as the economic crisis was becoming severe as in the 1990s. 
In 1988 for example, the commune Gishamvu had only 5 policemen.191
 
 
In 1989, as a major famine occurred in Butare, Kibuye and Gikongoro prefectures, people 
in Gishamvu and Kibayi resisted paying tax, the leaders also softened but did not stop 
their constraints on them. As a result, the financial situation of those communes was not 
good.  For example, in order to get the local Cell committee members to collect a greater 
                                                 
185 See Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara 
Subprefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune Council meeting held on 21 May 1985, Ref.: 163/04.04/2, 
Kibayi, 23 May 1985. 
186 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara 
Subprefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune Council meeting held on 21 May 1985, Ref.: 163/04.04/2, 
Kibayi, 23 May 1985. 
187 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara 
Subprefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune Council meeting held on 27 January 1986, Ref.: 34/04.04/2, 
Kibayi, 29 January 1986. 
188 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, S/Préfecture Gisagara, Commune de Kibayi, Rapport 
trimestriel Janvier, Février, Mars 1990, Commune Kibayi, 7 Mai 1990, p. 7 bis ; République Rwandaise, 
Préfecture Butare, Commune Kibayi, Monographie de la Commune Kibayi, Année 1981, p. 7. 
189 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune 
Gishamvu, Année 1986, Gishamvu, février 1987, p. 25 ; République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, 
Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune Gishamvu, Année 1987, Gishamvu, février 1988, p. 
47. 
190 Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la Commune Gishamvu, A Monsieur le Préfet de  Préfecture de 
Butare, Objet : Liste des Policiers Communaux, N° 102/C/G/M.13/74, Gishamvu, le 11 Mars 1974. 
191 Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la Commune Gishamvu, A Monsieur le Préfet de la Préfecture de 
Butare, Objet : Rapport relatif à l’Administration de la Police Communale 3ème et 4ème trimestre 1988, N° 
1078/04.01.02, Gishamvu, le 30/12/1988. 
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percentage of the party dues, the Burgomaster told them that those who reached 95% of 
collections would be rewarded with a bicycle.192
 
 
Gishamvu and Kibayi communes also targeted income from the tourism industry. 
However, among the two, it is only Kibayi that was able to attract such incomes. Part of 
this is due to the outstanding effort of Burgomaster Nyamigango who is said to have been 
very active towards developing the commune in general and tourism in particular. In 
Kibayi, it is the mountain called Makwaza mountain that was made a tourist site. It is 
near the Akanyaru river, and allows one to have a clear view of both Rwandan and 
Burundian sides including a beautiful peak. Nyamigango started this project in 1974 by 
building huts on top of that hill and displaying samples of ethnographic and art 
collections in one of those huts. The following Burgomaster, Kajyambere, pursued this 
project, and as a result, it proved successful. For example, from 1976 to 1986, close to 
4,000 tourists had visited this site.193 In Gishamvu, prospective sites were two: one 
mountain, Ibisi, and a historical site called ikibuye cya Shali. But these two sites did not 
attract as much tourist attention as Kibayi.194
 
 
Furthermore, Umuganda communal labour was very precious in contributing to the 
implementation of development projects such as the building of infrastructure and major 
agricultural projects, such as the planting of trees, the fight against erosion and hygiene. 
Umuganda was an unpaid communal labour provided by the constituents once per week 
in rural areas. It was instituted in 1974. Though it was not enforced by law, Umuganda 
appeared as a formal contribution, because local authorities were able to punish those 
who refused to participate in it.195
                                                 
192 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, 
Minutes of the Commune Development Commission Meeting held on 17 February 1989, Ref.: N° 
93/04.09.01/16, Kibayi, 27 February 1989; République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, S/Préfecture 
Gisagara, Commune de Kibayi, Rapport trimestriel Janvier, Février, Mars 1990, Commune Kibayi, 7 Mai 
1990, p. 11. 
 Umuganda was closely monitored from the ministry of 
193 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Kibayi, A Monsieur le Préfet de la 
Préfecture de Butare, Ref. : N° 349/03.09.01/15, Kibayi, le 19/11/1981. 
194 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune 
Gishamvu, Année 1985, Gishamvu, juin 1986, p. 23 ; République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune 
Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune Gishamvu, Année 1987, Gishamvu, février 1988, p. 20. 
195 André Guichaoua, “Les ‘travaux communautaires’ en Afrique centrale”, Revue Tiers Monde, t. XXXII, 
n° 127, Juillet-Septembre 1991, pp. 551-573, pp. 553 et 561 ; Alberto Basomingera, “La participation de la 
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local government to the prefect down to the commune.196 At local level, it is 
Development Councils that were in charge of planning for Umuganda activities.197
 
 
Umuganda was about to be formalized by the issuing of an ad hoc card when the 
multiparty system came and weakened this communal work. It was planned by the 
Minister of Local affairs that from 1 January 1990 onwards, a card showing Umuganda 
participation would be issued and would be given to every member having the age and 
conditions required, so that this member could show it to whom it may concern to prove 
that he or she really participated in communal works “geared towards the development of 
his country.”198
 
 
 Umuganda is said to have contributed to the building of considerable social and 
administrative infrastructure: local roads and paths, schools, medical centres, 
administrative buildings, planting of trees in order to fight against erosion, etc.199 One 
official report evaluated the Umuganda labour at about 1 billion Rwandan francs each 
year.200 Each commune also quantified the extent of Umuganda works in its budget. For 
example, Gishamvu Commune evaluated at about 1.243.528 francs as the contribution of 
Umuganda labour in the first quarter of 1988.201 Across the country, Umuganda 
contribution is said to have reached 25% of certain development projects.202
 
 
Foreign aid was also very important in this move. According to one author, Rwanda was 
a country of a thousand NGOs. That was in part true if one considers the number of 
                                                                                                                                                 
population à l’administration et à l’exécution des missions de développement des collectivités locales au 
Rwanda”, Revue Juridique du Rwanda, Vol. VI, n° 3-4, juillet-octobre 1982, pp. 231-264, p. 263. 
196 Frédéric Karangwa, Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, A Monsieur le Responsable du MRND en 
Commune, tous, Objet : Carte de participation à l’Umuganda, N° 2348/04.09.02/4, Butare, le 24/10/1989. 
197 See for example République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport trimestriel d’activités, du 1er 
Janvier au 30 Mars 1976, p. 10. 
198 Jean Marie Vianney Mugemana, Ministre de l’Intérieur et du Développement Communal, A Monsieur le 
Préfet de Préfecture, tous, Copie, Objet : Carte de participation à l’Umuganda, N° 2939/04.09.02/4, 
Kigali, le 10 Octobre 1989. 
199 See several Butare Prefecture reports. 
200 République Rwandaise, C.I.C. Ministériel en matière de politique, d’information et de sécurité, 
Evaluation du système et de la situation politiques du Rwanda, Kigali, Juin 1990, p. 18. 
201 Commune de Gishamvu, Volume des réalisations de l’Umuganda, 1er Trimestre 1988. 
202 Augustin Nkundabashaka, et Voss Joachim (organisateurs), Les projets de développement rural : 
Réussites, échecs et stratégies nouvelles, Séminaire, UNR/CIAT, Butare, UNR, 4-6 mai 1987, p. 71. 
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projects that operated around the country under the intervention of international aid. In 
the estimation of Peter Uvin, “[i]n total, there were approximately 200 donors in the 
country: about 20 bilateral ones, 30 multilateral ones, and 150 nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). Together, they managed more than 500 projects in 1986, ranging 
from the very small to the very large. The aid system was omnipresent in Rwanda both 
physically and geographically. […] This development aid supplied the fuel on which the 
machinery of the state ran.”203 The little economic growth witnessed towards the 1970s 
and 1980s is said to have benefited from this international aid and cooperation, but this 
growth was still far from development, because inequalities persisted. 204
 
 
In Gishamvu Commune, for example, from 1980 to 1987, the Commune Council 
financed its development projects in the proportion of 10%, while the state supported 
44%, and the twinning cooperation, i.e. bilateral cooperation between provinces or 
district of two distinct countries, helped with 6% and the remaining 39% were supported 
by NGOs. As for Kibayi, for the same period, the commune financed 0%, the state 
supported 18%, international cooperation paid 21%, there was no twinning, then the 
remaining 61% came from NGOs.205
 
 This means that dependence from the state financial 
intervention was borne by Gishamvu more than Kibayi, while dependence from 
international aid was borne by Kibayi more than Gishamvu.  
Since 1986, Gishamvu Commune had twinning cooperation with the Municipality of 
Daun of Rhenanie-Palatinat. Among other projects, this cooperation had helped build the 
Nutritional Centre of Gishamvu and the Mubumbano primary school.206
 
 
Another economic strategy that seems to have been widespread in Rwanda is the 
grouping of the active population in cooperatives. For example, Gishamvu and Kibayi 
had each two big cooperatives that enjoyed juridical personality. In Gishamvu there were 
COFOGI for Gishamvu smiths and COPADAGI that specialized in storage, catering and 
                                                 
203 Uvin, Aiding Violence, pp. 41-42. 
204 Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989, p. 11; de Lame, “Changing Rwandan Vision of Women”, p. 4. 
205 Basomingera et al., Etude sur les potentialités, p. 45. 
206 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune 
Gishamvu, Année 1987, Gishamvu, février 1988, p. 44 ; Basomingera et al., Etude sur les potentialités, pp. 
42-43. 
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selling of food products. COFOGI produced metal tools used in farming and in household 
everyday activity. COPADAGI had more than 2,500 members in 1986, which was a great 
number. COPADAGI was legally recognized since 1983.207 In 1986, Gishamvu had other 
29 small cooperatives that were not yet legally recognised.208  In 1989, there were two 
big cooperatives in Kibayi, KOKIKI (1,401 members) created since 1982 and located in 
Kirarambogo, Rwamiko, and KOKINYA (1,325 members) located in Nyabisagara, 
Mukindo, created in 1985. They were both silo-cooperatives, that is, they bought, stocked 
and sold food from and to peasants. Another big one was the Migina People’s Bank that 
specialised in loan and savings with 1,760 members. There were other 33 cooperatives 
and precooperatives disseminated in the sectors of the commune created between 1973 
and 1988. About 5,712 people were members of those cooperatives and precooperatives, 
which suggests that the bulk of active population had enthusiastically embraced 
associations.209
 
 
Rice cultivation in particular was an activity that flourished significantly in Kibayi. It is 
Burgomaster Nyamigango who is remembered for having brought it to Kibayi in 1976 
and planted it in the Akanyaru marshland. This crop helped the peasants of Kibayi get 
cash income in addition to coffee.210 The preparation of the Akanyaru marshland had 
started since the colonial period, it was underway around 1942,211 and major works were 
done after the Second World War.212  Father Claude Simard was among the main 
development partners who helped Kibayi in the rice projects, in the COKIKI cooperative 
and in many other infrastructure projects.213
                                                 
207 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune 
Gishamvu, Année 1986, Gishamvu, février 1987, p. 40. 
 After initiating rice agriculture in 
208 Basomingera et al., Etude sur les potentialités, pp. 42-43. 
209 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, S/Préfecture Gisagara, Commune de Kibayi, Rapport 
annuel 1989, Commune Kibayi, Février 1990, pp. 24-25. 
210 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Kibayi, Monographie de la Commune Kibayi, 
Année 1981, p. 16 ; République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Commune de Kibayi, Monographie de la 
Commune de Kibayi 1985, Juin 1986, p. 15. 
211 Jungers, Vice-Gouverneur Général, Gouverneur du Ruanda-Urundi, Lettre à Monsieur l’Administrateur 
Territorial d’Astrida, objet : Cultures en marais, Usumbura, le 25 juin 1942, Archives Nationales, 
Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida. 
212 J. Languy, Agronome d’Astrida, Note au sujet de  la mise en valeur de la région de l’Akanyaru, 1946, 
Archives Nationales, Correspondance, Territoire d’Astrida. 
213 Commission Technique de la Commune Kibayi, Compte-rendu de la réunion du 24/11/1984, N° 
362/04.04/1, Kibayi, le 5/12/1984. 
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Kirarambogo, Rwamiko, Kibayi, this project was integrated in the national management 
in 1981. But certain management problems arose. Peasant associations started to be 
poorly paid for their labour.214
 
 
From 9 ha used for rice in 1977, Kibayi rice exploitations reached 50.44 ha in 1981. One 
notices that Nyamigango, who died in 1980, had done a great job in this respect.215 From 
1977 to 1983 the quantity of production of rice rose sharply, then reduced in 1984 and 
1985.216 Burgomaster Kajyambere pursued this rice project as well. It is worth noting that 
though Gishamvu Commune had also five marshlands, it did not however develop rice, 
nor did it efficiently exploit that land for more beneficial economic activity, as was the 
case in Kibayi.217
 
 
Finally, an effort was put into the building of social and administrative infrastructure. 
Perhaps it is necessary to show how this infrastructure evolved in the two communes, 
because this helps us to understand in the next section how the constituents evaluated the 
power performance of their local leaders on the basis of what they have achieved 
materially for them. Although infrastructure in rural areas was still insufficient, and the 
capital city benefited from more investment, certain improvements had taken place. For 
example, roads had been developed; new schools had been added to the ones that existed 
during colonial period; administrative buildings had been built and medical facilities had 
multiplied. 
 
However, certain obstacles remained key to understanding the backwardness of 
infrastructure at the level of rural areas. For example, electricity was still rare. Gishamvu 
had a connection that provided electricity to the Nyakibanda Great Seminary, the 
Nyumba parish houses, the administrative office of Gishamvu commune and to a few 
                                                 
214 Père Claude Simard, Mission de Kirarambogo, Commune Kibayi, Lettre à Monsieur le Préfet de Butare, 
Kirarambogo, le 13 octobre 1983. 
215 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Kibayi, Monographie de la Commune Kibayi, 
Année 1981, p. 16. 
216 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Commune de Kibayi, Monographie de la Commune de 
Kibayi 1985, Juin 1986, p. 15. 
217 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune 
Gishamvu, Année 1988, Gishamvu, février 1989, p. 9. 
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business houses located in the Busoro centre. However, Kibayi did not have electricity. In 
1982, the burgomaster of Kibayi was informed that there was a project to bring electricity 
from Save to Mugombwa (in the third Five Year Plan), so he wrote a motivation letter to 
the Minister of Planning, explaining why the project could be beneficial if it included the 
Kibayi administrative and medical centre.218
 
 But this project did not succeed, for, until 
1994, electricity was not yet available in Kibayi. Some medical centres had solar energy 
only. 
Local roads were made but not paved. In Gishamvu, the acknowledgement of road 
construction is mostly given to Burgomaster Munyarugano, but also to Kambanda, while 
in Kibayi, it is given both to Hakizimana, Nyamigango and Kajyambere, that is, 
burgomasters who lasted in office.  By 1988, all sectors and most cells in Gishamvu were 
linked by small unpaved but regularly maintained roads.219
 
 Concerning accessibility, 
Gishamvu was said to be more accessible to Butare town than Kibayi, for, it was linked 
to the national road of Butare-Akanyaru border to Burundi, a paved road in good 
condition. From Butare to the administrative office there is only 17km, while, from 
Butare to Kibayi commune office, there is 35 Km, that is, double the distance.  
Housing has also benefited from some attention. A systematic campaign existed already 
during the 1960s to get rid of straw thatching and replace them with roofing of tiles and 
corrugated iron. That campaign bore fruits, for by the 1980s, more than half the houses of 
peasants were covered by these durable materials. For example, in 1985, Kibayi 
commune had 6,196 houses covered with tiled roofs, 86 covered with corrugated iron, 
and 3,185 with straw, which suggests that straw roof houses were fewer than hard roof 
houses, while in Gishamvu there were only 1,666 houses covered with straw against 
6,659 covered with both tiles and corrugated iron. 
 
                                                 
218 Pierre Canisius Kajyambere, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Kibayi, Lettre à Monsieur le Ministre du 
Plan, Kigali, Ref. : N° 348/03.09.02/4, Kibayi, le 12/10/1982. 
219République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune 
Gishamvu, Année 1987, Gishamvu, février 1988, pp. 27-28.  
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Concerning schools, in 1985, Kibayi commune had eight primary schools and two post-
primary vocational training schools (CERAI). By 1991, Gishamvu Commune had six 
primary schools : four had been achieved just after the second world war, by the time the 
colonial administration was focusing on infrastructure development: Nyumba A school 
created in 1945, Nyumba B school created also in 1945, Mukuge school created in 1946, 
Mubumbano school created in 1947. Two more schools were added during the 
Habyarimana regime: Liba school in 1976, Nyanza school in 1987. As post-primary 
education of CERAI for vocational training, there was a CERAI at Nyumba that started 
in 1987. In 1993, the Gishamvu Commune was able to get its first secondary school: the 
Groupe Scolaire de Nyumba. 
 
Concerning health infrastructure, this remained minimal until 1994. In Gishamvu, there 
were two medical facilities: the Sheke dispensary that stated during the office of 
Munyarugano in 1966 and the Nyumba Nutritional Centre opened during the office of 
Kambanda in 1975. Kibayi had more medical facilities than Gishamvu: it had two better 
equipped medical centres with hospitalization facilities, the Kirarambogo medical centre 
created since 1971 and the Kibayi Medical centre that started in 1979 during the office of 
Nyamigango. 
 
In addition to the above social infrastructures, the bulk of construction at commune level 
focused on administrative building, i.e., offices of burgomasters, tribunals and offices of 
sectors. The new office of Gishamvu Commune had been inaugurated in 1980, while the 
one of Kibayi was inaugurated in 1986. 
 
3.5. PERCEPTIONS ABOUT LOCAL POWER: RELATIONS BETWEEN 
LEADERS AND CONSTITUENTS 
 
In this section, I look at how the nature and character of power in Gishamvu and Kibayi 
are viewed. I notice that constituents talk about power in individual terms. The individual 
mentioned is often the burgomaster, but sometimes also the councillor. This is in part 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
203 
because power was also too personalised.220
3.5.1. Two key burgomasters during the First Republic: Munyarugano in 
Gishamvu and Hakizimana in Kibayi 
 Secondly, this evaluation depends on who 
the constituent is, Hutu, Tutsi or leader or peasant, and the relation he or she had with that 
particular leader. This means that this evaluation is highly subjective, but remains 
significant to help us understand how power was perceived at local level. Thirdly, this 
evaluation takes into account the behaviour and performance of the leader in relation to 
events and phenomena or elements developed above: authoritarianism, unresolved issues, 
structural violence and economic performance. How a particular leader reflected on those 
issues at particular times determines how he was viewed.  
 
Munyarugano from Gishamvu and Hakizimana from Kibayi can be put together for a 
number of reasons. Both ruled during the Kayibanda regime, with the difference that 
Munyarugano entered power only in 1963, while Hakizimana had started as ad interim 
subchief from 1959.  Hakizimana, after 1971 when he lost support from above and 
therefore was rejected at local level, disappeared from the political landscape and went to 
work as civil servant in Kigali, Nyanza and Butare towns. He only came back to politics 
during the multiparty system of 1991-1994, when he became president of MRND party in 
Kibayi. As for Munyarugano, he had a bright political career as burgomaster from 1963 
and as parliamentarian from 1968. When he retired, he became respectively local judge in 
Gishamvu and member in Technical Commission during the Habyarimana regime.221
 
 
Because of his close relation with the new burgomaster Kambanda, he continued to 
influence local politics until the late 1980s. Like Hakizimana, Munyarugano competed 
for the post of president of MRND party in Gishamvu, in 1991, but unlike Hakizimana, 
he failed.  
It can be said that the postindependence state of Rwanda was a developmental one, at 
least in its overt ideology. In this regard, the ruler was evaluated in terms of what he had 
                                                 
220 Guichaoua, L’administration territoriale rwandaise, p. 22 ; Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 277. 
221 Justin Nsengimana, Président de la Commission Technique de Gishamvu, Compte rendu de la réunion 
de la Commission Technique tenue au Bureau Communal de Gishamvu en date du 10 juillet 1989. 
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done concerning the improvement of social and economic infrastructure. Munyarugano is 
said to have brought more development activities and infrastructure to Gishamvu than 
any other burgomaster. He advocated that people use clay available in the valleys to 
make tiles and bricks and build houses covered by tiles instead of straw.222 This was done 
through a major campaign to eradicate Nyakatsi, that is, houses thatched with straw. In 
that housing development scheme, he targeted the youth. He made it a rule that no young 
man would any longer marry in a straw-thatched house.223 Once the production of tiles 
became prosperous, Munyarugano is said to have ordered the payment of taxes from tile 
revenues,224
 
 which means that he made it a double gain. 
In this process, Munyarugano is said to have striven to build some gender balance. 
Consider for instance what this old lady Emerite Kubwimana narrated:  
 
Munyarugano advised people good things for development. He said that if a man 
comes to a local authority meeting, he must come with his wife. That if the man 
with his wife work together, they make adobe bricks, and tiles and build their 
houses, they can develop their household. […] Men and their wives worked with 
endeavour. The man reduced his alcohol consumption, and the woman managed 
very well her harvest and reduced the spending in the clothes, so that they could 
make savings in order to build houses.225
 
 
The fight against alcohol is stressed by another lady: “He forbid Hutu and Tutsi, young 
and others from spending in the bars. That is what I remember about him.”226 He also 
taught people to make associations.227 He is said to have founded the markets.228
                                                 
222 Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 1, 
Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 2. 
 
223 Interview with Anonymous 8, Gishamvu, 24 and 26 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 6, 
Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
224 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
225 Interview with Emérite Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. But this gender effort is not seen in the 
number of administrative employees that he had in the Commune office. They remained overwhelmingly 
men. 
226 Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
227 Interview with Emérite Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
228 Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with 
Augustin Gakuru, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, Gishamvu, 21 April 
2007; Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
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Munyarugano is reported to have made the new roads inside Gishamvu.229 Munyarugano 
also converted the former accommodation of colonial Europeans located at Sheke into a 
medical dispensary.230
 
 
In personal behaviour, he is said to have been a hard worker, a busy person: “…it is 
worth acknowledging that Munyarugano was a hard worker. He liked to cultivate. He 
could not make a conversation like the one we have made, no. Moreover, he was not 
following gossips. He investigated for himself. Munyarugano was a man, he was good 
leader.”231 Munyarugano is said to have been very charismatic, because he was 
considered as an “intellectual”: he had been a nurse since late colonial period.232
 
 Certain 
constituents shared the myth of people who had studied. They appeared more legitimate 
than the ones who had less education. This is what Claudine Vidal has called the cultural 
capital of the fourth ethnic group, that is, the ‘intellectuals’. This positive evaluation of 
Munyarugano is shared by the upper leaders. In 1966, for example, he was the sole 
Burgomaster to have got the evaluation “Elite” in the whole Butare Prefecture.  
On the other hand, as far as politics is concerned, the above positive description is highly 
relative. For example, Munyarugano is said to have been authoritarian.233 Furthermore, as 
he was contemporary to the time of Inyenzi attacks, he is said to have been very harsh to 
anyone he suspected of going to Burundi. This was a national policy as some recognize, 
so, some argue, it cannot be put down to him. But, others say that in this process, he took 
advantage of expelling any Tutsi who was not on good terms with him, and they conclude 
that that was his fault.234
                                                 
229 Interview with Anonymous 1, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 
April 2007; Interview with Célestin Bangambiki, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
 This ambivalence is found also in ethnic relations: some say he 
230 Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
231 Interview with Innocent Nahayo, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
232 Interview with Hakizamungu François-Xavier, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
233 Interview with Anonymous 4, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 2, Gishamvu, 19 
April 2007; Interview with Callixte Kanyamugenga, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
234 Interview with Innocent Nahayo, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, 
Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; Interview with 
Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Augustin Gakuru, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; 
Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; Interview with Elias Karengera, Gishamvu, 
30 April 2007. 
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was discriminatory towards the Tutsi.235 But other informants explain that this ethnic 
discrimination policy was a national one, so it cannot be put on him as Burgomaster.236 
Most importantly, others separate his behaviours in different epochs: they say that when 
he was Burgomaster he was good; he just focused on development without excluding 
anyone. But when he became parliamentarian, that is when he shifted and became 
discriminatory. As one of the informants stresses, this is also the time when Munyarugano 
had become very rich, so he started to be more arrogant and authoritarian.237
 
  
As for Burgomaster Hakizimana from Kibayi who was a contemporary of Munyarugano, 
the majority of informants report that he had been a good leader. They do not stress too 
much development activities such as for Munyarugano in Gishamvu, but they say that he 
had no ethnic discrimination. He also enjoyed considerable respect because he was 
considered as an intellectual too; he had been a teacher before entering politics.238
 
 
Development activities undertaken and realized are mentioned by himself. He talks about 
road design and construction, about coffee planting, tax collection, water taps and other 
minor activities. 
Unlike Munyarugano who continued to enjoy outstanding respect and influence during 
the Habyarimana regime, Hakizimana was among Butare politicians who were rejected 
by PARMEHUTU during the divisions of that party in 1968, him with his elder brother 
Isidore Nzeyimana. He kept office until the 1971 elections when he failed to get re-
elected, since he had lost support from above and the confidence of other councillors 
from below. In 1971, the Butare Prefecture described his removal from office in the 
following terms: “Burgomaster Hakizimana Raymond, a very active element, with 
integrity and impartiality, but he was not re-elected because most of his fellows did not 
                                                 
235 Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; Interview with Justin Munyankindi, 
Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007; Interview with 
Augustin Bucyabutata, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 
2007. 
236 See for example, interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
237 Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Léopold 
Muremangando, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Léopold Hategekimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 
2007. 
238 Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007; Interview with Ignace Gatabazi, Kibayi, 21 
May 2007; Interview with François Mukezamfura, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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like him due to political antecedents…”239 Another report from national intelligence 
observed: “The Burgomaster does not have any notorious influence in his commune. He 
has lost popularity during his collaboration in the political struggle of his elder brother 
Nzeyimana Isidore […] by the time the latter was deposed.” 240
3.5.2. Nyamigango in Kibayi during the first years of the Second Republic 
  
 
Local populations depict Epaphrodite Nyamigango in very controversial terms. On the 
one hand, almost all tangible development achievements are put down to his efforts. 
However, he is said to have been very authoritarian as well. Nyamigango had completed 
only one year of secondary education, but this limited education level seems to have had 
little impact on his performance. He started to work as a secretary at the Butare prefecture 
and was much appreciated there.241 Then in 1973, when the regime changed, the 
Burgomaster of Kibayi, André Sebarera, who had replaced Raymond Hakizimana in 
1971, was deposed. Nyamigango was appointed as new Burgomaster of Kibayi from 
December 1973.242
 
 
Concerning commune administration, before Nyamigango, many adult people were still 
escaping paying annual levy and taxes. When he came into office, he focused on making 
people pay tax. He used the councillors and cell committee members to sensitize the 
population in this line. He also used the police and even got himself involved in everyday 
control and pursuit of those who were not paying.  
 
Two major works of infrastructure are accredited to him: the Kibayi Medical centre and 
the Makwaza tourist attraction. However, even projects such as the building of the 
administrative office of the Kibayi commune that was completed after his death, is 
                                                 
239 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport annuel 1971, p. A.P.-7 (bis).  
240 Malraux (pseudonyme), Sûreté Nationale, Butare, A Monsieur le Directeur de la Sûreté Nationale à 
Kigali, Réf. : N° 036/IV.1, annexes I et II, Le 8 juillet 1971. 
241 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Rapport annuel 1973, p. 6. 
242 Many informants said that Nyamigango was a Burundian. See for example this elaborate explanation of 
Bisamaza: “Nyamigango was also a Burundian, except that he studied and was raised in Rwanda at his 
brother-in-law called Sebitenga who was staying at Murama of Mukomacara. That is where he was raised, 
but he is originally from Burundi. His family resides at a place called ku Cyamaguru in Mwumba 
Commune, here in Burundi, in Gatsinda Zone.” 
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ascribed to him, because he is said to have initiated it. The rice agriculture is maybe the 
most important achievement for which the population gives Nyamigango credit. It made 
the Kibayi people have two cash crops: rice and coffee, not to mention banana. 
 
Nyamigango realized all these infrastructure initiatives and projects, thanks to his 
capacity to negotiate with higher leadership and with foreign donors. There prevails a 
belief that Nyamigango never feared the upper echelons of power.243
 
 He was for instance 
the first one to have brought to Kibayi the President of the Republic in 1979, when he 
came to inaugurate the Kibayi Medical Centre. For all the above achievements, many 
constituents appreciated him.  
Senior leaders appreciated his performance as well.244 He was very active in the MRND 
single party. As a matter of fact, in 1976, he got elected among twelve members who 
were in the Prefecture Committee of MRND.245
 
 This is maybe one of the factors that 
brought him into contact with senior leadership so he felt at ease contacting them in order 
to get many projects initiated in his commune.  
Then concerning his mode of rule, he is said to have been very authoritarian in that he 
used force too much. He beat people.246 Secondly, he disturbed people even in the night, 
by coming after tax evaders and smugglers. The behaviour of Nyamigango in attempting 
to control the lives of people including at night became so embedded in memory that an 
artist invented the following saying or formula: “Nyamutwara ijoro kw’ijanja, bwacya 
akaritwaza umurindi”, meaning that he worked day and night in his administration.247
 
 
Another informant had this to say about enforcement of tax collection:  
                                                 
243 Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. See also Interview with Raymond Hakizimana 
and André Uzaramba. 
244 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport annuel 1974, p. 23. 
245 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport trimestriel d’activités, du 1er Janvier au 30 Mars 
1976, p. 12. 
246 Interview with Faustin Nduwayezu, Kibayi, 17 May 2007; Interview with François Mukezamfura, 
Kibayi, 17 May 2007 ; Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007; Interview with Vianney 
Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
247 Interview with Epaphrodite Ndibaze, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
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No one hid from him, he could discover you even in the bush. He charges you a 
fine, and goes after you have paid it to him. Or else he detains you. […] We were 
impiringi, that is, we were not paying tax. When he realizes that such a hill does 
not pay tax, he goes there for a week, he comes back after receiving the whole 
payment of those taxes…248
 
 
 
Another leadership flaw ascribed to him is that he used to intervene without making any 
investigation. If someone accused another person to him, he punished him immediately. 
A number of informants said that he listened to gossip.249
 
 
Nyamigango is said to have fought against smuggling until it was significantly reduced. 
All previous burgomasters had failed to halt this activity. According to one informant, 
many smugglers shifted to new businesses.250 Another informant who had been himself a 
smuggler, presented the Nyamigango campaign against smugglers as corruption, because 
things confiscated went into the pockets of leaders not into the state coffers.251
 
 Certain 
people interpreted the fight against smuggling as authoritarianism, because for them, the 
leaders were stopping the constituents from empowering themselves. Through this 
debate, one sees the contradiction between the formal and the informal economies:  
In fact, you could see that there was no development. Because they were 
undermining the one who is empowering himself. I saw this from people who 
wanted to do low value trade, then you realize that he was charging them fines, 
and stopping their right to operate. […] For example, I will refer to the area where 
I was living. There was a man Birasa Gerald, he was helping his neighbours, by 
resorting to smuggling. He goes to Burundi and brings cheap food such as beans, 
sorghum, oil, then he was always mistreating him, charging him money. Then you 
realize that those that he was helping to survive by selling to them, no longer get 
something from him because of the fine. There are many other examples.252
 
 
Nyamigango ultimately died in June 1980 of an incurable wound on his leg. But there are 
numerous interpretations about his death. Some say that it was by bewitchment that he 
got that wound. Yet those who say so narrate various versions about how he was 
                                                 
248 Interview with Ignace Gatabazi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
249 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
250 Interview with Jean Sindayigaya, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
251 Interview with Vianney Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. But on Nyamigango, this has to be relativised, 
because he died poor. 
252 Interview with Ladislas Hererimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
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bewitched. In these versions, one says that the bewitching took place at Mugombwa 
place, others say that it was at Saga place. Some say it is a lady who bewitched him after 
the Burgomaster threw away her traditional beer, for she did not pay tax. Others say it 
was a Burundian smuggler.253 The fact that these stories of bewitchment abounded 
reveals to what extent the strength of bewitchment in the local belief was great. It would 
be worthwhile to analyse more deeply these stories of bewitchment, and what they revel 
about people’s feelings and their subjectivities in the face of survival and local power. 
Several Gishamvu people said that he died poor. He did not accumulate wealth like most 
other leaders. At his funeral, the Prefect of Butare Prefecture said that Nyamigango loved 
his commune more than himself.254 But in the final years of his rule, one former 
councillor said that Nyamigango had changed, that he had become softer.255
3.5.3. Kambanda in Gishamvu and Kajyambere in Kibayi during the Second 
Republic: Genocide burgomasters 
 
 
These two burgomasters share certain features: they were incumbents when the country 
entered into a busier political time following multiparty politics and during the genocide. 
Both are the ones who lasted more years in power and probably who did a great deal in 
terms of infrastructure building. But all their credit for this has been given to their 
predecessors, because of their role in the genocide. Kambanda was in office from 1971 to 
1994, while Kajyambere ruled from 1981 to 1994. 256
 
 
Kambanda tried his chances as a candidate in the parliamentary elections of 1981, and 
received good enough results to become a replacement parliamentarian. But he never 
                                                 
253 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 
May 2007; Interview with Aloys Mutarambirwa, Kibayi, 17 May 2007; Interview with Christophe 
Nyandwi, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; Interview with Drocelle Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007; Interview with 
Ildéphonse Habimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007; Interview with Vianney Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
254 Interview with André Uzaramba and  Joseph Baritunga. 
255 Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
256 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, 
Ref. : No. 210/C/G/71/, Gishamvu, 6 September 1971; Emmanuel Ruzindana, Préfet de la Préfecture de 
Butare, Confidentiel, Lettre à Monsieur Kajyambere Canisius, Projet GBK Butare, Réf. : N° 585/03.01.01, 
Butare, le 29 mai 1981. 
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became a parliamentarian.257
 
 Kajyambere seems not to have evolved beyond the 
commune level, though he tried by all means to co-opt high profile national leaders who 
were originally from Kibayi by incorporating them in the Technical Commission of the 
Commune. 
Socially and politically speaking, they were different. Kambanda, having come from a 
catechist background, behaved, according to certain informants, like a priest.258 
Kajyambere on the other hand was presented as adulterous, in that he abused his position 
to get sexual favours from women. He was caught several times sleeping or attempting to 
commit adultery with wives of his employees and simple peasants.259
 
  
Politically, Kambanda is presented as a moderate Hutu during all the years he lasted in 
power, even during the times of multiparty politics. In this respect, ethnic discrimination 
witnessed in the commune is put down to politics at a higher level. For example, 
Rwandanga who was a councillor, is among those who say that Kambanda interacted 
with the Tutsi socially: “In the mode of rule, Kambanda was on good terms mostly with 
the Tutsi. I don’t know how this changed later. You used to find him mingling together 
with the Tutsi, talking, sharing drinks.”260 This is confirmed by Anonymous 4 who was 
and still is a teacher, and Kumuyange who worked for several years at Nyakibanda Grand 
Seminary as a typist. Kambanda is accused of being extremist only during the genocide. 
Indeed, some people did not understand how he just betrayed the Tutsi at the last 
minute.261
                                                 
257 Dominique Bakinahe, Les élections législatives au Rwanda, de 1981 à 1988, Kigali, Août 1993 ; 
République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport triennal des activités 1981-1983, p. 34. 
 On the other hand, Kajyambere is presented as a person who did not socialise 
that much with the Tutsi, and who created injustice against some of them, such as 
confiscating their harvest. The one from whom he is said to have confiscated a whole 
258 He was a teacher at Nyumba Primary school from 1963 to 1966. Then he went to study at the School of 
Catechists  in Butare town for one year. When he came back, he taught catechism at the Nyumba School of 
Catechists until 1971. (Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of 
Butare Prefecture, Ref. : No. 210/C/G/71/, Gishamvu, 6 September 1971.) 
259 Interview with Faustin Nduwayezu, Kibayi, 17 May 2007; Interview with Drocelle Uwimana, Kibayi, 
11 May 2007; Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
260 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
261 Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Célestin Karemera, 
Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
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lorry of rice is André Kameya, who was also in the Technical Commission. However, 
Kajyambere is said to have had close relations with the Tutsi who were wealthy, 
especially the businessmen of Kibayi commercial centre.262
 
 This shows to what extent 
the relation between the leaders and the Tutsi population was often inauspicious, but also 
complex in the sense that injustices bore exceptions.  
Concerning authoritarianism, both burgomasters are depicted as authoritarian figures but 
who behaved differently. Kambanda is said to have been very hypocritical: he was not 
punishing people openly, he made signs to the policemen to do that.263 While 
Kajyambere lacked that tact.264 Kambanda is said to have ruled in a soft way, that is, he 
was not taking decisions himself, he had within the Commune council and administration 
a faction that often influenced him. People who are enumerated in this faction include the 
driver Gatabazi, the Councillor Cyuma of Gishamvu Sector who was related to him as an 
in-law, his wife also is said to have influenced him in decisions pertaining to commune 
administration, and Sebujangwe, the brother of his wife.  But the person most cited as 
having influenced Kambanda’s policies is the former Burgomaster, Munyarugano, who 
also became a parliamentarian. Also one priest is cited, Father Londen, for having been 
close to him.265 Kajyambere is described as very authoritarian, with a strong personality, 
who was not approached by lay people, let alone his family members. Furthermore, some 
say that Kajyambere did not like to consult the population that much.266
                                                 
262 Interview with Anonymous 16, Kibayi, 10 May 2007; Interview with François Ntukabumwe, Kibayi, 10 
May 2007; Interview with François Mukezamfura, Kibayi, 17 May 2007 ; André Kameya, “Projets à 
réaliser dans la Commune de Kibayi, Butare”, in Compte rendu de la réunion de la Commission Technique 
de la Commune Kibayi tenue à Butare le 8/12/1985, Ref. : N° 15/04.01/1, Kibayi, le 9 Janvier 1986. 
 According to one 
former Councillor, Kajyambere did not like to mingle with minor local affairs, he 
delegated them to lower administrative levels, such as the sector and the cell. This 
263 Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
264 Interviews with Gratien Rwigimba and Venuste Sindabizera, Kibayi, 9 May 2007; Interview with Jean 
Sindayigaya, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
265 Interview with Anonymous 11, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007, Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 
April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 6, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Léopold 
Hategekimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007; Interview with Léopold Muremangando, Gishamvu, 23 April 
2007; Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; Interview with Gaston Nzabamwita, 
Gishamvu, 26 April 2007; Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; Interview with 
Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
266 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; Interview with Aloys Mutarambirwa, 
Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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according to him, was a “modern way of rule”, modern in the sense of taking some 
distance from interpersonal acquaintance and acting in a more abstract and indirect 
way.267
 
 
Concerning economic activities, as early as 1974, Kambanda was among the 
Burgomasters most praised at the level of prefecture for his good performance, because 
he was striving to promote projects that improved infrastructure. That is the time when he 
was launching major projects for building health and education facilities and organizing 
cooperatives for adults and youth. 268  He is the one who initiated the building of the 
Gishamvu commune office located at Nyumba, and many more projects, but the credit 
went to Munyarugano who is believed to have brought ideas for that.269
 
 All that 
Kajyambere achieved is also accredited to Nyamigango. Kajyambere is presented as 
someone who had managed business as usual, who pursued policies initiated by 
Nyamigango, either in the building of social infrastructure or in the tourism project. They 
are right in part, but the improvement of those activities lie in the long-term work of 
Kajyambere.  
Finally, both Kambanda and Kajyambere are held responsible for the genocide in their 
communes. Kambanda is presented as having been moderate during multiparty politics 
and extremist during the genocide. As for Kajyambere, he is said to have been worse both 
during the time of multiparty system and during the genocide.  
3.5.4. Relations of obedience and disobedience 
 
After this description of perceptions of constituents about their commune leaders, it is 
important to look at how they related to them. In general, the local population obeyed 
their leaders. This is what Prunier calls the culture of obedience and De Lame 
                                                 
267 Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
268 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport annuel 1974, p. 23. 
269 Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Athanase 
Kumuyange, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 3, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
214 
conformism or conformity.270
 
 In my case studies, obedience towards authorities and 
orders is also the general rule. It is the normal accepted political behaviour. However, the 
existence of so many complaints by leaders about cases of disobedience or constituents 
escaping governmental requirements, the strategies of leaders in order to bring back 
constituents to “order”, or the narratives of constituents about cases of disobedience 
against the authorities and their strategies to do this, suggest that disobedience against 
existing power structures needs to be taken seriously.  
In general, Gishamvu and Kibayi informants assert that the population obeyed the orders 
of the state and responded to multiple demands of the government. But a closer 
examination suggests that this overall obedience was the result of multiple efforts and 
strategies of state agents, rather than of spontaneous or unconditional willingness of the 
population. Nothing captures this conditional obedience than the description given by my 
informant Hakizamungu:  
 
Normally the population obey the rules of the authorities. Kambanda said to plant 
coffee. We did it. […] I told you that every time the lay people fear punishment: 
prison, detention, beating. This makes them obey the rules of authorities so that 
they can remain in peace. Even if they disagree with those measures. 
Question: how was the burgomaster considered? 
Answer: Consider how the head of the family is respected. When he arrives at 
home, you know how his wife and children welcome him. That’s the illustration I 
give you as to how the burgomaster was considered in his commune.271
 
 
 
Other informants point out that obedience in Umuganda communal works, in tax 
payment, in anti-erosion works, in entering cooperatives, in road maintenance, in hygiene 
works, etc. resulted in the fear of fines and corporal punishment or detention.272
                                                 
270 Danielle de Lame, “Le génocide rwandais et le vaste monde, les liens du sang”, in Filip Reyntjens et 
Stefan Marysse (dir.), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 1996-1997, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997, pp. 157-
177, pp. 161 et 169, 172-173. 
 The 
271 Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
272 Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007; Interview with François Munyantore, 
Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 1, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Emérite 
Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; 
Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 
23 April 2007; Interview with Vénuste Sindabizera, Kibayi, 9 May 2007; Interview with 
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commune pick-ups that were sometimes used to collect people to be detained came to 
bear the nickname “Ruhumbangegera” (collector of vagabonds, rogues), meaning that 
anyone who did not pay tax or fulfil commune duties was considered an irresponsible 
citizen.273 Another pejorative qualification for such people is “impiringi” often used in 
commune reports as a description of people who disobeyed rules.274 Guichaoua also 
notes that people who did not participate in Umuganda were considered as “bad” citizens. 
275
 
  
Leaders also assert that the population obeyed them in general,276 although they also 
reveal the everyday struggles to convince a number of constituents to fulfil state duties 
and the everyday fight against the disobedience of certain individuals. In this respect, 
depending on who the leaders were or what they did, namely their ontology and action or 
agency, it is possible to identify those who enjoyed more obedience than others. In 
Gishamvu, Munyarugano is believed to have been more obeyed than Kambanda, due to 
their personalities and actions. In Kibayi, Nyamigango is said to have been obeyed due to 
his actions and not to his personality, because certain informants present him as a person 
who was not having the image of a leader, due to his attire and ways of talking. Whereas 
Kajyambere is said to have borne a leadership image, though some informants present 
him as having enjoyed more obedience because he came into office after the population 
had been put to order by previous burgomasters. For example, the campaign of 
Nyamigango towards tax paying and his continuous fight against smuggling brought 
order to Kibayi in such a way that the rule of Kajyambere is depicted as having been 
easier: he found that people had started to comply with tax paying, Umuganda 
participation and other state dues.277
                                                                                                                                                 
François Manirabona, Kibayi, 11 May 2007; Interview with Emmanuel Mutarambirwa, Kibayi, 12 May 
2007. 
 Postindependence leaders lacked the use of corporal 
273 Interview with Anonymous 14, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
274 See for example Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Ntahobavukira, Joseph, 
Secretary, Minutes of the Commune Council meeting held on 28 April 1976 and interview with Fortunée 
Mujawamariya. 
275 Guichaoua, “Les ‘travaux communautaires’ en Afrique centrale”, p. 561. 
276 See for example République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Commune de Kibayi, Monographie de la 
Commune de Kibayi 1987,  Juin 1988, p. 19. 
277 Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
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punishment,278
 
 but certain burgomasters attempted to use it again, regardless of its very 
sharp unpopularity. Such is the case of Burgomaster Nyamigango who used beating 
anyway. 
However, this obedience of constituents did not come from nowhere. It was notably the 
result of continuous efforts of the state. For example, concerning the control of everyday 
movement of population, whenever an individual would move from one commune to 
another for work or migration or marriage or other reasons, a document was filled out for 
him or her to carry to the commune authorities where he/she was moving and a copy of 
that document remained at the commune of origin. So every commune had a file about 
people who entered their communes or went away to other communes. This movement 
was notably regulated by the law concerning the census of the population, their identity 
documents and their migration, of 19 February 1964.279
 
 It helped to monitor internal and 
external migrations, but also individual movements so as not to escape commune duties. 
Furthermore, the local leaders strove to identify tricks of the constituents to escape 
commune duties. For example, during the office of Munyarugano in Gishamvu, the 
commune authorities were able to discover that certain individuals used to pay tax for one 
goat, and after getting the proof of payment of that tax, they used it for all the goats they 
had. So Munyarugano concluded that, since no one pays tax with joy, excessive control 
and regular punishment have to be used.280
                                                 
278 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p. 134. 
 During the office of Kambanda, in order to 
escape doing Umuganda, some constituents were misleading the councillors that they 
have a sick person to take to the hospital by foot carrying him or her. As they gave the 
same explanation every time, the councillors discovered that those were tricks. As a 
strategy, the burgomaster asked the councillors to make a list of all those who escaped 
doing Umuganda so that he can plan the place where they will work the next time and 
279 See for example the letter of Médard Muligande, Burgomaster of Ngenda Commune to the Burgomaster 
of Gishamvu Commune, Concerning the authorization of Nzabonimana and his wife Mukandutiye to settle 
in Ngenda Commune, Ref.: No. 592/04.04/I, Ngenda, 29 October 1974. 
280 Emmanuel Munyarugano, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Oscar Nkundizera, Secretary, 
Minutes of the Commune Council meeting held on 5 July 1968. 
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how to control them.281 Moreover, some people were hiding their pigs in bushes located 
near the market of Busoro in order to escape paying taxes. Kambanda decided to clear 
that bush in order to avoid financial loss.282
 
 
In addition to these strategies to overcome tricks of peasants, local leaders also set up 
special services or commissions for almost all duties - tax, Umuganda, party dues, health 
inspection, etc. – in order to monitor constituents’ participation.283 Yet, despite these 
local state efforts, the acts of avoidance and dissimulation continued. Some individuals 
always found ways of escaping the compliance with state rules. The more control was 
strengthened, the more the strategies and tactics of certain constituents also sharpened.284 
To begin with, in the local political culture, there were certain stereotypes about the 
population of Butare. One Prefect of Butare Prefecture once noted in a report: “If the 
people of Butare like to put themselves in all situations without caring about laws and 
rules, it is worth saying that this population likes and adores tribunals”.285
                                                 
281 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Joseph Ntahobavukira, Secrétaire, 
Minutes of the Commune Council meeting held on 8 February 1978. 
 Moreover, 
some areas of Gishamvu and Kibayi were believed to be hard to rule. Such places include 
Sholi Sector in Gishamvu and Saga Sector in Kibayi. In Gishamvu, the Burgomaster once 
confessed that it was hard for him to monitor Gishamvu people because they were very 
282 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Minutes of the Commune Council meeting, Ref.: No. 78/04.04/2, Gishamvu, 25 February 1994. 
283 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, S/Préfecture Gisagara, Commune de Kibayi, Rapport 
annuel 1989, Commune Kibayi, Février 1990, p. 13 ; Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi 
Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara Subprefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune Council held on 2 
October 1984, Ref.: 323/04.04/2, Kibayi, 22 October 1984; Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of 
Kibayi Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara Subprefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune Council held 
on 11 October 1985, Ref.: 318/04.04/2, Kibayi, 16 October 1985; Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, 
Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara Subprefecture, Re: Minutes of the 
Commune Council held on 25 May 1985, Ref.: 134/04.04/2, Kibayi, 25 April 1985; Pierre-Canisius 
Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara Subprefecture, Re: Minutes 
of the Commune Council held on 12 February 1983; Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi 
Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara Subprefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune Council held on 26 
April 1985, Ref.: 149/04.04/2, Kibayi, 13 May 1985. 
284 On tactics and strategies of the “weak” vis-à-vis the “strong”, see Michel de Certeau, “General 
Introduction to the Practice of Everyday Life [1980]”, in Ben Highmore, ed., , The Everyday Life Reader, 
London, Routledge, 2002, pp. 61-75, pp. 66, 69-70. 
285 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Rapport annuel 1973, p. 9 (bis). 
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violent and robbers.286 There was yet a stereotype that became like a saying that said: 
“Ab’i sholi twumva nabi.” (Sholi people, we do not listen, i.e., obey.) 287
 
 
In Saga there was also something that looks like a saying. It goes: “I Saga si agahato” 288
 
 
(You cannot compel Saga people.) However, for Saga sector in Kibayi Commune, the 
description of people there went beyond stereotypes. It included some tangible examples 
of insubordination. Already since the 1960s, the former burgomaster Hakizimana 
confessed to have had a hard time ruling Saga as compared to other areas of his 
commune:  
At that time things were fine. We were on sufficiently good terms with 
constituents. When you invited the population, they came, you share ideas, you 
give them advice, you show them instructions, they go back home knowing those 
instructions, that is, the works they will do, then the councillors made a follow up 
of those instructions. […] It is Saga that made me suffer. Because they had an 
unusual way of understanding things. There were some violent people there, 
people who even killed others. That place made me suffer for two years. After 
that time, things went in order. […] Some said it was witches, some other people 
were fighting over minor or ordinary issues, then you hear that someone has been 
killed.289
 
 
Another young man narrated this about Saga as being hard to rule:  
 
I remember when I was getting to an intelligent age, there is a place now called 
Buhiza cell, they called it “Kuri douane” [At the customs]. There has never been a 
customs office there, in general. But, there were some youth, including some men 
who lived there, there was also someone called Kagaragara, the other is Rutanga 
rwa Minani, but this is a nickname, there was also a Tutsi man who died called 
Rindiro. They were very violent people. In such a way that whenever they did not 
like people to pass there, no one could cross that area. That is why people called 
that place, kuri douane. It is at the road coming from Saga and going up to 
Rwamiko. People passed there with fear. People were talking about this when I 
grew up, and my mother is born from that cell, near that douane. […] There were 
also those who were disrespecting the administration openly. That came from the 
youth, who had become kagarara [rebellious]. They were not doing Umuganda, 
that is why people were saying that Saga is hard to rule.290
                                                 
286 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune and Joseph Ntahobavukira, Secretary, Minutes 
of Commune Council meeting of 22 December 1971. 
 
287 Interview with Eugénie Nikuze, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
288 Interview with Epaphrodite Ndibaze, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
289 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
290 Interview with Aloys Mutarambirwa, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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Another informant points out that the much-feared Burgomaster Nyamigango had been 
severely beaten in Saga: “Nyamigango, as a result of harassing people, going to check in 
people’s house for the hygienic situation, he was strongly beaten by sons of Kiramoto at 
Saga.”291 This beating is confirmed also by Kimonyo who puts it in the context of 
political competition. According to him, it occurred in July 1976.292
 
 Indeed, Kiramoto 
was a nickname for former Burgomaster André Hitimana who ruled Saga from 1960 to 
1961. Maybe André Hitimana was among Nyamigango’s rivals. The death of 
Nyamigango through bewitchment by Saga people can be put under the rubric of 
disobedience too. 
Secondly, certain practices of disobedience continued to prevail, regardless of means 
devoted by the commune officials to halt them. For example, in order to escape doing 
Umuganda, certain peasants likened it to colonial labour constraints, and the state spent a 
great deal of time, energy and means to refute such comparisons.293 As a result, although 
the majority of constituents performed duties of Umuganda work, there were always 
some individuals who managed to escape doing that work for several days. In the same 
vein, in order to escape paying annual personal levy, certain youths reaching the age of 
taking ID books, that is, 18, refused to report to the commune office and apply for those 
ID books, because that would mean starting to pay levies asked of adults. 294
 
 
One area where disobedience prevailed regardless of the extent of control used is 
smuggling. This situation is asserted for both the whole Butare Prefecture border areas 
and Kibayi Commune. The authorities even organised at different times joint meetings 
with fellow Burundi authorities in order to halt smuggling, but it did not stop. For 
                                                 
291 Interview with Jean Sindayigaya, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
292 Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, pp. 175-176. 
293 See for example Republic of Rwanda, Butare Prefecture, Minutes of a meeting that was held in the 
Butare Prefecture, led by the His Excellency Major General Juvénal Habyarimana, President of the 
Republic and President of the Comity in charge of Peace and Unity, on 13 May 1975, p. 8; République 
Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Intérieur et du Développement Communal, Bilan des 25 ans d’indépendance du 
Rwanda: 1962-1987, Kigali, Juillet 1987, pp. 188-190. 
294 Epaphrodite Nyamigango, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Minutes of the Commune Council held on 7 November 1978, Ref.: No. 206/03.04:2, Kibayi, 10 November 
1978. 
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example, in 1973, the bulk of border communes were considered as smuggling zones: 
“Nearly all businessmen in Butare Prefecture survive by smuggling. The biggest centre 
for specialists of smuggling is located at Nyanza of Nyabisindu Commune. […] Similar 
cases are also found in Nyakizu, Kigembe, Kibayi, Muganza, Muyaga and Muyira 
Communes.”295 The Burgomaster Nyamigango had talks with the administrators of 
Mwumba, Marangara and Gashikanwa Communes of Ngozi Province of Burundi. Some 
of them were newly appointed following the taking over of power of President Bagaza in 
Burundi in 1977. So he went there to initiate relations with them. They discussed joint 
issues such as how to fight against smuggling on the two sides of the border, how to 
control the movement of Burundians entering into Rwanda illegally, that is, without 
passing through customs, and Rwandans who went to Burundi in the same way. They 
discussed also smugglers who sold bicycles stolen on the other side of the border and 
brought them into another country. They agreed to be vigilant against nightly smugglers. 
They discussed also about the activity and behaviour of conductors of boats who operated 
on the Akanyaru river.296 Similar talks also took place in 1984 between authorities of 
Butare Prefecture and the ones of Kayanza Province in Burundi.297 But, despite all those 
measures, smuggling continued.298
 
 
3.6. SOCIAL RELATIONS 
 
In my area of study, social relations are depicted in general as having been harmonious 
among the Hutu and the Tutsi. The Butare area is actually one of the Rwandan regions 
that had registered a long history of interaction of these two groups. In this regard, the 
Hutu and the Tutsi of Gishamvu and Kibayi are said to have interacted very well. This is 
seen in a big number of intermarriages and mutual help in everyday life.299
                                                 
295 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Rapport annuel 1973, p. 9. 
 However, 
296 Epaphrodite, Nyamigango, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Kibayi, A Monsieur le Préfet de la 
Préfecture de Butare, Compte-rendu des entretiens qu’a eus le Bourgmestre de la Commune Kibayi avec 
les Administrateurs des Communes Mwumba, Marangara et Gashikanwa, en Province de Ngozi 
(République du Burundi), Réf. : N° 177/03.09.01/7, Kibayi, le 11 octobre 1977. 
297 Antoine Nkezabera, Responsible du SRP (Service de Renseignement Préfectoral) de Butare, Lettre à 
Monsieur le Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, Réf.: N° 011/02.0/84, Butare, le 24 janvier 1984. 
298 See for example République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport annuel 1987, p. 85.  
299 Several of my informants have also had marriages with wives or husbands of different ethnic groups. 
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ethnic intermarriage did not mean that ethnicity disappeared. Some few quotes show this 
pattern:  
 
The population was living on good terms, but it was clear that ethnic groups 
existed. […] there was sometimes suspicion saying that one is Tutsi, if you see 
him or her, if you were talking, you change the topic.300
 
 
…we ate together but it was not very warm, however, it was also not bad.301
 
 
People interacted very well. We lived together, no one knew that things could 
change this way. [We] were intermarrying. It is now that we witnessed division. 
We were sharing food. […] But we knew our ethnic group, you knew that you are 
a Hutu, he knew that he is a Tutsi. But you live together. Even myself I once 
proposed a Tutsi young lady of the Tutsi Sembayi. I got her, but we thereafter 
separated.302
 
 
On the other hand, intermarriage appeared, among other reasons, as a way of securing 
trust or protection on the side of the Tutsi. For example, one of my informants says that 
whenever a Tutsi was marrying his daughters to other Tutsi, a number of Tutsi people 
were warning him that he is discriminating, that he should also have Hutus as in-laws in 
order to be fully integrated in the local area.303
 
 
As for mutual help, it concerned mostly exchange of goods or services. Those who had 
milk exchanged it with those who had grass for cattle. They cultivated for each other. 
They carried each other’s sick persons to hospital. They invited each other to celebrations 
and attended each others’ funerals. They shared food and drinks. Indeed, to live together 
on good terms was not just a moral obligation. It was also dictated by economic life in 
rural areas. In a place where public transportation is rare, where there is no fire-fighter 
organisation, where the ambulances are scarce, the neighbour is a great deal, if not 
everything.  
 
On the other hand, some Tutsi individuals stress their subordinate status after 
independence due to political exclusion and suspicion at each time of crisis. This 
                                                 
300 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
301 Interview with Béatrice Yambabariye, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
302 Interview with Gratien Rwigimba, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
303 Interview with Anonymous 17. 
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suspicion seems to have reached also the everyday relations of the Hutu and the Tutsi at 
local level, where Tutsi had to be cautious about their everyday acts, by avoiding any 
conflict with their fellow Hutu neighbours. This was especially so in times of political 
crisis:  
 
Between the population there were problems. But they were not sharp that much. 
They became sharp since 1990, when people heard that the Inkotanyi (Rwandan 
Patriotic Front rebels) had attacked.304
 
 
Since the war started, bad things came in, you saw that people were still not 
understanding each other. You find that the Tutsi keeps prudent. If you have an 
argument with someone, he speaks with irony on you, telling you that ‘akanyu 
ntigahera’ [you are still the same, you don’t change]. If a child of Tutsi and a 
child of Hutu fight, […] you find that things become hard. The Tutsi had to 
remain prudent, to avoid arguments and conflicts.305
 
 
During this time, the ethnic discrimination was not clear, but between the 
population you saw that there was something of not trusting each other that much. 
For example, in the cabaret, you could see people making many small groups or 
gatherings. […] But they were not showing it that much. […] But those things 
[ethnic division] increased as we were approaching things of politics [political 
crises] when people were listening to many radios, and many newspapers were 
writing, then it was clear that there is a small problem between ethnic groups. 
People were no longer sharing, but it was not yet severe.306
 
 
 
This relativises the above idyllic depiction of mutual understanding. As for the Twa 
group, both Hutu and Tutsi informants assert that interaction with the Twa never went 
beyond exchange of goods. The Twa were literally put aside. For instance, they were not 
allowed to share food and drinks with the rest of Rwandans.307
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
304 Interview with Drocelle Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
305 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
306 Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
307 On other experiences of the Twa, see Gaspard Sebalinda, “The Relationship between the Batwa and the 
State in Rwanda”, in H. Veber et al. (eds.) , “Never drink from the same cup”, Proceedings of the 
Conference on Indigenous Peoples in Africa, Copenhagen, IWGYA, 1993, pp. 163-172. 
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This chapter focused on structural elements and examined them both chronologically and 
analytically. It first looked at authoritarianism and party politics. In this respect, I 
explained how power operated both at the national and local levels, and briefly 
reconstructed the process that led to the shift from multiparty politics to single party 
politics during the First Republic, and the continuation of the single party system in the 
Second Republic. I argued that the political line adopted during this time was as much the 
result of colonial legacy and postindependence actors’ choices and actions. 
 
Furthermore, I highlighted the long standing character of land, refugee and violence 
issues. In Chapters One and Two we saw that they were the result of previous decisions 
and structural developments. In this chapter, I showed how they continued to survive in 
the everyday life during the postindependence period.  
 
It is in structural violence that I placed ethnicity and regionalism as policies of exclusion, 
a feature that characterized both the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes. But I also 
showed that those were not the only ones, that it was possible to identify other forms of 
exclusion and inequalities.  
 
It was not sufficient to describe the nature and performance of power from the standpoint 
of legal, official and scholarly reports and references. So, I resorted also to the views of 
constituents. This worked very well. Indeed, these two sources helped me uncover the 
economic performance, the perceptions about leaders, and about their relations with their 
constituents, but also social relations. In the next chapter, I look at the conjuncture of 
genocide and show the relevancy of all the above structural elements. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ON THE EVE OF THE GENOCIDE: MULTIPLE CRISES from 1985 
to 1993 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The period preceding the genocide was so fast, that is, a time when multiple events and 
processes were speeding up, converging and diverging. In a short time, the Rwandan 
economy found itself shrinking due to international and national developments; the 
country descended into civil war; the political system underwent dramatic changes; a 
strong famine occurred in three prefectures including Butare; and around 300,000 
Burundi refugees fled and were settled in Butare, half of whom were in Kibayi. This 
chapter revisits these events, that is, it documents, reconstructs and problematizes these 
experiences and their multiple agents, linking the national to the local.  
 
In this respect, it examines to what extent economic crises and the war paved the way for 
the increase of social and criminal violence, and to what degree political competition 
between political parties produced political violence. Since these two forms of violence 
are documented sufficiently in urban areas, this chapter highlights them in Gishamvu and 
Kibayi, arguing that even in rural areas violence was becoming acute.  
 
Part of the argument is that these crises cannot be understood by referring only to the 
time in which they occurred. A number of them have a long genealogy since at least 
colonial times. In other words, they found their conditions of possibility and emergence 
long ago. Achille Mbembe has already argued to what extent the postcolony is not 
separated from the colony, although they are not the same.1
                                                 
1 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, 
2001. 
 In this regard, these crises 
appear to bear both structural and conjunctural conditions. However, as we shall see, 
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every time the leaders and other stakeholders tried to deal with those crises, they 
proposed solutions that targeted more conjuncture and less structure. Does this stem from 
the fact that they had limited means to address structure or that in facing emergency, 
structure was sacrificed to be dealt with in future? All in all, it appears that deep solutions 
were not priorities for political actors at this time. They were mostly concerned about 
gaining power first rather than attempting to solve crises, a factor that, as we shall see, 
deepened problems. 
 
4.1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRISES FROM 1985 ONWARDS 
 
Economic data for Rwanda reveals that the period between 1970 and early 1985 was the 
most prosperous one. This was the period characterized mostly by the advent of 
Habyarimana into power and his continuous and successful attraction of foreign 
investment and aid. Thanks to this foreign aid and to strategic economic policies, a 
number of viable infrastructures arose and food self-sufficiency was guaranteed for most 
Rwandese. This is the time when Rwanda was among the success stories of Africa. 
However, a number of authors insisted that this economic move was different from 
“development”, since it evolved hand in hand with social and economic inequalities, 
inequalities that I put under the label of structural violence in the previous chapter.2
 
 
However, Rwanda started its economic decline in 1985 with the fall of major export 
products’ prices such as coffee, tea and minerals.3
                                                 
2 Johan Pottier, “Taking Stock: Food Marketing Reform in Rwanda, 1982-89”, African Affairs, Vol. 92, 
No. 366, January 1993, pp. 5-30, pp. 5 and 11; Fernand Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989 : Bilan socio-
économique d'un régime, Louvain-la-Neuve, Institut d'Etudes du Développement, Janvier 1990, p. 11 ; 
Danielle de Lame, “Changing Rwandan Vision of Women and Land, in the Heart of the House, at the 
Outskirts of the World”, Africa Focus, Vol. 15, No. 1-2, 1999, pp. 3-12, p. 4; David Waller, Rwanda: 
Which Way Now?, Oxford (UK), Oxfam Country Profile, 1993, p. 9; Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: 
The role of the West in Rwanda’s genocide, London, New York, Zed Books, 2000, pp. 39-40.  
 Under this disequilibrium, the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund imposed a Structural Adjustment Programme 
3 Stefaan Marysse, et al., Rwanda. Appauvrissement et ajustement structurel, Bruxelles, Institut Africain 
CEDAF, Cahiers Africains, n° 12, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1994, p. 9 ; Waller, Rwanda: Which Way Now, pp. 
27-28, 30; Bézy, Rwanda 1962-1989, pp. 15, 20 et 24 ; République Rwandaise, Ministère de l'Agriculture 
de l'Elevage, Division des Statistiques Agricoles, Aperçu sur la politique cafeicole au Rwanda, par David 
Tardif-Douglin, Jean-Léonard Ngirumwami, Jim Shaffer, Anastase Murekezi et Théobald Kampayana, 
Décembre 1993, p. 0. 
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(SAP) as a way of bringing back financial equilibrium. They allocated funds to Rwanda 
and at the same time imposed a number of financial and economic reforms that aimed to 
gradually solve this economic crisis. In this respect, the Rwandan currency was devalued 
twice, first in November 1990 by 40% and then in June 1992 by a further 15%. Other 
measures concerned the reduction of state expenses in areas of salaries and jobs in the 
public sector, and the decrease of coffee subsidies to peasant farmers, in addition to 
policies aimed at increasing state income through the raising of taxes and increase of user 
fees for health, education and other services. The SAP also asked the Rwandan 
government to implement more liberal policies in trade such as the lowering of 
protectionism and the privatization of some state enterprises.4
 
  
While this Programme is said to have increased state financial means through allocation 
of funds, the devaluation policy and the increase of fees for access to social facilities are 
criticized for having significantly reduced the purchasing power of the poor who were 
already affected by the lowering of prices for coffee and tea.5
 
  
During this crisis time, three prefectures located in the south and west, Butare, Gikongoro 
and Kibuye, underwent a severe famine starting from 1988 and continuing until early 
1990. This famine was caused by the lack of sufficient rain during several agricultural 
seasons, culminating in the decrease of food production. Gishamvu and Kibayi 
experienced this famine mostly in 1989 when their harvest was reduced significantly, but 
it continued. In 1991 some aid from the World Food Programme arrived in Butare and 
was distributed to households in need. In order to survive this famine, a number of 
peasants resorted to emigration and moved towards Mayaga region that had some food 
reserves. Others went to Burundi and as far as Tanzania, where they hoped to get help 
from their relatives who were there as refugees. Some peasants from Kibayi survived by 
                                                 
4 Andy Storey, “Structural Adjustment, State Power and Genocide: The World Bank and Rwanda”, Review 
of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 89, September 2001, pp. 365-385, p. 371. 
5 Catharine Newbury, “Background to Genocide”, Issue: A Journal of Opinion, Vol. 23, No. 2, Rwanda, 
1995, pp. 12-17, p. 14; Storey, “Structural Adjustment”, p. 372; Waller, Rwanda: Which Way Now, p. 32; 
Melvern, A People Betrayed, p. 41. 
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exchanging their beer bananas with yam produced in Burundi.6 However, a number of 
those refugees, including some who went to Burundi and Tanzania a bit earlier, were 
evicted in 1991 and 1992. They were accused of either settling in those countries illegally 
or of participating in criminal activities. Once evicted, they were welcomed back to 
Rwanda and to their respective communes.7
 
 
In Butare Prefecture, famine continued until the end of 1993. In Gishamvu alone, half of 
the population, about 20,905 were considered as vulnerable and in need of food aid.8 The 
reasons for this famine were a continuous lack of rain as a conjunctural cause, but also 
structural causes such as the small size of land holdings that were also not fertile, lack of 
fertilizers, lack of medicine, lack of seed due to poverty, and the problem of refugees 
welcomed back in certain communes. The solutions foreseen were: to seek aid from 
humanitarian agencies for emergency aid, and to exploit marshlands.9
                                                 
6 Frédéric Karangwa, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Minister of Local Government and 
Commune Development, Kigali, Re: The issue of famine in Butare, Ref.: No. 120/04.18., Butare, 21 
November 1989; République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, S/Préfecture Gisagara, Commune de 
Kibayi, Rapport annuel 1989, Commune Kibayi, Février 1990, pp. 1, 4 et 13; République Rwandaise, 
Préfecture de Butare, Commune de Kibayi, Monographie de la Commune de Kibayi 1989,  Mars 1990, p. 
8; Justin Temahagali, Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, A Monsieur le Bourgmestre de la Commune, Tous, 
Objet : Aide alimentaire du PAM aux personnes frappées par la disette, N° 1893/04.09.01/4, Butare, le 
9/11/1991. 
 These solutions 
were necessary but not sufficient in order to alleviate that famine, for, they focused more 
7 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, List of Rwandans expelled from Tanzania who 
are from Gishamvu Commune, Ref. : 570/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, le 16 July 1991; Pascal Kambanda, 
Bourgmestre de la Commune de Gishamvu, Synthèse des données sur les victimes de la famine et les 
refoulés de Tanzanie, Réf.: N° 712/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, le 6/9/1991 ; Justin Temahagali, Prefect of 
Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Butare Prefecture (All), Re: Report concerning Rwandans 
who have been expelled from Burundi, Ref.:  No. 2088/04.09.01/14, Butare, 10 December 1991; Justin 
Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, (P.O. Subprefect of Préfecture), Letter to All the Burgomasters of 
Butare Communes, Re: To collect the aid destined to the Rwandans who have been expelled from Tanzania, 
Ref.: No. 1787/04.09.01/4, Butare, 23 October 1991; Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect of Busoro 
Subprefecture, Urgent, Circular letter to the Burgomasters of Gishamvu-Kigembe-Nyakizu Communes, Re: 
Welcoming of Rwandans who have been expelled by Burundi, Ref. No. 73/04.09.01/14, Busoro, 24 January 
1992; Straton Semanyenzi, Burgomaster of Kigembe Commune, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Rwandese young people expelled from Burundi, No. 029/04.09.01/14, Kigembe, 13 January 1992; Justin 
Temahagali, Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, (P.0. S/Préfet Bicamumpaka Evariste), A Monsieur le 
Bourgmestre de la Commune Ndora, Kigembe, Gishamvu, Nyaruhengeri, Nyakizu, Runyinya, Ngoma, 
Kibayi, Shyanda, Rapatriés du Rwanda refoulés du Burundi le 25/01/1992, Gishamvu, N° 157/04.09.01/14, 
Butare, le 5/02/1992. 
8 Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Gishamvu, Lettre à Monsieur le Préfet de la 
Préfecture de Butare, Objet : Situation alimentaire dans notre Commune, N° 439/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, le 
17/12/1993. 
9 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Meetings of Councillors held on 23 December 1993, Ref.: No. 450/04.04/2, Gishamvu, 31 December 1993. 
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on conjuncture than on remote or structural factors that were equally fragile at this time. 
As a result, up until the beginning of the genocide in the first semester of 1994, this 
famine prevailed in some households of Butare. Indeed, we learn from Patricia Hayes 
that famine is a complex process that involves at the same time structure, conjuncture and 
multiple agencies.10
 
 
As a result of economic crisis in the whole country in addition to famine at local level, 
Butare Prefecture communes experienced a major financial crisis. Commune employees 
received their salaries with delays of several months and accumulated several months of 
unpaid overdue salaries. Furthermore, tax income also decreased as a result of war, as 
markets were not operating properly. In 1990, for example, only seven out of 20 
communes were able to recover 80% of expected tax revenue.  Prefecture and commune 
leaders continued to put much endeavour towards tax collection, but they had little 
success since the tax payers’ economy was not doing well, and the political context was 
not favourable to the use of force in this regard, as the multiparty system had 
considerably reduced the population’s fear respecting the leadership.11
 
 
Disasters continued in Butare Prefecture. The advent of violence in Burundi following 
the assassination of President Ndadaye on 21 October 1993 brought around 300,000 
Burundian refugees who were settled in Butare Prefecture. Among these, more than 
140,000 were settled in Kibayi Commune alone. As a result of this human concentration 
and lack of sufficient hygiene, in December 1993, a dysentery epidemic spread across a 
number of communes in Butare, including Gishamvu and Kibayi. In January 1994, there 
were about 140 patients affected by this disease in Gishamvu. In February 1994 the 
                                                 
10 Patricia Hayes, “The ‘Famine of the Dams’. Gender, Labour & Politics in Colonial Ovamboland 1929-
1930”, in Patricia Hayes et al. (eds.), Namibia under South African Rule: Mobility & Containment 1915-
1946, Oxford, James Currey, 1998, pp. 117-146, p. 126.  
11 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Rapport annuel 1990, p. 19; Justin Temahagali, Prefect of 
the Butare Prefecture, To the Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, Kigali, Minutes 
of Meeting of Burgomasters held on 15 February 1991, Ref.: No. 723/04.09.01/16, Butare, 17 April 1991; 
Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Minutes of Commune Council meeting held on 13 September 1993, Ref.: No. 354/04.04/2, Gishamvu, 16 
September 1993; Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Augustin Rugemintwaza, 
Secretary, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Minutes of a meeting held on 21 October 1993, 
Ref.: No. 386/04.09.01/7, Gishamvu, 8 November 1993. 
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number surpassed 300 patients.  Dysentery attacked the Kibayi Commune severely. 
About five sectors had from around 40 to around 60 deaths whereas the other five sectors 
had from around 10 to 20 deaths from 1 November to 28 December 1993. About 323 
people died in total in Kibayi during that period. It became an emergency health 
situation.12
 
  
In relation to the political crisis that occurred during this same time when the SAP was 
implemented, starting with the RPF war and then by multiparty politics and violence, the 
impact of SAP was interpreted in various ways. On the one hand it allegedly brought 
some kind of legitimacy to the Habyarimana regime as the allocation of funds looked like 
a support.13 On the other hand, the imposition of SAP together with multipartyism led to 
a weakening of the authoritarian regime that ultimately felt so threatened that it chose to 
resort to extreme violence in order to remain in power.14
 
 
 
Finally, the economy suffered from the effects of the 1990-1994 war. An estimated 40% 
of the Rwandan budget was used for military purposes, which suggests that other 
economic activities were less financed.15 Indeed, the military expanded from 5,000 units 
in 1990 to about 30,000-40,000 units in 1992, and the Rwandan government was 
spending about US$ 100 million per year. In the view of Pierre Galand, the Rwandan 
economy became a war economy that benefited those who were involved in the 
purchasing of weapons and military logistics, while impoverishing more and more of the 
population.16
                                                 
12 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of the Butare Prefecture, 
Security Report held in Saga Sector of Kibayi Commune on 13 December 1993, Ref. : No. 391/04.09.01/4, 
Kibayi, 14 December 1993; Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect 
of Butare Prefecture, Re: Minutes of Commune Council meeting, Ref.: N° 78/04.04/2, Gishamvu, 25 
February 1994; Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of the 
Butare Prefecture, Report on the Dysentery epidemic, Estimates of numbers of deaths from 1 November to 
28 December 1993, Ref.: No. 20/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 2 February 1994. 
 In addition to the erosion of the economy, the war also disturbed regions 
13 Storey, “Structural Adjustment” , pp. 372, 376. 
14 Regine Andersen, “How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda “Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3, June 2000, pp. 441-456, pp. 445-447. 
15 Andersen, “How Multilateral Development”, p. 447. 
16 Longman, Christianity, p. 165 ; Waller, Rwanda: Which Way Now, p. 117 ; Pierre Galand, Interview à 
Radio France Internationale, “L’Economie du génocide”, http://rfi.fr/actufr/articles/052/article_27304.asp, 
consulté le 20 novembre 2008.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
230 
where it was operating, in the north and western parts of the country. By 1993, war 
displaced more than 10% of populations and created a humanitarian disaster for a number 
of years, and undermined transport movements and agricultural production in those 
regions and had an indirect effect on other parts of the country. 
 
4.2. WAR AND ITS INSTRUMENTALISATION 
 
1990-1994 was also a period when Rwanda underwent a military invasion by Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA) rebels, a military branch of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). 
The RPF existence and struggle stem from the unresolved refugee issue from the 1960s 
onwards. However, the time of the first invasion towards the end of 1990 needs to be put 
in the wider context of the end of the Cold War, a moment when most authoritarian 
regimes in Africa were required to open up their political space. At this moment, Rwanda 
was no exception. Power was still the monopoly of a single party, and alternative political 
views were not authorized. This time also needs to be put in its regional context, with 
regard to the political organisation of Rwandan refugees from 1982 onwards, the time 
when most of them were in a fragile state in asylum countries.17
 
  
Before the formation of RPF in December 1987, Rwandan refugees had organised 
themselves into a wide range of associations from the mid-1970s onwards. Discussions 
that occurred in 1988 between Rwanda and Uganda, which would provide for a peaceful 
resolution of the refugee issue, became unproductive; hence, Rwandan refugees took the 
military option. When the RPF attacked, Presidents Museveni and Habyarimana were 
both in New York, attending a World Summit on children. The initial attack of 1 October 
1990 of the RPA rebels estimated at about 2,500 was defeated by the Rwandan army 
backed by ex-Zaire, French and Belgian soldiers. General Fred Rwigyema, the 
Commander of RPA was killed on 2 October 1990 and the whole rebellion became 
scattered, losing a big number of its fighters in the process. At the end of October 1990, 
                                                 
17 For the experience of Rwandan refugees in Uganda, See Mahmood Mamdani, “The political diaspora in 
Uganda and background to the RPF invasion”, in Didier Goyvaerts (ed.), Conflict and Ethnicity in Central 
Africa, Tokyo, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of 
Foreign Studies, 2000, pp. 305-353, and Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, pp. 159-184. 
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the Rwandan government declared triumph over the rebels. However, starting from the 
beginning of November 1990, Major Paul Kagame, who had gone to the USA for 
military training, rushed back to take over control of the rebellion. He reorganised the 
movement from the remaining rebels who had fled back to Uganda or who had hidden in 
the Akagera National Park, recruited more fighters and started a new phase of the war, 
based on guerrilla warfare tactics. He chose the Virunga Volcanoes as a new site and 
organised his rebellion from there. From January 1991 to July 1992, RPA rebels 
organised a more patient guerrilla warfare, thanks to a few territories that they occupied 
in Mutara, Byumba and Ruhengeri. At the beginning of 1991, the number of rebels had 
reached about 5,000 men. That number kept on increasing throughout 1992 and 1993. On 
January 22 or 23, 1991, the RPF Inkotanyi attacked the prison of Ruhengeri, freed 
prisoners and looted some food stuffs and cattle. They further attacked Gatuna located at 
the border with Uganda and closed the road from that country to Rwanda. From July 
1992 onwards, a cease-fire was agreed upon following the Arusha negotiations that 
evolved from that time until 4 August 1993. This ceasefire was violated on 8 February 
1993 by the rebels who nearly reached the capital Kigali and stopped a few kilometres 
away. By the time of the RPF attack on 8 February 1993, RPF had become strong enough 
thanks to recruitment from neighbouring countries such as Burundi, Zaire, Rwanda and 
other parts of the world, and due to more financial contributions from Rwandan refugees 
across the world. As the number of recruits was increasing the ranks of the RPF, the same 
applied to the Rwandan army which grew from its initial 5,000 to around 40,000 some 
time before the genocide.18
 
 
                                                 
18 For a detailed history of Rwandan refugees, the RPF and its rebellion in Rwanda, see Wm. Cyrus Reed, 
“Exile, Reform and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 34, 
3, 1996, pp. 479-501; Gérard Prunier, “The Rwandan Patriotic Front”, in Christopher Clapham (ed.), 
African Guerrillas, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1998, pp. 117-133; Théo Karabayinga et José 
Kagabo, “Les réfugiés, de l’exil au retour armé”, Temps Modernes, Juillet-Août 1995, n° 583, pp. 63-90 ; 
José Kagabo, “La question des réfugiés rwandais”, in Enjeux Nationaux et Dynamiques régionales dans 
l’Afrique des Grands Lacs, URA CNRS, n° 363 “Tiers-Monde/Afrique”, 1992, pp. 125-129 ; Ogenga 
Otunnu, “An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)”, in Howard 
Adelman and Suhrke Astri (eds.), The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaïre, The path of a genocide, New 
Brunswick (USA) and London (UK), Transaction Publishers, 1999, pp. 31-49 ; André Guichaoua (dir.), 
Exilés, réfugiés, déplacés en Afrique centrale et orientale, Paris, Karthala, 2004; Gérard Prunier, The 
Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995; and Stephen Kinzer, 
A Thousand Hills: Rwanda’s Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It, New Jersey, Wiley, 2008.  
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Politically, the war offered to the Habyarimana regime an occasion to redefine a common 
enemy in ethnic terms. The enemy was presented as Tutsi, borrowing from the fact that 
the RPF rebels were made up of a majority of Tutsi. This label automatically victimized 
the Tutsi who lived inside Rwanda.19 Secondly, the official discourse and propaganda 
likened the RPF rebels (Inkotanyi) to the Inyenzi of the 1960s, and the RPF party to the 
UNAR of the 1959. In this process, the rebels were presented as pro-monarchists, as the 
opponents of the 1959 Hutu “revolution”, and the 1973 “moral revolution”, and as people 
who were coming to establish Tutsi rule over the Hutu. Propagandists of the regime 
reminded the Tutsi that they were a minority and that they ought to accept themselves as 
such and not try to change their ethnic identity. The qualification of Hamite as Tutsi and 
Bantu as Hutu was brought once again to the fore. The colonial anthropological 
stereotypes of Tutsi as “cleverer” and “liars” were brought back to life. In short, the 
regime initiated an ideological war against the RPF couched in ethnic terms and based on 
the political rhetoric and discourse used during the 1959 “revolution”.20
 
  
In one demonstration march against the RPF war in Butare Prefecture on 3 November 
1990, this rhetoric was already formulated:  
 
Message 3: The Inkotanyi… will have to accept our revolution, that represents a 
Rwanda in harmony. 
Message 5: Inyenzi have been dispersed. 
Message 15: Since God is on our side, who will be against us?  
Message 29: Long life to Habyarimana. What is Rwigema? Rwigema is an 
Inyenzi. What does this enemy of Rwanda want? He wants to bring back Ubuhake 
clientship in Rwanda. 
Message 32: We know from what servitude the Revolution of 1959 has freed us, 
no one will bring us there again. 
Message 36: We have defeated the monarchy and colonial rule. 
                                                 
19 Filip Reyntjens, L’Afrique des grands lacs en crise. Rwanda, Burundi: 1988-1994, Paris, Karthala, 1994, 
pp. 93-94; Kinzer, A Thousand Hills, p. 152. 
20 This propaganda is contained mainly in three books that were produced just at the beginning of the war 
by a number of Rwandan intellectuals and in a number of extremist ethnic media: Mathieu Ngirira, et Jean 
Bosco Nzitabakuze, Le Rwanda à la croisée des chemins, Butare, 1991; François-Xavier Bangamwabo et 
Emmanuel Rukiramakuba, “Le vocabulaire et le discours des Inkotanyi et leurs allies”, in François-Xavier 
Bangamwabo et al., Les relations interethniques au Rwanda à la lumière de l’agression d’octobre 1990. 
Genèse, soubassements et perspectives, Ruhengeri, Editions Universitaires du Rwanda, 1991, pp. 223-268 ; 
and Shyirambere J. Barahinyura, Rwanda. Trente deux ans après la révolution sociale de 1959, Frankfurt 
Am Main, Editions Izuba, 1992. 
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Message 47: We reject feudalism –long life to Habyarimana – Long life to 
Democracy. 
Message 51: Who wants monarchy?? No one!! 21
 
 
In fact, before being used by intellectual propagandists, this rhetoric had been used by 
political leaders in official correspondence. Take for example the following circular letter 
produced in early November 1990: “…the only goal [of the enemy] is to grab from us the 
goodness of our Social Revolution of 1959 and our Moral Revolution of 1973.”22
 
 
Concrete manifestations of the war were witnessed in the whole country albeit on an 
uneven basis. Areas where the military confrontations occurred suffered more severe 
effects of the war such as deaths of civilians, the destruction of infrastructure, the 
displacement of the bulk of populations and a significant decrease of agricultural 
production, resulting in famine and dependence on humanitarian aid.23 In other parts of 
the country, workers and peasants contributed differently to the effort de guerre in kind 
through food contribution or in cash through payment of a portion of their salary. 
Additional recruitment for military service in the army and gendarmerie also reached 
almost all communes of the country.24
 
 
Furthermore, the war became a justification for human rights violations against people 
the government did not like. Indeed, following the RPF attack of 1 October 1990, the 
Rwandan army fomented a fake attack of Kigali capital on 4th October, 1990. This was 
followed by mass detention of so-called accomplices. And the arrests were made 
throughout the whole country. By 19 October 1990, around 30,814 case files of people 
                                                 
21 Butare Prefecture Archives, Some of the messages written on placards that militants were carrying in a 
march of support of the Rwandan army and its Supreme Commander in Butare on 3 November 1990. 
22 Innocent Ndindabahizi, Secrétaire Général au Ministère de l’Intérieur et du Développement Communal, 
et Cyriaque Habyarabatuma, Commandant du Groupement Butare et rapporteur de la réunion, Secret, 
Compte – rendu de la réunion du Conseil Préfectoral de Sécurité de Butare tenue le 04 novembre 1990. 
23 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, pp. 203-204. 
24 For recrutements in Butare Prefecture, see Christophe Kabera, Commandant ESO a.i., Urgent – Presse, 
Lettre à tous les Bourgmestres des Communes de Butare, Butare, le 20/11/1990 ; Cyriaque Habyarabatuma, 
Major, Commandant de Gendarmerie, Groupement Butare, Lettre circulaire aux Bourgmestres des 
communes de la Préfecture de Butare, Objet : Recrutement des gendarmes, Réf. : N° 018/GSC.1.1.2, 
Butare, le 18 janvier 1992 ; Aloys Baranyeretse, Commandant de place Butare-Gikongoro de l’armée 
rwandaise, Lettre à Monsieur le Bourgmestre de la Commune de Gishamvu, Objet : Recrutement des 
candidats AR, Ref. : N° 152/MSC.1.1., Butare, 31 August 1992. 
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who included Tutsi and a number of Hutu considered as non-allies of the regime were 
collected by the Prosecuting authorities throughout the country.25 Following this, around 
15,000 people were arrested after being accused of being accomplices of the RPF.26 
Prunier thinks that this fake attack was made so as to attract France’s military support in 
favour of the Rwandan army, which effectively came in, while Braeckman indicates that 
it is from Mobutu, President of ex-Zaire, that President Habyarimana was advised to 
foment this fake attack.27
 
 
In Butare Prefecture, the Tutsi who were arrested as accomplices of the RPF (Ibyitso) 
were predominantly the wealthier ones: businessmen, priests, university lecturers and 
employees, teachers in rural areas, but also some peasants. Cases for Butare town include 
Abbé Modeste Mungwarareba, Dr. Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana, Isidore Barahira, Vincent 
Munyeshuli, Abel Dushimimana, Gaëtan Niyonizeye, Godefroid Ruzindana, Samuel 
Gasana, Alphonse Rutsindura, Augustin Ndwaniye; many businessmen, who include Jean 
Baptiste Sebukangaga, Martin Uwariraye, Vincent Semuhungu, Jérôme Ngarambe, 
Clément Mudaheranwa, Jean Claude Kalisa, and Pierre Nsonera. Most of them were 
released in February-March 1991 after suffering severely in prison. 28
 
 
In Kibayi, a number of businessmen also were arrested. These include Ignace Mbuguje, 
Claver Nyirindekwe, Léonidas Nkundabagenzi, Vianney Gakuba, Segica, Gasekurume 
                                                 
25 Théoneste Mujyanama, Ministre de la Justice, Très Urgent, A Monsieur le Président de la République, 
Compte rendu de la réunion des Chefs des Parquets, du 15 octobre 1990, Réf.: N° 6563/05.00, Kigali, 19 
octobre 1990. 
26 Alphonse-Marie Nkubito, “Le rôle de la justice dans la crise rwandaise”, in André Guichaoua (sous la 
direction de), Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994). Analyses, faits et documents, 2è 
édition, Paris, Karthala, 1995, pp. 275-287, p. 285. 
27 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 101-102; Colette Braeckman, Rwanda: Histoire d’un génocide, Paris, 
Fayard, 1994, p. 130. 
28 Justin Temahagali, Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, A Monsieur le Ministre de l’Intérieur et du 
Développement Communal, Kigali, Objet : Liste des personnes libérées, Réf. : N° 086/04.09.01, Butare le 
29 mars 1991 ; Maurice Ntahobari, Recteur de l’Université Nationale du Rwanda, Confidentiel, Lettre au 
Vice-Recteur de l’UNR, Campus Universitaire de Butare et à l’Administrateur-Trésorier de l’UNR, Réf. : 
N° 1.10/0321/91, Butare, le 3 avril 1991 ; Apollinaire Nsengiyumva, Président de la Commission de Triage 
et Fidèle Iyamuremye, Rapporteur, Compte rendu de la rencontre des membres de la Commission de triage 
tenue en date du 16/02/1991 à 11h dans la salle du Groupement Butare, Réf. : N° C/0437/D.11/A/Proré, 
Butare, le 25/02/1991 ; Denis Sekamana (abbé), Director of ICA (Institut Catéchétique Africain), Letter to 
the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Evidence, Butare, 24 October 1990; André Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994: 
Les politiques du génocide à Butare, Paris, Karthala, 2005, p. 51. 
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and Nyirimpunga. Teachers include Gasasira. Peasants include Marara, Burasa, Sylvestre 
Rutagengwa, Mperekeje and Maniraho.29 The case of the businessman Nyirimpunga is 
interesting. He was under so much suspicion of collaborating with the RPF that when his 
two sons died, after burying them, the Burgomaster obliged him to open their graves and 
remove the corpses so that they could check whether he had hidden guns inside the 
coffins.30 The cases of Maniraho and his father Mperekeje are also worthy of note. On 13 
October 1990, a peasant Innocent Mperekeje, born in 1929, in Linda, Kibayi, a Tutsi but 
living in Runyinya Sector, was interrogated by the Judiciary Police Inspector (IPJ) 
François Nsengiyumva. Mperekeje said that he was arrested because when the authorities 
came to search his house, they found a letter that he received from his son who resided in 
Tanzania. This son had celebrated his marriage in Tanzania, so one of his wife’s family 
members came back to Rwanda. In the process, he gave her a letter to give to his father, 
asking that his father should pay a cow (indongoranyo) to the in-laws. He added the 
following: “People accused me of hosting some unknown people and that I have a gun, 
but authorities searched for these things but did not find them.”31 The son of Mperekeje, 
Faustin Maniraho, was also interrogated the same day of 13 October 1990. In addition to 
asking him questions about his younger brother who had written a letter to his father 
about his marriage cow, they asked him this: “Question: Are you denying that you said 
that if the Tutsi win, where will the Hutu go? Answer: They are lying against me, really, I 
never said those things.” 32
 
 Maniraho is husband to my informant Béatrice Yambabariye. 
She narrates how both her husband and her father-in-law were suspected of holding guns, 
then their houses were searched, but no guns were found. However, both were jailed 
among the accomplices. 
In Gishamvu, a number of people were also arrested as accomplices. But informants did 
not mention names. The only person mentioned is Paul Gakuba from Kibingo Sector, 
                                                 
29 Interviews with Paul Twahirwa, Epaphrodite Ndibaze, Cesaria Uwambajimana, Julienne 
Uwiringiyimana, Anonymous 17, Ildéphonse Habimana, Béatrice Yambabariye, and Anselme Rutabingwa. 
30 Interview with Drocelle Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
31 République Rwandaise, Parquet de la République, Butare, Interrogatoire de Mperekeje Innocent, par 
l’IPJ Nsengiyumva François, Butare, le 13 octobre 1990. 
32 République Rwandaise, Parquet de la République, Butare, Interrogatoire de Maniraho Faustin, par l’IPJ 
Nsengiyumva François, Butare, le 13 octobre 1990. 
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who is said to have died in the prison.33
 
 As we shall see in the next chapter, RPF attacks 
in 1990, 1991 and 1993 were also used as excuses to commit massacres against Tutsi 
populations in certain areas of the country. 
4.3. INSECURITY IN RURAL AREAS 
 
Criminal and social violence became widespread during the 1990-1994 time. Ironically, 
this is also the time when the whole territorial administration was transformed into a 
security machine. But how this machine failed to halt insecurity at local level is a 
complex question. A number of authors have documented this violence at local level. 
Kimonyo called it social violence, but it is possible to find some criminal features in it, 
especially due to the fact that the bulk of motives behind it lay in the pursuit of material 
goods, so scarce in this time of severe famine and economic poverty. I found a number of 
cases in Gishamvu and Kibayi. Given that the existing literature focused mostly on urban 
criminal violence during this period, cases of insecurity in Gishamvu and Kibayi are 
worthy of note. While considering their authors, victims and modes of operation, one 
notices that they reveal varied patterns. In relying on commune reports, I first enumerate 
cases of criminal and social violence, and thereafter I discuss their major patterns. 
4.3.1. In Gishamvu 
 
On October 17th, 1990, the home of Nkeramihigo located in Bitare, Sheke Sector, was 
attacked by robbers and three persons were injured: Mr. Nkeramihigo himself, his wife 
and one of their children. The following day, the Subprefect of Busoro and the 
Burgomaster of Gishamvu met with the population of Sheke to calm them down and 
sensitize them about national cohesion. The casualties were transported to the Sheke 
dispensary for medical treatment.34
 
 
                                                 
33 Interview with Anonymous 4 and Anonymous 5 and André, Guichaoua (dir.), Les crises politiques, p. 51. 
34 Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Two Telegrams to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Security, Text 
No. 631/04.09.01 and 633/04.09.01, without date. 
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The Security Report of the Gishamvu police indicated that for the month of July 1991, 
nine people brought cases against 11 others who wronged them. Accusations were about 
six cases of assault and battery, two robberies and one murder.35
 
 
In the night of 17 August 1991, a mob of robbers attacked at Kibu in Gikunzi Sector at a 
place called Fauboug, but the population came and caught a certain Havugiyaremye who 
was from Mubumbano. The police transferred him to the prosecuting authority of 
Butare.36
 
 
In a Security Council meeting of the Butare Prefecture held on August 5th, 1992, the 
Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune gave the state of security in Gishamvu. He noted 
that the “virus” of urusimbi (gambling) had spread in all sectors of the commune, that 
there had been a meeting of all party leaders but that they failed to solve that problem. He 
also mentioned a case of released prisoners from Liba and Mubumbano who were 
causing insecurity. He also said that on 26 July 1992 violence was about to happen, 
because some robbers from Nyakizu were caught in Kigembe near Gishamvu and were 
brought to the detention place of Gishamvu commune. Then people from Nyakizu came 
to reclaim them in order to jail them at Nyakizu instead, but it seems in reality they 
wanted to kill them. Because they refused to cooperate and were very angry, the 
Gishamvu commune authorities called in the gendarmerie who calmed down the 
situation.37 On 24 July 1992, a lady called Nyiramanywa from Kibingo Sector was killed 
by her step-son in connivance and her brother- in- law.38
 
  
In one security meeting, the Butare Prefecture leaders complained about the behaviour of 
the population in taking justice into their own hands and killing robbers.  The prosecutor 
alleged that Commune authorities brought robbers without file cases, and Commune 
                                                 
35 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Security report of July 1991, Ref.: 629/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 9 August 1991. 
36 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Councillors of 
Gishamvu, Sholi and Nyakibanda Sectors, Ref.: No. 713/04.09.01/1, Gishamvu, 6 September 1991. 
37 J. Baptiste Hakizamungu, Subprefect of Prefecture, Fabien Uwimana, Rapporteur of the meeting, Letter 
to the Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, Kigali, Re: Minutes of the Security 
Council of Butare Prefecture, held on 5 August 1992, Ref.: No. 191/04.09.01, Butare, 17 August 1992, p. 2. 
38 Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu 
Commune, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 501/04.09.01, Busoro, 30 July 1992. 
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leaders retaliated with the charge that the prosecutor released those brought before him. 
For example, 15 robbers were killed in no more than a week: 11 in Nyaruhengeri on one 
time; 2 killed in Gishamvu and 2 others in Muganza. These killings of robbers occurred 
on the night of 6-7 August 1992.39
 
 
In another meeting at the Butare Prefecture in September 1992, the Minister of Justice 
lamented the fact that the population in Nyaruhengeri, Gishamvu and Runyinya was 
punishing the robbers themselves, and other people at fault, without transferring them to 
the justice system.40
 
 
In a letter dated 23 September 1992, the Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture asked the 
Burgomaster of Gishamvu to investigate the case of a certain Georges, son of Saveri 
Nkwaya from Liba Sector, Kinteko Cell, who allegedly was a bandit and hid a mob of 
other bandits at his home, aiming at robbing and killing people in Gishamvu. Also he 
asked the burgomaster to investigate the case of the death of Melani Nzajyibwami from 
Liba who was killed in the night of 10-11 September 1992, and his wife who was 
severely injured and who ultimately died on 22 September 1992. The following people 
were suspected at having taken part in that killing: Sibomana son of Ntuyahaga; Sehorana 
son of Karimumbari; Ntezimana son of Habumugisha; Nkurunziza son of Felesita.41
 
 
On 26 November 1992, the home of Pucie Nyirabalinda in Liba Sector was attacked by 
robbers who robbed and did violence. This robbery and violence led to the subsequent 
killing of Bazubwabo.42
 
 
On the night of 5 January 1993, six robbers using arms such as grenades and machetes 
and wearing military uniforms attacked and robbed money and goods at the bar of J. 
                                                 
39 Jean Baptiste Habyarimana, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, and Sylvain Halindintwali, Rapporteur, To the 
Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, Kigali, Minutes of the Security Council 
Meeting of 10 August 1992, Ref.: No. 190/04.09.01, Butare, 17 August 1992. 
40 Jean Baptiste Habyalimana, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, and Sylvain Halindintwali, Rapporteur, Minutes 
of  Security Council meeting held on 10 September 1992, Ref.: No. 234/04.09.01, Butare, 5 October 1992. 
41 Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Confidential, Letter to the Burgomaster of 
Gishamvu Commune, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 631/04.09.01, Busoro, 23 September 1992. 
42 S/Préfet Busoro, Télégramme officiel au MININTER Kigali, I0II20B, N° de l’exp : 92/087, s.d. 
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Baptiste Nyabyenda of Kansi Sector in Nyaruhengeri Commune. Eight people got injured 
in that attack. Two people were suspected: Regis from Liba Sector, Mububa Cell of 
Gishamvu, and Nzeyimana son of Prosper from Kinteko, Liba Sector, also of 
Gishamvu.43
 
 
On February 8th, 1993, an unidentified person attacked the driver of Gishamvu Commune 
and injured him with a machete. Furthermore, on the evening of 18 February 1993, other 
unidentified persons attacked a man called John Kubwimana from Kibingo Sector and cut 
him with a machete and destroyed his car. As the population came to intervene, the 
perpetrators launched a grenade. On the 21st of the same month again, a lady called 
Nibarere from Buvumu Sector was killed. This killing is said to have been caused by an 
argument between gamblers in the game called kazungu. In Sheke Sector also, an old 
lady was slashed with a machete following a deep conflict between her and the 
perpetrators.44
 
 
Since insecurity increased, one citizen called Antoine Rwangombwa from Kansi Sector, 
Nyaruhengeri Commune, took the liberty of writing a letter to the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, on July 28th, 1993, asking for protection. He informed the Prefect about a 
problem of insecurity created by unidentified persons who attacked pedestrians and 
robbed their stuff, beat them and also stripped women. That violence was said to be 
located in Nyaruhengeri, Kigembe, Gishamvu and Ngoma communes.45
 
  
 
On 17 September 1993, at Gikunzi Sector in Gishamvu, three people were severely 
beaten until they died: Ntirumaririmana, Nyabyenda and Mukasoni. They were accused 
of witchcraft. They were beaten by a crowd of people in Gikunzi Sector. The population 
                                                 
43 Jean Baptiste Habyarimana, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, and Sylvain Halindintwali, Rapporteur, 
Confidential, To the Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, Kigali, Minutes of the 
Security Council Meeting of 11January 1993, Ref.: No. 32/04.09.01, Butare, 29 January 1993. 
44 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Eliphaz Liberakurora, Rapporteur, Minutes 
of Security Council meeting held on 4 March 1993. 
45 Jean Baptiste Habyalimana, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Nyaruhengeri, 
Ngoma, Gishamvu, and Kigembe Communes, Re: Security, Ref., No. 1032/04.09.01, Butare, 3 August 
1993. 
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wished that those responsible for their death be punished once identified. As it was 
argued, some used the witchcraft allegation in order to attack their previous enemies.46
 
 
A person called Callixte Karekezi from Gashiru, Sheke Sector, was attacked on 17 
October 1993 at night by robbers. They robbed and seriously injured him and his wife. 
They robbed money, radio systems and kitchen utensils. A person called Nzaramba was 
suspected of having participated in that robbery.47 On the 31st of the same month, some 
unidentified people attacked the home of Alexis Rutaburingoga, a businessman at Busoro 
centre. When he and his wife arrived at their home around 8:00 pm, the robbers threw a 
grenade at the house and fled. That grenade killed Théogène Bulindwi, a worker of 
Rutaburinagoga and injured a person called Damascène. The windows were seriously 
damaged. The population came to their rescue and made a lot of noise but they failed to 
identify those responsible for the violence. The enquiry simply remained open.48
 
  
In a security council meeting held at Gishamvu Commune in mid-December 1993 a 
number of criminal and social violence cases were reported per Sector: (1) In the valley 
of Migina located between Gishamvu and Nyaruhengeri Communes, robbers organized 
in mobs were stopping people and confiscating their belongings during the day. (2) Some 
people from Gishamvu Sector were killed after being accused of witchcraft. Those who 
killed them were pursued and caught. (3) Some people including Gabriel Murara from 
Sholi, Jean Kubwimana from Kibingo, Callixte Karekezi from Sheke and Alexis 
Rutaburingoga from Mubumbano mentioned that they were attacked by grenades, but the 
perpetrators could not be identified, except Nzaramba who allegedly attacked Karekezi 
on 18 October 1993. (4) In Mubumbano Sector, two grenades were found. Robbery in 
Mubumbano is said to have increased the degree of famine during that time. (5) In 
Gishamvu Sector, security was threatened at the Busoro centre because of many bars in 
                                                 
46 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Report concerning insecurity in Gikunzi, Ref.: No. 357/04.09.01, Gishamvu, 24 September 1993. 
47 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Report on the attack of the home of Karekezi Callixte, Ref.: N° 385/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 5 November 
1993. 
48 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Report on the assault at the home of Rutaburingoga Alexis who lives in Mubumbano 
Sector, in the night of  31 October 1993, Ref.: No. 384/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 2 November 1993. 
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which many people allegedly spread ethnic hatred and then resorted to violence. (6) In 
Nyakibanda and Gikunzi, security was threatened by the robbery of livestock and food in 
the fields. (7) Liba and Kibingo Sectors were said to witness robbery of food in the 
fields.49
 
  
The late Rumashana’s family was attacked in mid-December 1993 and two children, 
Kalimanzira and Uwambaje, were killed by a grenade. The population accused two 
people of that killing: Thadeo Ngiruwigize and his son Charles Turame. Ngiruwigize was 
also son of Rumashana. This was a family plot killing. At the same time, robbers targeted 
Kalimunda’s house in Buvumu and robbed a radio system, clothes and a machete.50
 
 
On 2 February 1994, Gabriel Hingabugabo from Kibingo was killed while attempting to 
rob the home of J. Damascène Twagirumukiza. Also on 6 February 1994, the shop of 
Gloriose Kanyumba was attacked by grenade; the robbers continued to the shop of Jean 
Kubwimana and robbed two boxes of beer.51
4.3.2. In Kibayi 
 
 
Two cases of murder were reported in the third quarter of 1990.52
 
 
In early 1991, the Councillor of Shyombo, André Uzaramba, was accused of mistreating 
a number of his constituents. In this regard, Nzaramyimana, a peasant from Shyombo, 
wrote a letter to the Prefect, alleging that this Councillor was attacking him because he 
did not elect him (in the councillors’ election of January 1990), that he had extorted 9,500 
francs from him, and had beaten him severely in such a way that he alleged he spent 
                                                 
49 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Augustin Lyumugabe, Assistant to the 
Burgomaster, Report of Security Council of Gishamvu Commune, held on 14 December 1993, Ref.: No. 
01/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 5 January 1994. 
50 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
The death of Kalimanzira and Uwambaje from Gishamvu. Three grenades have been found in Buvumu 
Sector-Gishamvu, No. 440/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 17 December 1993. 
51 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
The death of Hingabugabo Gabriel from Kibingo-Gishamvu, and the grenade thrown at the home of 
Kanyumba Gloriose from Nyanza-Liba-Gishamvu, Ref.: No. 39/04.01./4, Gishamvu 7 February 1994. 
52 République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, S/Préfecture Gisagara, Commune de Kibayi, Rapport 
Trimestriel Juillet – Août – September 1990, Kibayi, le 23 Octobre 1990, p. 2. 
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about two months in bed not working.53 The same applies to the inhabitant Vitaliani 
Nduwumwami who alleged that he was severely beaten by the Councillor Uzaramba: “I 
am being wronged in the Shyombo Sector because I did not vote for the Councillor, he 
attacked and beat me at my home more than the way people used to be beaten during the 
colonial period. I have been unable to work, he says that I refused to become his client, as 
if I do not know where beer is sold [i.e., so that I can buy for him]. Dear Prefect, we are 
about to die of hunger in our homes, will we get things to eat and to give him?”54
 
  
The Security report of Kibayi, for August 1991 mentioned 13 charges: One charge for 
public insults, five charges for assault and light battery, two certified robberies, one 
charge for assaults having caused death, one charge for inflicting physical pain, one 
charge for marijuana smoking and one charge for destruction of houses.55 On 10 October 
1991, another eight charges were registered. They included one murder, one rape case 
and one certified robbery.56
 
 
In April 1992, the security report mentioned three cases of violence: In Joma Sector, a 
teacher called J. Pierre Rutazikwa was beaten with a bottle over his head and was injured. 
He was sent to hospital. It was on 18 April 1992. In Mukindo Sector, a woman called 
Tharcilla Nyirandutiye was stabbed in the head on 19 April 1992. In Shyombo, a man 
called Bosco Ntirushwamaboko was beaten and injured on 18 April 1992.57
                                                 
53 Nzaramyimana, Inhabitant of Kibayi Commune, Shyombo sector, Cyimana Cell, Letter to the Prefect of 
Butare Prefecture, in January 1991, received on 25 January 1991; Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Re: The problem of Nzaramyimana, Ref.: No. 
584/04.05/3, Butare, 26 March 1991. 
 On 25 May 
54 Vitaliani Nduwumwami, Inhabitant of Kibayi Commune, Shyombo sector, Cyimana Cell, Letter to the 
Prefect of Butare Prefecture, 30 December 1990; Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to 
the Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Re: The problem of Nduwumwami, Ref.: No. 574/04.05/3, Butare, 26 
March 1991. 
55 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Kibayi, A Monsieur le Préfet de la 
Préfecture de Butare, Objet: Rapport de sécurité, août 1991, Réf. : N° 467/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, le 10 
septembre 1991. 
56 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Kibayi, Confidentiel, A Monsieur le Préfet 
de la Préfecture de Butare, Objet : Rapport de sécurité, mois de Septembre 1991, Réf. : N° 524/04.09.01/4, 
Kibayi, le 10 Octobre 1991. 
57 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Subprefect of 
Gisagara Subprefecture, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 181/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 21 April 1992. 
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1992, security in the Kibayi Commune and at the border with Burundi was reported as 
fine. However, the robbery of bicycles was registered. 58
 
 
Security is described as bad towards the end of July 1992 in Kibayi: (1) In the night of 24 
July 1992 in Runyinya Sector, Agasharu Cell, a young man called Samuel Musabyeyezu 
was killed by Mugarura in tandem with Clément Bikorabagabo and Vuganeza. Though 
the cause is not mentioned in the report, it looks like social violence. Mugarura who had 
killed Musabyeyezu on 24 July 1992 was caught four days later. (2) On 24 July 1992 in 
Shyombo Sector, a cow and a goat belonging respectively to Baligira and Christophe 
Nyandwi were robbed. (3) In Nyagahuru Sector, Kibu Cell, on 25 July 1992, the 
population took over land belonging to the commune where cattle stayed after drinking 
water, and cultivated it. The commune Burgomaster said in the meeting that he was 
planning to go to remove them from that state land.59
 
 
August 1992: Around 100 people organized themselves and attacked cooperatives in 
Kibayi. The purpose of that attack is not mentioned. (2) On 4 August 1992 a young man 
was killed by his family member as he opened the door for him when he was asking for 
shelter. He was seeking to kill his paternal uncle because of conflicts they had regarding 
inheritance. (3) There was also an issue of robbing cattle that were taken to Burundi, 
provided that they were sold there at a higher price. (4) In Kibayi there were also the 
issues of youth playing the urusimbi game, the consumption of marijuana, and people 
who escaped prison who had come to take revenge.60
                                                 
58 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Security Report, Ref.: No. 217/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 25 May 1992. 
 On the night of 3 August 1992 in 
Mukindo Sector, a Yamaha 100 motorbike belonging to Vincent Urayaha was stolen. (2) 
In Rwamiko Sector, a house belonging to a certain woman had been burnt by her enemies 
59 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Subprefect of 
Gisagara Subprefecture, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 286/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 27 July 1992; Pierre-Canisius 
Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara Subprefecture, Re: Security, 
Ref.: No. 288/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 31 July 1992. 
60 J. Baptiste Hakizamungu, Subprefect of Prefecture, Fabien Uwimana, Rapporteur of the meeting, Letter 
to the Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, Kigali, Re: Minutes of the Security 
Council of Butare Prefecture, held on 5 August 1992, Ref.: No. 191/04.09.01, Butare, 17 August 1992, p. 4. 
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who were not identified.61 In August 1992 again: The robbery of cows was exacerbated 
especially in Mukomacara, Shyombo, Joma and Mukindo Sectors, because these sectors 
had crossing bridges or paths (ibyambu) leading to Burundi where the stolen cows were 
sold. Rwandese robbed them and Burundians in connivance bought them. (2) In 
Shyombo, Nyakazana Cell, the population killed four bandits who had robbed the house 
of Balthazar Nzaramba. 62
 
 
In September 1992, a number of forests and hills were burnt: these included the forest of 
Straton Nsabumukunzi located in Kibayi Sector, Rwahambi Cell, burnt on 24 September 
1992; 6 ha of a hill located in Nyagahuru, Mushongi  Cell, burnt on 21 September, and in 
Joma Sector where seven people lost their forests.63 At the end of September and 
beginning of October 1992, hills and houses kept on being burnt in Joma, Nyagahuru, 
and Shyombo.64 On 19 October 1992, a man Joseph Kalinda from Runyinya Sector, 
Munyegera Cell was beaten and latter killed for having stolen a pot belonging to those 
who beat and killed him.65
 
 
On 4 December 1992, three people - the teacher Jean Pierre Rutazikwa, Nzabambarirwa 
and Sindikubwabo - were accused of robbing bananas in Joma Sector, Rebero Cell. A 
group of people went to attack the teacher Rutazikwa at the Magi primary school where 
he worked, they were carrying machetes and clubs and were saying that they were going 
to kill him. The Burgomaster and policemen intervened in order to stop that violence. The 
group asked for 50,000 Rwandan Francs as a deposit in order not to kill him. The 
Commune authorities paid it. Then they released him but after beating him. He was 
                                                 
61 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara 
Subprefecture, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 297/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 10 August 1992. 
62 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Security Report, Ref.: No. 317/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 1 September 1992; Pierre-Canisius 
Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Security Report for August 1992, Ref.: No. 327/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 14 September 1992. 
63 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Security Report for the previous week, Ref.: No. 350/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 28 September 
1992. 
64 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Security Report, Ref.: No. 361/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 5 October 1992. 
65 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Report on the killing of a person, Ref.: No. 380/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 21 October 1992. 
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thereafter taken to hospital. (2) On 6 December in Mukindo Sector, Nyabisagara Cell, a 
man called Habimana raped Alphonsine Nyiraminani who lived in Muganza commune.66
 
 
The Councillor Theodore Bikorabagabo of Saga Sector was dismissed in March 1993 
because he robbed tiles from the sector’s office roof, a chair and some money.67 On 1 
May 1993, one of Cell Committee members in Rebero Cell, Joma Sector, called Alfred 
Ntibiruke, alias Mwami, died. An unidentified person had injured him a month 
previously with a stone.68 The Security Council meeting of 17 May 1993 in Kibayi 
calculated that in almost all 9 sectors of the commune the following crimes were found, 
however to an unequal degree: physical violence, robbery, gambling (urusimbi and 
akazungu), informal liquor Kanyanga, marijuana, and Burundians who brought food into 
markets through smuggling.69  On 27 May 1993, Faustin Kabera from Nyakazana Cell, 
Shyombo Sector was killed by Callixte Rutayisire and Murekezi for motives of revenge, 
because they were accusing the mother of Kabera to have poisoned the official wife of 
Rutayisire who later died. (2) A grenade TNT was found on 30 May 1993 in Joma Sector, 
Rebero Cell in the house of Viateur Nzasabimfura.70
 
 
In Joma Sector, Gitega cell on 11 June 1993, a man called Nahimana had beaten his wife 
Espérance Nyirarukundo with an axe until she died. The lady was carrying a baby of 
three months who also got injured in the process and died at the hospital of Butare town. 
The man also attempted to commit suicide by throwing himself from the top of a tree 
down into the stones. He was severely injured and was taken to hospital. He allegedly 
                                                 
66 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Security Report, Ref.: No. 428/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 7 December 1992. 
67 Jean Baptiste Habyalimana, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, 
Re: The issue of Mr. Bikorabagabo Théodore, Councillor of Saga Sector, Ref.: No. 431/04.07, without 
date. 
68 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 134/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 3 May 1993. 
69 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Minutes of Security Council meeting held on 17 May 1993, Ref.: No. 179/04.09.01/4, 
Kibayi, 9 June 1993. In this meeting of 17 May 1993, one of my informants, Joseph Balitunga, was also 
accused of selling the liquor Kanyanga. The council decided that Balitunga’s house should be checked, in 
such a way that he be punished if found guilty. 
70 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 170/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 1 June 1993. 
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had some mental sickness.71 In the last week of July 1993, three people were killed and 
two houses were destroyed. (2) On 5 July 1993 a certain Nsabineza from Mukindo Sector 
was injured by a stone to the leg, thrown at him by Bizumuremyi. He was taken to 
hospital, but died on 26 July 1993.72
 
 
Certain news spread in Kibayi saying that some Saga people were going to attack Kibayi 
Sector. Kibayi Sector inhabitants became afraid in the process. But authorities said that 
this news was just rumours. (2) On 10 December 1993, a Burundian refugee called 
Frédéric Ntahondi residing near to Kanage was found with a submachine gun with 32 
bullets. He said that he bought it from two Burundians who had fled with it. He did not 
resist showing it. That case was submitted to the Prosecuting authority.73
 
 
An R4 rifle and bullets were also discovered in Rwamiko Sector. (2) On 27 February 
1994, a man Nkurabanga attacked and injured a number of his family members cutting 
the arm of one, the leg of another, and the arm and two fingers of the third. (3) In 
Mukindo Sector, on 24 February 1994, a Burundian person died in the Kanage refugee 
camp. He was killed by other Burundians who suspected him of being a wizard. (4) In 
Runyinya Sector, on 27 February 1994 Straton Butoyi used a small hoe to hit 
Hategekimana in the head.  Both were reported to have been drunk.74
4.3.3. Patterns, Motives and Measures 
 
 
In all these cases of Gishamvu and Kibayi, it is possible to find some key motives that 
drove the criminals. First it is material gain. Although robbery was always there before 
this crisis, a new feature is that it becomes more regular and more intense. The second 
feature of it is that it involves the easy killing of victims before or after robbing them. It 
                                                 
71 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 187/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 14 June 1993. 
72 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Security Report, Ref.: No. 255/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 3 August 1993. 
73 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of the Butare Prefecture, 
Security Report held in Saga Sector of Kibayi Commune on 13 December 1993, Ref. : No. 391/04.09.01/4, 
Kibayi, 14 December 1993. 
74 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Report of Security, Ref.: No. 38/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 2 March 1994. 
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involves also the killing of robbers by the population. The proliferation of arms must be 
one explanation, this is also related to the fact that some soldiers used to escape the 
battlefield and desert with guns and grenades and use them in criminal activities or sell 
them. The growing impunity during this time must also be a cause. Rampant corruption 
of justice employees and prisons may also be a cause of this, as well as the big number of 
prisoners who succeeded in escaping prisons. The consumption of marijuana and the 
increase of gambling suggest the exaggeration of desperation and criminality, while the 
accusation of witchcraft against targeted people suggests the use of “customs” for self-
justifying purposes. 
 
Yet, security measures had been tightened during this crisis time. For example, a day 
after the launch of the first attack of the RPF rebellion, a state of emergency and a curfew 
were proclaimed. They reduced the freedom of movement and regulated the hours for the 
opening and closing of certain public places such as markets, business places and bars. 
Those measures were applied more leniently at areas far from the battlefield towards May 
1992.75
 
  
Secondly, the state during this time became a defensive and police state. The authority of 
the Prefect at the level of the Prefecture was further reinforced. On security matters, the 
Prefect worked in tandem with the Prefecture Security Committee, which was supposed 
to work as a “crisis committee”.76
                                                 
75 Gaspard Gatera, Sous-Préfet et Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare ad interim, A Monsieur le Bourgmestre 
de la Commune, tous, Objet: Mesures nécessaires pour la Sécurité Publique, N° 2032 :04.09.01/…, Butare, 
le 2 Octobre 1990 ; Faustin Munyazesa, Ministre de l’Intérieur et du Développement Communal, Message 
Fax N° 420/04.09.01 de MININTER au Préfet (tous), Copie, Ref. : No. 133/04.04.09.01., Butare, le 26 Mai 
1992. See also Kirschke, Linda, Article 19, Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda, & State-
Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990-1994, London, Article 19, 1996, p. 22. 
 At the level of the Commune, the Burgomasters were 
asked to report everyday on the security situation at the Subprefecture, the Subprefecture 
had to make a summary and send the message to the Prefecture, and then the Prefecture 
76 Innocent Ndindabahizi, Secrétaire Général au Ministère de l’Intérieur et du Développement Communal, 
et Cyriaque Habyarabatuma, Commandant du Groupement Butare et rapporteur de la réunion, Secret, 
Compte – rendu de la réunion du Conseil Préfectoral de Sécurité de Butare tenue le 04 novembre 1990. 
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to the Ministry of Local Government and Commune Development. In this process, the 
Burgomasters were helped by their Commune Security Councils.77
 
 
For communes located at the border with neighbouring countries, security measures 
became even more strengthened. For example, Butare Burgomasters were constantly 
reminded to guard the border and other sensitive and strategic infrastructures located in 
their communes such as public buildings, bridges, factories, telephone antennas, etc., 
using both the police and the civilian population in what was called civil self-defence 
units. These units operated through the organisation of daily and nightly patrols and the 
placing of roadblocks and control of identity of all those passing at those roadblocks. The 
Prefect ruled that all the canoes that operate in the Akanyaru river between Rwanda and 
Burundi be stopped from operating, and that the Butare population ceases to go to 
Burundi. Burgomasters having sectors that touched on the frontier with Burundi were 
asked to set up an intelligence committee made by Rwandans and possibly Burundians in 
order to get information about an eventual attack of rebels from Burundi.78
 
 
A special emphasis was put on the control of the youth who went to Burundi allegedly in 
order to join the RPF rebel camp. The Prefects asked the Burgomasters to tighten the 
control of their territory and catch anyone suspected of joining the Inkotanyi.79
                                                 
77 Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Letter to Burgomasters of Gishamvu, Kigembe, 
Nyakizu and Runyinya Communes, Re: Information to send everyday on Security in the Commune, Ref. : 
No. 778/04.09.01, Busoro, 20 December 1990; Dominique Ntawukuriryayo, Sous-Préfet de la Sous-
Préfecture de Gisagara, Urgent, Lettre aux Bourgmestres de Commune de la S/Préfecture Gisagara, Ref.: 
No. 205/04.09.01/4, Gisagara, le 18 mai 1992. 
 In Kibayi 
78 Jean Marie Vianney Mugemana, Ministre de l’Intérieur et du Développement Communal, Lettre 
circulaire n° 3655/04.09.01 du 24 octobre 1990 aux responsables des cellules spécialisées, Objet : 
Sensibilisation –Encadrement des collectivités nationales concernant l’attaque des INYENZI du 
1/10/1990 ; MININTER, Kigali, Télégramme aux Préfets (tous), Sécurité, Texte n° 110/04.08, s.d. ; L. 
Rusatira, Colonel, Secrétaire Général du Ministère de la Défense Nationale, Confidentiel, A Monsieur le 
Ministre de l’Intérieur et du Développement Communal, Kigali, Objet : Surveillance des points sensibles 
par la population, Copie, N° 01006/02.1.0, 1991 ; Justin Temahagali, Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, 
Confidentiel, A Monsieur le Ministre de l’Intérieur et du Développement Communal, Kigali, Objet : 
Situation en Préfecture de Butare, Réf. : 081/04.09.01/16, Butare, le 10 novembre 1990 ; Justin 
Temahagali, Prefect of the Butare Prefecture, To the Minister of Local Government and Commune 
Development, Kigali, Minutes of Meeting of Burgomasters held on 15 February 1991, Ref.: No. 
723/04.09.01/16, Butare, 17 April 1991. 
79 Jean Baptiste Habyalimana, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to all Burgomasters of Communes 
located in Butare, Re: The issue of young men who join the Inkotanyi (RPF), Ref. : No. 229/04.09.01, 
Butare, 21 September 1992. 
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for example, nine young people were caught trying to cross the border on an unofficial 
bridge on the Akanyaru river at Joma Sector. They were from Muganza and Ndora 
Communes. They explained that they were going to Burundi to visit their relatives. But 
the population that caught them suspected that they were joining Inkotanyi. They brought 
seven of them to the commune authorities who reported to the Prefect about the 
incident.80
 
  
However, both in Gishamvu and Kibayi, movement of the population to Burundi seems 
to have continued regardless of these war regulations. Concerning Gishamvu, the 
Subprefect wrote the following to the Burgomaster: “There is news informing me about 
the movement of people back and forth of Mukuge Sector going to Burundi, especially 
the youth. It is possible that even other people from other sectors do this also. I urge you 
to verify if such information is sustained…”81 As for Kibayi, some Burundi peasants 
were crossing the border and entering Rwanda without crossing the official border since 
it was closed. Those Burundians were bringing food to the market. Those who were 
crossing from Kanage path were also bringing goods through smuggling.82
 
 
The security means were also supplied. For example, in November 1991, new guns were 
distributed to commune police in the proportion of two machine guns per commune 
added to what they had before, plus seven more guns for communes sharing borders with 
a foreign country.83 Communes were regularly asked to apply for an increase of police 
forces within their jurisdiction, with an emphasis on more police forces for communes 
located at frontiers.84
                                                 
80 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Nine Young men arrested while going to Burundi, Ref.: No. 409/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 23 
November 1992. 
 If this scheme was to be respected, Gishamvu should have 16 
81 Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Confidential, Letter to the Burgomaster of 
Gishamvu Commune, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 634/04.09.01, Busoro, 26 September 1992. 
82 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Minutes of Security Council meeting held on 17 May 1993, Ref.: No. 179/04.09.01/4, 
Kibayi, 9 June 1993. 
83 Justin Temahagali, Prefect of the Butare Prefecture, To the Minister of Local Government and Commune 
Development, Kigali, Minutes of Meeting of Burgomasters held on 15 February 1991, Ref.: No. 
723/04.09.01/16, Butare, 17 April 1991. 
84Justin Temahagali, Prefect of the Butare Prefecture, To the Minister of Local Government and Commune 
Development, Kigali, Numbers of Commune Police on 31 December 1990, Ref.: No. 225/04.01.02, Butare, 
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policemen instead of five, and Kibayi 44 policemen instead of six. However, the number 
of policemen on the eve of genocide suggests that this number never got increased in the 
desired proportions. Both communes remained with less than ten policemen per 
commune. 
 
Major holders of power at local level, including heads of political parties, heads of 
schools, businessmen, and other employers were associated with the security issue and 
some of them were represented either in Prefecture Security Committees or in Commune 
Security councils.85
 
 
Last but not least, the able-bodied civilian population were required to protect their local 
neighbourhoods by patrolling them day and night. Those who were not fit enough to do 
this job or who did not have time to do it, had to contribute financially by providing 
money to buy torches, and batteries for torches. At the beginning, all ethnic groups 
participated in these patrols. But towards 1993, when hatred against the Tutsi had 
increased as a result of hatred propaganda in the media, the Tutsi were excluded or 
excluded themselves from Hutu patrol groups. According to official instructions, people 
who guarded the roadblocks had to arrest any person not known in the vicinity and bring 
him or her to the nearby authorities for further investigation.86
                                                                                                                                                 
1 February 1991; Jean Baptiste Hakizamungu, Subprefect of Butare Prefecture, and Onesphore 
Muvunandinda, Rapporteur, Confidential, Minutes of the Meeting of Police Brigadiers of Communes, held 
on 7 October 1991, Ref.: No. 1755/04.09.01/16, Butare, 17 October 1991; Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect 
of Busoro Subprefecture, Confidential, Minutes of the meeting with Burgomasters held on 19 September 
1991, Ref.: No. 747/04.09.01/16, Busoro, 5 October 1991. 
 The civilians’ patrols were 
85 Augustin Misago (abbé), Recteur du Grand Séminaire de Nyakibanda, Lettre à Monsieur Justin 
Temahagali, Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, Objet : Mise au point sur la situation du G.S. de 
Nyakibanda, Nyakibanda, le 2/12/1990 ; Augustin Ngendahayo, Inspecteur d’Arrondissement, Butare, 
Compte rendu de la réunion des chefs d’Etablissements d’enseignement secondaire de la Préfecture de 
Butare tenue le mardi 12/03/1991, Réf.: N° 13.03/0/207, Butare, le 20 mars 1991 ; Pascal Kambanda, 
Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to Mr.  Mukimbiri François, Chairman of Gishamvu 
Businessmen, Ref. : No. 37/04.09.01/16, Gishamvu, 2 February 1994. 
86 Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu 
Commune, Re: Main points developed in the meeting of the Prefect with Burgomasters held on 9 November 
1991 in Butare, Ref.: No. 848/04.09.01/16, Busoro, 14 November 1991; Dominique Ntawukuriryayo, 
Subprefect of Gisagara Subprefecture, Confidential, Letter to all Burgomasters of the Gisagara  
Subprefecture, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 013/04.09.01/4, Gisagara, 22 April 1992;  Interview with 
François Manirabona, Kibayi, 11 May 2007; Interview with Aloys Mutarambirwa, Kibayi, 17 May 2007; 
Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007; Interview with Anonymous 8, Gishamvu, 
24 and 26 April 2007; Interviews with Anonymous 1, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Célestin Karemera, 
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so important that in every meeting where the issue of robbery was reported, the leaders 
recommended that the patrols be strengthened more and more. In this respect, leaders 
appeared to rely on the population as a means of fighting against criminality.  
 
But state measures to prevent rebels’ infiltration and to stop civil disorder did not halt 
criminal violence. As one can conclude, security measures were necessary but not 
sufficient, since structural and conjunctural situations could not be solved by security 
measures alone. First, land had been scarce and become less and less productive. In this 
respect, incidents of social violence among family members and the taking over of state 
property were related mostly but not solely to land. Secondly, banditry grew hand in hand 
with the large number of youth lacking jobs and land for agriculture, with famine that led 
to the theft of foodstuffs in the fields or in homes and with the proliferation of weapons 
due to the present war. Thirdly, the justice apparatus failed to punish those implicated in 
crimes; as a result the populations took justice into their own hands, and thus aggravated 
the situation.87
 
 
In the following section, we shall see that politicians in their quest for power also 
manipulated these fragile situations and in the process produced another form of violence 
that can be labelled political violence, since it opposed political actors or operated within 
the political arena.  
 
4.4. PARTY POLITICS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
 
It can be argued that the advent of multiparty politics in Rwanda from 1991 to 1994 was 
a positive move in the sense that it brought political plurality and an opening of the 
political space. But given the result that this multiparty system produced, it can also be 
argued that it brought more chaos than democracy. But multiparty politics in Rwanda is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gishamvu, 24 April 2007; Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with 
Justin Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. Interview with Anonymous 4, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; 
Interview with Vénuste Sindabizera, Kibayi, 9 May 2007; Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, 
Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
 
87 On this last point see Longman, Christianity, pp. 166-167. 
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interesting in that it helps us understand to what extent politicians of all sides were prone 
to use all means including crude violence in order to reach power. The degree of resorting 
to violence depended more on what means of violence a party or politician had at his 
disposal and less on the political programme of that party.  
 4.4.1. The Evolution of Multiparty Politics 
 
a) The launch of the multiparty system 
 
The advent of multipartyism in Rwanda was the result of international changes following 
the end of cold war and of internal demands. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the la 
Baule Conference in June 1990 brought about requirements for authoritarian states 
around the African continent to democratize their regimes. France, USA and the 
institutions of Bretton Woods imposed conditions on African countries that were not 
ruled democratically to democratize their regimes as a condition in order to continue to 
receive aid and loans.  
 
Internally, it is also in Mid-May 1990 that the debate on how to open up the political 
space for multiple voices started, first inside the ruling party MRND through the CIC 
(Interministries Coordination Committee) and thereafter through the CNS (National 
Synthesis Commission). In May 1990, the CIC had criticized the confusion of power 
between the MRND power and the executive government, the presentation of a single 
candidate to the post of president of the republic, the unlimited eligibility of the President 
of the Republic, the lesser flexibility in the choosing of candidates in parliament and the 
way Burgomasters had a big influence in the election of candidates to the position of 
Councillor.88
                                                 
88 République Rwandaise, C.I.C. Ministériel en matière de politique, d’information et de sécurité, 
Evaluation du système et de la situation politiques du Rwanda, Kigali, Juin 1990, pp. 2, 11-12, 35-38 and 
49. 
 That was followed by the decision of the President of the Republic to form 
a commission that would study how to install multipartyism in Rwanda. That commission 
came to bear the name National Synthesis Commission. It started its gatherings on 24 
September 1990 and presented its report in January 1991. However, before the CNS 
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commission, a letter signed by 33 intellectuals reclaiming the opening of political space 
had been issued in August 1990.89
 
  
It is the new Constitution of 10 June 1991 that legally recognized many parties. From 1 
July 1991 to 18 July 1993, 17 parties were created or legalized, but five seem to have 
been the most important: the former MRND single party transformed into MRNDD 
(Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement et la Démocratie), MDR 
(Mouvement Démocratique Républicain), PSD (Parti Social Démocrate), PL (Parti 
Libéral) and PDC (Parti Démocrate Chrétien). 1991-1994 proved to be the time of 
intense political activity in Rwanda in general, including in Gishamvu and Kibayi which 
were among rural area communes. It is worth noting that at the beginning of July 1991, 
party activities already started in Gishamvu and Kibayi.  
 
In August 1991 leaders of parties in Gishamvu were as follows : Augustin Kabiligi, 
director of CERAI Liba living in Mubumbano, for MRNDD ; Augustin Sezibera who 
lived in Sholi and a teacher at the primary school of Mubumbano was head of MDR ; 
PSD was said to be present but his leader was not yet known. It was advertised by 
Thadeo Kanyemera living at Muboni in Gishamvu Sector and teaching at Mubumbano 
primary school. It was also advertised by Aloys Sibomana, who was the agronomist of 
Gishamvu Commune.90
 
 
Deputé Amandin Rugira, one of the Executive members of MRND and the coordinator of 
MRNDD in Butare Prefecture came to launch the beginning of that party in Gishamvu. 
He is one of the senior Butare politicians since the 1960s and became an experienced 
politician during the Second Republic. He is from Kigembe, close to Gishamvu and 
Kibayi. He selected and invited 61 influential people in the commune and organized an 
election among them. For the presidency of MRNDD in Gishamvu, Augustin Kabiligi, a 
Hutu, head of CERAI-Liba and living in Mubumbano Sector, won over Jean 
                                                 
89 Charles Kabwete Mulinda, L’idée de démocratie au Rwanda, de 1948 à 1994, Mémoire de Licence en 
Histoire, Université Nationale du Rwanda, Butare, Mai 1997, pp. 108-110 ; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 
90. 
90 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Concerning politics, Ref.: 676/04.09.01, Gishamvu, 23 August 1991. 
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Niyizurugero, the Inspector of schools in Gishamvu, and Emmanuel Munyarugano, 
former burgomaster and parliamentarian. The coordinators of MRNDD at the level of 
sectors were also elected.91 Three days before the meeting of 7 July 1991, a list of 
provisional leaders of MRNDD had been made by the Burgomaster Pascal Kambanda, in 
the proportion of six persons per sector. The Burgomaster was also a member of MRND 
in 1991. Two groups seem to have entered MRNDD earlier: those who held government 
jobs such as teachers, medical employees, agronomists, administrative leaders, and then 
businessmen, both Hutu and Tutsi.92 Two months later, the MRNDD President in 
Gishamvu, Augustin Kabiligi, held a meeting with coordinators of MRNDD in sectors. 
Those coordinators voted in their office-bearers: vice president: Mathias Twagirayezu, 
Secretary: Laurent Minani, Treasurer: Innocent Murengerantwali. In this meeting, they 
also calculated the members of their party and they showed the number of 4,674 which is 
very big. If this holds true, that means at the beginning of the multiparty system, three 
months later, many people were still in the former single party and had not yet decided to 
join other parties.93 According to MRNDD records, on 30 September 1991, this party had 
5,884 members out of 15,073 people who were able to vote in the Gishamvu commune. 
Sheke Sector had 68.1% of its adult people in MRNDD and was the most affiliated to 
MRNDD with Mubumbano and Mukuge. It is worth noting that Sheke was the most 
populated by Tutsi people. That is why maybe Laurent Minani, a primary school teacher 
and Tutsi from Sheke, was elected into office.94
 
  
7 July 1991 was extremely early if one considers that the new MRNDD party following 
multipartyism was only formally created on 5 July 1991. That means that in Butare 
Prefecture, MRNDD attempted to penetrate rural area communes simultaneously with the 
                                                 
91 Amandin Rugira, leader of the meeting and Jean Marie Vianney Muramutsa, Secretary, Minutes of the 
meeting of key leaders of MRND held on 7 July 1991 in Gishamvu, Ref.: No. 545/04.12, Gishamvu, 8 July 
1991. 
92 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, List of Provisional leaders of MRND in 
Gishamvu Commune, Ref.: No. 537/04.12, Gishamvu, 4 July 1991. 
93 Augustin Kabiligi, Coordinator of MRND in Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Coordinator of MRND 
in Butare Prefecture: Re: Minutes of the meeting of coordinators of MRND in Gishamvu, Gishamvu, 19 
September 1991. 
94 Augustin Kabiligi, Coordinator of MRND in Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Subprefect of Busoro 
Subprefecture, Re: The number of people who have already joined MRND party in Gishamvu, Gishamvu, 
10 October 1991. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
255 
capital city from which the launching of the party occurred. The same applies to other 
significant parties such as MDR, PSD and PL. These were launched almost at the same 
time with MRNDD, respectively on 1 July, 1 July and 14 July. At the end of August, all 
of them were present in Gishamvu and Kibayi albeit at an unequal strength.  
 
Other parties had also started their activities by designating party leaders. MDR’s 
President was Augustin Sezibera, Hutu, born in 1940 and living in Sholi Sector. He was a 
teacher at Mubumbano primary school. The representative of PSD was Aloys Sibomana, 
Hutu, born in 1959 and living in Gishamvu Sector. He was Executive Secretary of PSD 
in Gishamvu. He worked as chief agronomist of Gishamvu. He was helped by two 
assistants, one Tutsi named Thadée Kanyemera, a teacher at Mubumbano primary school, 
and a Hutu from Sheke called Athanase Habinshuti who had been dismissed from ESM 
(Military Academy).95 PSD also had the support of the renowned businesman in 
Gishamvu called François Mukimbiri, a wealthier Tutsi and head of the Gishamvu 
chamber of commerce. He gave one of his houses to PSD to become an office of that 
party in Gishamvu. This house was located at the Bosoro centre. 96 The leaders of PL 
were not yet known by September 1991, but the party was already operating. It is later on 
that Justin Senyange represented it in Gishamvu. He was also a teacher, and Tutsi.97
 
 
In Kibayi, commune leaders, such as the burgomaster, the majority of councillors and cell 
committee members, were also from MRNDD party at the beginning of multiparty 
system. The President of MRNDD was Raymond Hakizimana, former Burgomaster and 
brother of Isodore Nzeyimana, renowned politician of the 1960s during and after the 
“revolution”. Seemingly, the MRNDD strategy in the Butare Prefecture level was to 
capture leaders of the 1960s and bring them to the fore again in order to win the 
multiparty system. It had done that in Gishamvu by designating Emmanuel Munyarugano 
                                                 
95 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, to Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: CV of 
heads of parties in Gishamvu, Ref.: 720/04.09.01, Gishamvu, 9 September 1991. 
96 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Minutes of the Campaign meeting 
of PSD held at the Office of Gishamvu Commune on 31 August 1991, Ref.: No.706/04.09.01, Gishamvu, 2 
September 1991. 
97 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Minutes of the Councillors’ meeting held on 4 
September 1991, Ref.: No.709/04.09.01/16, Gishamvu, 6 September 1991; Interview with Evariste 
Murindwa, Gishamvu, 24 March 2006. 
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among the list of candidate presidents, but he had not been elected there, probably due to 
his old age: he was 71 by then. Amandin Rugira, head of the party in Butare prefecture 
was close to both as they worked together in the 1960s, and Rugira was brother-in-law of 
Hakizimana. The president of MDR was Christophe Nyandwi who had been Inspector of 
schools in Kibayi and Muganza areas. He lived in Shyombo Sector. The president of PSD 
was Alphonse Vunabandi, a young person who lived in Saga Sector and who worked at 
the Commune office as Assistant to the Burgomaster in charge of economic and technical 
affairs. Salvator Ndahiro was the head of PL. He was replaced later by Jean Bosco 
Butera.98
 
 
At an earlier stage, MRNDD benefited a lot from its controlling of administrative power 
at the prefecture, subprefecture and commune levels. The Prefect, the Subprefect of 
Busoro and Gisagara subprefectures, the Gishamvu and Kibayi burgomasters and the 
majority of councillors were all from MRNDD.99
 
 
 
b) Rational choice theory in party adhesion 
 
As a first proposition, most rural intellectuals and peasants who had had some 
misunderstanding or conflict in the past with established administrative leaders such as 
the burgomaster, commune employees and councillors tended to become the very first 
members of opposition parties, that is, MDR, PSD and PL. This element transpires 
clearly in the interviews of both rural intellectuals and ordinary peasants. It was a way of 
settling some unfinished conflicts. 
 
                                                 
98 Interview with Christophe Nyandwi, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 
May 2007; Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007; Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, 
Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Minutes of 
Security Council meeting held on 17 May 1993, Ref.: No. 179/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 9 June 1993. 
99 Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994, p. 176; Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Letter to the 
Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Re: The Commune meeting of 31 December 1991, Ref.: No. 
10/04.04./2, Busoro, 6 January 1992; Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, 
Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Security Report, Ref.: No. 221/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 1 
June 1992. 
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In Gishamvu for example, Callixte Kanyamugenga, a Tutsi peasant from Mukuge Sector, 
was in MRNDD, then Gabriel Murara, Medical assistant, ‘recruited’ him in MDR by 
confiscating his MRNDD card and giving him the MDR one. Kanyamugenga asserts that 
he accepted to enter MDR because of his need for health treatment that he benefited from 
Murara.100
 
 In the same vein, Vincent Kanamugire, a Tutsi peasant from Mukuge as well 
joined MDR because as he narrates, he was an opponent of Burgomaster Kambanda for 
having refused him permission to buy land in Busoro centre. And later on when he 
bought a house there, the Burgomaster forbade him to finish the construction of it. Until 
the time of the interview, the case was still in court. So he claims to have joined MDR in 
order to counter Kambanda’s politics.  
It is in Kibayi that I found many cases. Aloys Mutarambirwa lived in Saga Sector in the 
same neighbourhood with Alphonse Vunabandi, the assistant of the burgomaster and 
president of PSD in Kibayi. They knew each other very well. But he did not join the PSD, 
although he ought to enter there, since the youth, according to this informant, were 
attracted mostly to PSD because of more powerful propaganda and entertaining songs. He 
said he did not enter PSD because Vunabandi refused to lend him 400 Rwandan francs to 
pay for his tax in order to apply for his ID book.101
 
  
Another conflict saw Christophe Nyandwi, who was Inspector of schools, opposed to 
Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster. According to Nyandwi and his wife Domitilla 
Niyonsaba, the burgomaster was jealous of their household because they were as rich as - 
if not richer than – him, although he was the paramount leader of the commune. 
Concerning professional matters, Kajyambere is said to have been afraid that Nyandwi 
would one day replace him in the post of burgomaster, since Nyandwi was able to attract 
more aid from international NGOs in favour of education. As a result, an open conflict 
arose between the two, the burgomaster refusing to work with Nyandwi. A Ministerial 
commission even came to settle the case in Kibayi. It concluded that ‘two heads cannot 
be cooked in the same pot’, which meant that Nyandwi should be removed from the post 
                                                 
100 Interview with Callixte Kanyamugenga, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
101 Interview with Aloys Mutarambirwa, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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of Inspector. In 1992, Nyandwi had become an ordinary teacher and had been replaced by 
Vincent Mukuralinda who was then Inspector for Kibayi schools.102
 
 When the multiparty 
system came, Nyandwi found in it an occasion to oppose the burgomaster. He entered in 
MDR and became the president of that party in Kibayi. Later, the fight between MRNDD 
and MDR became an incarnation of the battle between these two individuals. 
Another rivalry was between Joseph Baritunga and the Burgomaster Kajyambere. 
Baritunga was president of COKINYA cooperative since 1987. This cooperative had 
more than 1,000 members and had some influence even in Butare and Kigali cooperative 
associations. Baritunga was almost as a civil society opponent to the commune leaders. 
According to him, the conflict arose because whenever he went to Kigali to attend 
meetings, he used to report about what was not going well in the commune, a behaviour 
that the burgomaster did not withstand.  When the multiparty system arrived, national and 
Butare MDR leaders noticed him as a person of influence in the commune and appointed 
him as head of MDR in Mukindo Sector and in charge of recruiting members for the 
party. He was soon among the most important figures who turned MDR into one of the 
most powerful parties in Kibayi.103
 
  
Rwabigwi joined PSD not because it was strong, as he explains, but because it gave him 
more freedom of action than MDR for example. He says he only attended one campaign 
meeting of PSD party, yet they did not punish him. He needed his time, because he had a 
shop to take care of, cultivation tasks, and he also helped his parents. But in MDR, if you 
were absent you would get punished.104
 
 
Ignace Gatabazi refused to join parties because he was unhappy about the existing 
leaders, Christophe Ndagijimana, the Councillor of Rwamiko Sector in particular, 
                                                 
102 Interview with Christophe Nyandwi, Kibayi, 12 May 2007 and Domitilla Niyonsaba, Kibayi, 10 May 
2007 ; Vincent Mukuralinda, Inspecteur de secteur Kibayi, Lettre à Monsieur l’Inspecteur 
d’Arrondissement Butare, Objet: Cotes, Réf. : N° 13.03/003/5, Kibayi, le 20/1/1992. 
103 Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
104 Interview with Laurent Rwabigwi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
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because he did not help him solve an issue he had about isambu (land). Then he refused 
to enter MRNDD. Also he hesitated about entering MDR.105
 
 
Secondly, some individuals, in single or in groups, made strategic choices based on their 
previous experiences with the multiparty system in the 1960s or else based on party 
propaganda machines. Some old people who had been in APROSOMA and 
PARMEHUTU joined MDR which claimed the PARMEHUTU legacy. They also 
sensitized their sons to enter MDR. But, according to Mutarambirwa, it is only sons who 
“listen to their fathers” who accepted this, since most young men liked to enter PSD 
because of its entertaining and propaganda songs which are said to have been very 
attractive, both in terms of rhythm and adaptability to youths’ taste at that moment. 
Guichaoua also confirms that the PSD was able to attract more young people including 
new elites than any other party in Butare Prefecture.106
 
  
In the same vein, many Tutsi both in Gishamvu and Kibayi chose strategically to remain 
in MRNDD since the beginning, because it was showing some strength. They believed 
that the incumbent party is always the safest one. They were uncertain about the new 
change.107
 
 But the subsequent weakness of MRNDD in both communes in 1992 and 1993 
suggests that some Tutsi also ultimately got away from it to join opposition parties.  
A number of peasants also claim that they did not have any party conviction. But 
strategically, they adhered to one or more parties so as to survive during the multiparty 
times. A number of them held two or more party cards so that wherever they went, if 
asked, they could produce the card of the prevailing party in that place. This strategy was 
important especially in 1992 when political violence among parties escalated.108
 
 
                                                 
105 Interview with Ignace Gatabazi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
106 Interview with Aloys Mutarambirwa, Kibayi, 17 May 2007; André, Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994, pp. 96-97 
et 100. 
107 Interview with Cesaria Uwambajimana, Kibayi, 21 May 2007; Interview with Tharcisse Karengera; 
Interview with Christophe Batura. 
108 Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije and François Munyantore. 
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Others, especially leaders and intellectuals, moved from party to party due to the 
evolution of strength of those parties. By doing so, they hoped to gain some positions in 
the power sharing to come. This behaviour seems to have been more frequent among 
rural intellectuals. For example, the Burgomaster Kambanda who until mid-1992 was in 
MRNDD109
 
 joined PSD probably in early 1993.  
Third, others made a sociological choice. A number of Hutu individuals entered MDR 
because they believed MDR to be the “party of Hutu”.110 A number of Tutsi individuals 
were also in PL, since that party was also considered as “the party of Tutsi.”111 As for 
MRNDD, it was considered as a mixed party as far as ethnicity is concerned. This was 
different from other regions of the country where MRNDD and MDR were both 
considered as “parties of Hutu”. PSD was also considered as the party of Hutu and Tutsi, 
and so it was. Indeed, the Tutsi in Gishamvu adhered mostly to MRNDD and PSD, as 
one female informant Mukangwije narrates.112
 
 
It seems that very few followed parties for their ideological programmes since the 
differentiating line was not always clear. MRNDD, MDR and PSD, to name the few 
among the parties, were rivalling to get the “revolution” of 1959 as their keystone 
ideology. They were not very different. They all emphasized republican, developmental 
and democratic principles. Party pageantry during campaign meetings and propaganda 
also borrowed a lot from former MRND single party propaganda programmes that aimed 
at building the personality cult of the president. Opposition parties had learnt from the 
MRND party how to use cultural performance or entertainment to attract masses. They 
were adding a cultural dimension to politics. Gishamvu and Kibayi were among Butare 
                                                 
109 For example, charles Kabeza the Burgomaster of Nyaruhengeri commune, neighbour to Gishamvu, 
asked Burgomaster Kambanda to come to help him in campaigning for MRND in Nyaruhengeri. (Charles 
Kabeza, Burgomaster of Nyaruhengeri Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu 
Commune, Ref.: 295/04.09.01, Nyaruhengeri, 18 May 1992.) 
110 Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. But this informant says that though Hutu, 
he was not in MDR. 
111 Interview with Julienne Uwiringiyimana, Kibayi, 17 May 2007; Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of 
Gishamvu Commune, To the Prefect of the Butare Prefecture, Minutes of a meeting held by PL in Busoro 
Subprefecture, Gishamvu Commune on 13 September 1992, Ref.: No. 673/04.09.01, Gishamvu, 16 
September 1992. See also Braeckman, Rwanda: Histoire d’un génocide, p. 122. 
112 Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
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communes that had trained some of the best artists in party live performance (animation 
in French). For example, Gishamvu ballet won the third place in the prefecture for live 
performance competition in 1986, and Kibayi became top in the Prefecture in 1989.113
 
 
However, among parties in Gishamvu and Kibayi, it seems that PSD made a good use of 
party live performances so as to attract the youth.  
c) Multiparty system, power sharing and power bargains in 1992-1993 
 
 
Before the advent of multipartyism, there was a government made of MRND party 
ministers that was formed on 9 July 1990 and a parliament elected since 1988. Another 
cabinet was formed on 4 February 1991. It is only on 31 December 1991 that the first 
multiparty government was formed. Besides MRNDD, it included only the PDC party. 
That was two months after the Prime Minister of this government was appointed in the 
name of Sylvestre Nsanzimana, and asked to form this government. As he failed to 
include other major parties, these started a series of hardcore street demonstrations from 
January to February 1992 in Kigali city and in Gitarama and Butare Prefectures. MDR 
proved to be strong in these manifestations, for, it was able to mobilise nearly a hundred 
thousand people in the streets against the Habyarimana and Nsanzimana government. In 
March the Nsanzimana government accepted to negotiate with MDR, PSD, PL and PDC 
parties about the terms of power sharing. That process resulted in the formation of a new 
government on 16 April 1992, led by Dismas Nsengiyaremye from the MDR party. 
Cabinet portfolios were shared in the following proportion: 9 posts for MRNDD, 4 posts 
for MDR, 3 for PSD, 3 for PL and one for PDC. 
 
This government gave to itself the agenda of restoring peace and security, that is, to solve 
the war issue through peace negotiation, to organise the administrative service, to 
stabilise the economy that was in crisis, to organise the national political debate, to solve 
                                                 
113 République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Commune Gishamvu, Monographie de la Commune 
Gishamvu, Année 1986, Gishamvu, février 1987, p. 38 ; République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, 
S/Préfecture Gisagara, Commune de Kibayi, Rapport annuel 1989, Commune Kibayi, Février 1990, p. 29 ; 
République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, S/Préfecture Gisagara, Commune de Kibayi, Rapport 
trimestriel Janvier, Février, Mars 1990, Commune Kibayi, 7 Mai 1990, p. 2. 
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the refugee crisis, and to respect the constitution.114 Just upon entering office in April 
1992, the Minister of Education, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, together with this government 
made some significant moves in the education sector, for she was able to put an end to 
the policy of ethnic and regional quotas in education, and decided that only individual 
merit would determine admission in education. A number of powerful MRNDD 
supporters intimidated her, she even underwent a physical attack at her home from 
‘unknown people’, but all failed to make her change her decision.115
 
 Another thing that 
this government achieved was the peace process between the government, the opposition 
parties and the RPF, from June 1992 onwards. It was able to obtain a cease-fire from both 
the Rwandan army and the RPF on 12 July 1992, which lasted many months. 
At the national and local level, the year 1992 is very significant in that it is during this 
time that political parties were busy organizing political campaigns to make their parties 
known, to recruit new members into their parties and to bargain for political posts at 
central level. They were also negotiating peace with the RPF first in Nsélé in 1991 and in 
Arusha all through 1992 until 1993. As we shall see in the next section on political 
violence, these parties used all means to make themselves more powerful, including 
violence and force.  
 
Concerning party campaigns, I was able to gather party public activities for Gishamvu 
but very few for Kibayi. They are located in Appendix 2. But the reading of the schedule 
for campaign meetings for Gishamvu shows that political activity at rural area level was 
also intense, and that it was not confined to cities only.  
 
 
These party campaign meeting schedules are not comprehensive, therefore they cannot 
allow me make some valid conclusions. However, they make it clear to what extent party 
public demonstrations were in Gishamvu on a regular basis. Interviews in Kibayi also 
                                                 
114 Reyntjens, L’Afrique des grands lacs, pp. 111-112 ; Jordane Bertrand, Rwanda. Le piège de l’histoire, 
l’opposition démocratique avant le génocide (1990-1994), Paris, Karthala, 2000, p. 195. 
115 Reyntjens, L’Afrique des grands lacs, pp. 115-116. 
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suggest that these party campaigns were very regular and that political life was busy at 
this time.  
 
One element that transpires from the political rhetoric of parties in 1992 as said before is 
that PSD, MDR and even CDR created on 16 March 1992 reclaimed ownership of the 
social “revolution” of 1959. In one campaign meeting in Gishamvu on 31 August 1992, 
Félicien Gatabazi, national leader of PSD and Minister in the Transitional Government, 
said that ideologically his party had a relationship with former APROSOMA and 
PARMEHUTU parties that organised the 1959 “revolution”.116
 
 The MDR charter also 
proclaimed its relation with former MDR-PARMEHUTU ideals, although it proclaimed 
itself as a “renovated” MDR.  
In a television public broadcast, in a video dated 2 November 1992, CDR and MDR party 
leaders were disputing the ownership of the 1959 “revolution”; they were fighting for the 
right to own the legacy of PARMEHUTU. In this tape, Barayagwiza of CDR said that 
Twagiramungu of MDR must not be the owner of PARMEHUTU legacy just because he 
is merely the son-in-law of former President Kayibanda. Barayagwiza said: “That legacy 
is for all the Hutu. If you are Hutu, it is yours, it is mine too.” Instead, Twagiramungu 
contradicted the CDR on its insistence on the Hutu privileges and advantages and said 
that the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa all were entitled to citizenship rights. He accused the 
CDR of dividing the Rwandan population. For Twagiramungu, the 1959 “revolution” is 
for all Rwandans, no one must claim the ownership of it. This was a debate between Hutu 
and Hutu, yet they contradicted each other politically. Twagiramungu said: “The 
Transitional government has rejected the quota policy in education and starts to speak 
about merit.” Stanislas Simbizi of CDR replied that the quota of MDR education ministry 
was still valid for regions. Barayagwiza argued that the Hutu are majority, therefore they 
                                                 
116 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Minutes of the Campaign 
meeting of PSD held at the Office of Gishamvu Commune on 31 August 1991, Ref.: No.706/04.09.01, 
Gishamvu, 2 September 1991. 
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must rule, and then they protect the minorities. Simbizi from CDR insisted that 
PARMEHUTU is for CDR not for “renovated” MDR.117
 
 
Another element is the replacement at Butare Prefecture level of the Prefect. Justin 
Temahagali came in Butare just after the attack of RPF in 1990 and administered this 
prefecture from 4 October 1990 until June 1992. He was from MRNDD. He attempted to 
use all means to make MRNDD a strong party in Butare. He had partly succeeded in 
1991,118 but the political developments of 1992 that empowered opposition parties made 
Butare the stronghold of PSD and MDR oppositions. When on 4 July 1992 the new 
prefect came, MRNDD ceased to have a significant position in Butare. He was from the 
PL opposition party, his name was Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana, a Tutsi, Professor at the 
National University of Rwanda. According to Guichaoua, Prefect Habyalimana 
acquainted himself easily with both Hutu and Tutsi from all regions and was able to rule 
this fairly moderate Prefecture efficiently.119
 
  
The gradual weakening of MRNDD in Butare Prefecture had been seen all through 1992. 
During this time, a number of Butare people had slowly left MRNDD and adhered to 
opposition parties.120
 
 One of these is Jean-Gualbert Rumiya, a Historian and Professor at 
the National University of Rwanda. He was among the top leaders of this party in Butare. 
He decided to go away from MRNDD when that party participated in the creation of 
CDR party and worked with other smaller parties such as PADER, PARERWA and 
PECO that proved to be very extremist against the Tutsi. In his resignation letter, he 
wrote:  
As a Historian, working on the recent history of Rwanda, I believe that I know the 
circumstances and reasons that have led to […] the politicization of the ethnic 
phenomenon for the government of this country. I know that there was a way to 
                                                 
117 Vénuste Nshimiyimana, Journalist moderator, Rwanda Television, Broadcast programme: the Forum of 
political parties, title: who said that Byumba must be conquered? Public debate programme between MDR 
and CDR, Television Program Video, Kigali, on 2 November 1992, Archives of ORINFOR. 
118 See for example Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Confidential, Letter to the Minister of 
Local Government and Commune Development, Kigali, Re: Meeting of Subprefects and Burgomasters held 
on 10 October1991, No. 278/04.09.01, Butare, 31 October 1991, pp. 2-3 and 10.  
119 Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994, pp. 177 et 179. 
120 Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994, p. 84. 
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found the society on other bases. […] As a citizen, I would like to remind you that 
I am the son of a Hutu mother and a Tutsi father. My family is linked to Hutu and 
Tutsi since many generations. It is by way of natural fidelity towards these links 
that I cannot support a political association where one of the members is 
categorically opposed to the Hutu-Tutsi unity that I believe to be the essential 
component of the Rwandan Nation.121
 
 
By 1993, MRNDD remained only with the control of seven out of 20 communes in 
Butare.  The rest were under the leadership of MDR, PSD and PL.122
 
 
The year 1993 became also determinant for the development of inter-party politics. First, 
the mandate of the Nsengiyaremye government had expired in April 1993. Its mandate 
got prolonged until July 1993 in order to allow the formation of a new government, a 
process that brought back bargaining and competition among politicians. The parties kept 
the same share of number of ministries as in the April 1992 government, but the debate 
arose in the MDR party that held the position of the Prime Minister. While the MRNDD 
party wished to reconsider the candidature of Nsengiyaremye, the government refused 
that choice. In this development, Faustin Twagiramungu, the President of MDR, took the 
liberty to appoint Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was Minister of Education in 
the 1992 government, as the candidate for Prime Minister. She was accepted and 
nominated to that position on 17 July 1993, but the majority of Political Bureau of MDR 
voted against that choice, alleging that the President of the party did not consult this 
bureau on that choice.  
 
This decision inaugurated a tense conflict within the leadership of MDR from this time 
until 1994, both at the national and Butare levels. At national level, MDR leadership met 
on 23 July 1993 and suspended Twagiramungu and Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 
announced that anyone accepting to enter that 1993 government would also be 
suspended. According to Reyntjens, the party got divided into three factions and not two 
                                                 
121 Jean Rumiya, Professeur à l’UNR, Membre du Comité National et Préfectoral du MRND à Butare, 
Lettre au Président du MRND, Kigali, Objet : Démission du MRND, Butare, le 14 novembre 1992. 
122 Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994, p. 19. 
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as the above suspension suggested.123 Of 42 people making the Bureau Politique of 
MDR, those who signed in favour of punishing Twagiramungu were 34, a telling sign 
that the Twagiramungu group had become a minority within MDR.124
 
 
At the level of Butare Prefecture, the MDR party committee in Butare met on 7 August 
1993 and demoted Agathe Uwilingiyimana from the position of President of MDR in 
Butare and proposed Jean Kambanda for that position. Agathe Uwilingiyimana rejected 
her suspension, as a result, both factions continued to function in anarchy for some time 
in Butare, each faction rejecting the other. That continued until when the Prefecture 
administrative authorities decided that no campaign meetings of MDR would take place 
until the MDR agreed which faction was to be considered as the legitimate one.125
 
 
The government, the opposition parties and the RPF finally signed the Arusha peace 
accords on 4 August 1993, during the time when MDR was experiencing these divisions. 
Following those accords, a Broadened Base Transitional Government (BBTG) was 
supposed to be formed 37 days after the signature of the Arusha peace accord.126
                                                 
123 Reyntjens, L’Afrique des grands lacs, p. 123; Dismas Nsengiyaremye, 1er Vice-Président du MDR, 
Ancien Premier Ministre du Rwanda, Pour le respect des accords de paix d'Arusha et le succès du 
processus démocratique au Rwanda, Bruxelles, le 10/09/1993, p. 3 ; Bertrand, Rwanda. Le piège de 
l’histoire, pp. 223-224. 
 As a 
result, before the July 1993 government could operate, party leaders had to bargain anew 
for power sharing in the BBTG government to come. Within the MDR, the 
Nsengiyaremye-Murego-Kambanda faction proposed Jean Kambanda to the post of 
Prime Minister for BBTG while the faction Twagiramungu-Agathe Uwilingiyimana 
proposed Twagiramungu to that post. The rival faction to Twagiramungu wrote a letter to 
the President of the Republic explaining reasons why Twagiramungu was not a suitable 
candidate for the BBTG Prime Minister’s post. These reasons range from economic to 
ethical: they enumerate court cases against him by the STIR Company in which he 
worked previously, monies that he robbed, debts that he refused to pay. Regardless of 
124 MDR, Kigali-Ville, Announcement No. 53, Where are we in Democracy?, Kigali, 12 July 1993. 
125 Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, pp. 212-213. 
126 République Rwandaise, Accord de Paix d’Arusha entre le Gouvernement de la République Rwandaise et 
le Front Patriotique Rwandais, signé à Arusha, le 4 août 1993, Journal Officiel de la République 
Rwandaise, Année 32, Numéro 6, 15 août 1993, Article 7. 
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that, the President of the Republic opted for the choice of Twagiramungu. This choice 
inaugurated a new battle between both factions of MDR.127
 
 The Broadened Base 
Transitional Government (BBTG) power-sharing scheme was signed on 9 January 1993 
in Arusha. It planned the sharing of power as follows: MRNDD: 5 cabinet posts, RPF 5, 
MDR 4, PSD 3, PL 3 and PDC 1.  
After this MDR division, the extremist faction represented by Kambanda, Murego, 
Karamira and others won over the one of Twagiramungu considered as moderate.128
 
 In 
Butare also Jean Kambanda got bigger support than Agathe Uwilingiyimana. In a 
meeting that he held in Gishamvu on 26 September 1993, the Gishamvu representative of 
MDR made it clear that in Gishamvu, it is the Kambanda faction that was supported. 
Indeed, Jean Kambanda was a native of Gishamvu, from Mubumbano Sector. In his 
intervention at this meeting, his outright opposition against Twagiramungu and Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana transpired clearly. Here is a speech that refers to this indirectly:  
Mr Kambanda Jean also spoke, saying that MDR originates from MDR-
Parmehutu… He also told those present that their party was betrayed by Faustin 
Twagiramungu and Mme Uwilingiyimana Agathe. Because of that, 
Twagiramungu, Agathe and other three ministers have been dismissed from the 
party. He said that on Monday 27 September 1993 himself Kambanda Jean will 
go to accuse Mme Uwilingiyimana Agathe in the Tribunal of First Instance of 
Butare because she kept the tools and materials of the party whereas she has been 
dismissed and refused to go away from the party. He promised the members that 
he is the one who will be Prime Minister in few days, and that he prepares himself 
to establish the Government. He informed the members that the MDR party will 
in few days create a radio of its own and asked them to keep away from the bad 
belly129 and respect the existing power.130
                                                 
127 Froduald Karamira, 2ème Vice-Président du MDR, Donat Murego, Secrétaire Exécutif du MDR, Lettre 
au Président de la République Rwandaise, Kigali, Objet: Indignité de Monsieur Twagiramungu, comme 
Premier Ministre du Gouvernement de Transition à Base Elargie, Réf.: 0094/MD/n.jb/93, Kigali, le 27 
octobre 1993. See also Filip Reyntjens, L’Afrique des grands lacs, pp. 123 et 125; Dismas 
Nsengiyaremye, 1er Vice-Président du MDR, Ancien Premier Ministre du Rwanda, Pour le respect des 
accords de paix d'Arusha et le succès du processus démocratique au Rwanda, Bruxelles, le 10/09/1993, pp. 
3-4. 
 
128 Bertrand, Rwanda. Le piège de l’histoire, p. 249. 
129 “Bad belly” (inda mbi in Kinyarwanda) is a metaphor to mean greed.  
130 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Report on the Campaign meeting of MDR party that took place in Gishamvu on 29 
September 1993, Ref. : N° 362/04.17.02, Gishamvu, 28 September 1993. 
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Following bargains within parties’ leaderships for ministerial positions in the BBTG, 
divisions among parties reached PL, PSD and PDC as well.131
 
  
Finally, concerning the strength of parties, it is worth noting that their influence was 
unequal both at national and local levels. MRNDD seems to have enjoyed more support 
in the north where its leaders come from, that is, in Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Byumba 
Prefectures. Other strongholds of this party include Rural Kigali, Kibungo and Cyangugu. 
MDR had also support in many prefectures, first the ones located in the centre where 
former MDR-PARMEHUTU was more popular, that is, in Gitarama and Kibuye, but also 
in Cyangugu from where Twagiramungu the President of the party came from, and again 
in Kigali town, Gikongoro and Kibuye. It was also present in Butare and some other 
prefectures. As for PSD, it was mainly influential in Butare and Gikongoro Prefectures, 
an area where APROSOMA formerly was strongly established. PL had a very limited 
support, and it is hard to say which Prefecture it controlled, although it was present all 
over the country.132
 
  
At commune level, it becomes difficult to say which single party was strong between July 
1991 when parties started to operate until April 1994 when the genocide started. 
Interviews show categorically this complexity. Informants are divided among those who 
assert that MRNDD was the strongest party in Gishamvu133 and in Kibayi;134 those who 
say that it is MDR which was strong;135
                                                 
131 On PL, see Landoald Ndasingwa, Premier Vice-Président du Parti Libéral, Lettre à Monsieur le 
Président du Parti Libéral, Kigali, Kigali, le 31 août 1993, and PL, Communiqué de presse du Parti 
Libéral, signé par Justin Mugenzi, Président, Agnès Ntamabyaliro, Premier Vice-Président, Charles 
Zirimwabagabo, 2ème Vice-Président et Emmanuel Rwagasana, Secrétaire Général, Kigali, le 21/12/1993. 
 or those who say that is PSD. There is a number 
132 Dismas Nsengiyaremye, “La transition démocratique au Rwanda”, in Guichaoua (dir.), Les crises 
politiques, pp. 239-263, pp. 249-250. 
133 Anonymous 13. 
134 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; Interview with François Manirabona, 
Kibayi, 11 May 2007; Interview with Anselme Rutabingwa, Kibayi, 9 May 2007; Interview with 
Christophe Nyandwi, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; Interview with Jean Sindayigaya, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
135 Interview with Ladislas Hererimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; Interview with Vénuste Sindabizera, Kibayi, 
9 May 2007; Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; Interview with Anonymous 16, 
Kibayi, 10 May 2007; Interview with François Shirubute, Kibayi, 11 May 2007; Interview with 
Anonymous 15, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
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of others who argue that no party was stronger than the other especially among the three 
most prominent ones: MRNDD, MDR and PSD.136
 
 Others mention MRNDD and MDR 
as the stronger ones.  
Those who say it is MRNDD that was the strongest point out reasons such as the 
continuous holding of administrative positions. A number of those who consider MDR 
say that this party had so many youths who were hooligans who threatened the local 
population; that violent feature appears as a strength. Those who mention PSD also say 
that this party had enjoyed the adhesion of the youth, which was a prominent group 
demographically speaking, though weak in term of organisation as we saw in chapter 
three.  
 
The reconstruction of Kimonyo suggests that in Gishamvu MDR was the dominant party 
and that in Kibayi it was PSD.137 In my view, one meaningful reconstruction of the 
strength of parties would be across time. Definitely no party got or kept its influences at 
all times from 1991 to 1994. In Gishamvu, MRNDD remained the strongest in 1991 if we 
are to believe estimates of burgomasters and prefects in their correspondence and minutes 
as seen above. Furthermore, the majority of the Tutsi remained in MRNDD as a survival 
strategy. By 1992, MDR became strong as a result of the intensification of campaign 
meetings, of demonstrations of end of 1991 and early 1992 for posts in the 
Nsengiyaremye government of April 1992. Also most bandits were said to be members of 
MDR, a thing that made many people join MDR in order to avoid violence against them. 
Thereafter, PSD became the strongest in 1993 thanks to meeting campaigns, party live 
performances and propaganda of national leaders such as Félicien Gatabazi, and 
commune party leaders such as Aloys Sibomana and others. This is the time when 
Burgomaster Pascal Kambanda decided to resign from MRNDD and join PSD.138
                                                 
136 Interview with Ignace Gatabazi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007; Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana, Kibayi, 11 
May 2007; Interview with Théoneste Hakizimana, Gishamvu, 24 March 2006. 
 It is 
worth noting some of his Tutsi friends such as the businessman Mukimbiri and the 
137 Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, pp. 216 et 226. 
138 Guichaoua argues that Burgomaster Kambanda, though he went to PSD, he may have also remained 
somehow in MRNDD. (Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994, p. 236.) A number of informants contend that 
Kambanda Pascal did not decide to enter PSD, but that it is PSD that recruited him by force (kumubohoza). 
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employee Kumuyange, were also PSD members. The entering of Pascal Kambanda in 
PSD is said to have also attracted many Gishamvu people in PSD. But by late 1993 when 
Jean Kambanda became President of MDR in Butare, as he was very popular in 
Gishamvu, MDR seems to have become the strongest from that time until the time of the 
genocide. 
 
As for Kibayi commune, it appears as well that in 1991, MRNDD was still the strongest 
party. In 1992 and 1993, MDR became strongest. This transpires in the power that MDR 
party leaders had at commune level. These became so popular that the majority of the 
population believed that they were the ones who would lead the commune after the 
elections. Christophe Nyandwi, Joseph Baritunga and Jean-Baptiste Mukuralinda (alias 
Masima) to mention a few started to prepare themselves to become commune leaders. 
Nyandwi allegedly started to wear suits and ties every day in order to have the look of a 
burgomaster. This strength came from campaign meetings where national and Butare 
leaders such as Agathe Uwilingiyimana were frequently visiting this commune, and from 
the use of force in recruitment. When MDR got divided in July 1993, the new team of 
MDR Butare led by Jean Kambanda did not have much influence in Kibayi, the way it 
had it in Gishamvu. Instead, Straton Nsabumukunzi of PSD Butare and originally from 
Kibayi became very influential in Kibayi. As a result, PSD became the strongest in 
Kibayi after July 1993, and possibly until when the genocide started. Thus, the point of 
Kimonyo about the strength of parties in Gishamvu and Kibayi holds only towards the 
second half of 1993 until when the genocide started. 
 
d) Party campaigns and social divisions 
 
Although the transitional government put an end to the ethnic and regional quota policy, 
ethnicity did not stop. Instead, it went in the political discourse of certain parties that saw 
in it a convenient strategy to win their audiences. In this regard, parties that gradually 
proclaimed themselves as Hutu parties, that is, in favour of the promotion of the Hutu, 
such as MRNDD, CDR and later on the extremist faction within MDR and PSD and PL, 
called PAWA faction, chose to radicalise their positions around ethnic discrimination 
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against the Tutsi. This discrimination came slowly and piecemeal. In December 1990, the 
extremist newspaper published The Ten Commandments of the Hutu and appealed to the 
Hutu not to mingle with the Tutsi both socially and economically. The year 1991 and 
1992 saw a number of newspapers also adopting this tone. In October 1992, Léon 
Mugesera pronounced a speech in which he showed that the Tutsi are the candidates for 
death. When in 1993 politicians fought over positions within the July transitional 
government and the promised BBTG but that did not occur, and when the “Pawa” 
alliance between MRNDD and extremist factions within opposition parties was created 
following factionalisation of opposition parties, the criteria for power sharing and party 
alliances became ethnic, as Jordane Bertrand noted.139 Byabarumwanzi, who observed 
this dramatic development in its contemporaneity, lamented the severity of this ethnic 
shift: “When we examine the actions produced and the discourses used so far by political 
parties, we realise that they did all that they could in order to undermine the unity and 
reconciliation between Rwandans. Their role in the national reconciliation has hence been 
negative.”140
 
 
Apart from the role of political parties in undermining ethnic relations, certain informants 
point out that even within families and friends’ relations, there occurred some trust crisis. 
Though parents (husband and wife) and children (brothers or sisters) could be in different 
parties, in general the wife adhered to the party of her husband. This is the case of the 
ladies Uwambajimana and Uwilingiyimana who were in the same party as their 
husbands.141
 
 But it was also possible to find a family in which the husband and the wife 
adhered to different parties.  
When some family members did not share party affiliations, by the same token they 
started being on bad terms at best and enemies at worst. Such is the case between 
                                                 
139 Bertrand, Rwanda. Le piège de l’histoire, p. 252. 
140 François Byabarumwanzi, “Le rôle des partis politiques”,  Dialogue, N° 170, Septembre-octobre 1993, 
pp. 47-51, p. 48. 
141 Interview with Cesaria Uwambajimana, Kibayi, 21 May 2007, Interview with Julienne Uwiringiyimana, 
Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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Anonymous 17 and her brother who was in MRNDD and who looked at her as “an 
adversary”: 
 
I went in a meeting of MRND there at Makwaza. The meeting was held by 
Raymond. Raymond said: ‘People who are not with us, are wasting our time, so 
they can go out. He told those from other parties to go. Then you stand up and go. 
[…] Then my brother is the one who was about to put me away from the meeting, 
telling me that I am not in MRND. We are born together, then I winked him, the 
eye was still in good shape142, telling him ‘why are you doing this? Can’t you let 
me listen?’ […] I was not afraid of my brother.143
 
 
Such is also the case with Anonymous 6 with his siblings, as he narrates. The experience 
of Twahirwa’s family shows that different memberships for the same family members 
does not always lead to conflict. He says that him with his father were in MRNDD, while 
his mother and sisters were in PL.144
 
 
Among friends, if it happened that they did not share party affiliation, they could by the 
same token also not share drinks in a bar, because people started to sit in the bars 
according to their party affiliation, as Nyirakanani and Ntukabumwe explain.145 In this 
respect, Munyantore says that he resolved to be a member of two parties, MDR of his 
friend, and PL for him. His friend gave him a cap of MDR so that they could be able to 
sit together in a bar and share a drink. “When I go to drink alcohol in the Gatobwe bar, I 
go as MDR pawa. When I climb the hill back, in order to mislead other people, I carry 
another cap of another party. I put PL on the head. It was a way of seeking the way 
[creating a crossing space and safety].”146
 
  This case shows some efforts of individual 
agency trying to overcome social division created by political parties. 
Some boys are said to have started to disrespect parents:  
 
                                                 
142 Now one of her eyes is broken. 
143 Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
144 Interview with Paul Twahirwa, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
145 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; Interview with François 
Ntukabumwe, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
146 Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
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They [the youths] used to follow party activities […] until Gisagara to campaign 
meetings, others at Mugombwa. […] The youth spent their time dancing behind 
parties. […] No young man was respecting and following advices of the father 
and mother anymore. When you talk to him, he says ‘I am free’. The party made 
many people hot, a son tells you that he will slap you. Then the parent keeps 
quiet. […] The son goes to dance for parties, and comes back only at night, after 
you have locked the door.147
 
 
The experience of Rwabigwi is a case of disagreement between brothers. His brother was 
in MRNDD and he was in PSD. So his brother convinced him to join MRNDD so that he 
could not fear to disclose secrets of MRNDD to him.148
4.4.2. Political Violence 
 
 
Political competition both at the national and local level went hand in hand with political 
violence. In fact, it should be said that the latter was a means used in the former. This 
section deals with a form of violence that appeared to be the result of conflict or physical 
clash between party leaders and administrative leaders and vice versa, between party 
members of one party against party members of another, or between administrative 
leaders against party members of a certain party and vice versa.  
 
One motive behind these acts of violence between parties was to recruit as many 
members as possible, starting from the most influential ones, even the ones already in 
rival parties. That led to serious conflict between parties. It produced a phenomenon of 
political behaviour or political culture called “kubohoza”, which means literally “to 
liberate someone”, that is, to recruit him or her by force. Several interview accounts 
suggest that it is mostly leaders, rich people such as businessmen, intellectuals such as 
teachers and administrative employees, etc. who were targeted in the kubohoza. Then 
how it was done included such varied acts as to bring a mob at the house of a person, they 
sang and danced for or about him, they sensitized him, they put caps or scarves (i.e., 
symbols) of their party on the person, or else they used violence such as to destroy his 
house or property if the person is stubborn. Sometimes, the motive was not to recruit 
                                                 
147 Interview with Ignace Gatabazi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
148 Interview with Laurent Rwabigwi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
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individuals in parties, but simply to loot public or private property such as land, forest 
wood and other things. In this regard, the looting was not the means for recruiting a 
person; it became an end in itself. 
 
In the explanation of one informant in Kibayi, Kubohoza was like a version of war by - 
and among - political parties.149
 
 That means that as the government or to be precise the 
Habyarimana clique was waging a war against the RPF on the battlefield, the opposition 
parties were also waging a war among themselves and against MRNDD.  
This phenomenon occurred in the whole country, but a careful examination of it at local 
level reveals to what extent it produced a state of uncertainty and instability. Strong 
words used in campaign meetings by parties against others, the carrying of weapons in 
campaign meetings despite the law against it, and the behaviour of kubohoza showed to 
what extent the culture of tolerance and democracy was very far to be reached.150 That 
experience was close to what one report called a state of anarchy.151
 
 The remainder of 
this section enumerates certain cases of political violence in Gishamvu and Kibayi as 
recorded in archives and narrated by some of my informants. 
a) In Gishamvu 
 
 
On 25 September 1991, the President of MDR in Gishamvu accused the Cell Committees 
members of Liba and Buvumu Sectors and Mr. Gashugi from Gikunzi to the Burgomaster 
of Gishamvu Commune for having beaten members of his party.152
 
 
On 14 December 1991, the Executive Secretary of PSD in Gishamvu, Aloys Sibomana, 
wrote a letter to Joseph Bacinoni, Councillor of Sheke Sector, telling him to stop 
mistreating the members of PSD in his sector. He forbade him to insult his members, 
                                                 
149 Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
150 Byabarumwanzi, “Le rôle des partis politiques”, p. 50. 
151 Organisation de l’Unité Africaine, Rapport sur le génocide au Rwanda, Mai 2000, pp. 60-61. 
152 Augustin Sezibera, Head of MDR in Gishamvu, Copy, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu 
Commune, Re: The meeting of MDR in Sectors, Sholi, 25 September 1991. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
275 
saying that they are the ones who urge people not to pay levies and government 
contributions.153
 
 
In one of his speeches, one leader of MRNDD in Butare, Amandin Rugira, was accused 
of having said something that aimed at dividing the Hutu and the Tutsi. He criticized the 
coalition between MDR and PL arguing that the genetic mixture of these two parties 
considered respectively as Hutu and Tutsi parties will give birth to “ibirambu”.154 In the 
process, he pronounced a proverb saying that: “Ujya gukuraho imbagara, 
arazegeranya”155 or “Ujya gutwika imbagara arazirundanya”,156
 
 meaning that that 
union will be nothing but unproductive. 
On 12 June 1992, the citizen Célestin Bangambiki who had been Councillor of Gikunzi 
Sector in Gishamvu was being recruited by force to enter MDR and leave MRNDD. The 
MDR members were putting the hat of MDR on his head and were giving him the MDR 
party card. As the Subprefect of Busoro subprefecture witnessed that action, he 
intervened, explaining to MDR members that what they were doing was unlawful.157
 
 It is 
worth noting that it is mostly influential people who were recruited by force this way 
(kubohozwa).  
On 18 August 1992, the Councillor of Buvumu Sector, John Hakizimana, wrote a letter to 
four people from PSD from Buvumu telling them that he heard that they were planning to 
kill him. He explained to them that if he dies, he will be avenged a hundred times: “what 
I see is that I may die as one person, but a hundred will die as a consequence of my 
death.”158
                                                 
153 Aloys Sibomana, Executive Secretary of PSD party in Gishamvu Commune, Letter to Mr. Bacinoni 
Joseph, Concillor of  Sheke Sector,Re: To give a warning to Bacinoni, Councillor of Sheke Sector, 
Gishamvu, Gishamvu, 14 December 1991. 
 In response to that letter, the head of PSD in Gishamvu, Aloys Sibomana, 
154 Ibirambu means babies of animals born before the complete time for birth, i.e., abnormal babies. 
155 Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
156 MDR Butare-Ville, Announcement No. 1, Avoid Division, Butare, 10 March 1992. 
157 Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu 
Commune, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 373/04.09.01, Busoro, 13 June 1992. 
158 Jean Hakizimana, Councillor of Buvumu Sector, Letter to Kalisa Janvier, Rutagombwa, Nzabamwita 
and Sekamondo and others, Buvumu 13 August 1992. 
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wrote five days later a letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune regretting this 
behaviour of the Councillor Hakizimana of threatening the four youths.159
 
 
On 29 August 1992, Mr. Gabriel Murara, President of MDR in Gishamvu asked the 
Judiciary Police Inspector (IPJ) to launch an investigation into the case of a lady called 
Aniziya Mukaremera who allegedly had a problem with MDR party members and 
specifically with the youth of MDR, namely JDR of the Commune.160
 
 
As MDR had too many bandits in Gishamvu as members, the members of other parties 
were afraid of this party. Even leaders seem to have feared this party. One example of 
this behaviour of fear is that in Sheke, some MDR members destroyed roofs of houses of 
those that they wanted to recruit by force in their party.  Those wronged went to report 
the case to the Burgomaster and the Subprefect. These two leaders visited the Sheke 
Sector, saw the destroyed houses, but did not act against the perpetrators. The population 
got confused: they thought that either the leaders were complicit, or were helpless.161
 
 
Some time in 1993, some people from Nyakizu commune, neighbouring to Gishamvu, 
used to come and attack the home of Burgomaster Kambanda. They danced, sang 
“…what’s wrong with Kambanda? Is he sick or what?”162 They wanted to put him in 
MDR probably, since it is MDR that was strong in Nyakizu. This is what Karengera 
narrates: “[Kambanda] was in MRND, then the MDR from Nyakizu attacked him and 
wanted to bohoza him, they even tried to remove him from office. In order to rescue his 
office, he joined PSD, but they were not happy with that. They went at his home a 
number of times. He posted a policeman at his home. But they were not even afraid of 
bullets. The policeman was not shooting, he was only threatening them.”163
                                                 
159 Aloys Sibomana, Executive Secretary of PSD in Gishamvu Commune (P.O. Acting Executive Secretary 
Onesphore Muvunandinda), Letter to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Re: Security in Buvumu, 
Gishamvu, 18 August 1992.  
  Then PSD 
160 Gabriel Murara, President of MDR in Gishamvu, Letter to the Inspector of Judicial Police, Re: Asking 
for an investigation, Ref. : 776/04.04.01, Gishamvu, 29 August 1992. 
161 Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
162 Interview with Athanase Kumuyange, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 1, 
Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
163 Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
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national and local leaders came to recruit him by force, they are the ones who succeeded 
to put him in their party. According to the female informant Nyirakanani, they sang for 
him the following song: “‘Why are you trembling with fear? ... I am trembling because I 
am afraid of Rukokoma.’ Then they put him in the middle of the crowd and told him 
many things, that was when he shifted and entered in their party of PSD. When the war 
[of 1994] happened, he was already a PSD member.”164
 
 
b) In Kibayi 
 
In Mid-January 1992 a clash between MDR and MRNDD members had occurred in 
Kibayi.165
 
 This report does not give more details about actions and effects that 
characterized this clash. 
The regional secretary of PSD in Butare complained about several attacks of authorities 
against his party. He writes that on 11 February 1992, the flag of PSD was burnt at 
Muzenga in Gisagara. Moreover, the Subprefect of Gisagara in which Kibayi is located 
made an indictment against Charles Murindahabi, the Executive Secretary of PSD in 
Butare. Again, in Ndora commune the citizen Emmanuel Bangumuvunyi of PSD was 
beaten by an Interahamwe of MRND and went into a coma.166
 
 
At the beginning of March 1992, some members of MDR rebelled against one cell leader 
called Emmanuel Nyilinkindi in Joma Sector, accusing him of being extremist against the 
Hutu, as he was Tutsi. But the Burgomaster Kajyambere, who was Hutu, intervened in 
favour of Nyilinkindi since they shared both administrative duties and party 
membership.167
                                                 
164 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
 Those who were against Nyilinkindi calmed down only after a meeting 
165 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Security Report, Ref.: No. 59/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 27 January 1992. 
166 Faustin Rutayisire, Secrétaire Régional du PSD à Butare, Lettre à Monsieur le Préfet de la Préfecture de 
Butare, Objet: Indignations sur certaines situations dans Butare, Réf.: N° 196/04.09.01, Gishamvu, le 12 
mars 1992. 
167 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Security Report, Ref.: No. 117/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 6 March 1992. 
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that the Subprefect of Gisagara and the commune authorities held with the population of 
Joma Sector on 12 March 1992.168
 
 
A member of MRND called Alexis Uwihoreye in Saga Sector stabbed a member of MDR 
called Kubwayo. That happened on 4 April 1992. The injured person was sent to 
hospital.169
 
 
On 28 May 1992, opposition party members from MDR, PSD and PL marched in support 
of the new coalition government established in April 1992. When they finished that 
march, on their way back home, some of them attacked the house of the Councillor of 
Nyagahuru Sector, Didace Nkundiye, and destroyed the windows and the roof of his 
house. No one got injured, since the Councillor of Kibayi Sector and the head of police 
intervened to stop that violence. Others who also came from that march and who were 
going back home at Rwamiko Sector provoked more violence. When they arrived at a 
place called mu Buseruka, they met with some MRNDD members, reportedly provoked 
them and this caused a fight. As the Councillor of Rwamiko Sector, Christophe 
Ndagijimana, was present, he managed to stop that fight. However, this group organised 
itself against the Councillor and went to the Burgomaster to reclaim his resignation. The 
Burgomaster came the following day to settle that case in Rwamiko and found that those 
people were very angry. They accused the councillor of having beaten some of them at 
night. As a result, they reclaimed his resignation. When the Burgomaster told them to 
calm down, they refused. He went to the Prefecture office to ask for intervention and 
came back with a written message of the Prefect, read it, but the population said that they 
were not satisfied with that answer. They insisted that the Councillor be removed from 
office. As it was evening of that second day, they showed more anger. The Burgomaster 
narrates his experience:  
 
                                                 
168 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, Confidential, To the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: Security Report, Ref.: No. 134/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 16 March 1992. 
169 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara 
Subprefecture, Re: Security Report, Ref.: No. 170/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 9 April 1992. 
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I told the councillor to go back home, I wanted to carry him in the car, but the 
population refused to go away from the road. Then the councillor went to his home by 
foot accompanied by some of those who were not against him. Afterwards, I wanted 
me too to go back home, so that we could settle this matter the following day, that 
faction stopped me from going, saying that the car will sleep there, that if I want I can 
go by foot. I continued to beg them but to no avail. Because it was late (around 19 
hours), it was hard to continue arguing, also I decided not to use force because that 
could cause the destruction of the car and the injury of people. By then the 
interahamwe [MRNDD youth and militia] had availed themselves to protect us, but I 
realised that nothing could be done, since it was night. I was with two policemen, I 
asked them to remain in the car, me I went to the Health Centre at Monique 
Vernandell [Kirarambogo]’s house, I remained there waiting for the population to 
calm down so that I could go back home. But the situation remained radical. That is 
when I wrote to the subprefect of Gisagara asking him to intervene in order to rescue 
me. When he got the message he promised to intervene. But that faction remained on 
the car doing party live performance, beating drums until morning. The next day in 
the morning I went to see them, I found that they were still insisting on the removal of 
the Councillor. But they were not still having violent mood (amahane), they accepted 
that I take the car. Then I went immediately to the Commune office, after 2km I 
found that the interahamwe have also set a barrage [roadblock] saying that they 
wanted to go to drive away that faction located in Buseruka in Rwamiko. I calmed 
them down. I continued until mu Kibangu where I found an attack mob [igitero] led 
by Vunabandi Alphonse, Assistant Burgomaster and the representative of PSD in the 
commune. That mob was made of PSD, MDR and PL members from Saga Sector. I 
asked them not to continue that march, because above all they did not have a 
permission to do it, they refused and continued to do it. When I arrived at the 
commune office, I met with the gendarmes who were already there, then we went 
back to Rwamiko. We found that the subprefect of Gisagara had arrived there, and 
had started to talk with them, advising them. Then that faction of Buseruka, the 
interahamwe and the igitero of Vunabandi, fortunately reached an agreement and 
went back to their homes. On that day moreover, in order to keep security, night 
patrol hours were set at 19 hours. No one was allowed to walk at that time. We 
installed two policemen there to remain in Buseruka day and night. Except two 
people who got injured there and a house of a citizen that had tiles destroyed, no other 
destruction occurred.170
 
  
Besides verbal and property violence, this detailed report reveals to what extent 
commune leaders had lost authority and could be easily contradicted by their constituents 
who did not share party membership with them. On 6 June 1992, the Subprefect of 
Gisagara Subprefecture in which Kibayi is located, wrote the following to all 
Burgomasters of his jurisdiction. “I inform you that members of parties other than 
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MRND with their leaders have spent some days doing acts of terrorism in sectors and 
cells, attacking people who do not share party membership with them, spending their 
days insulting them, beating drums, doing live dance performances in homes, now they 
have started to even attack leaders of sectors and even communes.” He told the 
burgomasters to stop that live dance performance in houses and in the sector, and to 
strengthen security and consult with leaders of parties in order to solve those problems.171 
This content, though proving the taking of side in favour of MRND by the Subprefect, 
also shows to what extent local leaders were disrespected as a result of party competition. 
In the next sections, I insist on emphasizing these acts of disobedience. Other versions of 
this clash reveal the taking of side in favour of MRND by local leaders but also the weak 
position of the latter.172
 
 
The helpless behaviour of local leaders in the face of party violence seen in Gishamvu 
was also evident in Kibayi. Here is one account:  
 
MDR was the strongest party at our place. If a member of MDR does violence to 
you, if you go to accuse him, it becomes useless. […] Because the Burgomaster 
had no authority over the then MDR leaders. Even at the local level, you could 
bring a case at our Councillor, for example a wrong thing that a MDR member 
has done to you, our Councillor Ndagijimana could not attempt to punish him. He 
says: ‘how can I dare punish that one? You saw some time ago how they came to 
demolish my house saying that they are bohoza [liberating] me. How will I try to 
punish him? This time they can come back and kill me.’173
 
 
The other reason why Rwabigwi says MDR was the strongest party is because when it 
decided to have a campaign meeting on a date, that day the market could not open, every 
public gathering might be cancelled to allow many people to be available. Anyone who 
dared to open his shop or bar could see his assets taken over after the campaign meeting. 
But for other parties, the market still continued as usual.174
 
 
                                                 
171 Dominique Ntawukuriryayo, Subprefect of Gisagara Subprefecture, Confidential, Letter to all 
Burgomasters of the Gisagara  Subprefecture, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 027/04.09.01/4, Gisagara, 6 June 
1992. 
172 Interview with Paul Twahirwa, Kibayi, 21 May 2007; Interview with François Ntukabumwe, Kibayi, 10 
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As compared to the Burgomaster of Gishamvu, the Burgomaster of Kibayi, Kajyambere, 
also faced the recruitment by force (kubohoza) from MDR top and local leaders. 
According to the informant Domitilla Niyonsaba, who is the wife of Christophe 
Nyandwi, President of MDR in Kibayi, top MDR leaders such as Agathe Uwilingiyimana 
came to her home to discuss about how to recruit by force the Burgomaster who was in 
MRNDD. But Kajyambere refused to enter MDR. When MDR became strong in Kibayi 
in 1992 and 1993, Kajyambere is said to have been afraid of Nyandwi, thinking that he 
could take over the leadership of the commune.175
 
 But Kajyambere was not in Rwanda 
since 1994. He was said to be in exile in Tanzania or elsewhere, so it is hard to verify 
these allegations. But another informant, Ildéphonse Habimana who was a policeman 
during this time of multipartyism narrates how Nyandwi started to prepare himself to be 
burgomaster and that that behaviour created a serious misunderstanding between him and 
the incumbent burgomaster. Another thing which is sure is that Kajyambere remained in 
MRNDD until when the genocide started. 
Some time in 1992, another form of party violence from PSD members occurred. After 
their campaign meeting, the members went to loot food and drinks in restaurants and 
bars, they consumed without paying. But the leaders of PSD, who included Dr. Straton 
Nsabumukunzi, president of PSD in Butare Prefecture and originally from Kibayi, agreed 
to pay all the expenses.176
 
 
Habimana, who is a key informant in these matters since he often intervened in order to 
stop violence during this time, narrates another episode of violence produced against one 
MDR leader in Mukindo Sector, called Joseph Baritunga. He indicated that after one 
meeting of MRNDD in Gisagara, the propaganda group of MRNDD came back to Kibayi 
and on their way they found Joseph Baritunga at a place called mu Kabuga ka 
Nyabisagara where he stayed. This man stopped those MRNDD members, called his own 
MDR members and both started fighting. Baritunga got injured in the process, he was 
wounded in the head and the police organised some people who took him to the medical 
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centre. In his own account, Joseph Baritunga presents himself as a victim, he hides his 
agency in that violence, especially his provocative role as Habimana stressed.177
 
 
Violence continued in Rwamiko. For example, the Burgomaster reported in August 1992 
that some people from Kibangu, Rwamiko, such as Nzeyimana and Saveri, and 
Niyongana from Buseruka, were still beating others claiming to “liberate” them, that is, 
to forcibly recruit them into their parties.178
 
  
Burgomaster Kajyambere had gone into open conflict with his Assistant Burgomaster 
Alphonse Vunabandi, who was one of his prospective rivals, since he was President of 
PSD in Kibayi. All were waiting for elections to come in order to compete for that post of 
burgomaster or other posts at higher level. As a result of this party competition, anyone 
who could find a small mistake from another did his best to exploit it. One example is 
when the Burgomaster found that at a certain afternoon of 1 June 1993, the Assistant 
Burgomaster Vunabandi was not in office and did not take part in a committee in charge 
of collecting taxes. The Burgomaster immediately wrote to him a punishment letter called 
in French “demande d’explication”.179 The Burgomaster even plotted against Vunabandi 
by organizing eight people to accuse him of corruption in the fight against the smuggling 
of coffee to Burundi and about physical violence against them.180
 
 
c) Precautions Taken 
 
All these acts of violence occurred despite measures, strategies and precautions by the 
national, Prefecture and Commune leadership in close collaboration with party leadership 
and civil society such as churches, businessmen and others. From October 1990 when the 
                                                 
177 Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007; Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 
10 May 2007. 
178 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Subprefect of Gisagara 
Subprefecture, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 297/04.09.01/4, Kibayi, 10 August 1992. 
179 Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Kibayi, Lettre à Monsieur Vunabandi 
Alphonse, FAB Chargé des Affaires Economiques et Techniques, Commune Kibayi, Objet: Demande 
d’Explication, Réf.: N° 173/04.01.02, Kibayi, le 4 juin 1993. 
180 Obedi Gahamanyi et al., Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: To publicize the badness of 
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RPF attacked the country to 1991-1994 multiparty experiences of violence, Security 
Council meetings at all levels were organised. They examined the situations, identified 
causes of those acts of violence, and set up strategies to stop them. We have already seen 
some of these measures in the above section on insecurity. 
 
In relation to these, the Minister of Local Government wrote several times instructions 
about how Burgomasters must behave during the multiparty system and urged the party 
leaders and administrative leaders to respect the law on parties. Those instructions were 
repeated by Prefects in numerous meetings. Basically, Burgomasters were asked to be 
impartial in party campaign meetings, that is, to avoid speaking in favour or against such 
or such party, to stop wearing symbols of any party, to guarantee security for all 
parties.181 When it became clear that parties were not respecting these instructions, the 
Prefect decided that “any party that has insulted others or has instilled kubohoza violence 
should be refused the authorization of holding other campaign meetings where it has 
behaved like that.”182 In order to stop disorder in the putting up and respecting of flags of 
parties, the Prefect of Butare Prefecture instructed leaders of parties to put only one flag 
for each party per Sector, Commune and Prefecture.183
 
 
In May 1992, the Minister of Local Government issued an instruction to all Prefects and 
Burgomasters stating that the place of campaign meeting at Commune and Sector level 
must not be close to residential areas and bars and market (if it is a day of market), and 
that the Burgomasters and Councillors must attend those gatherings in order to monitor 
                                                 
181 Assiel Simbalikure, Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Confidential, Minutes of the meeting with 
Burgomasters held on 19 September 1991, Ref.: No. 747/04.09.01/16, Busoro, 5 October 1991; Justin 
Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture and Onesphore Muvunandinda, Employee, Minutes of the 
Meetings of the Burgomasters, Heads of Services and Heads of Secondary Schools, held on 6 December 
1991, Ref.: No. 2180/04.09.01/16, Butare, 30 December 1991, p. 6; Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, and Thérèse Kabega, Rapporteur, Minutes of the Meeting of Subprefects, Burgomasters, and 
Leaders of the Prosecuting Authority, and Commune Prosecuting employees, held on 26 November 1991, 
Ref.: No. 246/04.09.01/16, Butare, 25 February 1992, pp. 3-6. 
182 Jean Baptiste Habyalimana, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Circular letter to all Burgomasters, Re: 
Fighting against the behaviour of Kubohoza, Ref.: No. 1067/04.09.01, Butare, 14 August 1992. 
183 Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Burgomaster of Communes of Butare, Re: 
The issue of parties’ flags, Ref.:  No. 318/04.09.01, Butare, 17 March 1992; Justin Temahagali, Prefect of 
Butare Prefecture, Letter to the Minister of Local Government and Commune Development , Kigali, 
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any disorder.184 The Cabinet Meeting urged leaders not to use discourses or words that 
are provocative and inspire hatred. But leaders kept using hate language. It asked the 
Prefects to control parties that have militias and that undergo military training, such as 
MRND and CDR.185 As the violence continued, the Minister issued a number of other 
instructions reviewing some of previous measures. For example, the Prefects and 
Burgomasters were forbidden to take part in party campaign meetings during labour 
hours, and that any Commune employee found in the act of recruiting members for 
parties by force would be relieved of his or her duties. At some point, even the 
populations were forbidden to wear party symbols while going to campaign meetings.186
 
 
Administrative and party leaders at all levels also strove to identify causes and reasons 
for the continuation of political violence. They pointed out the war that the country was 
undergoing at that time, and a number of soldiers who had become undisciplined and 
who were engaging in acts of looting, with total impunity.187 The justice system also had 
failed to punish all criminals and authors of political violence, after releasing prisoners 
even bandits.188 Furthermore, some administrative leaders considered the kubohoza 
action, the insulting of leaders and subsequent political violence as a clear programme by 
opposition parties to weaken the existing power holders, while opposition parties 
considered the insulting of their other rival parties as a positive strategy.189
 
 
                                                 
184 Faustin Munyazesa, Ministre de l’Intérieur et du Développement Communal, Message Fax N° 
400/04.09.01 de MININTER au Préfet (tous), Copie, Ref. : No. 128/04.04.09.01., Butare, le 22 mai 1992. 
185 Faustin Munyazesa, Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, To the Prefects of 
Prefectures, All, Ref.: No. 505/04.09.01/4, Kigali, 26 June 1992. 
186 Munyazesa Faustin, Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, Letter to All Prefects, 
Re: The speech pronounced in a meeting with Leaders of Gikongoro Prefecture, Ref.: No. 2196/04.09.01, 
Kigali, 7 August 1992, pp. 6-8.  
187 Dismas Nsengiyaremye, in Guichaoua (dir.), Les crises politiques, p. 255. 
188 Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, and Iphygénie Mukandora, Rapporteur, Minutes of the 
Security Council meeting held on 29 May 1992, Ref.: 152/04.09.01, Butare, 24 June 1992; Jean Baptiste 
Habyarimana, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, and Sylvain Halindintwali, Rapporteur, To the Minister of 
Local Government and Commune Development, Kigali, Minutes of the Security Council Meeting of 
19August 1992, Ref.: No. 219/04.09.01, Butare, 9 September 1992. 
189 Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Letter to All Subprefects of Subprefectures, to All 
Burgomasters of Communes, Re: The Speech of the Minister of Local Government and Commune 
Development concerning the situation of the country, Ref.: No. 261/04.09.01, Butare, 3 March 1992, pp. 2-
4 ; Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, and Iphygénie Mukandora, Rapporteur, To the Minister 
of Local Government and Commune Development, Minutes of the Security meeting held on 11June 1992, 
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Indeed, the same administrative leaders who took these measures together with party 
leaders are the same who broke them. Apparently, each party was ready to do anything in 
order to conquer more influence, in order to bargain for more power in political 
developments to come. Those who could, used ethnicity as a prospective strategy to win 
the support of the Hutu group, which was a majority. Once one had the support of this 
group, one could hope to win elections. Others who could, used violence. This professing 
of one thing in the meetings and doing quite the opposite in the field resembled the 
mixture of law and disorder as formulated by the Comaroffs. These authors have stressed 
the way the democratization process in Africa in the early 1990s was followed 
immediately by “a sharp rise in crime and violence”. They also highlighted the complex 
combination of both criminal violence and a “simulacra” of social order or stability. Law 
resembled the agreement between parties, and disorder was close to their actual 
behaviour.190 Thus, by 1993, the multiparty experiences created not hope for positive 
change, but “frustration, disappointment and fear” on the part of the population.191
 
 
4.5. DISOBEDIENCE AND FAILURE OF THE STATE TO CAPTURE SOCIETY 
 
The state trained the population in the use of the means of violence, and in return some 
elements of the society used the same violence against state wishes for their own benefits 
through both political and criminal violence. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that 
it is multipartyism and opposition discourse of parties that led the populations to disobey 
certain state rules, especially those that symbolised the authoritarian feature of 
Habyarimana power around coffee, tax, party dues and Umuganda. The ease with which 
this refusal was reached suggests that the populations were just waiting for an occasion 
allowing them to do so. Party discourse hence became an ingredient for this 
disobedience, but, as we saw in the previous chapter, some few people were already 
escaping fulfilling them. What happened in 1991-94 was the result of economic crisis 
first and then some degree of political freedom; these two made it possible for peasants to 
achieve their dream of freeing themselves from those constraints.  
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Disobedient practices seem to have been twofold: disobedience against leaders and 
disobedience against their programmes. According to the form of disobedience, it seems 
to have transpired in language and in action. As far as language of disrespecting 
administrative leaders is concerned, MDR seems to have made a record in its campaign 
meetings. From the end of 1991 onwards, at several demonstrations and in campaign 
meetings, this party launched slogans insulting the President of the Republic, calling him 
names such as “Gisunzu”, to refer to his hair fashion, or insulting the MRNDD party, in 
the formula such as “Zinga akarago” (go away). But MDR was not the only one in this 
insulting behaviour. Other parties also did that.  
 
At local level, we saw previously how Kambanda was mocked as a person who is afraid. 
As for Kajyambere of Kibayi, he was nicknamed “Karyambeba” (a person who eats rats), 
as opposed to his true name, Kajyambere (a person who evolves, progresses).192 At this 
time Burgomasters were no longer respected as before. The only constituents who 
respected them were the ones who shared party membership with them, which means that 
authority was shifting from administration to party structures. In one meeting in Butare 
Prefecture, the Prefect observed that in some communes, administrative leaders had 
become like jokes, while certain party leaders were respected as genuine leaders.193
 
 
In another meeting, as early as December 1991, that is, only five months after the advent 
of multipartyism, the Prefect complained that local leaders were being likened to colonial 
leaders in order to undermine their authority: “In the campaign meeting they [the 
opposition party leaders] say that the Prefect is comparable to the chief [colonial chief], 
the Burgomaster is the Subchief, the Councillor is the Kirongozi! They are destroying the 
existing administrative structure, therefore if they win what power regime will they put in 
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193 Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, and Thérèse Kabega, Rapporteur, Minutes of the 
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place?”194
 
 This allegation shows that the parties were trying to recreate the ambiance of 
1959 of calling their fellows colonial employees so as to demonize them. This critique 
was a political strategy in itself. 
However, the most considerable act of disobedience was directed against previous 
programmes that were considered as geared towards “development”. They are the 
programmes that founded the very essence and legitimizing ideology of the Habyarimana 
regime. These are Umuganda communal work, MRND party dues, ONAPO 
contraceptive campaigns, coffee production, and party live performances. The first thing 
opposition parties did was to sensitize their members to stop fulfilling these duties, as a 
proof of “liberation”. That occurred in the whole country.195
 
 
In Butare, it did not take too much time to start witnessing disobedience against state 
programmes. In September 1991 already, the Prefect was accusing MDR party of 
strongly attacking MRND, of criticizing all activities that have been done, of instilling 
the people to disobey the power and not accept it, not listen to it, to refuse to pay tax and 
levies of the commune.196
 
 
As early as August 1991, just a month after the beginning of multipartyism, constituents 
in Gishamvu were celebrating that the parties have “liberated” them from levies and 
taxes.197
                                                 
194 Justin Temahagali, Prefect of Butare Prefecture, and Muvunandinda, Onesphore, Employee, Minutes of 
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meeting that people were no longer paying taxes and do Umuganda because of party 
195 Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence. The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, WestHartford, Conn, Kumarian 
Press, 1998, p. 131; Marysse, et al., Rwanda. Appauvrissement, p. 54 ; Timothy Longman, “State, Civil 
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sensitization. Furthermore, the impiringi, i.e. people who escaped paying taxes since long 
ago, had become the main opposition party recruiters.198
 
 
One former Councillor in Kibayi had this to say: “It is during the multiparty system that 
the population started to disobey the leaders. When you tell them something, no reaction. 
They spend their time singing sarcastic songs against us, insulting us, but we accept that. 
The parties leaders said: ‘those who worked for MRND must not look down upon you.’ 
Then we got discouraged, when you talk to a person, he or she refuses to hear you.”199
 
 
Cases of disobedience were registered even in security patrols. For example, in early 
1992, by the time crime was rising and war was unfolding in the northern part of the 
country, leaders in the south focused on night and daily patrols of the able-bodied men as 
a means for security protection. In Butare, some people living near the border such as in 
Gishamvu, feared the attack coming from Burundi more than the war in Mutara (north). 
Others from Kibayi are said to have been reluctant to do patrols (amarondo) because they 
considered the war to be far from them.200
 
 This entails that even in the patrols, obedience 
was not entirely there.  
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter showed to what extent the economic crisis and war increased not only 
poverty but also the level of crime. Crime became so prevalent and trivialised that leaders 
failed to halt it, despite all means and measures planned. The point was not to have just 
measures, but to have ones that were appropriate. The war between RPF and the national 
army did not occur in Gishamvu and Kibayi physically, but the effects of it were felt 
there on an everyday basis, socially and psychologically, due to the propaganda that 
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followed it, and to security measures that were taken and that affected economic and 
social life, to mention just the few. 
 
The democratization process in Rwanda led to – or coincided with – the spread of crime 
and political violence. Although this has happened in other parts of Africa,201
 
 in Rwanda 
it seems to have reached the apex, as it was coupled with economic crises and political 
hardlining never witnessed before. Violence became the language and the means not only 
of the state as experienced in the war of the state army against the RPF rebels, but also 
the language and the means of political parties and even of individuals. Everyone who 
had the capacity to resort to violence in order to attain some economic or power interest 
seems to have used it. 
Leaders complained about the population not obeying them, while the population felt 
deceived about the helpless or passive behaviour of leaders in the face of crime and 
political violence or their role in producing all those forms of violence. How 
disobedience turned into obedience at the time of genocide is an intriguing question. It 
needs to be addressed deeply.  In the next chapter, I look at the way all these crises were 
used in the production and dissemination of genocide ideology. It is there that I come 
back again to the behaviour around obedience and disobedience.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FROM POLITICAL MOBILIZATION TO GENOCIDE 
Knowledge about ideology is knowledge about ‘the 
conditions of its necessity’.1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The twentieth century has been a century full of great technological discoveries, but also 
full of pessimism, part of the reason being that it registered a list of the most murderous 
world wars and genocides.2
 
 Rwanda is a case in point, where in 1994, the state murdered 
more than 800,000 Tutsi and between 30,000 and 50,000 Hutu moderate in just a hundred 
days.   
This chapter analyses the ideology of genocide, that is, the ideas, the mobilizing 
techniques and the human, material and intellectual means used by the Habyarimana 
regime in order to make genocide an acceptable and feasible project. It examines the 
contemporary conditions under which this regime operated but also how it reinterpreted 
the remote conditions – as examined from the beginning of this thesis onwards – in its 
ideological constructions.  
 
In order to understand the conditions that led to the genocide in Rwanda, we need not just 
ask why (the causes of genocide), but also ask who (agency or agencies), what (actions, 
manifestations, practices or beliefs), how and when (processes, contexts, conditions) 
genocide became possible. To try to address these questions, I first explore key 
theoretical dimensions around genocide, then I examine the genocide ideology as it built 
up in Rwanda, from 1990 until 1994. In this respect, I look at dehumanisation, the 
instrumentalisation of history and the 1959 “Hutu revolution”, the depiction of Tutsi as a 
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threat and the carrying out of the 1990-1993 massacres as both the result of ideology 
against the Tutsi and as ideological technique for genocide. I end this chapter with a brief 
reconstruction of the unfolding, the actors, the economics, the geography and the timing 
of genocide at national level. 
 
5.1. A TWO-FOLD LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
 
The existing theories of genocide can be summed up in a two-fold analysis, the first 
focusing on the actors who engineered the genocide, and the second on the processes and 
contexts that made the planning and the execution possible. While the first element tends 
to be in the contemporary time of genocide, the second has its roots located far back in 
the past and is only instrumentalised at the moment when actors decide to use it in the 
project of annihilating a certain group of population. Authors who privileged the analysis 
of genocide from the standpoint of actors came to be called intentionalists, that is, those 
who analyse the intentions of the organisers and perpetrators. Those who analysed it by 
looking at contexts and processes were called functionalists. But a number of others came 
to realise that neither of those approaches was sufficient in itself, so they chose to 
combine both in order to fully make sense of genocide production, as far as that task is 
possible.3 I place myself among the latter, considering the fact that both approaches are 
complementary. As Edward Said wrote, ideas, cultures and histories are better understood 
only when linked to power configurations that produced them.4
 
 And to understand power 
configurations, one needs definitely to consider power holders. In this regard, it appears 
that the linking of processes to actors is unavoidable if not compulsory.  
As far as twentieth century genocides are concerned, the actors of genocide have been 
relatively easily identified, while the remote contexts and the immediate developments in 
which they operated seemed to be very complex to understand and uncover, so much so 
                                                 
3 On the discussion of intentionalism and functionalism in genocide research, see Doris L. Bergen, War & 
Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust, New York, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003, p. 30;  
Daniele Conversi, “Demo-skepticism and Genocide”, Political Studies Review, Vol.  4, 2006, pp. 247–262, 
p. 250 and René Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, Philadelphia, University of 
Philadelphia Press, 2009, pp. 117-118.  
4 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, London, Penguin Books, 1978, p. 5. 
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that even for early genocides (such as those of Herero, Armenians, and the Holocaust), 
and of course the recent ones (the Cambodia genocide, Yugoslavia genocide and the 
Tutsi genocide), debates and new interpretations are being produced incessantly. This 
suggests that theorizing about genocide is not an easy task. It appears that any effort to 
understand contexts and processes can provide only interpretation, never a total 
explanation.5
 
 
Drawing from nine cases of twentieth century crimes against humanity (Armenia (1915-
1916), Eastern Ukraine (1932-1933), Nazi Holocaust, Cambodia (1975-1979), Chile 
(1973-1988), Argentina (1976-1983), Burundi (1972 and other dates), Rwanda (1994) 
and former Yugoslavia, (Bosnia 1992-1995)], Marchak constructed a theory of 
preconditions and processes that led to crimes against humanity. Such preconditions are:  
 
- Economic and social crises that affect existing social and economic positions of 
citizens in their different hierarchies. These crises are caused by such different 
elements as war, environmental change, exhaustion of resources, economic 
changes in market, and dislocation of territorial parts of the country; 
- A strong military, militia or revolutionary opposition force;   
- Weak civil opposition institutions (political parties, universities, unions, mass 
media, and voluntary associations) that become unable to challenge a government 
that chooses the option of genocide against one part of its population;   
- The existence of a wide inequality between the powerful and powerless, the rich 
and the poor, rural and urban populations, between ethnic and/or religious groups; 
- The material interests that leaders have vis-à-vis their potential victims such as 
territory and property. 
 
The processes are:  
 
- A political crisis expressed in the form of a paralysis of governance, or a 
breakdown of the state; 
                                                 
5 This applies also to most contemporary historical accounts.  
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- The development of exclusionist ideology or ideologies around techniques of 
blame, dehumanization, negation of the right of life, etc. 
- A clear articulated intention to exterminate the potential victims. 
- And an open conflict.6
 
 
Another theorization about the conditions of the possibility of genocide is given by 
Howard Adelman. Borrowing from Waller, he formulates four categories or dimensions 
that contain each three variables:  
 
- Predispositions: 1. Ethnocentrism; 2. Xenophobia 
                             3. Desire for dominance 
- Cultural forces: 1. Authority system; 2. Moral disengagement; 
                            3. Rational self-interest 
- Cultural reinforcers: 1. Professional Socialization; 2. Group conformity;  
                                    3. Merger of person and role 
- Institutions of identity alterations: 1. Othering; 2. Dehumanizing 
                                                          3. Blaming the other.7
 
 
 
Though not expressed in the form of an enumeration, other authors have provided 
explanations about prior conditions necessary for genocide. Staub summed up a number 
of the above preconditions and predispositions in what he called “difficult life 
conditions” and “group persistent conflict”. Difficult life conditions refer to “economic 
problems, political disorganization and upheaval, or very great social/cultural changes”, 
while group conflict may take the form of war between perpetrators and victims or not.8
 
 
                                                 
6 Patricia Marchak, “Why Do States Kill Citizens? Or, Why Racism is an Insufficient Explanation”, in 
Victoria M. Esses and Richard A. Vernon and (eds.), Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations: Why 
Neighbours Kill, Malden (USA) and Oxford (UK), 2008, pp. 171-191, pp. 174-175. 
7 Waller 2002 in Howard Adelman, “Theories of Genocide: The Case of Rwanda”, in Victoria M. Esses 
and Richard A. Vernon and (eds.), Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations: Why Neighbours Kill, 
Malden (USA) and Oxford (UK), 2008, pp. 195-222, p. 198. 
8 Ervin Staub, “Genocide in Rwanda: Origins, Prevention, Reconciliation”, in Victoria M., Esses and 
Richard A., Vernon and (eds.), Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations: Why Neighbours Kill, 
Malden (USA) and Oxford (UK), 2008, pp. 245-268, pp. 247-248. 
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Related to open conflict is war. A number of authors identify the occurrence of war as a 
factor that, for the organisers of a genocide, becomes a favourable context in which to 
operate. Analysing the holocaust, Bergen wrote:  
 
War provided a cover for mass murder […] War also made possible the training 
of large numbers of experienced killers, beginning in Poland in 1939. […] War 
enabled Nazi propagandists to present attacks on innocent civilians of all ages as 
if they were defensive measures necessary to protect the German nation from its 
foes. For all these reasons, war was a necessary ingredient in what would develop 
into genocide…9
 
  
These patterns also were developed in the Rwandan case. It is during the war between the 
RPF and Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) that extremist parties created militias that 
became instrumental in the genocide. It is also in the context of war that the RGF defined 
the enemy as Tutsi. When genocide killings began in April 1994 following the crash of 
President Habyarimana’s plane, the language used in the ideology of extermination of the 
Tutsi was a war language: the Interim Government appealed to the population to wage 
war against the Tutsi “invaders”. 
 
Referring to the Armenian and the Tutsi genocide, Gibson identified three conditions for 
genocide possibility: the existence of a pluralized society, the advent of a period of 
political, economic and social crises, and the existence of governing formal and informal 
institutions that are weakened by those crises.10 Though his analysis lacks a longue durée 
perspective, his insistence on the formal and informal features of institutions is very 
important. In relation to social and economic crises, considering the Armenian and 
Rwandan case, Staub concedes that genocide comes after a series of smaller scale 
massacres.11
 
 In this regard, genocide appears as the culmination of a mass killing process. 
                                                 
9 Bergen, War & Genocide, pp. 141-142. 
10 Stacey Gibson, “The role of structure and institutions in the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi and the 
Armenians of the Ottoman Empire”, Journal of Genocide Research, 5, 4, December 2003, pp. 503–522, pp. 
503- 516. 
11 Staub, “Genocide in Rwanda”, p. 246. 
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The above preconditions, predispositions, contexts and processes exist in several 
societies, but they have led to genocide in some specific cases only. That suggests that 
there is need to understand the step that is taken in order to go to a choice of shaping or 
reinterpreting them into a genocidal project. In other words, we need to understand the 
intention of genocide. On the one hand, genocide organisers consider genocide as a tactic 
towards reaching certain state objectives that may include power consolidation, social 
purity, material gains and more.12
 
 On the other hand, though the past and the present 
context of the moment may be favourable for genocide implementation, perpetrators need 
to sensitize the whole social fabric about that “abominable” project, so that they can 
come to see it as a “normal” one:  
… the way to cruelty has to be prepared before it opens. Soldiers have to be 
systematically desensitized before they can kill; victims have to be dehumanized 
before they can be killed (or else killed from so great a distance that their 
humanity need not be confronted); great cruelties have to be approached, step by 
step, by a series of smaller ones, as though a natural resistance has to be 
overcome.13
 
 
Social psychological approaches extend the dehumanization process of victims to many 
other subcategories: “delegitimizing” victims, so that they enjoy no protection; 
“infrahumanizing” them, so that they become less than human or more bestial, morally 
excluding them, so that they are disqualified from fairness, justice and moral 
consideration.14
 
 
In addition to soldiers, that is, the institution formally in charge of force, and victims, that 
is, the ones against whom force has to be used, the whole society needs mobilisation 
before genocide can be an acceptable option: “… a substantial part of the population had 
to be ready to consider it desirable, acceptable, or at least unavoidable, that certain other 
                                                 
12 Catherine Barnes, “The functional utility of genocide: towards a framework for understanding the 
connection between genocide and regime consolidation, expansion and maintenance”, Journal of Genocide 
Research, 7, 3, September 2005, pp. 309–330, p. 310. 
13 Richard A. Vernon and Victoria M. Esses, “Why Neighbours Kill: An Overview”, in Victoria M., Esses 
and Richard A., Vernon and (eds.), Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations: Why Neighbours Kill, 
Malden (USA) and Oxford (UK), 2008, pp. 1-13, p. 1. 
14 Miles Hewstone et al., “Why Neighbours Kill: Prior Intergroup Contact and Killing of Ethnic Outgroup 
Neighbors”; in Esses and  Vernon (eds.), Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations, pp. 61-91, p. 65. 
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people would be isolated, persecuted, and killed.”15
 
 That is where mobilisation becomes 
necessary.  
5.2. IDEOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 
 
Any attempt to understand the ideology of genocide must include at least two things. The 
first must revolve around the conception of the genocide project. The second is the spread 
of that project to the whole country’s institutions and members of society. In a genocide 
such as the one that occurred in Rwanda which involved a mass participation, the 
analysis must include the techniques that were used in order to have ordinary citizens 
participate.  
 
Glickman has defined ideology in a way that stresses its origin, which is mostly the ruling 
group and its destination, which is the ruled. It also encompasses features that show the 
objectives to be reached which revolve around interests of the ruling elite.16
5.2.1. Dehumanisation 
 The Hutu 
extremist propaganda that operated from 1990 onwards following the RPF attack of 1 
October 1990 used a number of well-known techniques of mobilisation for genocide.  
 
The extremist press and the extremist discourse of extremist political parties included 
dehumanizing language and depictions. These included the stereotypes about identity and 
behaviour. Concerning the first, Tutsi were called “bad weeds”, “snakes”, “dogs”, 
“hyenas”and identified with “misfortune”.17
                                                 
15 Bergen, War & Genocide, p. 1. 
 According to the second, the Tutsi were 
considered as liars, always calculating in every matrimonial relation, unfaithful, 
dangerous, and always acting in complicity with group interests and not as single 
16 Harvey Glickman, “Reflections on State-Centrism as Ideology in Africa”, in Zaki Ergas (ed.), The 
African State in Transition, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1987, pp. 25-43, pp. 25 and 28. 
17 Interview with Consesa Kamuyumbo, Gishamvu, 24 March 2006 ; Yolande Mukagasana, N’aie pas peur 
de savoir : Rwanda: un million de morts. Une rescapée tutsi raconte, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1999; Jacques 
Sémelin, “Analyser le massacre. Réflexions comparatives”, Questions de Recherche, n° 7, septembre 2002, 
pp. 1-42, p. 12 ; Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “RTLM Propaganda : the Democratic Alibi”, in Allan Thompson 
(ed.), The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, London, Pluto Press, 2007, p. 56. 
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individuals, to name a few.18 Primo Levi had contended that to be human, one needed not 
just to eat and breathe, but to have also “an identity, relationships with others, ties to a 
past and a future, and a sense of decency and dignity.”19
 
 As we shall see, the Hutu Ten 
commandments, the Kangura newspaper and RTLM radio propaganda negated all those 
fundamental attributes or rights of the Tutsi. 
The Tutsi were considered as “the other” vis-à-vis the Hutu. But it would be an 
overstatement to say that the Hutu were “the same”, as the extremist propaganda had it or 
wanted it to be. Regional, class as well as political divisions proliferated among them, as 
we saw in chapters three and four. In this respect, it is more productive to argue that the 
Tutsi were more “other” than the “Other”20, the latter being the Hutu, or maybe the Hutu 
and the Twa, although the extremist interpretation seemed to forget the Twa in their 
rhetoric. In this process of “othering” the Tutsi, the propaganda negated or fought against 
all means of collaboration between the Tutsi and the Hutu, and urged the Hutu to take a 
distance from the Tutsi who were described as “evil”.21
 
 
Secondly, the state had produced a “culture of impunity” since the 1960s until 1993, 
whereby each time a rebel group related to Tutsi refugees would attack, systematic 
revenge murders were committed against the civilian Tutsi, and all those who 
participated in that violence against the Tutsi went unpunished. This behaviour produced 
an impression that the Tutsi were not humans like others.22
 5.2.2. On History And Ethnicity 
 
 
Perhaps the most important core mobilization message came from the representation of 
the past in the present relating to ethnic identity. This representation was not produced in 
                                                 
18 These elements are more developed in the sections below. 
19 In Bergen, War & Genocide, p. 174. 
20 See Derrida in Roland Paul Blum, “Deconstruction and Creation”, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 46, No. 2, December 1985, pp. 293-306, p. 295. 
21 Regine Andersen, “How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda “Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3, June 2000, pp. 441-456, p. 445. 
22 Organisation de l’Unité Africaine, Rapport sur le génocide au Rwanda, Mai 2000, p. 56 ; John A. Berry, 
and Carol Pott Berry, Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory, Washington, DC, Howard University 
Press, 1999, p. 2. 
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1990; it came all the way from the rhetoric of 1959. If one can assert that politics was 
partly decolonized at the time of independence, historiography remained in colonial 
terms. For example, the colonial ethnic descriptions ascribed to Hutu, Tutsi and Twa bore 
stereotypes about their physical features, behaviour and culture. The History that was 
taught to schools after independence was a history of successive arrival of ethnic groups 
on the territory, of “domination of Tutsi against the Hutu” as produced in the colonial 
historiography and the changes brought by the “Hutu revolution” against that domination. 
It was mostly political history, but included some few elements of social and economic 
history.23 It was as much a Marxist approach of history formulated in ethnic terms. 
Material culture, a long process of cohabitation and relation of people to environments, 
multiple regional and social identities that characterized the people who lived in the area 
that came to be called Rwanda, relations of conviviality and inequalities that existed 
between them and that transpired in a number of institutions, family oral histories 
expressing these multiple connections as well as contradictions, were not given an equal 
space in the curriculum. As Gasanabo concluded in his thesis, “Rwandans […] have a 
long history, a common language and culture. That there may be differences among them 
is undeniable; but to conceive these differences in racial or ethnic terms stems either from 
the ignorance of local realities, or from the deliberate choice to divide and oppose 
them.”24
 
 
The Hamitic and Bantu myths produced and diffused during the colonial period and 
captured during the “revolution” of 1959, became again a key reference of extremist 
leaders in 1990.25 The Hamitic Hypothesis had been rejected by international scholars in 
the 1960s,26 but it survived in Rwandan historiography and political rhetoric.27
                                                 
23 See Jean-Damascène Gasanabo, Mémoires et histoire scolaire: le cas du Rwanda de 1962 à 1994, Thèse 
de Doctorat, Université de Genève, 2004, pp. 73-82. 
 Part of the 
reason for this is that it offered an opportunity to put blame on the Tutsi through their 
description as affiliated to some other foreign people, and it emphasized their differences 
24 See Gasanabo, Mémoires et histoire scolaire, p. 261. 
25 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, (sous la direction de), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, Paris, Karthala, 1995, p. 
109. 
26 Edith R. Sanders, “The Hamitic Hypothesis; It Origin and Functions in Time Perspective”, Journal of 
African History, X, 4, 1969, pp. 521-532. 
27 Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, pp. 87-88. 
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with the so-called Bantu people.  “Hutu extremists propagated a revisionist history of 
relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi that were not based on cohabitation and 
exchange, but rather on segregation and violence.”28
 
 
Those depicted as Hamites, that is, the Tutsi, were deemed “superior”, because their 
origin was traced from elsewhere and close to the Caucasian race.29 Indeed, colonial 
historiography from Pagès to De Lacger to Alexis Kagame and others depict the Hutu 
and the Tutsi as having come from elsewhere, but with time, a new perception of Hutu as 
indigenous and Tutsi as alien came to be implanted.30 Though the claims to more 
autochthony of some groups than others is widespread in Africa,31 it is in Rwanda that it 
had extremely devastating consequences which led to genocide, because it was 
instrumentalized for that purpose: “In order to exterminate an ‘other,’ that other must first 
be placed outside, geographically, but also politically, socially, and symbolically.”32 
René Lemarchand has analysed both the 1959 period and the 1994 genocide. Regarding 
the Hamitic Hypothesis as instrumentalised in the 1990s, he states: “Initially fashioned by 
colonial historiography, the Hamitic Hypothesis provided a simple model for 
understanding perceived distinctions between lower and higher orders of humanity. 
Recast in the form of an ideological weapon to discredit allegations of Tutsi supremacy, 
it reemerged with extraordinary virulence during the 1994 genocide.”33 He writes further: 
“As an ideological construction designed to justify the annihilation of the Tutsi minority, 
the Hamitic myth must be seen as the central element behind the 1994 genocide.”34
 
 
                                                 
28 John and Carol Berry, 1999: 3, cited in Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills: Rwanda’s Rebirth and the 
Man Who Dreamed It, New Jersey, Wiley, 2008, p. 98. 
29 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p. 80. 
30 See Charles Kabwete Mulinda, “La généalogie de l’idée du peuplement du Rwanda : considérations sur 
l’autochtonie ou l’allochtonie des Rwandais”, in Cahiers du Centre de Gestion des Conflits, n°5, Août 
2002, pp. 49-72; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p. 34. On the Mamdani’s explanation of the 
Hamitic Hypothesis on the Rwandan case, see pp. 43-50. 
31 Bambi Ceuppens, and Peter Geschiere, “Autochthony: Local or Global? New Modes in the Struggle over 
Citizenship and Belonging in Africa and Europe”, Annual Review of Anthropology, Volume 34, 2005, pp. 
385-407. 
32 Guillermo Levy, “Considerations on the connections between race, politics, economics, and genocide”, 
Journal of Genocide Research, 8, 2, June 2006, pp. 137–148, p. 137. 
33 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence, p. 57. 
34 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence, p. 63. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
300 
A number of authors show to what extent Rwanda was a bipolarized society, where you 
find two dominant ethnic groups. In this situation, the manipulation of one ethnic group 
against the other, mostly smaller, suffers no opposition from third party ethnic groups 
because they are simply absent. Ethnic politics in this regard become dangerous.  But the 
existence of bipolar ethnic groups is not sufficient. It is the hateful manipulation of them 
that can create violence.35
 
 
Although historiography continued to spread ethnicity, and the “values” of the “social 
revolution”, Jefremovas argues that during her fieldwork in Rwanda in the 1980s, she did 
not find the “ethnic rhetoric” deeply implanted in the peasants’ social relations and 
beliefs: “When asked about ethnicity they typically replied, ‘What difference does it 
make to me? I don’t get anything out of it. I was born a peasant, I’ll live a peasant and I’ll 
die a peasant.’ They clearly saw that ethnicity conditioned the capacity of elites to gain 
access to power and privilege but had little meaning for the common Rwandan.” Then 
she goes on to explain that “[t]he massive propaganda of 1990-94 was necessary because 
the simplistic ethnic visions of the extremists did not match the experience of everyday 
people.”36 Danielle de Lame, too, in her fieldwork in 1988, reports finding little focus on 
ethnic conflict among peasants, rather the case she registered was complex, in that it 
opposed two rural intellectuals of the supposed same ethnic identity but who were 
supported by people of different ethnic groups. But this does not mean that ethnic 
cleavages had gone away.37
                                                 
35 Filip Reyntjens, “Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond”, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1996, pp. 
240-251, p. 240; Filip Reyntjens, “Akazu, ‘Escadrons de la mort’ et autres ‘réseau zéro’ : un historique des 
résistances au changement politique depuis 1990”, in André Guichaoua, (sous la direction de), Les crises 
politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994). Analyses, faits et documents, 2è édition, Paris, Karthala, 
1995, pp. 265-273, p. 265; Shaheen Mozaffar et al., “Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and 
Party Systems in Africa’s Emerging Democracies”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3, 
2003, pp. 379-390, p. 390. See also African Union, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, Addis Ababa, 
IPEP/OAU, 2000, p. 46. 
 In chapter three and four, I also showed that ethnic conflict 
only became sharp in times of political upheaval, suggesting that it had to be manipulated 
by political leaders first in order to escalate. But I also showed that in the everyday 
coexistence not everything was rosy, although people of different ethnic identity were 
36 Villia Jefremovas, “Review Article: Treacherous Waters: The Politics of History and the Politics of 
Genocide in Rwanda and Burundi”, Africa, 70, 2, 2000, pp. 298-308, p. 303. 
37 Danielle de Lame, Une colline entre mille ou le calme avant la tempête. Transformations et blocages du 
Rwanda rural, Tervuren (Belgium), MRAC, 1996, pp. 73-75. 
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interacting harmoniously. According to Gasanabo and Des Forges, that distorted history 
came to be accepted by intellectuals and entered the popular language of even those who 
did not study.38
 
 
Extremist propaganda also focused on Hamites and Bantu as minority and majority 
populations respectively. Part of the argument was that a majority group cannot accept to 
be ruled by a minority one, therefore any power that the latter are attempting to bring to 
Rwanda would be oppressive and must therefore be resisted. This ‘majority’ argument 
pervades the extremist newspapers and radio messages. It also transpires in the literature 
produced by Hutu intellectuals in the aftermath of RPF attacks from 1990 onwards.39
 
  
During the genocide, the propaganda repeated that what was happening was a replay or a 
new experience of the 1959 “revolution”. That strategy was intended to create a “good 
consciousness” among the actors.40 In this respect, in order to resurrect the whole 1959 
theatre, the RPF was likened to Inyenzi of the 1960s. The 1990 war was defined as the 
prolonging of the 1959 war “of the Tutsi against the Hutu”.41
 
  
The Hamitic and Bantu myths were used in explanations of political, social and economic 
experiences of both the Tutsi and Hutu.42 Ethnic identity was presented as natural, hence 
free from any debate and doubt.43
                                                 
38 Human Rights Watch, “The Rwandan Genocide: How It Was Prepared”, A Human Rights Watch 
Briefing Paper, April 2006, Number 1, pp. 1-17, p. 3; Gasanabo, Mémoires et histoire scolaire. 
 Yet a number of more critical authors have cast doubt 
on such allegations. For example, Emmanuel Ntezimana asked a fundamental question: 
How can we know who among the Hutu, the Tutsi and Twa was the owner of such and 
such material culture of ancient heritage, be it “cows,” “drums,” “iron,” “fire,” yet these 
39 See Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, and “Rwanda : La révolution socio-politique de 
1959 est irréversible”, in Mathieu Ngirira, et Jean Bosco Nzitabakuze, Le Rwanda à la croisée des chemins, 
Butare, 1991, pp. 13-32, p. 27. 
40 Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 119. 
41 Reply to Journalist J.B. Bamwanga, Radio Rwanda, 21 avril 1994 in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les 
médias du génocide, p. 127. 
42 On a deep and critical reading of the hamitic and bantu stereotypes, and their use in the Rwandan 
knowledge production, see Josias Semujanga, Origins of Rwandan Genocide?, Amherst, New York, 
Humanity Books, 2003, pp. 101-133. 
43 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Le défi de l’ethnisme. Rwanda et Burundi : 1990-1996, Paris, Karthala, 1997, p. 
46 ; Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 95. 
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people have cohabited for centuries?44 In the same vein as Ntezimana, Chrétien 
destabilized the notion of Hamite and Bantu. For instance, he wondered to what extent 
Rwandans and Burundians can call themselves Bantu - which they would do legitimately, 
given that the Kinyarwanda and Kirundi languages are part of the Bantu idioms – 
whereas this concept was coined only in mid-19th century by the German Wilhelm Bleek? 
Now the question becomes: who were they before that time, since we know that they 
existed?45
 
 
Perhaps the most helpful discovery of scholars concerning ethnic groups in Rwanda is 
that they were among the most debatable and controversial topics throughout Rwandan 
history. This is true even today.46
 
 But as one can understand, this does not take us far 
towards an explanation. If they came from elsewhere and to different places, as the 
colonial and republican historiographies would have it, then why did the Rwandan 
language and culture remain the same for centuries? Is it valid to persist in calling them 
ethnic groups, when they share these cultural traits? Drawing on Mamdani, Helen 
Hintjens argued that the best answer for us regarding the origin of ethnic groups in 
Rwanda is “I do not know.” 
We do not know for sure what are the origins of Tutsi, Hutu or Twa. We do know 
that since independence, and during colonial rule, identity politics in Rwanda 
involved little or no element of choice of ethnic groupings; instead identity has 
been a knife in the hands of power-holders. Identities can be manipulated to sever 
social connections and forms of solidarity, whether within families and 
neighbourhoods or within institutions such as schools, hospitals, churches and 
                                                 
44 Emmanuel Ntezimana, “Les récits historiques rwandais : Histoire achevée ou source d’une histoire 
précoloniale ?”, Etudes rwandaises, Vol. 1, n° 4, juillet-septembre 1987, Série Lettres et Sciences 
Humaines, pp. 457-497, pp. 468-469 ; 488-489. 
45 Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda: Les médias du génocide, p. 111. See also Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “Un génocide 
africain : de l’idéologie à la propagande”, in Raymond Verdier, et al. (eds.), Rwanda. Un génocide du XXè 
siècle, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1995, pp. 45-55, pp. 48-49. 
46 Uvin, Aiding Violence; Johan Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2002;  Gasanabo, Mémoires et histoire scolaire, pp. 35-72, and Laurent Nkusi, “L’énoncé des sujets 
controversés dans l’histoire du Rwanda”, in Déo Byanafashe, (sous la direction de), Les défis de 
l’historiographie rwandaise. Tome: Les faits controversés, Butare, Editions de l’UNR, 2004, pp. 55-84 are 
some among scholars who included ethnic identity and relations among the most controversial topics in the 
Rwandan history, conventionally speaking. 
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work places. Cutting the complex social and family ties between Hutu and Tutsi 
was seen as a necessary prelude to genocide.47
 
 
 
Prunier is right to say that it is a fallacy to talk about hegemony of a certain ethnic group 
over other ethnic groups across history.  In fact, to assert the opposite would be to ignore 
complexities about colonial injustices during the colonial period and structural violence 
during the postindependence period, as I indicated. During different epochs it was a few 
Tutsi and then a few Hutu who dominated the rest.48 Therefore, This essentialized 
description of the Hutu and the Tutsi created a certain consciousness, but one that can be 
considered as a “false consciousness”.49 According to Prunier, “ideas can kill”50, and 
according to Ignatieff, “it is not how the past dictates to the present, but how the present 
manipulates the past that is decisive.”51
 
 
Concerning ideology around ethnic relations, the very first text that was published in the 
media was the “Hutu Ten Commandments.” It was issued in Kangura, an extremist 
media as far as ethnicity is concerned. This piece, that a number of authors have likened 
to the “Protocol of the Learned Elders of Zion” describing the Jews as dangerous, was 
formulated in the imperative form close to the Ten Commandments contained in the 
Christian Bible. Keeping in mind that more than 80% of the Rwandan population was 
Christian, one understands the symbolic target of those who conceived it. Its content, 
which is worthy of note, runs as follows:  
 
1. Every Muhutu should know that a Mututsi woman, wherever she is, works for 
the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any 
Muhutu who:  
• marries a Tutsi woman, 
• befriends a Tutsi woman,  
                                                 
47 Helen Hintjens, “When Identity Becomes a Knife. Reflecting on the genocide in Rwanda”, Ethnicities, 1, 
1, 2001, pp. 25-55, p. 43. 
48 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1995, pp. 80-81. 
49 John M. Janzen, “Historical Consciousness and a ‘Prise de Conscience’ in Genocidal Rwanda”, Journal 
of African Cultural Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, In Honour of Professor Terence Ranger, June 2000, pp. 153-
168, p. 155. 
50 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 40. 
51 In Pranab Bardhan, “Method in the Madness? A Political-Economy Analysis of the Ethnic Conflicts in 
Less Developed Countries”, World Development, Vol. 25, No. 9, 1997, pp. 1381-1398, p. 1388. 
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• employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or a concubine. 
 
2. Every Muhutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and 
conscientious in their role as woman, wife and mother of the family.  
Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest? 
 
3. Bahutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons 
back to reason. 
 
4. Every Muhutu should know that every Mututsi is dishonest in business.  
His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result, any Muhutu who 
does the following is a traitor: 
• makes a partnership with Batutsi in business; 
• invests his money or the government’s money in a Tutsi enterprise; 
• lends or borrows money from a Mutusi; 
• gives favours to Batutsi in business (obtaining import licences, bank loans, 
construction sites, public markets…). 
 
5. All strategic positions, political, administrative, economic, military and security 
should be entrusted to Bahutu. 
 
6. The education sector (school pupils, students, teachers) must be majority Hutu. 
 
7. The Rwandese Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The experience of 
the October [1990] war has taught us a lesson. No member of the military shall 
marry a Tutsi. 
 
8. The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi.  
 
9. The Bahutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity, and be 
concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers.  
• The Bahutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and 
allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Bantu brothers; 
• They must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda; 
• The Bahutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy. 
 
10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the Hutu 
ideology, must be taught to every Muhutu at every level. Every Hutu must spread 
this ideology widely. Any Muhutu who persecutes his brother Muhutu for having 
read, spread and taught this ideology, is a traitor. 52
                                                 
52 Kangura, n° 6, December 1990, translated in Helmut Walser Smith (ed.), The Holocaust and Other 
Genocides: History, Representation, Ethics,Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 2002, p.  210. For 
another version of translation of this text, see Pancrace Twagiramutara, “Ethnicity and Genocide in 
Rwanda”, in Okwudiba Nnoli, (ed.), Ethnic Conflict in Africa, Dakar, CODESRIA, 1998, pp. 105-130, pp. 
119-120. 
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Commenting on this text, Jean-Pierre Chrétien insisted on the way their authors showed 
utmost disrespect of the Tutsi as well as depicted Tutsi women as “prostitutes-spies”.53 
There is little doubt that this kind of description in stereotypical terms contributed to 
making the targeted group vulnerable, and a scapegoat.54
 
 A careful reading of these 
“commandments” reveals that they targeted political, social, economic and even moral 
arenas of life. While the first is against intermarriage between the Tutsi and the Hutu, the 
second and third insist on purity of ontology and ethnic identity, and preservation. The 
statements resemble the Aryan racial preservation policy of Hitler. The fourth 
commandment includes behaviour, agency, and reputation, and advocates non-
collaboration between the two groups. The Fifth, the sixth and the seventh plead for 
power and higher status in favour of the Hutu. The eighth dwells on the moral part, by 
suggesting that mercy is negative. The ninth goes beyond Rwanda to include the central 
and eastern parts of Africa, where it calls for the unity of the Bantu people against a 
common enemy. The tenth calls for recollection, preservation and diffusion of the 1959 
“revolution” memory, which is close to the manipulation and instrumentalisation of 
history as we saw above. 
These themes were repeated over and over since 1990 in the Kangura newspaper and 
later in Radio Rwanda and RTLM extremist radio, in the speeches of CDR and MRND in 
1992 and 1993 and in the “Power” factions of MDR, PL and PSD parties. What makes 
the Hutu Ten Commandments interesting is the context in which they were produced. At 
this time (December 1990), RPF rebels had been attacking the country since October, but 
were defeated. The multiparty system was not yet set up, but laws for the multiparty 
system were underway through discussions of the National Commission of Synthesis. So, 
this means that on the one hand, it is not the Tutsi threat or the opposition threat that 
pushed the Habyarimana clique of Akazu to choose this extremist option. On the other 
hand, one may put forward a hypothesis that there was a strategy of grabbing the ethnic 
mobilisation discourse and the legacy of the 1959 “revolution” before any other party did. 
                                                 
53 Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 39.  
54 Peter Glick, “When Neighbors Blame Neighbors: Scapegoating and the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations”, 
in Esses and  Vernon (eds.), Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations, pp. 123 - 146, p. 138. 
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To evaluate the strength of this ideological text, I refer to Edward Said’s notions of 
strategic location, the author’s position with regard to his or her text and the social world 
he or she is describing, and strategic formation, that is, the way that text gets referenced 
by other texts and in the process all these texts influence society.55
 
 I also refer to 
Foucault’s analysis by considering this discourse not only as a memory, as an utterance, 
but also as a memory bearing a social impact:  
I do not question discourses about their silently intended meanings, but about the 
fact and the conditions of their manifest appearance; not about the contents which 
they may conceal, but about the transformations which they have effected; not 
about the sense preserved within them like a perpetual origin, but about the field 
where they coexist, reside and disappear. It is a question of analysis of the 
discourses in the dimension of their exteriority. […] To relate the discourse not to 
a thought, mind or subject which engendered it, but to the practical field in which 
it is deployed.56
 
 
To begin with, I posit that this text is not a point of departure. Its content shows clearly its 
borrowing from the ethnic consciousness built in the struggles of 1959 onwards. This 
position makes it a text in continuity, not a rupture or a new discovery. Therefore, we can 
say that the authors of that document wanted to reconquer the ideological power of the 
1959s in the new multiparty system that was to come in 1991. This means that they were 
targeting the future power, by using the past ideological canon. However, that text would 
not be powerful in itself if its content was not shared by other political actors (strategic 
location) and if it did not enter other texts and mediums (strategic formation).  
 
Now, it is worth showing how in subsequent years the message of the Hutu Ten 
Commandments became repeated and re-emphasized, how it was sustained by various 
other political leaders when the multiparty system came into effect. In March 1991, as a 
number of intellectuals were warming up by making contacts in order to create political 
parties, the Kangura newspaper warned the Hutu that it was not efficient to divide 
                                                 
55 Said, Orientalism, p. 20. 
56 Michel Foucault, “Politics and the study of discourse”, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter 
Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, with two lectures by and interview with 
Michel Foucault, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 60-61.  
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themselves into several parties. It also challenged the Tutsi for not accepting their ethnic 
identity:  
 
Tutsi who read Kangura, listen to me very well. I do not hate the Tutsi, I detest 
their refusal to call themselves Tutsi. I dislike their vice of dividing the Bahutu 
and of scorning them. You Hutu, I have so many things to reproach to you. It is 
surprising to see that you are creating division among yourself whereas you are 
attacked.57
 
 
It is worth recalling that the most influential opposition parties were created by people 
from the regions that were disadvantaged during the Habyarimana regime. Those who 
believed they had been wronged by structural violence were now trying their chances 
through the multiparty system. These parties include the MDR which had its leaders 
mostly from Gitarama and Cyangugu, the PSD which had its leaders mostly from Butare 
Prefecture, and the PL which had a number of Tutsi as leaders, but also businessmen. 
These leaders were mainly Hutu, that is why perhaps Kangura was accusing them of 
sustaining a division among the Hutu at the time when a war was occurring in the 
country. In this respect, the Murwanashyaka newspaper of MRND made it clear in April 
1991 that nothing other than ethnic identity can unite members of a party58, which means 
that parties of Hutu and Tutsi, perhaps also Twa,59
 
 are the ones that are wanted. Part of 
this obsession for ethnic party membership derives from the fact that the Hutu were in the 
majority, so they could simply win prospective elections on these grounds. But we know 
that ethnic identity does not always coincide with political affiliations. 
In May 1991, the Kangura newspaper made another reference to ethnicity, but also to 
colonial suffering and to the threat that the Tutsi, qualified as foreigners and feudalists, 
represented at the time:  
 
The Tutsi have found us in Rwanda, they have oppressed us and we endured it. 
But now that we have freed ourselves from serfdom and that they want to 
                                                 
57 Kangura, n° 12, mars 1991 quoted in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 97. 
58 Murwanashyaka, Avril 1991, in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 104. 
59 But the few intellectual Twa never tried to create a party of their own, because they assumed that they 
could fail at first glance. See Charles Uwiragiye, “The Ethnic Batwa and their Physical Situation in 
Rwanda”, in H. Veber et al. (eds.), “Never drink from the same cup”, Proceedings of the Conference on 
Indigenous Peoples in Africa, Copenhagen, IWGYA, 1993, pp. 173-178, p. 174. 
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reestablish the morning whipping [colonial ikiboko], I think that no Hutu will 
condone this. The war that Gahutu is waging is just, it is a struggle for the 
republic. All Hutu should know this, when the feudalists will arrive in Rwanda, 
they will not distinguish between the Hutu from the North and the ones from the 
South, they should know that that will be the end for all of them.60
The importance of referring to the past by extremist propaganda is underscored by 
Marcel Kabanda:  
 
Reference to the anger of parents is meant to inspire that of their children. […] 
Why did Kangura need to refer to the speeches made in 1964 by Kayibanda and 
Makuza, or by Joseph Gitera in 1976? In a society where age and experience 
bestow authority, the voices of elders constitute an excellent argument. The past 
provided evidence that violence against the Tutsi was normal and legitimate. 
However, it is clear that those historical references favoured a particular trend, 
that of the Parmehutu.61
In the same vein, one leader from the Ministry of Local Government stated in a meeting 
in Butare in early November 1990, that the military enemy (RPF)’s intention was to grab 
from them “the goodness of our Social Revolution of 59 and our Moral Revolution of 
1973.”
 
62
 
  
In 1992, at the time when political parties were busy campaigning and recruiting, and the 
peace process between the government, the RPF and opposition parties was underway, 
the extremist media continued to spread its hate message against the Tutsi and Hutu 
opposition party members. For example, in February 1992, Jean Barahinyura 
Shyirambere, who became later one of the founders of CDR extremist party, wrote the 
following: “I do not understand how MDR…can associate itself with PL knowing that 
the latter does not admit the Revolution of 1959 and what comes out of it.”63
                                                 
60 Kangura, n° 16, mai 1991 quoted in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 143. 
 In his book, 
also published in 1992, he conceded that Tutsi women were nothing but political 
strategists for their ethnic group: “The second point of the political strategy of the tutsi is 
61 Marcel Kabanda, “Kangura: the Triumph of Propaganda Refined”, in Allan, Thompson, (ed.), The Media 
and the Rwanda genocide, pp. 62-72, p. 71. 
62 Innocent Ndindabahizi, Secrétaire Général au Ministère de l’Intérieur et du Développement Communal, 
et Cyriaque Habyarabatuma, Commandant du Groupement Butare et rapporteur de la réunion, Secret, 
Compte – rendu de la réunion du Conseil Préfectoral de Sécurité de Butare tenue le 04 novembre 1990. 
63 Jean Barahinyura Shyirambere, in Kangura, n° 31, février 1992, in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias 
du génocide, p. 227. 
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classical, because it had been used since long ago even in the interior of Rwanda: their 
daughters. […] most of the Rwandan women married abroad and most particularly in 
Europe, being from the Tutsi ethnic group, they have become pillars used in the obscure 
aims of the Inyenzi.”64
 
 
The past memory was again instrumentalized in the President of the Republic’s speech on 
25 September 1992, at the commemoration of the anniversary of the “revolution” of 
1959, most precisely of the referendum against monarchy of 25 September 1961:  
 
I wish you a nice day of Kamarampaka. Referendum-Kamarampaka that we 
celebrate in these hard times in our Rwanda, you notice that it nearly resembles 
with what preceded Kamarampaka in 1961.  The anniversary that we are 
celebrating today of Kamarampaka coincides with the time when Rwanda is in 
war again, a war waged by those who are thirsty for reaching power without 
resorting to election…these are those who thrive to strangle the democracy that 
we got from that Referendum-Kamarampaka.65
 
 
 
However, 1993 was the most difficult year in terms of Rwandan political developments 
during this multiparty experience. It is the time when the Arusha accords were signed, 
which gave the RPF a substantial position in civil politics and the army. This made the 
Tutsi become a target of the extremist media that showed its utmost resistance to the 
outcome of this peace negotiation. The CDR party had refused to sign the accord and 
therefore had been excluded from the power sharing of the Broad Based Transitional 
Government (BBTG) that was to be formed following those negotiations. This was the 
time for it to present the Tutsi as a real threat. It is also the time when the Hutu president 
Melchior Ndadaye was killed and extreme violence escalated in Burundi, bringing 
hundreds of thousands of refugees to Rwandan territory. This event was used by Hutu 
extremists in Rwanda who argued strongly that it demonstrated the Tutsi could not share 
power with the Hutu in peace. This is also the time when the extremist radio RTLM was 
created to back up extremist print media. This was the radio station that broadcast appeals 
                                                 
64 Jean Shyirambere Barahinyura, Rwanda. Trente deux ans après la révolution sociale de 1959, Frankfurt 
Am Main, Editions Izuba, 1992, p. 43. 
65 Faustin Munyazesa, Minister of Local Government and Commune Development, To All Prefects of 
Prefectures and All Burgomasters of Communes, The Speech of His Excellency the President of the 
Republic on 25 September 1992, Ref.: No. 2696/04.09.01, Kigali, 22 October 1992. 
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for genocide participation from April to July 1994.66 When this radio started to air on 8 
July 1993, Kangura newspaper celebrated the event as a prospective victory for the Hutu: 
“Union is force. The Hutu have just achieved their strongest wish. […] This is the radio 
and the television that will help Kangura to finalise the objectives of the Hutu.”67
 
 Here 
we find Said’s ‘strategic location’, that is, the institutional relation between Kangura 
newspaper that published the “Hutu Ten Commandments” and RTLM, the radio that 
aired it in 1993-1994. 
In December 1993, Kangura newspaper published a picture of former President 
Kayibanda together with an illustration of a machete. Below those two images, the 
following question was written: “What tools will we use to defeat the Inyenzi once and 
for all?”68
In the previous chapter we saw that power bargains in order to enter the July 1993 
government and the BBTG resulted in the split of opposition parties and in the creation of 
a “PAWA” or “Power” faction within MDR, PL and PSD parties. Hutu politicians 
forming this faction joined the president’s cartel (MRND, CDR and other small parties) 
and started to use their newspapers for extremist causes as well.   
 The Kayibanda image can be interpreted as the ideological tool, that is, the 
Hutu “revolution” ideology, whereas the machete can be interpreted as the physical tool, 
one that was used also in 1959 and subsequently. However, one question remains: If the 
Inyenzi were the RPF, how could machete be used against modern military weapons? 
Then it becomes clear that the Inyenzi are mostly or exclusively Tutsi civilians. In fact, 
the RTLM rhetoric equated Tutsi to the inyenzi in its broadcasts. 
In a communiqué issued by the PAWA faction of MDR, this extremist ethnic rhetoric and 
the reference to violence in Burundi become clear:  
 
We are preparing manifestations that we will make on 5 November 1993 that aim 
at four things: (a) WE WANT UNITY OF THE HUTU: It is not understandable 
                                                 
66 African Union, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, Addis Ababa, IPEP/OAU, 2000, p. 127. 
67 Hassan Ngeze in Kangura, N° 46 in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, pp. 67-68. 
68Kangura newspaper, n° 26, Décembre 1993, in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 114. 
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the way a Hutu person member of MDR can every time be in conflict with the one 
in MRND or CDR, fighting, killing each other, thereafter leaders and politicians 
spend their time sensitizing us to the need to reconcile with the Inkotanyi who are 
Tutsi. If the Hutu of all parties become able to get enlightened, they can see that 
this war that has destroyed Rwanda is all about the Tutsi who want power. The 
apex that occurred in Burundi can serve as a lesson to us…69
 
  
In October 1993, the same message transpired in another extremist newspaper and drew 
from the Burundi context: “The Hutu of Rwanda should know that it is time to unite and 
envisage a long term [future], to collaborate instead of destroying themselves under the 
pretext of multipartyism.”70
 
 
The argument of Hutu as majority, and the Tutsi as a threat to a power coming from the 
1959 “revolution” continued in 1994 during the genocide. In order to give to the 1994 
killings the image of the “1959 revolution”, the propagandists continued to compare them 
with what happened in 1959. The Tutsi were called UNAR because they were born 
supposedly of UNAR parents. In this regard, identity and party ideology became the 
same; essentialism was pushed to political affiliation.71
 
 
Genocide was thus not the result of hatred between the Tutsi and the Hutu, but a result of 
a long standing racial ideology that created and entertained hatred against the Tutsi on 
each occasion that political leaders chose to massacre a certain number of the Tutsi.72 
Indeed, as a strategy, Habyarimana had chosen to sacrifice the Tutsi in order to have the 
support of all the Hutu.73
                                                 
69 MDR, Kigali-Ville, Announcement No. 62, The unity of the Hutu is not to kill the Tutsi, it intends to put 
an end to this war, Kigali, date not clear on document. Capital letters in original. 
 He had chosen to sacrifice the Rwandan nation in favour of the 
70 Echo des mille collines, n° 14, octobre 1993, p. 6: “Communiqué du Journal sur ce qui se passe au 
Burundi depuis le 21 octobre”, in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 148. 
71 See discussions of these MRND and MDR power leaders in RTLM : Ancien Ministre Joseph Nzirorera, 
secrétaire général du MRND à RTLM, le 28 mai 1994, in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du 
génocide, p. 119 et Mbonyumutwa Shingiro, leader de MDR power, interview à Radio Rwanda, 21 avril 
1994 in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 128. 
72 See Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “Un Nazisme tropical au Rwanda ? Image ou logique d'un genocide”, 
Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, Volume 48, Numéro 48, 1995, pp. 131 – 142, pp. 137-138. 
73 Alison Des Forges, ‘Leave None to Tell the Story.’ Genocide in Rwanda, London, Brussels, Human 
Rights Watch, Paris, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, 1999, p. 49. 
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“Hutu nation”. This culminated in the Tutsi genocide.74
 5.2.3. Tutsi Depicted as a Threat 
 A careful linking of the above 
extremist messages with the Hutu Ten Commandments shows that this document is an 
important one: it had summed up the core points that were to be developed slowly and 
steadily until the 1994 genocide. 
 
Vernon and Esses argue that the reasons for a state to exclude certain people include the 
following: the perception that they are different, not human or that they pose a threat.75
 
 
All these are found in the ideology of genocide in Rwanda. The Tutsi in general and the 
RPF in particular were presented in the extremist media as a threat to the Hutu. This 
became one of the strongest incentives in order to mobilize as much of the population as 
possible in genocide participation. The extremist propaganda presented the Tutsi as a 
threat on three grounds: the military, the economic and the political.  
Firstly, war became the first pretext to cast the Tutsi as a threat. In this respect, the 
extremist propaganda spread the news that the enemy is not only the RPF, believed to be 
made up of Tutsi from outside, but that even the Tutsi from within were part of the 
enemy, because they were related to them. For that reason, the latter were meant to 
collaborate with the former by all means. Two documents were produced and diffused.  
 
The first document was produced in September 1992 by a Commission of High 
Command Officers that met in early December 1991. That document defined the “main” 
enemy as the Tutsi within and without Rwanda, and the supporters of the enemy as Hutu 
opponents to the Habyarimana regime, and foreigners who either are related to Tutsi 
through marriage or who are from the “Nilo-Hamite” group that the extremists linked to 
                                                 
74 Benedict Anderson, in a public lecture in Cape Town at the Centre for the Book on 19 September 2006, 
after problematizing the notion of nation, argued that (1) the end of nation is genocide and (2) that nation is 
a place of hope. Anderson is right if we take Rwanda as the nation to be. 
 
75 Richard A. Vernon and Victoria M. Esses, “Why Neighbours Kill: An Overview”, in Esses, and Vernon 
(eds.), Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations, p. 3. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
313 
the Tutsi.76 Another document, entitled “the organization of civil self-defence” produced 
in early 1994 planned the use of popular resistance and traditional weapons against the 
“enemy”.77
 
 
The so-called threat of the Tutsi was not confined to the Rwandan territory. The 
propaganda stressed clearly and repetitively that all the populations located in the Great 
Lakes regions related to the Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi were also a threat of the Bantu 
people living in this region.78
 
  
That the RPF was a threat to the Habyarimana regime was not so much in question 
because both were fighting. But to include all the Tutsi population as a threat was wrong, 
it was simply a strategy to ethnicise the conflict. As Alison Des Forges wrote:  
 
…the RPF had recruited a small number of supporters, Hutu and Tutsi, within 
Rwanda, but most Tutsi had no link to the guerrilla movement and some actively 
opposed the invasion, remembering the killings of Tutsi civilians that had 
followed the incursions of the 1960s. Habyarimana and his supporters could have 
chosen to mount an appeal based on nationalism against the RPF, but decided 
instead to cast the war as a threat in ethnic terms. They may have believed it 
would be easier to rally all Hutu once again behind Habyarimana’s leadership if 
the threat were clearly identified as Tutsi.79
 
  
 
At local level, the ideology saying that the Tutsi is the enemy seems to have been 
believed. Each time young Tutsi men went outside Rwanda, their absence cast suspicion 
on the rest of their family members who remained in Rwanda. Whether they had gone to 
look for educational opportunities or work or whether they had joined the RPF as it was 
claimed, all the same, the assumption was that they had joined the RPF. One informant in 
Kibayi (Paul Twahirwa) pointed out that the burgomaster used to tell the peasants that 
their Tutsi neighbours were sending their children to the Inkotanyi rebels to come to kill 
                                                 
76 Article 19, Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda, & State-Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 
1990-1994, New York, 1996, pp. 17-18; Pancrace Twagiramutara, “Ethnicity and Genocide in Rwanda”, in 
Okwudiba Nnoli, (ed.), Ethnic Conflict in Africa, Dakar, CODESRIA, 1998, pp. 105-130, p. 120-121. 
77 Human Rights Watch, “The Rwandan Genocide: How It Was Prepared”, A Human Rights Watch 
Briefing Paper, April 2006, Number 1, pp. 1-17, pp. 12-13. 
78 See Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda: Les médias du génocide, p. 163. 
79 Human Rights Watch, “The Rwandan Genocide: How It Was Prepared”, p. 5. 
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them. He usually enumerated a list of families whose sons were absent. Some Hutu 
peasants believed it, others doubted it. But when after the genocide, some of the sons who 
were absent came back as RPF soldiers, this informant believed that what the 
burgomaster was saying was true. In fact, some of the young men had actually joined the 
rebellion. But these are a handful as compared to the others who were just absent from 
home. Two of my other informants (Drocelle Uwimana and Théodosie Kanyanja) told 
me that their brothers had actually joined the RPF rebellion.80
 
 In this respect, propaganda 
was about generalizing, so as to demonize every Tutsi. 
Secondly, economic factors used in the propaganda positioned the Tutsi as a threat. To 
begin with, the Tutsi were depicted as the cause of past and prevailing economic crises.  
One version had it that the Tutsi were the more educated and wealthy, that they were the 
majority in Kigali city, that they monopolised national education and commerce, that 
Tutsi women occupied all jobs, that they controlled even the state. Like Jews who were 
portrayed as wealthier in the post-First World War Germany, the Tutsi became the 
exception in the general economic suffering of the remaining Rwandans. Therefore, to be 
deemed well-off at the time when the majority of the population were in extreme poverty 
became a threat. The Tutsi were thus presented as authors of the suffering of the Hutu 
who were portrayed as the victims, who should defend themselves.81 Just at the 
beginning of the publication of the Kangura newspaper, it reported that “70% of the rich 
people in Rwanda were Tutsi.”82 However, these descriptions were fallacies, stemming 
from false ideas; the few Tutsi who did better in business were known by everybody, and 
as Andy Storey explains, the rest were peasants and as poor as the other Rwandans.83
 
 
Another economic explanation was that the manipulation of the local population to 
participate in the killing of Tutsi was facilitated by material desire. Things such as land, 
                                                 
80 Interview with Paul Twahirwa, Drocelle Uwimana, Théodosie Kanyanja and Anonymous 5. 
81 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, (dir.), Rwanda: Les médias du génocide, pp. 145-148; Human Rights Watch, “The 
Rwandan Genocide: How It Was Prepared”, p. 6; Peter Glick, “When Neighbors Blame Neighbors”, p. 
134. 
82 Chrétien, (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 92. 
83 Andy Storey, “Economics and Ethnic Conflict: Structural Adjustment in Rwanda”, Development Policy 
Review, Vol. 17, 1999, pp. 43-63, p. 52. 
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cattle, and other assets were targeted by those who took part.84 However, more than the 
material to aim at, the propaganda also instilled fear in the understanding of the 
population. It stated that the rebels were coming to take over their land, and that they had 
to fight for it. In this regard, some of those who took part in the killings may have done 
so believing that they were protecting their property.85  One Hutu perpetrator narrated 
this: “I did not believe The Tutsi were coming to kill us… but when the government radio 
continued to broadcast that they were coming to take our land, were coming to kill the 
Hutu – when this was repeated over and over – I began to feel some kind of fear.”86 In 
relation to genocide, Rose’s research reveals that “…some Hutus participated in the 
genocide in order to prevent a loss of their land to the invading RPF,” and that “some 
Hutus participated in the genocide in order to gain land as a Reward”, but that land 
continued to be an object of competition and conflict even after the genocide.87
 
 
But most authors argue convincingly that it is not the lack of arable land nor the difficult 
life conditions in general that caused the civil war and ultimately the genocide. These 
were the product of political developments. The economic was just an ingredient or an 
easy context for political mobilization: “The extreme violence of 1994 appears as the 
outcome of political manipulations at an economic dead end.”88
 
 
The third threat that the Tutsi were said to represent was around the conquest and 
ownership of power. This mostly occurred in 1993 when the Arusha accords were 
proving to be conclusive. The more Arusha negotiations reached the signature of a 
                                                 
84 Catherine André and Jean-Philippe Platteau, “Land relations under unbearable stress: Rwanda caught in 
the Malthusian trap”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 34, 1998, pp. 1-47, p. 39; Jared 
Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, New York, Viking Penguin, 2005, p. 326. 
85 Jean Bigagaza et al., “Land Scarcity, Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda”, in J. Lind and K. Sturman 
(eds.),  Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts, Nairobi ACTS PRESS/Pretoria, 
Institute for Security Studies, 2002, pp. 50-82, pp. 59 and 73 
86 A Hutu perpetrator quoted in Frank Chalk, “Hate Radio in Rwanda”, in Howard Adelman, and Suhrke 
Astri (eds.), The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaïre, The path of a genocide, New Brunswick (USA) and 
London (UK), Transaction Publishers, 1999, pp. 93-107, p. 99. 
87 Laurel L. Rose, “Land and genocide: exploring the connections with Rwanda’s prisoners and prison 
officials”, Journal of Genocide Research, 9, 1, March 2007, pp. 49–69, pp. 53-55. 
88 Danielle de Lame, A Hill among a Thousand, Transformations and Ruptures in Rural Rwanda, Madison, 
Wisconsin, Tervuren (Belgium), The University of Wisconsin Press, Royal Museum of Central Africa, 
2005, p. xvii. 
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protocol on power sharing, the more the extremist parties pronounced hateful speeches. 
The first move had occurred in November 1992 when MRND and CDR showed their 
resistance towards the negotiations and as a result, the President and after him Léon 
Mugesera made public declarations that showed their rejection of those negotiations and 
hence of power sharing with the RPF. It is following the Protocol with respect to human 
rights of 18 August 1992 and the Protocol on Power Sharing of 30 October 1992 that 
agreed to grant the RPF five ministries, including the Ministry of Local Government in 
the future BBGT, that the President said in one campaign meeting in Ruhengeri on 15 
November 1992 that the Arusha accords were no more than a mere piece of paper and 
that his supporters should not bother about the prospective power sharing with the RPF. 
He even promised to organize a parade of his Interahamwe militia to show the MRND 
force, behaviour that opposition parties condemned in a number of their 
announcements.89 On 22 November 1992, Léon Mugesera, an intellectual in the 
President’s party, made a speech in which he openly called for Hutu violence against the 
Tutsi. Furthermore, shortly before the accords on power sharing were signed on 9 
January 1993, Colonel Bagosora, one of MRND members, left and promised that he was 
going to Rwanda to prepare for an apocalypse, a declaration that all remaining parties 
condemned as extremist.90
                                                 
89 Dismas Nsengiyaremye, “La transition démocratique au Rwanda (1989-1993)”, in André Guichaoua, Les 
crises politiques, pp. 239-263, p. 258 ; MDR, PSD, PL, Special Announcement : MDR, PSD, PL, Butare, 
17 November 1992; MDR-Ruhengeri, Lettre au Président de la République, Kigali, Objet : Meurtres de 
populations civiles dans la Préfecture Ruhengeri, Kigali, le 23/02/1993. 
 Once the other protocol on the army integration of both the 
government forces and RPF forces was drafted, then the extremist discourse became even 
harsher against the Tutsi at large.  The CDR party had rejected those accords, hence was 
not included in power sharing. The first priority of the MRND and CDR then became 
reclaiming one ministry for the CDR. The opposition parties together with the RPF 
rejected that idea. This new misunderstanding between the MRND, CDR and other 
smaller parties and opposition parties plus the RPF became a new motive for the endless 
postponement of the establishment of the BBGT from January 1994 onwards. In addition 
to this, the Arusha peace process foresaw the change of all the local authorities, from the 
90 MDR, Kigali-Ville, Announcement No. 34, “Has Colonel Bagosora started to prepare his project of 
transforming Rwanda into a bloodshed (Umuyonga)?”, Kigali, 15 January 1993. 
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Prefecture to the Commune, which means that Prefects, Subprefects and Burgomasters 
who were incumbents by then felt that their position had become fragile.91
 
 
Following the signature of Arusha Peace Accord on 4 August 1993, Kangura magazine 
stressed that the only rescue for the Hutu was the CDR party, because the Tutsi had 
conquered power that the Hutu had had since 1959, that they came to grab all the material 
benefits that their 1959 “revolution” had given them and that the Tutsi were coming to 
subjugate them in slavery, corporal punishment, tax compulsion and economic 
exploitation again.92
 
 
Following the massacre of 300 people in the north-western part of the country in late 
January 1993, the RPF launched a major offensive towards Kigali on 8 February 1993 
and stopped some few kilometres before the city. By early March 1993 the number of 
displaced people reached 860,000, that is, more than 10% of the population at that time.93
 
  
This attack is said to have convinced even moderate Hutu politicians that the balance of 
force was big for military protagonists and small for political ones, and that the RPF was 
not to be trusted. This in a way worked in favour of extremists whose point that the RPF 
was a Tutsi conqueror group was now proved: “On one side, even the most resolute and 
honest opponents of the regime began to fear that they had been naive and that, through 
their actions, they were running the risk of exchanging a Hutu military dictatorship for a 
Tutsi one.”94 Oppositions parties’ messages following that offensive made it clear that 
they feared and condemned both extremist parties and the RPF.95
                                                 
91 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 196. 
 The MDR showed that 
it was against the RPF when the latter demanded that the French troops leave the country 
as one of the preconditions for the continuation of negotiations. MDR decided on 1 
92 Ngeze Hassan in Kangura, n° 47, août 1993, in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, pp. 
234-237. 
93 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 173-175. 
94 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 180. 
95 See for example MDR, Communiqué du Bureau Politique du MDR, signé par Dr. Donat Murego, 
Secrétaire Exécutif, Kigali, le 11/02/1993 ; MDR-Ruhengeri, Lettre au Président de la République, Kigali, 
Objet : Meurtres de populations civiles dans la Préfecture Ruhengeri, Kigali, le 23/02/1993 ; Colette 
Braeckman, Rwanda : Histoire d’un génocide, Paris, Fayard, 1994, p. 137. 
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March 1993 that the demand of the RPF should be rejected. This showed both the lack of 
trust towards RPF and the incertitude about the security of the country.96
 
  
However, the most significant factor that promoted the perception of the Tutsi as a threat 
to the Hutu is how the extremist media portrayed the killing of the Burundian president, 
Melchior Ndadaye, on 21 October 1993 by a faction of Tutsi officers, and the violence 
that followed in that country that caused the death of between 50,000 and 100,000 
people, both Hutu and Tutsi.97 The extremist media took this violent event as a proof that 
no Tutsi was ready for sharing power with the Hutu even in Rwanda, where the Arusha 
peace process had been signed two months before. In December 1993, Kangura wrote: 
“If Ndadaye was not assassinated, the Tutsi could continue to hide their strategy until the 
end of the world. Tutsi will pay until the end of the world the price for the death of 
Ndadaye, whether they like it or not!”98 According to Shingiro Mbonyumutwa, the 
killing of Ndadaye showed to clever Rwandans that the Tutsi cannot coexist with the 
Hutu in peace and share power peacefully.99 It became an occasion to reject the outcome 
of the Arusha peace accords. As Prunier wrote, the killing of President Ndadaye in 
Burundi became “ a godsend for the ‘Power’ fractions of the ‘opposition’ parties which 
could both pretend to have been ‘moderates’ hitherto and to have turned to ‘rightful 
extremism’ only as a response to an intolerable threat.”100
 
 
The death of President Ndadaye and the escalation of violence in Burundi, coupled with 
the flight of many Burundians to Rwanda, contributed to the polarization of politics in 
Rwanda. Opposition parties had been divided among themselves following the formation 
of the transitional cabinet of July 1993 as we saw in the previous chapter. All those 
politicians who were unhappy about the share of cabinet portfolios were approached by 
the Habyarimana clique and formed what was called the “Hutu Power” faction of the 
                                                 
96 MDR-Kigali, Communiqué de Presse, Position du Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) sur la 
présence des troupes françaises au Rwanda, Kigali, le 01 mars 1993. 
97 Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, pp. 69-70, 198. 
98 Ngeze Hassan in Kangura, n° 52, décembre 1993, in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, 
p. 186. 
99 Shingiro Mbonyumutwa in Radio Rwanda, 21 avril 1994 in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du 
génocide, p. 294. 
100 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 200. 
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MDR and PL and later on of the PSD. Moderate members of these opposition parties 
became more and more fragile because of that division of their parties. This occurred at 
the moment when the extremist discourse was becoming more and more radicalized 
against the Tutsi. Although ethnic identities were polarized101
 
 and were presented that 
way in the extremist propaganda, the latter had failed to convince many Hutu to see 
politics along ethnic lines only. After October 1993 however, they were increasingly 
successful in doing that, as the Tutsi were depicted more and more as a political threat. 
Finally, the arrival of Hutu Burundian refugees in Rwanda led to the banality of violence 
against the Tutsi as one of my informants narrated. 
 
You could see that the population began to have oppositions among themselves. 
That continued until 1993. Especially after the Burundians removed fear from 
them. A war had occurred in Burundi, then the Burundians began to cross the 
border, you saw that they came after having killed people easily. As they entered 
in the country, they had machetes that killed people. Then the population became 
also eager, saying, if this programme can come here, we can also kill them. […] 
you saw that their fear [the perpetrators’] was removed by the Burundians.102
 
 
Lastly, the Tutsi were accused of having killed the Rwandan President. This became an 
ultimate justification for exterminating them. The Tutsi were presented as evil in the 
extremist media: “These pitiful, pitiful Tutsi, in killing the President what did they 
reproach to him really? […] He had done a lot for them, but these people are 
insatiable.”103 In December 1993, the Kangura newspaper had even made a prophecy 
about the killing of President Habyarimana: “President Habyarimana could die before the 
month of March 1994. […] Last month we got irrefutable evidences that showed us that 
Habyarimana is going to be killed. Moreover, he will not be killed by a Tutsi but by a 
Hutu working for the Tutsi… We have carefully examined that…”104
 
 
                                                 
101 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p. 23. 
102 Interview with Drocelle Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
103 RTLM, Valérie Bemeriki, 20 mai 1994 in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 160. 
104 Ngeze Hassan in Kangura, n° 53, décembre 1993, in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, 
p. 188. 
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During the genocide, just a week after the death of President Habyarimana following the 
shooting down of his plane, RTLM radio broadcast the following message: “The Tutsi 
who are a minority in Bujumbura wanted to take over power and this caused the 
extermination of several Tutsi in the countryside. This is exactly what the group of 
inkotanyi has done against the Tutsi living inside the country. We haven’t stopped saying 
two things that can lead definitely Rwandans in the fighting: to kill the President of the 
Republic and to restart the battle.”105
 
 In this regard, the genocide in Rwanda looked like 
an imitation what had just occurred in Burundi a few months earlier.  
The result of this sophisticated propaganda machine was the production of a number of 
patterns of behaviour and emotional outcomes both on the side of the perpetrators and of 
the victims-to-be. On the side of perpetrators-to-be, it led to hatred, scapegoating, blame 
and fear of the Tutsi and obedience to genocide organisers, whereas on the side of 
victims-to-be, it led to fear and despair.  
 
It is worth noting that genocide propagandists were highly skilled. The analysis of Jean-
Pierre Chrétien suggests that they learned how to instil obedience, using both scholarship 
and previous Nazi techniques. And obtaining obedience was a very important factor in 
order to have killing orders carried out:  
 
Killing is very discouraging if you must decide to do so yourself ... but if you are 
obeying orders from the authorities, if you are adequately conditioned, if you feel 
pushed and pulled, if you see that the carnage will have absolutely no adverse 
effects in future, you feel comforted and revitalized. You do it without shame ... 
We envisaged this relief with no reluctance whatsoever ... we were efficiently 
conditioned by radio broadcasts and advice we heard.106
 
  
But the extremists were also helped by the existing structural and conjunctural social and 
economic conditions. Adult rural peasants who headed households were for the great 
majority illiterate. A study conducted in 1984 suggests that about 59.8 percent of heads of 
                                                 
105 RTLM, 13 avril 1994, Kantano Habimana, in Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 198. 
106 Hatzfeld 2003 quoted in Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “RTLM Propaganda: the Democratic Alibi”, in Allan, 
Thompson, (ed.), The Media and the Rwanda genocide, pp. 55-61, p. 55. 
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families in rural areas had no education, whereas the other more than 35 percent had only 
primary education.107 The level of poverty had increased significantly since 1985 and life 
conditions were becoming unbearable. Uvin argued that when people are put under these 
difficult conditions, they are prone to easy manipulation. As Ervin Staub contended, 
“[o]ne frequent, destructive response to difficult life conditions is scapegoating, blaming 
some group for the life problems, or conflict, or past violence, even if the violence has 
been mutual. Another frequent response is increased devaluation of another group.”108
 
  
But to what degree can the manipulated population be considered as passive in this 
process? To what degree the above media propaganda reached the audience, and to what 
extent did the latter react to it? While there is no doubt about the role that the radio 
played in the genocide, the direct causal link between radio and killing has been debated 
by a number of authors. Mironko argued that radio messages were not the main source 
for the peasants perpetrators that he interviewed; instead, the main influence for 
advocating genocide participation came from soldiers and leaders: “…soldiers brought it 
[the killing] and then RTLM reported it. For example, I had a small radio. The radio used 
to broadcast it. You found out that what it broadcast was what the soldiers were doing. 
So, it was necessary that we do it too. Because the leadership supported it, we accepted 
it.”109 The research of Scott Straus which includes both national and local cases, points 
out that face-to-face mobilization was more significant than radio messages in inciting 
genocide participation.110
                                                 
107 République Rwandaise, Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et des Forêts, Résultats de l’Enquête 
Nationale Agricole 1984, Kigali,  Printer Set, s.d., p. 31. 
 My interviews also point to the efficacy of human contact 
between local leaders and constituents in the instilling of extremist propaganda messages 
before the genocide and in the dissemination of killing orders during the genocide. These 
messages were conveyed by local authorities in their numerous meetings with the 
population. It is also sure that these authorities read the printed media in addition to what 
they heard through the radio and the instructions coming from above. As Higiro has 
108 Staub, “Genocide in Rwanda”, p. 249. 
109 Charles Mironko, “The Effect of RTLM's Rhetoric of Ethnic Hatred in Rural Rwanda”, in Allan 
Thompson, (ed.), The Media and the Rwanda genocide, pp. 125-135, p. 130. 
110 Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide. Race, Power and War in Rwanda, Ithaca and London, Cornell 
University Press, 2006, pp. 148-149. 
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noted, print media reached a very limited audience that was predominantly made of 
intellectuals and rarely the lay people.111 But the informants also point out that the radio 
did have some influence. Consider for example this answer: “[By the time of parties], I 
was a man who understands politics. I also had a radio. In fact, radio is a school of people 
who did not go to school.”112
  
  
While the extremist ideology focused on the blaming of Tutsi and the unifying of the 
Hutu against the Tutsi before the genocide, it shifted to accusations against the Tutsi for 
having killed the President and to the incitement to kill them during the genocide. 
However, it is worth noting that hatred and obedience were not obtained by verbal 
propaganda only. Even the list of massacres that the extremists conducted from 1990 to 
1993 seem to have acted as a propaganda in itself. Killing the Tutsi entered once again 
political culture and became a banal activity. I develop this point in the next section. 
 
5.3. MASSACRES AS MOBILISATION 
 
Doris Bergen who studied the history of the Holocaust asserted that “[v]iolence itself 
served the Nazi regime as a form of propaganda.”113
 
 This seems to have occurred in the 
Rwandan case as well. The first instrumentalization of violence in the propaganda was 
through war representation as we saw above. The second was that most massacres that 
occurred between 1990 and 1993 were presented as a response either to actual or fake 
RPF attacks. In this regard, they appeared as revenge killings or preventive killings. In 
both cases they produced the effect of banalization of extreme violence. The reading of 
Hannah Arendt (Einchmann in Jerusalem) suggests that banalizing violence is an 
ideology in itself.  
                                                 
111 Jean Marie Vianney Higiro, “Rwandan Private Print Media on the Eve of the Genocide”, in Thompson, 
(ed.), The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, pp. 73-89, p. 81. 
112 Interview with Vénuste Sindabizera, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. In fact, Frank Chalk has indicated that radio 
ownership in Rwanda was about 25 radios for one hundred persons in 1992, which was above the 
percentage in Subsaharan Africa. In early 1990, there were about 1,685 radios in the Kibayi commune. 
(Chalk, “Hate Radio in Rwanda”, p. 97; République Rwandaise, Préfecture de Butare, Commune de 
Kibayi, Monographie de la Commune de Kibayi 1989,  Mars 1990, p. 65.) 
113 Bergen, War & Genocide, p. 66. 
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But perhaps the most striking fact is that almost all the signs, practices and actors 
identified during the genocide - the language, the tools and the weapons, the actors 
ranging from the organisers to the executors, and the victims - had already appeared in 
these massacres. This is what makes them also a mobilising factor. They became a 
mobilising factor in that they showed that it is possible to massacre some Tutsi and not be 
seriously punished.  
 5.3.1. Kibilira 
 
The first massacre occurred in Kibilira Commune, in the North-western part of the 
country, only ten days after the start of the RPF war, between 11 and 13 October 1990. 
The Kibilira massacre took 348 lives and more than 550 houses got burnt, with the 
participation of local authorities who used the population to commit those atrocities. 
Following that massacre the Burgomaster and the Subprefect who initiated that massacre 
were only sacked. In this massacre, the killing was described as “working”. The 
techniques of instilling popular participation included rumours about the murder of an 
important national leader known locally, and the display of two corpses of people 
supposedly killed by the Tutsi. Yet, it is stressed that no Tutsi among the victims had any 
link whatsoever with the RPF. Those who were accused of taking part in that massacre 
were jailed only for a month and thereafter got released.114
 
 
The second attack against the Tutsi of Kibilira occurred again following the massacre of 
Bugesera that occurred in early March 1992. But because the authorities did not condone 
them and actually strived to stop them, only five people were killed and a few others 
were injured. More than 1,000 others fled to a nearby church seeking safety. Another 
attack on the same place occurred in late December 1992, an attack that targeted not just 
the Tutsi, but also the Hutu from the opposition parties. It followed the speech of Léon 
Mugesera of 22 November, made at Kabaya in Gaseke Commune, neighbouring Kibilira. 
                                                 
114 Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), et al., Rapport de la Commission 
internationale d’enquête sur les violations des droits de l’homme au Rwanda depuis le 1er Octobre 1990 (7-
21 janvier 1993), Rapport final, Paris, London, Mars 1993, pp. 18-21 ; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 
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That speech led to the attack of Tutsi living in Kibilira, Kayove and Mutura Communes.  
It is in this late massacre that the MRND militia, the Interahamwe took part. They had 
existed since early 1992. They were progressively used in massacres across the 
country.115 Following the Kibilira massacre, other attacks on Tutsi and Hutu opponents 
occurred in Murambi, Kibuye, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi.116
 
  
The Mugesera speech has been analysed in various ways. My reading suggests that the 
first point that can be found in it is about party competition expressed in violent terms. 
The author of this speech is a party leader. He is talking to party members, haranguing 
them to fight against members of the MDR, the PL and other opposition parties: 
 
… I tell you that the Gospel has already changed in our movement. If someone 
slaps you once, you must doubly retaliate, possibly give two mortal slaps. Please 
understand very well: we do not want in our territory a member of MDR and 
others, they must not be heard here [Kabaya] and in the whole Gisenyi. Their 
small flags must not be put here. Our fief must not be infiltrated: it is 
forbidden.117
 
  
Moreover, the key word that keeps on coming back in his speech was “vigilance”, a word 
found also in the Hutu Ten Commandments (article 9). Then the killing, and not the 
chasing of the Tutsi as it happened in 1959, is perceived as a weapon to win political 
control. The speech of Léon Mugesera is also to be put in the context of the Hamitic 
theory, especially with its mention of the Nyabarongo river leading to Ethiopia: 
 
Recently, I told to a so-called member of PL that the mistake we made in 1959, as 
I was a child, was that we let them go out [of the country] peacefully… “I inform 
you that your country is Ethiopia, and we are going to send you there via 
Nyabarongo in an express trip.” Yes, I repeat to you that we must start working. 
[…] At last, I remind you the main points of what I just said: be vigilant in the 
first place.118
 
 
                                                 
115 FIDH et al., Rapport, pp. 22-26. 
116 Article 19, Broadcasting Genocide, p. 14; Colette Braeckman, Rwanda : Histoire d’un génocide, Paris, 
Fayard, 1994, p. 117. 
117 Discours de Léon Mugesera du 22 novembre 1992 (sous-préfecture de Kabaya) in André Guichaoua, 
(sous la direction de), Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994). Analyses, faits et 
documents, 2è édition, Paris, Karthala, 1995, p. 620. 
118 Guichaoua (dir.), Les crises politiques, p. 621. 
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Violence that occurred in Kibilira and Mutura in December 1992 is believed to have been 
caused by this speech.119 The Justice Minister asked that Mugesera be prosecuted,120
 5.3.2. Massacre of Bagogwe 
 but 
the Habyarimana regime protected him and ultimately facilitated his flight to Canada.  
 
The massacre of Bagogwe, a group of Tutsi who lived near the volcanoes and the 
Virunga Park, occurred in January 1991 following the RPF attack of the Ruhengeri 
prison. The FIDH human rights organisation pointed out the role of top country leaders in 
organizing this massacre including the President of the Republic. This massacre took 
around 300 to 1,000 lives of Bagogwe.121
 5.3.3. Massacres in Bugesera 
 
 
The massacres of Tutsi in Bugesera occurred in March 1992. But since October 1991, the 
Burgomaster of Kanzenze located in the Bugesera region had harassed a number of 
young Tutsi men accusing them of joining the RPF. He had also gone into open conflict 
with the head of the PL opposition party in his commune, accusing him of being an 
accomplice of the RPF.  From then on, extremist propaganda had been spread asking the 
population to be “alert”, and to make sure that the Tutsi did not escape. Part of this 
campaign was done by the official radio, Radio Rwanda, and with its leader, Professor 
Ferdinand Nahimana, who became one of the ideologists of genocide. Another 
development in these massacres is that the Interahamwe militia operated for the first time 
in this Bugesera massacre. It had just been founded shortly at that time. This massacre 
was made possible after an active participation of local leaders, Radio Rwanda, 
Interahamwe, Kangura, Military and others.122
                                                 
119 African Rights, Rwanda. Death, despair and defiance, Revised 1995 Edition, London, African Rights, 
August 1995, p. 77. 
   
120 Stanislas Mbonampeka, Ministre de la Justice, Confidentiel, Lettre à Monsieur le Procureur Général 
près la Cour de Sûreté de l’Etat, Kigali, Réf. : N° 031/05.00/Cab., Kigali, le 25 novembre 1992. 
121 FIDH, et al., Rapport, p. 37-38 ; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 27 and 136-138. 
122 FIDH et al., Rapport, pp. 42-43 ; African Rights, Rwanda. Death, despair and defiance, p. 69 ; Chrétien 
(dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 94-95 ; Alison Des Forges, “Call to Genocide: Radio in 
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The FIDH (Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme) report concluded that the 
killings had reached 2000 between 1990 and January 1993, targeting Tutsi but also a 
number of Hutu opponents; that leaders had planned those mass killings in advance; that 
they had involved the outstanding participation of local leaders but also of local 
populations, but that the perpetrators had not been punished in proportion to their 
crimes.123
 
  
It is worth noting that it is in the regions that constituted strongholds of the MRND and 
CDR that these massacres occurred. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, party leaders 
had chosen violence against rival party members as a political strategy. The degree of 
manufactured violence depended on the control over the means of inflicting violence that 
a particular party might have. The MRND and CDR were privileged in this area, since 
their militia were becoming more militarily trained than the youth wings of other parties, 
and had the support of the military, the gendarmerie and the police more than any other 
party. 
 
5.4. GENOCIDE AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
 5.4.1. The Unfolding 
 
At the beginning of 1994 almost all conditions were met in order to have a serious 
political crisis. The Habyarimana regime was postponing the establishment of the Broad 
Based Transition Government (BBTG). The economic situation had not been improved 
by the Structural Adjustment Programme policies. War between the Rwanda Government 
Forces (RGF) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and political violence between 
extremist and moderate political parties, had produced both criminal violence and 
political violence. The extremist parties had gone so far as to organise and implement the 
first massacres of Tutsi and assassinations of Hutu opponents since 1990. The Hutu 
                                                 
123 FIDH et al., Rapport, pp. 48-49 et 79. See also Africa Watch, Beyond the Rhetoric. Continuing Human 
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extremist media were predicting the worst against the Tutsi in general and the RPF in 
particular. In other words, the political and social climate was extremely tense at this 
time. 
 
However, it is the assassination of Habyarimana that gave the Hutu extremists the 
ultimate opportunity to implement genocide against the Tutsi and assassinate moderate 
Hutu politicians. That this genocide was planned and prepared some years before has 
been ascertained by the existing literature on genocide today and has cast very few 
doubts, given the efficiency with which the organisers and later on the perpetrators acted. 
However, when this planning started has not yet been precisely ascertained. Prunier 
situates the planning time to the end of 1992.124 According to Verwimp, that date is to be 
estimated between November 1991 and August 1992.125
 
  
The announcement of the extermination of the Tutsi following the death of President 
Habyarimana achieved two things as far as the ideology of hatred is concerned. It 
increased fear and blame. It also polarized behaviour. One had to participate in the 
genocide, or be considered as accomplice of the enemy. That is at least in theory. 
 
Furthermore, opposition parties’ leaders had been seriously weakened by their internal 
divisions. So the extremist faction became strengthened by the coalition with the “Hutu 
power” leaders. Therefore, those who had caused disobedience during the multiparty 
system had been weakened, and those who wanted to lead the whole country in wholesale 
massacre gained more and more voice. As a result, the number of those Hutu individuals 
who had always been moderate started to decrease as a number of them were joining the 
killings. This is what Fletcher has called “to turn interahamwe”. The State message 
during the time of genocide was about turning more “bystanders” into “perpetrators”. 
However, the experience was that not every Hutu joined the side of the perpetrators, 
which suggests Staub was correct when he argues that no matter what the genocide 
experience, people still keep a certain portion of choice. 
                                                 
124 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 168-169. 
125 Philip Verwimp, “Development ideology, the peasantry and genocide: Rwanda represented in 
Habyarimana’s speeches”, Journal of Genocide Research, 2, 3, 2000, pp. 325-361, p. 354. 
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A number of Hutu extremists, in a move to clear their image after the genocide, have 
given more importance to the period between 1990 and 1994; in this regard they have 
argued that without the civil war caused by the RPF there would have been no 
genocide.126 Scott Straus has contended that the more the RPF attacks threatened the 
Hutu hardliners’ power, the more these turned to an extremist choice against the Tutsi, 
and ultimately to genocide.127 But a careful analysis of the content of the ideology of 
Tutsi genocide as developed above reveals clearly that the choice to victimize all the 
Tutsi as political strategy to counter the RPF advances was made as soon as the war 
erupted in October 1990, and that this ideology built its core arguments from the political 
situation since 1959. Alison Des Forges has argued that between the many choices that 
the Habyarimana regime had to fight the war, both militarily and politically, it chose the 
ethnic one. Maybe this temptation stemmed from the supposed efficacy of ethnic 
manipulation during the 1960s and the continuation of a racist policy during the First and 
Second Republics. The instilling of fear had become a permanent strategy to have 
massacres implemented, or to plan for future massacres.128
 
 
The presidential plane was shot down on 6 April 1994 shortly after 8:00 pm. 
Immediately, roadblocks and patrols of Presidential Guards and other forces started. A 
number of Hutu moderate political leaders, who included the Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana, were assassinated within a few hours. Retired Colonel Théoneste 
Bagosora, one of the Akazu members, took charge of the political control of the country 
for several hours and set up structures that could lead the country in this crisis. He is 
presented as the one who set up the Interim Government (IG) that implemented the 
genocide.129
                                                 
126 See in Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence, p. 73. 
 This government was set up on 8 April 1994. It was led by Théodore 
Sindikubwabo as President and Jean Kambanda as Prime Minister. It contained MRND, 
127 Straus, The Order of Genocide, pp. 12-13, 41. 
128 Chrétien, Le défi de l’ethnisme, pp. 58 et 308.  
129  Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda: trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1995, pp. 80-
86 ; Roméo  Dallaire, (Lieutenant-General), with Brend Beardsley (Major), Shake Hands with the Devil: 
The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Random House Canada, 2003, pp. 221-262 ; Prunier, The Rwanda 
Crisis, pp. 239-242.  
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CDR members but also “Hutu Power” factions members of MDR, PSD, PL and PDC 
parties. No Tutsi was a member of this government for obvious reasons.130 Both 
Sindikubwabo and Kambanda were from Butare Prefecture. The first was elderly, and 
had been a renowned political figure since the 1960s. He was among the symbolic Hutu 
leaders during the “revolution”. He even became a Minister in the government of Rwanda 
on 1 July 1962. He is among the few politicians who served both the First and the Second 
Republic regimes. In 1994 he was a MRND member. As for Jean Kambanda, he was 
born in 1956, was in his late thirties by the time of genocide. He was commercial 
engineer and member of MDR “Power”. He had been a rival of Agathe Uwilingiyimana 
during the multiparty system and was angered by the fact that he had been excluded from 
the BBTG list of Ministers. Entering the IG became, as Guichaoua argued, an occasion 
for revenge against his long-time adversary, Agathe Uwilingiyimana.131 But the 
calculation by the Hutu extremists here was that including Butare politicians at the helm 
of this genocide government would homogenize the genocide project for the whole 
territory of the country, as they were already very sure of its implementation in regions of 
MRND and CDR control. Some other names of Ministers from Butare were Straton 
Nsabumukunzi, Callixte Kalimanzira and Pauline Nyiramasuhuko.132
 
 
The first thing the IG together with the security structures including the army, the 
Presidential Guard, the gendarmerie, and the police did was to set up roadblocks and 
monitor the daily and nightly patrols using the local population. The latter was organized 
into “security committees” which included also local leaders such as cell committee 
members, and sector committee members.  These committees depended on the allegiance 
of commune, sector and cell local leaders. They seem to have operated efficiently as far 
as the experience of the genocide tells us. Indeed, if anything, the administration 
remained efficient during the genocide, a coherence it did not have during the time of 
multiparty system in the whole country, when, as we saw in the previous chapter, the 
local leaders were not being obeyed by their constituents in Butare, because this area was 
                                                 
130 Reyntjens, Rwanda: trois jours, p. 88. 
131 André Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994: Les politiques du génocide à Butare, Paris, Karthala, 2005, p. 63. 
132 Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994, pp. 65-67. 
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a stronghold of opposition parties. It is worth noting that with the exception of one 
commune, Giti, located in the centre-eastern part of the country, all other 144 communes 
obeyed the call of genocide. Since the beginning of the genocide, the success of the 
execution of the extermination of the Tutsi population in an area depended in most cases 
firstly on the dedication of local leaders, but also of self-defence civil committees which 
worked in tandem with local leaders. Soldiers and policemen intervened in areas where 
the Tutsi had assembled en masse to use firearms, but the “finishing” of the “job” was 
done by the local population that had become “Interahamwe” that is, killers.  The local 
leaders coordinated massacres, that is, mobilised as much of the population to enter the 
killing mobs (Ibitero); planned the areas where they would go to operate; moved the 
Tutsi population to assembly areas; and brought the killing mobs to murder them. 
Sometimes, the victims themselves fled to places which they thought to be safe, such as 
churches and administrative offices of the communes, but these areas turned out to be 
places of massacre. When the Tutsi were able to put up some resistance against their 
Hutu attackers, it was the local leaders who were in charge of calling for backup from the 
military, the gendarmerie or the neighbouring commune local populations. 
 
The role of the local leaders can be discerned by the fact that where these showed some 
reluctance to participate in genocide, its implementation was delayed. Such is the case of 
Butare Prefecture where the Prefect, Jean Baptiste Habyarimana, the only Tutsi prefect at 
the time, resisted the genocide implementation in Butare. As a result, with the exception 
of one commune, Nyakizu, he was able to delay the genocidal killings in that prefecture 
for about 10 days, that is, until 18 April 1994.133
 
 He was ultimately deposed on 19 April 
by President Sindikubwabo and Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, and later killed. The 
appointment of Sylvain Nsabimana as new Prefect and Colonel Alphonse Nteziryayo as 
the Head of the Civil self-defense unit in Butare, now made the genocide in Butare 
possible. 
The IG then chose the strategy of sending its Ministers to their region of origin, to instill 
popular participation in the killings and to monitor how that “work” was being done. It is 
                                                 
133 Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994, pp. 110 et 254-255. 
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in that regard that Sindikubwabo and Kambanda came to Butare. In the episode of 19 
April 1994 during which the Butare Prefect was deposed, the speech of the President was 
about raising awareness among the Butare people that they should cease behaving as 
neutral or passive (Ba Ntibindeba) and to choose to be active, that is, to accept that they 
should “work”, which meant at the time of the genocide to kill the Tutsi. He even 
threatened to deal with those who would remain neutral. But his language was coded, 
though it was clear enough, given the circumstances of the moment:  
 
The people of Butare, … are known for their behaviour of indifference vis-à-vis 
what is happening elsewhere, as if it is not their business (ntibindeba). Today, the 
situation is different, you are wrong to think this way…. This is the only way of 
stopping the RPF attack, of defeating the inyenzi-inkotanyi once and for all, and 
to never hear about them anymore. Work as others. Those who do not want to 
work should not embarrass others. They must also be cleaned out of the way, so 
that they let others work.134
 
 
 
This speech was aired on Radio Rwanda. It may have convinced more Rwandans who 
were not willing to take part in the killings to do so, since it looked as if that was the only 
option left for them.   
 
The obedience of local leaders to orders coming from the national government stems first 
from the very political culture in which most burgomasters had evolved. As we saw in 
Chapter three, the commune leaders represented national leaders at local level; they had 
been appointed by the President of the Republic, were monitored by Prefects, who also 
were appointed by the President of the Republic, and as many authors argued, they 
seemed to represent the interests of the government more than those of their constituents. 
The genocide experience shows that the multiparty system time (1991-1994) did not 
change this culture that much. But it also shows that the propaganda entertained during 
this moment was strong enough to convince the majority of local leaders to join in the 
genocidal project. But more importantly, the killing of the President and the war situation 
following that killing and the starting of the genocide were encouraging a large number 
                                                 
134 See the French version of this speech which was pronounced originally in Kinyarwanda, in  Ntaribi 
Kamanzi, Rwanda. Du génocide à la défaite, Kigali, Editions REBERO, 1997, p. 130. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
332 
of leaders but also the population to join in. As Fletcher argued, the start of the killing of 
Tutsi showed those who were not participating that they had to join.135
 
 
The efficiency with which the IG acted depended both on last minute strategies and past 
structural organisation. Indeed, the government moved from Kigali to Gitarama on 12 
April 1994 as the RPF had arrived in the capital a day before and war was starting in the 
capital. The government worked in Gitarama until 28 May 1994, when it was obliged 
again to move to Gisenyi, as Gitarama was being invaded by the RPF.136 However, 
despite the geographical instability of this government, Tutsi massacres kept on 
continuing, which suggests that those in charge at local level had taken their task 
seriously. This outstanding submission was the result of the 1994 situation or pressure but 
also of the way burgomasters had always carried their duties, as we saw in chapter three. 
Therefore, those who argue that the Rwandan state was strong at the time of the genocide 
have a point if we consider these two elements: predominantly obedient relations already 
existing between upper leaders and lower leaders, and the 1994 context.137
 
 
One illustration that corroborates this two-fold analysis is the way genocide was 
conceptualised and symbolised in relation to Umuganda communal labour as far as 
longue durée is concerned.138
 
 The Killing of the Tutsi was Umuganda “work”; those who 
enforced the 1994 killing were the same who had enforced Umuganda until 1990; that is 
the Burgomaster, the Councillor and the Cell committee members, also the Umuganda 
committees; the outcome that was always promised, that is, social welfare, was the same 
that was promised after the extermination of the Tutsi. 
                                                 
135 Luke Fletcher, “Turning interahamwe: individual and community choices in the Rwandan genocide”, 
Journal of Genocide Research, 9, 1, March 2007, pp. 25–48, pp. 40-41. 
136 Kamanzi, Rwanda. Du génocide à la défaite, pp. 109 et 165. 
137 Danielle de Lame, “Le génocide rwandais et le vaste monde, les liens du sang”, in Filip Reyntjens et 
Stefan Maysse (dir.), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 1996-1997, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997, pp. 157-
177, pp. 161 et 169 ; Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994, pp. 70 et 181. 
138 Philip Verwimp, “Peasant Ideology and Genocide Under Habyarimana”, in Susan E. Cook (ed.), 
Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives, New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK), 
Transaction Publishers, 2006, pp. 1-40, pp. 27-28; Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 95. 
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The conjuncture, that is, the period during the genocide, was also used. In the Hutu 
“Power” media propaganda and in the instructions of the upper echelons, genocide was a 
war. The Tutsi were the “enemy”. A big number of the local population of able-bodied 
men were organised into civil self-defence forces. Every adult Rwandan was asked to be 
“vigilant” towards the enemy; in practice this meant mounting roadblocks and doing 
night and day patrols for men, and to inform on hiding places of the Tutsi for women. 
The participation of soldiers, Presidential Guards, Gendarmerie and Police in the killing 
activity corroborated this war situation. The population was asked to collaborate with the 
military in the operations. Where the RGF and RPF forces had had confrontations, this 
was a proof that the “war” was a reality. But the whole country knew it, because it was 
reported on radios.139
 
 War became a reality as the RPF advanced and victories were 
increasing. On 22-23 May 1994, the RPF captured both the Kanombe Airport and the 
Kanombe Military Camp. They attacked Kabgayi on 2 June 1994, occupied Gitarama 
Prefecture on 13 June 1994, and on 4 July both Kigali and Butare were captured.  
Roméo Dallaire, the Commander-in-Chief of United Nations Mission Assistance Mission 
for Rwanda (UNAMIR), attempted to obtain a cease-fire between the RGF and the RPF, 
but both parties failed to reach any agreement, their actions, objectives and means during 
the genocide being diametrically opposed: 
 
For the RGF (Rwandan Government Forces), the cease-fire was a prerequisite to 
stop the massacres; for the RPF, the cessation of the massacres was a prerequisite 
to the signing of any cease-fire agreement. […] The Government forces wanted 
the cease-fire because they did not seem to be holding very well. They were weak 
militarily. The RPF did not want it because they were under the impression that a 
cease-fire would be a significant limiting factor in their endeavor to stop the 
massacre.140
 
  
 The RGF were waging the war against RPF forces, but were also coordinating and 
participating in the massacres of Tutsi, especially in sites where the Tutsi were assembled 
                                                 
139 See leaders’ hatred media messages and orders in Chrétien, (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, pp. 
289-320. 
140 Jacques Castonguay, “In Search of a New Cease-Fire (April-July 1994)”, in Howard Adelman, and 
Suhrke Astri (eds.), The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaïre, The path of a genocide, New Brunswick 
(USA) and London (UK), Transaction Publishers, 1999, pp. 271-280, p. 274. 
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in big numbers, while the RPF was advancing to gain territory but also was rescuing the 
Tutsi population where it could find them alive. The objective of the RGF was to win the 
war against the RPF and to exterminate the Tutsi population, while RPF aimed at 
defeating the RGF, stopping the Tutsi genocide and bringing back peace. The means of 
the RGF included the military, the gendarmerie, the Interahamwe militia but also the civil 
self-defence units, while the RPF relied on its military forces that increased significantly 
during this time. 
 
The war argument became strong as it convinced the population that their participation in 
the genocide was a “self-defence” effort. The war propaganda argument reduced the 
degree of guilt that perpetrators would normally have under ordinary situations. As 
Hannah Arendt stressed, “No one questions the use of violence in self-defence, because 
the danger is not only clear but also present, and the end justifying the means is 
immediate.”141
 
 That the “Tutsi enemy” was a fake one seems to have mattered less, as the 
danger pressure was being brilliantly orchestrated by the organisers of the genocide. For 
example, in areas where resistance to participation was foreseen, leaders implemented 
such techniques as to bring corpses supposedly of Hutu people killed and displayed them 
as a way of mobilising the indifferent Hutu individuals for participation.  
It is worth noting that war has become a classical context for extremist governments to 
implement genocides. Presenting defenceless citizens as the enemy in times of war has 
become an ordinary technique for governments to eliminate their unwanted innocent 
citizens.142
                                                 
141 Hannah Arendt, “Excerpt from On Violence”, in Manfred B. Steger and Nancy S. Lind (eds.), An 
Interdisciplinary Reader, Violence and its Alternatives, London, Macmillan, 1999, pp. 3-11, p. 9. 
 The war argument in the extremist media seemed to benefit from the 
coincidence of the same analysis of the situation by a number of international media and 
international organisations. According to a number of international media agencies, what 
was happening in Rwanda was a war between the Hutu and the Tutsi, it was an 
interethnic cleansing, which means that both ethnic group members were perpetrators and 
victims. Several international media agencies did not want to understand the multiple 
142 For the Holocaust, see the quotation of Bergen above.  
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causes of the genocide and did not sufficiently report the extreme violence occurring.143 
This interpretation of events went at least until late June 1994 when the UN report of 
René Degni-Ségui demonstrated unequivocally that it was a genocide against the Tutsi 
and that the Hutu who were killed at this time, were victims of either war between RGF 
and RPF or were moderate Hutu as far as political affiliations were concerned. Initially, 
international media delayed to investigate the events in Rwanda from April 1994 
onwards,144 and when they did so, they were not efficient enough to attract the attention 
of the world and bring about preventive measures. The UN and OAU also cannot claim to 
have not known what was happening in Rwanda. Roméo Dallaire had issued early 
warnings about arms caches, intensive training of civilian militia for an imminent 
resumption of violence on the side of the Habyarimana regime, since January 1994, but 
the UN Head Quarters did not intervene to halt these actions. Instead, during the 
genocide, the UN decided to downsize its troops in Rwanda and to reduce the mandate of 
those remaining on duty.145 On the side of the OAU, war seems to have been the 
description of the crisis that was occurring in Rwanda at this time. It did not put 
significant pressure on the RGF, nor did it avail troops to stop the killing of the Tutsi 
population. Instead, it allowed the Rwandan government delegation to take part in one 
meeting of OAU in Tunis on 13 June 1994,146
 5.4.2. Agency, Non-agency and Victimhood 
 a gesture that looked like a recognition of 
the “genocide government.” 
 
The perpetrators of the Tutsi genocide were numerous and appeared in different 
categories as far as the degree of agency and hence responsibility is concerned. At the 
first level were organisers. The first cited by many authors are those who controlled the 
                                                 
143 McNulty, M., “Media Ethnicization and the International Response to war and Genocide in Rwanda” , 
in Tim Allen, and Jean Seaton, (eds), The media of conflict, war reporting and representations of ethnic 
violence, London and New York, Zed Books, 1999, pp. 268-286. 
144 Roméo Dallaire, “The Media Dichotomy”, in Thompson, (ed.), The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, 
pp. 23-30, p. 23. 
145 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, pp. 263-327; United Nations, Information Centre for the Nordic 
Countries, Chronology of Events Relating to Rwanda and Transcript Of Daily Press Briefing Of Office Of 
Spokesman For Secretary-General, Copenhagen, 11-12 March 1996, pp. 1-2; 7-9. 
Alison Des Forges, “Call to Genocide”, pp. 52-53. 
146 Kamanzi, Rwanda. Du génocide à la défaite, p. 169. 
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state during the Habyarimana regime, i.e., the Akazu members. Second come those who 
entered the Interim Government on 8 April 1994 who include Akazu members but also 
Hutu “Power” party members and other members from MRND and CDR. Then follows 
top military officials who got involved in the genocidal plan since its inception, Heads of 
Self-Defence Units in all prefectures, Heads of Interahamwe militia.  Prefects, 
Subprefects, Burgomasters, communal police and local civil self-defence units seem to 
have received orders to execute the genocide in their jurisdictions, though it is possible 
that few of them were part of the planning clique. The last but possibly most complex 
group of perpetrators concerns the local ordinary citizens. These include as much the 
urban and the rural, the intellectuals and the illiterate, the latter being the great majority, 
the young and the old, men and to a small degree women. They include even foreigners 
such as Burundi Hutu refugees and others.147
 
 
 
The Christian Churches in Rwanda have been considered as complicit in the genocide for 
their lack of preventive action or their ambivalent behaviour, given the prominent 
position they occupied in society and given the expectations that the victims put in them.  
The Roman Catholic Church in particular has always been close to state ideologies as 
they were changing from the colonial period until 1994. Sociologically speaking, 
churches were a good sample of the Rwandan society: they contained all the ethnic 
groups, all the economic classes, all the political tendencies, both in the clergy and in the 
membership. Ethnic divisions that were witnessed in society were also in the church. 
During the genocide, the church also had perpetrators, bystanders, victims and rescuers. 
Despite its political stand in favour of the “Hutu revolution”, and its divisions in 1959-
1962, the Church had been able to save lives of the Tutsi and monarchists who fled to 
parishes and Christian schools. It had at least kept its moral power, as a sacred place and 
institution. In 1994 however, it failed to save most victims who sought refuge in its 
                                                 
147 On perpetrators, see African Rights, Rwanda. Death, despair and defiance, pp. 100-176; Guichaoua, 
Rwanda 1994, pp. 255, 470; Fletcher, “Turning interahamwe”, pp. 25–48, p. 34; Prunier, The Rwanda 
Crisis, pp. 239-242; Alison, Des Forges, ‘Leave None to Tell the Story.’ Genocide in Rwanda, London, 
Brussels, Human Rights Watch, Paris, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, 1999, 
p. 432 ; African Union, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, Addis Ababa, IPEP/OAU, 2000, pp. 128-129. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
337 
premises.  The MINALOC census calculated that 11.6% of genocide victims perished in 
churches.148
 
 
Given the mass participation in the genocide in Rwanda, which makes it the most 
peculiar genocide in history for having mobilised the biggest number of ordinary citizens, 
the Tutsi genocide has been called a “popular genocide,” a “rural genocide,” etc. 
However, such a terminology fails to capture the essence of each genocide so far 
witnessed in history: that genocide is always a state policy and project. I suggest that it be 
called “a popularized genocide” in order to stress the process of becoming popular, that 
is, both the role of the state in the ordering, and of the process of ordinary populations 
coming to join in the execution of genocide.149 As we have seen all along this chapter, 
mobilization or manipulation comes in between the state and society.150
 
 
At an international level, the role of countries such as France in supporting the Hutu 
extremist government has been proven. France’s military trained the RGF as well as the 
Interahamwe militia in Rwanda before the genocide. They backed the RGF in the first 
RPF attack of 1990. The French military left Rwanda in December 1993, but delivered 
weapons for the RGF during the genocide, and continued to support the IG government 
in exile following the victory of the RPF. Politically, France supported the idea of 
“double genocide” in order to reject the recognition of the Tutsi genocide. From June 
1994, through “Opération Turquoise,” France had been able to save some few lives of 
                                                 
148 MINALOC, Dénombrement des victimes du génocide et des massacres, Rapport final, version révisée, 
Kigali, MINALOC, avril 2004, p. 33. On the social complexity and the multiple contradicting voices 
contained within the Churches in Rwanda, Church understood as “institution” and civil society agent, see 
Timothy Longman, “Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda”, Journal of Religion in Africa, XXXI, 
2, 2001, pp. 163-185; Carol Rittner et al. (eds.), Genocide in Rwanda : Complicity of the Churches ?, Saint 
Paul (Minnesota), Aegis in association with Paragon House, 2004;  and Faustin Rutembesa, et al. (dir.), 
Rwanda. L’Eglise catholique à l’épreuve du génocide, Greenfield Park (Canada), Les Editions Africana, 
2000 ; Saskia Van Hoyweghen, “The Disintegration of the Catholic Church of Rwanda: A Study of the 
Fragmentation of Political and Religious Authority”, African Affairs, Vol. 95, No. 380, July 1996, pp. 379-
401; Todd Salzman, “Catholics & Colonialim. The Church’s failure in Rwanda”, Commonweal, May 23, 
1997, pp. 17-19. 
149 See the provocative book titles of Scott Straus (The Order of genocide) and of Jean-Paul Kimonyo (Un 
génocide populaire), despite the fact that both authors have included national and local case studies, as well 
as state and citizens’ participation. 
150 On the doubt about the concept “popular genocide”, see José Kagabo, “Après le genocide. Notes de 
voyage”, Temps Modernes, Juillet-Août 1995, n° 583, pp. 110-111. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
338 
victims, but also to provide the genocidaires (killers) with a safe haven and a way to 
escape prosecution. Finally, France gave asylum to some of the top genocide leaders.151
 
 
The passivity of other powerful countries, and of the UN and OAU who decided to keep 
silent concerning what was happening in Rwanda at the time of genocide, gave the 
Rwandan government the opportunity to continue its genocidal project undisturbed.152 
One author has suggested that this kind of passive behaviour, characteristic of all 
bystanders, can be considered as an act of perpetration itself, since it gives to actual 
perpetrators the impression of being silently and remotely supported: “Perpetrators see 
passivity as acceptance or even approval of their actions.”153 Others have gone so far in 
their problematization of the position of bystander as to bring together the bystander with 
the perpetrator.154
 
 But bystanders were also among the ordinary citizens who either 
succeeded in not participating in the killings of their Tutsi neighbours or failed to rescue 
them.  
As for Genocide victims, they include those who died and those who survived. The 
existing literature usually stresses the estimate of 800,000 Tutsi killed, and some tens of 
thousands of Hutu moderate who were killed (between 30,000 and 50,000). However, the 
Rwandan Local Government Ministry’s census of 2000, revised in 2004, has calculated 
about 934,218 people who lost their lives in the genocide. These include the Tutsi, those 
who died for being mistaken as Tutsi, those who died for being related to the Tutsi as a 
result of matrimonial relations or political affiliations, or those who were opposed to the 
Hutu extremist government. The Tutsi alone were about 93.67% of the overall number of 
victims, which is 875,082. This estimate is also calculated differently as compared to the 
                                                 
151 Coalition Citoyens France Afrique, Dossier n°1, Rwanda: depuis le 7 avril 1994, la France choisit le 
camp du génocide, s.l.n.d ; République du Rwanda, Commission nationale indépendante chargée de 
rassembler les preuves montrant l’implication de l’Etat Français dans le génocide perpétré au Rwanda en 
1994, Rapport, Kigali, 15 Novembre 2007. 
152 See Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda, New York, New 
York University Press, 1998. 
153 Staub, “Genocide in Rwanda”, pp. 258-259. 
154 Fred Grünfeld, and Anke Huijboom, The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda: The role of Bystanders, 
Leiden and Boston, Transnational Publishers, 2007, pp. 5-6. 
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one in the existing literature in that it includes the victims from 1 October 1990 until 31 
December 1994.155
 
 
Butare Prefecture was the top in having lost more lives during the genocide, followed by 
Rural Kigali, Gitarama, Kigali capital, and Gikongoro. The victims were of all ages, but 
those from 0 to 24 were more numerous than the ones from 25 to 64 and 65 and above. 
Tutsi genocide also included more male victims than women (56.4% versus 43.3%). It 
victimized more peasant-farmers than any other professional category, which 
corroborates the assertion that it was a rural genocide from the perspective of both 
perpetrator and victim.156
 
  
Dan Stone argues that the tools of killing were bullets rather than machetes: “In fact, 
most of the murdered were slain by being shot, machetes being used to ‘finish off’ 
already dying victims, or toward the end of the genocide, when the numbers to be killed 
were smaller.”157 He says this with good intentions of warning those who study the Tutsi 
genocide, not to confuse it with “savage natives” busy “bestially murdering one another” 
with machetes. But the Ministry of Local Government’s Study corroborates the 
predominance of the machete as the main tool used in the Tutsi genocide. According to 
this study, 37.88% of victims were slain by machetes, while those killed by guns were 
14.8%, a number that is even smaller to those who were killed by clubs (16.78%).158
 
  
The current Government of Rwanda has also conducted a census of the survivors of 
genocide. It calculated about 367,362 survivors of different categories that include 
102,743 men, 150,170 women, 74,642 orphans, 27,733 widows and 12,074 disabled from 
genocide violence.159
                                                 
155 MINALOC, Dénombrement, pp. 17, 21 et 35. 
 This number however does not take into consideration women who 
died after 31 December 1994 as a result of rape and AIDS contamination during the 
156 MINALOC, Dénombrement, pp. 22, 24 et 26. 
157 Dan Stone, “Genocide as Transgression”, European Journal of Social Theory, 7, 1, 2004, pp. 45–65, p. 
37. 
158 MINALOC, Dénombrement, p. 32. 
159 Number of survivors of genocide, http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/abarokotse%20english.pdf, 
consulted on 6 October 2007. 
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genocide. Between 200,000 and 500,000 women were raped during the genocide. Some 
of them were infected with HIV-AIDS.160
 
 
The agents in the rescue of victims include certain Hutu who hid them, the RPF rebels 
who arrived in their area before they were killed and saved them, or the fact that the 
victims were able to cross the border of Rwanda and fled to neighbouring countries. But 
it is worth noting that the first agent of the rescue is the victim him/herself: he or she is 
the one who chooses to survive, who negotiates survival, who begs for it, who runs and 
then gets rescued. The second is the rescuer, but he or she comes after the survivor’s 
effort to survive. Of course, there is also fate or fortune. Indeed, most narratives of 
survivors of the Tutsi genocide stress their utmost conviction that it is God who saved 
them.161
 5.4.3. The Economics of Genocide 
 
 
A glimpse at the profile of perpetrators in the Rwandan government census of Tutsi 
genocide perpetrators, as produced by the Gacaca courts, suggests that property was a 
very important incentive in genocide participation. Out of 808,564 alleged perpetrators, 
those charged for robbery or destruction of property reach 308,738 persons, about 
38%.162
                                                 
160 Catharine Newbury and Hannah Baldwin, “Aftermath: Women in Postgenocide Rwanda”, Center for 
Development Information and Evaluation U.S. Agency for International Development Washington, 
Working Paper No. 303, July 2000, p. 4; CNUR, Le rôle de la femme dans le processus de réconciliation et 
de consolidation de la paix au Rwanda: Dix ans après le génocide 1994-2004. Contributions, défis, 
perspectives d’avenir, Mars 2005, pp. 12-13 ; Shelley Whitman, “The Plight of Women and Girls during 
the Genocide”, in Susan M. Thomson and J. Zoë Wilson (eds.), Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region, 
Special Issue of International Insights, Halifax, Canada, June 2005, pp. 93-110, p. 96; Françoise 
Nduwimana, “Women and Rwanda’s genocide: What goes unsaid”, News Clippings, Excerpt from Libertas 
(Rights & Democracy’s  Newsletter), Vol. 14, No. 2, December 2004. 
 It is also likely that some of the remaining perpetrators who are in the categories 
of killers had also charges in relation to property.  I have stressed above the importance 
of land in the argument about mobilisation. The prospective loss of land produced a 
161 See Charles Kabwete Mulinda, “Le sauvetage dans la zone frontière de Gishamvu et de Kigembe au 
Rwanda”, in Jacques Sémelin, Claire Andrieu, Sarah Gensburger (eds.), La résistance aux génocides. De la 
pluralité des actes de sauvetage, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2008, pp. 361-375.  
162 Summary Of Persons Prosecuted For Having Committed Genocide, http://www.inkiko-
gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/abaregwa%20english.pdf, consulted on 22 May 2009. See also David Yanagizawa, 
“Malthus in Rwanda? Scarcity, Survival and Causes of the Genocide”, Paper, March 2006, pp. 1-31, p. 25. 
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psychological effect of uncertainty about the future, while the present was itself 
precarious. On the other hand, killing Tutsi neighbours could become an opportunity to 
seize their land. For these two reasons, scholars have considered land to be a significant 
incentive. In addition to land, there was also livestock, furniture and movable assets. 
These material things functioned both as an incentive to participate in the killing and as 
booty once the killing had ended. Given the levels of poverty at the time of the genocide, 
it was not hard to recruit people after promising them better living condition 
afterwards.163
 5.4.4. The Geography of Genocide 
   
 
Geography mattered both at the macro and micro level. The victims who lived near 
borders used them to escape, but the perpetrators used them also to catch those who were 
trying to cross.164 Rwanda had very few forests and uninhabited places where people 
could hide easily. In this respect, it was hard to hide.165
 
 The mountainous topography of 
Rwanda and the way the Tutsi and Hutu lived together in most areas of the country made 
it difficult to lie about ethnic identity or to hide in the landscape. But in places where 
Tutsi lived as one majority group and close together, they attempted to resist killings, 
such as in Bisesero in Kibuye or Bitare in Gishamvu. Major roads and small paths were 
monitored by roadblocks. Rivers became sites of genocide, as they were used to throw in 
the victims.  
Even the killing places revealed the significance of space. Narratives about the genocide 
across the country stress how certain people were assembled in places such as 
administrative offices, churches, and improvised hill places in order to be killed en 
masse, or how they brought themselves there believing they had more chance as a group 
to resist or be rescued. Others were killed in scattered places near or far from their homes. 
In this regard, the sites of rescue often became the sites of genocide. Perpetrator 
                                                 
163 This does not mean however that poverty always leads to mass violence. It is well known that across the 
world many other people are poor but do not engage in genocide. Other conditions have to be present. 
164 Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 191 ; Yanagizawa, “Malthus in Rwanda”, p. 25. 
165 Hintjens, “When Identity Becomes a Knife”, p. 45. 
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behaviour also followed geography: certain people found it easy to kill in neighbouring 
communes where they were unknown. Certain people went very far distances to loot. But 
others killed both at their places and elsewhere.166
 
  
5.4.5. The Timing of Genocide 
 
 
Timing during the genocide is also important. At certain places, genocide started as soon 
as the presidential plane was shot down, and it reached other places later. When genocide 
was underway, it had phases. There were April killings after which in certain areas, 
leaders thought that all the Tutsi were exterminated or others had fled outside the 
country. Then came other phases in May or June at different dates, after leaders had 
noticed that some perpetrators had spared some victims, mostly women and children. 
They ordered them to be killed as well. But fearing the attention of the international 
community at this time, the killings had to be done in secret as compared to the April 
ones which were in open places.167 The last phase of killings seems to have been when 
the Hutu extremists were now fleeing following the progress of the military victories of 
the RPF. Before fleeing, they killed the very last Tutsi they found or knew so that they 
could later escape accusation. That phase can be dated between July and December 1994, 
although even during the RPF rule following the genocide, some few survivors continued 
to be killed. In some areas, the killing was selective at first, then it became systematic or 
total in the process. Finally, as in many other genocides, the official end of genocide did 
not mean the end of the threat for those victims who survived, or the end of their 
suffering.168
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
                                                 
166 For details about killing centers and different perpetrator-victim behaviours in relation to geography, see 
the rich accounts gathered in African Rights, August 1995. 
167 See for example Kamanzi, Rwanda. Du génocide à la défaite, p. 149; Monique Mujawamariya, “Report 
of a Visit to Rwanda: September 1-22, 1994”, Issue: A Journal of Opinion, Vol. 23, No. 2, 199, pp. 32-38, 
p. 33; Chrétien (dir.), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, p. 316. 
168 On the Holocaust, see Bergen, War & Genocide, p. 222. On dates of onset of genocide in all Communes 
and Prefectures, see Straus, The Order of Genocide, pp. 249-256. 
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This chapter has revisited the ideological process that led to genocide through the 
instilling of obedience. It looked at the intentions and roles of actors and processes, both 
remote and recent, that is, intentionalism and functionalism. It considered both the 
structural and the conjunctural conditions that the Hutu ideologues have used in their 
genocide propaganda.    
 
Although by early 1994 all conditions - political, economic and social - were showing a 
serious crisis, it is the political choice of extremist leaders that instrumentalised the hard 
socio-economic living conditions so that they could blame one of the Rwandan ethnic 
groups, the Tutsi, and ultimately effect its victimization. This chapter has shown to what 
extent this instrumentalisation was done in the Hutu “power” propaganda using varied 
means, such as the written or oral media, massacres and power instructions; using past 
and present to prove how “threatening” the Tutsi were; and how it mobilised as much of 
the Hutu population as possible in the genocidal project.  
 
But the actors did not involve only perpetrators and victims, as the extremist propaganda 
probably wanted; there were also bystanders inside the country. The Tutsi genocide is 
considered as a “popularised genocide” for having mobilised more local populations, 
more neighbours to kill other neighbours, than any other genocide. But, the presence of 
bystanders shows that not every Hutu Rwandan able-bodied person participated. This 
corroborates Staub’s point that despite the degree of mobilisation for genocide, actors 
still keep a certain margin of choice.  
 
In the next chapter, I trace the process that led to the implementation of genocide in 
Gishamvu and Kibayi. In this regard, I try to understand how the national genocidal 
project became internalised by local agents; how local conditions were at work in relation 
to national ones; how the actors, the geography, the timing and the means used played a 
role in these local contexts, and ultimately what effects the genocide produced locally.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE GENOCIDE IN GISHAMVU 
 
The perpetrator tries not only to kill, but to erase the 
memory of the killing, that is, to do, to act in such a 
way that no archive is left.1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter reconstructs the Tutsi genocide in Gishamvu Commune. It does so by using 
witnesses’ own reconstructions. Indeed, when one analyses the content of interviews, 
especially on the section regarding the genocide, one notices that this content is already a 
reconstruction which contains both experiences of the informant but also experiences of 
other people in his or her area; experiences which occurred when he/she was present in 
time and space, or sometimes which occurred in his/her absence both in time and space. 
It could not be otherwise, after sixteen years. Rwandans who witnessed the genocide 
spent these years trying to understand and put together as much as they could in terms of 
insights about what happened. So they supplemented their own recollections by what 
they heard elsewhere. The result becomes their recollections of today. Concerning my 
informants, the extent of their testimony before me depended on the value that they gave 
to my research and hence on what they decided to tell me. It depended also, I assume, on 
the context during which the interview took place. 
 
Indeed, I started to collect interviews in April 2007. This coincided with the time during 
which the Gacaca tribunals trials were taking place in the whole country, for they had 
started in July 2006, after the phase of collection of information on acts of genocide since 
January 2005.2
                                                 
1 Jacques Derrida, “Archive Fever (A seminar by Jacques Derrida, University of the Witwatersrand, August 
1998, transcribed by Verne Harris)”, in Carolyn Hamilton et al. (eds), Refiguring the Archive, Cape Town, 
David Philip Publishers, 2002, pp. 38-80 (even pages), p. 66. 
 This contemporaneity may have impacted on the content of my research, 
2 National Service for Gacaca Jurisdictions, Report on the phase of collection of information on the Tutsi 
genocide, http://inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw..., consulted on 17 July 2006; James Munyaneza, “Gacaca trials start 
en masse tomorrow”, The New Times, Kigali, Rwanda, 14 July 2006. 
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especially with regard to the perpetrators who may have thought that I was part of the 
government and that they had to tell me almost the same version they told to the Gacaca 
courts. This, I assume again, may have created a certain bias in my accounts, a bias which 
may be assessed after a certain distance in time.  
 
So far, the information collected about genocide can at best be considered as the product 
of negotiation between state, civil society (especially Churches and Human Rights 
organisations) and individuals.  It is a negotiated or mediated truth; it is in this regard the 
product of truth regimes.3 It is also a truth closely related to confession at least from the 
perspective of perpetrators4
 
, or related to memory recovery or justice reparation for the 
survivors. However, this truth is of value, and must not be dismissed, given that it is one 
sort of truth, and, above all, because it is the product of these complex relations and 
interests.  
This chapter is shaped along seven key sections: the action that triggered the beginning of 
mass killings of Tutsi, how the genocide unfolded in the bulk of sectors of Gishamvu, the 
second phase of killings that occurred in May and June 1994, the Hutu-Hutu violence 
following the Tutsi genocide, the rescue practices, the victims and the perpetrators.  
 
6.1. HOW GENOCIDE STARTED IN GISHAMVU 
 
The shooting of the Presidential plane on the night of 6 April 1994 that heralded the 
genocide against the Tutsi in several parts of the country did not produce the same effect 
in Gishamvu immediately. That news was heard in Gishamvu via radio. It produced at 
first insecurity and uncertainty in Gishamvu as elsewhere, but it was a combination of 
political decisions and actions, both nationally and locally, that brought the genocide into 
Gishamvu some two weeks later. 
                                                 
3 Premesh Lalu, The Deaths of Hintsa. Postapartheid South Africa and the shape of recurring pasts, Cape 
Town, Human Sciences Research Council, 2009, pp. 5, 7 and 9; Mamadou Diouf, “Des Historiens et des 
histoires, pour quoi faire? L'Histoire africaine entre l'Etat et les communautés”, Revue Canadienne des 
Études Africaines, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2000, pp. 337-374, pp. 338. 
4 Derrida, “Archive Fever”, p. 52. 
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For instance, in the minutes of the Security Council of the Gishamvu Commune of 11 
April 1994, the Burgomaster and the Security Council of the commune decided to follow 
recommendations from the central government heard on the national radio and in 
Prefecture security meetings: these were the ban on gatherings of people, and the closing 
of cabarets and markets from 7 April. In addition, the Burgomaster urged the Councillors 
to be close to the population during those difficult times and urged them to fight rumours. 
In particular, he asked them to organise meetings with their populations, because in those 
days the Councillors were organizing meetings, but their constituents allegedly were not 
attending them. Gabriel Murara, head of MDR party, said: “I realize that the way some 
people welcomed and interpreted the death of the President of the country can cause 
insecurity. Some showed happiness, while others were saddened by this event. That 
caused a bad climate in the population.” The Councillor of Gishamvu Sector, Célestin 
Kubwimana, alias Cyuma, agreed with him and mentioned the fact that the populations 
were divided. He illustrated that misunderstanding by the fact that some persons such as 
François Nkurunziza (Inspector of Judiciary Police), Athanase Kumuyange, Silas 
Murekezi and Kinyata moved from their homes and went to seek protection at the home 
of a businessman called François Mukimbiri. Cyuma said that that movement caused 
insecurity because those people created factions. But Mukimbiri denied that those people 
were sleeping at his home. Another person, Sebujangwe, argued that in Gishamvu there 
were factions of Hutu and Tutsi, but that those factions were not always geared towards 
bad purposes. The Subprefect and the Burgomaster asked people not to divide themselves 
ethnically. This shows that until 11 April, the Burgomaster and the Subprefect were 
moderate in that they followed the line of the Butare Prefect, Jean Baptiste Habyarimana. 
They also decided not to close bars during the day since it was not creating insecurity. 
They also decided to continue to have Wednesday and Sunday markets in Busoro so that 
people could have a place to buy and sell goods. Because some people had started to look 
after themselves by organising night patrols, the Security Council found that that was not 
bad, but decided that the patrols should not be made of people of one ethnic group, they 
had to be mixed, in order not to become a “bad” group. Those involved in the patrols also 
had to inform the Councillor, who would in turn report to the Commune office about their 
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patrol activities.5
 
  This shows that to start with, the patrols were an initiative of the 
population itself and did not arise from an order coming from above. But it was closely 
monitored by local leaders. It definitely became a state obligation from 19 April onward.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, genocide in the Butare Prefecture came later. It 
followed the dismissal of the Butare Prefect, Jean Baptiste Habyarimana, on 19 April 
1994. This Prefect had been able to prevent the escalation of Tutsi massacres in his 
prefecture thanks to his charisma and to his close collaboration with the majority of 
Burgomasters and with military and police officers. With the exception of Runyinya and 
Nyakizu Communes where Burgomasters disobeyed his orders and initiated large scale 
Tutsi massacres before the 19th of April, all other parts of the Butare Prefecture remained 
relatively peaceful.6
 
  
As for the action that triggered the genocide in Gishamvu, informants from Gishamvu 
understand or reconstruct the beginning of genocide in two ways. First, there is a view 
that it came from above, from the agents of central power: that President Sindikubwabo 
came to initiate the killings in their commune. Second, there is a view that it came from 
below or through the agency of the population: how the arrival of displaced people from 
Gikongoro Prefecture, Runyinya Commune and Nyakizu Commune informed the 
Gishamvu people that elsewhere the Tutsi genocide had started, a situation which also 
triggered the start of genocide in Gishamvu. But these two versions are not conflicting, 
they are complementary, since both occurred. 
 
Concerning the view that it came from above, genocide was initiated by the arrival of 
President Sindikubwabo in Gishamvu. He came there on Thursday, 21 April 1994, 
afternoon, and met with local authorities (the Subprefect Assiel Simbarikure, the 
Burgomaster Pascal Kambanda and Councillors) at the office of the Subprefecture in 
Busoro, in Gishamvu. He was coming from Ndora Commune. A policeman from 
                                                 
5 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Security meeting held on 11 April 1994, Ref.: No. 101/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 12 April 1994. 
6 See also Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, Paris, Karthala, 2008, p. 222 ; André 
Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994: Les politiques du génocide à Butare, Paris, Karthala, 2005, p. 183. 
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Gishamvu pointed out that it was from that meeting that the order to kill the Tutsi came. 
In another afternoon, the Subprefect and the Burgomaster spread the message of killing 
the Tutsi in the whole commune territory, one leader circulating at one side of the 
commune with a megaphone, another at another side, also with a megaphone.7 Two days 
before, the President Sindikubwabo had said that the Tutsi who had fled to Nyumba 
parish were “heavily armed,” 8
 
 a statement that presented them as a threat. 
Some Gishamvu people, especially those who lived near the Commune office, either saw 
the Presidential cars passing by,9 or heard immediately about that visit.10 But no ordinary 
people attended that meeting. What told the population that that meeting was incendiary 
is that it was followed by the schedule of tracking down the Tutsi, of assembling them 
and of killing them. As André Guichaoua wrote, Gishamvu became one of the communes 
in which the order to start the Tutsi genocide was immediately implemented, given that 
the Prime Minister of the genocide government, Jean Kambanda, was from Gishamvu.11
 
 
Three other informants note a tactic that provoked the genocide in Gishamvu. They say 
that certain local leaders brought a number of corpses allegedly of Hutu persons and 
explained that they had been killed by the Tutsi. One informant said that those dead 
persons were from the Butare University, another that they were from the north of the 
country. These corpses were put on the tar road that passes through Gishamvu and goes 
to Burundi, precisely near the Ikibuye cya Shali. This tactic presented the Tutsi as the 
potential killers of the Hutu and advocated that the Hutu defend themselves by killing the 
                                                 
7 African Rights, The History of the genocide in Sector Gishamvu. A collective account, Kigali, January 
2003, pp. 4, 7 and 8. 
8 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, (sous la direction de), Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, Paris, Karthala, 1995, p. 
194. 
9 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
10 Interview with Gérard Segatashya, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
11 André Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994, p. 260. Jean Kambanda was born on 19 October 1955 (or 1956) in 
Gishamvu commune, Mubumbano Sector. He had been Commercial Engineer of Popular Banks of Rwanda 
in Kigali and Head of MDR party in Butare Prefecture in 1993. He became Prime Minister of the Interim 
Government that implemented the Tutsi genocide. 
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Tutsi. In addition to these corpses and to the explanations ad hoc, there was a rumour 
saying that every rich Tutsi person had a grenade.12
 
 
Another explanation concerning how genocide started in Gishamvu is given by Joseph 
Kubwimana, who accuses Laurent Kubwimana, who was Subprefect in Butare Prefecture 
but lived in Gishamvu, of giving 6,000 Rwandan Francs to two people in order to kill a 
Tutsi peasant that he had brought to them. This informant says that this was the act that 
heralded other killings in Gishamvu. He also adds that this act happened in Mukuge 
Sector and that he heard about it in the Gacaca jurisdictions trials.13
 
 
Concerning the view that it started from below, informants understand the beginning of 
genocide from the sequence of events. First, there were Tutsi displaced people who came 
from areas where the genocide had started just after the shooting of the President 
Habyarimana’s plane. They came from Gikongoro Prefecture, from Runyinya Commune 
of Butare and from Nyakizu Commune of Butare as well. As they arrived, they sought 
refuge in the Nyumba parish and at the Nyakibanda Great Seminary. As they were 
passing along the roads of sectors of Gishamvu Commune, some people started to loot 
the property and livestock which they had brought with them.14 In the security meeting of 
11 April 1994 noted above, we do not hear anything about the displaced people from 
Nyaruguru at that date. That means that they came later, maybe towards or after the 15 
April. As Alison Des Forges suggests, large-scale killings began in Cyahinda (Nyakizu) 
on 15 April 1994.15 But the report of African Rights maintains that already by 10 April, 
certain displaced people coming from Gikongoro had arrived in Gishamvu.16
 
 
Some Gishamvu people were asking them why they were fleeing; they answered that 
they were fleeing people who were wearing plastic bags on their heads and who were 
                                                 
12 Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007; Interview with Christophe Batura, 
Gishamvu, 27 April 2007 and Interview with Léopold Hategekimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
13 Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
14 Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 13, 
Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. See also African Rights, The History of the genocide, p. 7. 
15 Alison Des Forges, ‘Leave None to Tell the Story.’ Genocide in Rwanda, London, Brussels, Human 
Rights Watch, Paris, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, 1999, p. 488. 
16 African Rights, The History of the genocide, p. 7. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
350 
burning houses.17 Indeed, the smoke from the burned houses from the Nyaruguru area 
(Nyakizu, Runyinya and some parts of Gikongoro) were seen in the sky from Gishamvu 
hills.18
 
  
Dative Kandanga, my informant, who was from Gikongoro, tries to explain the meaning 
of the plastic bags. In her view, plastic bags were like an imitation of guns or explosives: 
“It is the ordinary citizens who became Interahamwe. There were a number of young 
men who had been trained to use guns. Others had closed plastic bags that frighten, they 
put air in them, they go on top of a big hill, and they burst them. Then those [Tutsi] who 
fight back get afraid saying ‘guns are coming.’ Then some flee.”19
 
 This mention of 
plastic bags is widespread in accounts of both informants of Gishamvu and Kibayi.  
6.2. GENOCIDE IN SECTORS OF GISHAMVU COMMUNE 
6.2.1. Genocide in Gishamvu and Nyakibanda Sectors 
 
Perhaps the main sectors to have witnessed extreme mass murder on their territories more 
than other sectors of Gishamvu are the Gishamvu and Nyakibanda Sectors, because not 
only Tutsi inhabitants from there died there, but even other Tutsi from other sectors and 
communes died there too. The way genocide started in Gishamvu Sector shows that 
though mobilisation for hatred against the Tutsi had been carried out some time before 
(see chapter five), the overt order to kill the Tutsi came slowly and gradually as the 
genocide was starting in the whole commune, i.e., after 20 or 21 April 1994.  
 
The Tutsi from Gikongoro, Runyinya and Nyakizu were the first to gather at public 
places such as Nyakibanda, Nyumba, Ibisi mountain and Bitare hill. Célestin Karemera 
thinks that the Tutsi from Gikongoro chose to come to Gishamvu because they expected 
help or protection from a Roman Catholic priest who was working there and who 
originated from their place:  
                                                 
17 Interview with Anonymous 14, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007; Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, 
Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
18 Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
19 Interview with Dative Kandanga, Butare, 09 September 2005. 
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At first, the Tutsi in flight started to hide here at Nyumba. They chose here 
because they were coming to look for a priest called Gakwandi who originated 
from Kibeho [Gikongoro]. When they came, as they were thousands, he could not 
have the means of settling them. They came and spent here a week, then things 
became also bad here. Then the people from here also fled and went there. As for 
me, as I worked for those priests [at the Nyumba parish], I tried to help many 
people by bringing them water. When water was destroyed, I went to search for 
water far, and hid the jerrycan in grass because it was not allowed to help the 
Tutsi.20
 
 
Marie Ntawuyirushintege also points out that she went to Nyakibanda to give food to 
Tutsi that she knew, and stopped doing so when the leaders forbade the Hutu people to 
help the Tutsi.  
 
Laurentine Nyirakanani, from Muboni Cell of Gishamvu Sector, narrates how the 
genocide started in her area. She mentions a number of attacks of unequal strength:  
 
People wearing plastic bags threw stones at us, so the Hutu and the Tutsi came 
along to defend themselves from those stones. They then identified three persons 
among those who were attacking them, and caught them. Those three persons 
were from Gikunzi. They took them to the Commune office, they submitted them 
to the Police. Then, the Commune employees on duty told them to go back home 
and promised to punish the three people. Those populations went back home. The 
following day, another attack was made on the Muboni people. This attack was 
much stronger. Again the Hutu and the Tutsi went to stop that attack. Then they 
fought, the cell authorities went to tell the Commune authorities how they were 
attacked once more. What made them deceived is the fact that the then 
Burgomaster, Kambanda, told them to go back and defend themselves and if they 
were unable, it was their business. They went back home. Among those cell 
authorities, there were some Tutsi.21
 
    
A day after this second attack, the Muboni people underwent a much stronger attack, as 
Laurentine Nyirakanani pursues the story. They went back again to the Commune office 
to report the attack, but found the driver of the Burgomaster, called Evarite Gatabazi. 
This one “told them to go back home, saying that those people [the attacked ones] had 
killed Habyarimana [President]”. That is when Hutu and the Tutsi people of Muboni 
decided to pack things and go to the Nyumba parish to seek refuge. Some remained in the 
                                                 
20 Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
21 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
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roads, others went up to the hill Ibisi bya Nyakibanda. At first the Tutsi and the Hutu fled 
together. Then Councillor of Gishamvu Sector, Cyuma, asked the Hutu to go back home 
and explained to them that they were not targeted. But some few Hutu refused to separate 
from the Tutsi.22
 
  
The way the Tutsi people from Gishamvu and Nyakibanda Sectors fled to public places 
(Nyumba and Nyakibanda) is diverse. Some went there from their own initiative after 
they saw that the Tutsi from other communes such as Nyakizu, Runyinya and Gikongoro 
had fled to those places. Some others were chased from their houses by certain Hutu 
assailants and were obliged to join their fellow Tutsi at public assembly places. Some 
went to Nyumba and Nyakibanda, but some others climbed on top of the Ibisi Mountain. 
According to Nyirakanani, a soldier went to shoot them on the Ibisi mountain, but he was 
immobilised and disarmed by Tutsi and killed afterwards. “After killing him, other 
people phoned to Butare to call many soldiers saying that the Tutsi have started to kill 
Hutus. That is when the Tutsi got afraid and all ran to the Seminary”23 and probably to 
Nyumba. According to Rusanganwa, the soldier shot the group of Tutsi who were on top 
of the Ibisi Mountain because they refused to descend from the hill with their cattle and 
join the other displaced people.24
 
  
The account of Munyankindi, who was among the displaced people at Ibisi Mountain 
corroborates the statements of Nyirakanani and Rusanganwa:  
 
There were the military, there were policemen, then they came at our place, it is 
the military from Butare who came up there to our place in the Ibisi mountain to 
make us descend. There is one military that we killed, that is the reason why they 
came to make us come down. We had fought first. We were using stones. Then 
they defeated us, they made us descend, that is how we came here in the 
Seminary. The ones who brought themselves here were actually being killed even 
on their way, but us we came here [Nyakibanda Seminary and Nyumba] by 
force.25
                                                 
22 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007 ; Interview with Anonymous 14, 
Gishamvu, 30 April, 2007 
  
23 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
24 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
25 Interview with Justin Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
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The killing of a soldier and the moving of the Tutsi to public gathering places is also 
narrated by Anonymous 13:  
 
All the Tutsi of Janja [Nyakibanda Sector] on 17 April took the decision to flee. 
They went to the Ibisi mountain. On the 19th, a problem occurred from the 
soldiers who were stationed at Kadahokwa. The soldiers went up to shoot at them. 
But, as I heard this story, it seems that there was a soldier who was from Kigali, 
and who came with his wife who is from Vumbi [near Gishamvu]. Then the Hutu 
from Vumbi lied to that soldier ‘that the enemy is up there at the Ibisi hill, we see 
that he is more powerful than us, he will come to attack us.’ They lied to him, 
then he went there, when he arrived there he shot, fired, then the gun got broken. 
The Tutsi young men ran after him, caught him and killed him. After killing him, 
the Hutu of Vumbi went to seek reinforcement from the soldiers from 
Kadahokwa. There was their detachment there. That is when they went to the Ibisi 
mountain, scattered the Tutsi, they fired on them, the ones who survived then 
came to the Seminary, all of them.26
 
 
Another informant from Nyakibanda Sector gives an additional version of the same 
action of going to Nyakibanda Seminary: 
 
A day after the death of Habyarimana, people from Nyakibanda, from Gikongoro, 
fled to Ibisi. Others were in the Seminary. At 15:00 [on a certain day], two young 
men, Raphael Habanabashaka and Pascal Mutangana, came to tell the military 
who were working at the Electrogaz station of Kadahokwa that ‘the people from 
Ibisi will descend on us and kill us.’ […] Pascal was a reservist soldier, he had a 
gun that the commune had given him. He took it and together with the military, 
they climbed the Ibisi. Then they went there and started to shoot. As we were at 
home, we saw people from Ibisi descending and going to the Seminary. On their 
way, the population who had witnessed it started to loot their belongings. By 
fleeing in the Seminary, they thought the situation will be like before [in 1960]. 
They thought they will come back home, just like others went back home. That is 
why they fled towards the Seminary.27
 
 
Another technique of instilling the Tutsi to leave their homes was to burn their houses so 
that they could have no other option than to join other Tutsi at mass gathering places.28
 
   
                                                 
26 Interview with Anonymous 13, Gishamvu, 30 April, 2007. 
27 Interview with Augustin Gakuru, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
28 Interview with Marie Ntawuyirushintege, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
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As for the mass killings that occurred at Nyumba and Nyakibanda, it can be summed up 
in the following activities or steps: the gathering of Tutsi at one place; the first attack 
made by other populations against the Tutsi, which became a failure; the closing of water 
supply and stopping food sold or given to Tutsi; the calling of reinforcements from other 
communes by the Subprefect and the Burgomaster; the second attack which became a 
success (from the perpetrators’ perspective); the massacre; a few escape at night or after 
days of being among the corpses; then a day of burying corpses using a caterpillar and 
other means.  
 
As seen above, after the meeting of 11 April, roadblocks and daily and nightly patrols 
were mounted by the population. The report of African Rights on Tutsi genocide in 
Gishamvu Sector informs us that the Tutsi from elsewhere were moving freely in the 
Gishamvu territory since they arrived (either after the 10th or 15th of April), seeking food 
or drinks. But after the visit of President Sindikubwabo, the Councillor Cyuma forbade 
them to move anymore. They had to stay in the premises of the Nyumba parish or the 
Nyakibanda seminary. Cyuma forbade those who were selling food to refugees to 
continue selling them “in order to starve them so that they wouldn’t be able to put up any 
kind of resistance”.29
 
  
Thereafter, the Councillor spread the message of killing the Tutsi, first to the Cell 
Committee members of his sector, then to the population. In one meeting with the 
population, the Councillor gave the order to burn first the houses of the Tutsi so that they 
could flee to public gathering places. The Agronomist Aloys Sibomana, who was 
Executive Secretary of PSD party, was also together with Cyuma, a sign that he had 
joined the “Power or pawa”, i.e., extremist faction. Then the action of burning followed. 
Here is how it was made:  
 
The work started at 6:30 a.m. [of Friday, 22 April 1994].  
There was a massive response to this invitation from the young, strong people as 
well as the residents from the three cellules of Gishamvu sector. Young people 
from Gikunzi sector, Kibo [sic: Kibu] cellule, were also present at the meeting. 
Before burning the houses we had to check inside to see if there was anything that 
                                                 
29 African Rights, The History of the genocide, p. 9. 
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had been abandoned there by the owner. Tables, chairs and household utensils 
were carried off by people. They set fire to the whole of the Gashyankingi [sic: 
Gasyankingi] hill; at least 50 houses were burnt. Afterwards, in order to soothe 
our tiredness, we held a handicapped man François Mukimbiri, to ransom for the 
sum of 10,000 francs. He was a Tutsi from Gishamvu cellule who was rich and 
had a lot of money. Damascène Ruzibiza collected the money; we quenched our 
thirst. Ruzibiza is currently held in Gishamvu commune detention centre. Once 
that entertainment was over, the councillor thanked us for the task we’d 
accomplished and told us that we still had the job of clearing the Tutsi refugees 
out of the seminary and Nyumba parish. Instructions were given and another 
meeting was fixed for the next day.30
 
  
That next day was Saturday, 23 April. On the morning of that day, the population 
gathered near the Nyumba primary school. The policemen who had guns shot and killed a 
few people. Then the population threw stones at Tutsi who were there, but the resistance 
of the latter made the attackers withdraw. Sunday became the day of gathering 
reinforcements from the population, police and leaders from the whole Gishamvu 
Commune, from neighbouring communes such as Runyinya, Nyakizu and Kigembe and 
of ammunition coming from Butare Prefecture. Then Monday 25 April became the day of 
a large scale massacre.31
 
  
The meeting of the population led by the Councillor Cyuma occurred on Sunday, 24 
April.32 It is confirmed by my informant Nyirakanani who says that her husband attended 
it. She adds that the agenda was top secret, but that this meeting was followed by the 
attack against Nyumba and Nyakibanda Tutsi.33
 
 
Monday, 25 April 1994 was indeed a fatal or decisive day.34
                                                 
30  African Rights, The History of the genocide, p. 9. 
 In the morning of that day, 
answering the call of local leaders, the inhabitants coming from all corners of the 
commune territory arrived at the Commune office located at Nyumba. Afterwards, cars 
31 African Rights, The History of the genocide, pp. 5, 9-10. 
32 African Rights, The History of the genocide, p. 10. 
33 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
34 Nevertheless, the Tutsi genocide is commemorated in Gishamvu on the 20 April, according to a 
conversation I had with the now Executive Secretary of Gishamvu Sector, Joseph Kagabo, on 19 April 
2007. 
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bringing policemen and people from the neighbouring Kigembe commune also arrived 
there.  
 
The courtyard of Gishamvu commune was filled with a vast crowd ready to 
launch the assault. The bourgmestre and the councilor told us: “The job now is to 
kill all the Tutsi refugees at Nyumba parish and at Nyakibanda seminary.” The 
crowd clapped, and we set off as fast as we could, shouting and singing. Once we 
got near the primary school we divided ourselves into two groups. The first group 
stayed by the primary school and Nyumba parish, while the second headed 
towards the seminary. Frightened by the shouting and the commotion, some 
refugees had crammed into the classrooms and locked the doors. Those who were 
in the courtyard were the first to be lynched. In order to be able to execute the 
people in the classrooms we had quite a difficult task because we had to go and 
get pickaxes to break the doors down. This was done both at Nyumba parish and 
at the seminary. The soldiers and policemen used their guns, while the others who 
had knives were on the lookout for people trying to escape. The massacre started 
at 9:00 a.m. and was finished by about 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. After this slaughter, the 
strong returned with their spoils: cows, goats, doors, windows and other things of 
value. The people of Kigembe went back to their houses drunk with joy at having 
carried off so many things. The corpses were scattered all over. The sites of the 
massacres were real bloodbaths. On the Tuesday morning, the people from 
Kigembe came back to put the finishing touches to their gruesome plan. No 
gunshots were heard that day as their objective was to finish off the people who 
were still alive in the midst of all the corpses, and to loot property again like they 
had the previous day. The Tutsis who were struggling under all the human 
remains were automatically killed with knives.35
 
  
Anonymous 14 also talks about the first and second days of attack, maybe the Saturday 
23 April and Monday 25 April:  
 
…the population went and started to throw stones to the displaced who were at 
Nyumba. The latter also resisted. They threw stones at them, then they took the 
same stones and threw them back at the attackers. The attackers let them, returned 
home. In the next day morning, they came back again. When they came back they 
were not alone, people from Nyakizu came, Kigembe came, and elsewhere, they 
came sitting in cars, wearing hats, carrying weapons. They came, threw stones 
here [Nyumba], they killed them […] They massacred them until they finished 
them.36
 
 
The above account of African Rights makes it clear that the massacre continued again on 
Tuesday, 26 April. One of my informants from Nyakibanda Sector makes a 
                                                 
35 African Rights, The History of the genocide, p. 10. 
36 Interview with Anonymous 14, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
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reconstruction of what happened in Nyakibanda. He mentions two days of attacks, the 
second being more fatal, just as the account of African Rights and Anonymous 14 
suggested. But his dates are different from the ones of African Rights’ report, a sign that 
it is hard to identify precise dates in oral narratives, even for a period that is not very 
ancient:  
 
Many Tutsi arrived at Nyakibanda, even the ones who were hiding at my home 
told me that they were going to Nyakibanda. Because allegedly in 1959, people 
fled there and survived in the church. I told them ‘please let me seek for you a 
way of going to Burundi via Nyaruhengeri, because I had an uncle who had been 
a leader there, I hoped that he could help us find the path to Burundi.’ They fled 
to Nyakibanda. The Hutu followed them there. The Hutu became weak, they 
realised that their strength was not enough to attack them. Then, the existing 
power structure, that is when I can blame Kambanda [Burgomaster], the existing 
rulers who had done a good thing before of availing a policeman to guard those 
displaced, went to seek support from the policemen from Kigembe. They came 
with grenades, guns… They are the ones who started to shoot the displaced. They 
shot the whole day of 21 April until evening. At midnight a child from the people 
who had hidden at my home and who decided to go to Nyakibanda, together with 
other four persons came back at my home and told me that the rest of their family 
members were exterminated. On the 22, the police of Kigembe and Gishamvu 
together, resumed again the firing. That is where I condemn Kambanda, because 
if he wanted, he could advise those displaced to flee just like the ones of Sheke 
had gone to Burundi earlier. Here it was near the border. If you did that small 
gesture in secret, no central rulers could know about it. […] In Nyakibanda 
Sector, the majority were Hutu. But in particular the cell of Nyakibanda had a 
small quarter having around 50 Tutsi families. They were only Tutsi, no one else 
lived with them. […] Many people died there. […] It makes me sad when I pass 
there. Unfortunately, it is there that people accuse me of having killed people.37
 
 
 
Murindwa was among the Tutsi victims of Nyumba. He fled five days after the 24 April 
massacre. He camouflaged himself among the corpses and was able to flee only on 29 
April: “There were many displaced people there at Nyumba parish. They were finished 
towards the 24th April. I was in the church. Me I left that place on the 29 April. I crossed 
                                                 
37 Interview with Anonymous 13, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. Concerning the role of this informant in the 
genocide, he says that he looted “only” a motorbike, a cow, a sofa in Musange, and 100 tiles from a Tutsi 
family’s house, and because people died where he looted at Musange, although he did not kill there, as he 
says, he pleads guilty for not having rescued them there. But he rejects the killing crime, though he is 
accused to have participated in the killing of Tutsi in Janja. He was in prison at the time of the interview.  
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dead bodies, I bathed the blood of the dead, then on the 29th I left. For God’s help I fled 
and reached Burundi. […] The Tutsi people of Gishamvu were a lot.”38
 
 
Godeberthe Mukagitoli who was from Muboni cell of Gishamvu says that her family, that 
is, her mother, brothers and sisters, were killed at Nyumba parish.39 Justin Munyankindi 
lost his wife and children at the Nyakibanda Seminary. His only son who survived is the 
one who was in Kigali during the genocide.40
 
  
Joseph Rwandanga who took part in the killings at Nyumba narrates:  
 
The displaced people were here in Nyumba Parish, in classrooms, in the church, 
in the celebration area. There were the policemen. The councillors and the cell 
responsibles called the ibyitso [accomplices] to come and participate in the 
killings. I understood that I was among those called. I took my arc and bows and 
went to shoot at the church.41
 
  
The use of “traditional” weapons such as bows, arrows and spears was widespread during 
the genocide. It was mostly used by older people who had once learned how to use 
them.42
 
  
The African Rights report calculates that Tutsi victims were more than 3,000 in those 
major sites: Nyakibanda Seminary, Nyumba Parish and Nyumba primary school. As 
corpses were scattered everywhere between Nyakibanda and Nyumba and rain was 
falling heavily, corpses started to decompose. Commune officials ordered to cell leaders 
to order the population to bury the dead, but the population refused since it was hard. The 
Councillor, the Burgomaster, some businessmen and a priest from Nyakibanda, Thaddée 
Rusingizandekwe, paid people to remove corpses from Nyumba and Nyakibanda. The 
Red Cross was called in, worked but also failed to finish the cleaning. The Subprefect 
Simbarikure and the Burgomaster Kambanda went to Karubanda prison in Butare to seek 
the help from prisoners to come do that job, but these also failed to finish it. Finally, a 
                                                 
38 Interview with Evariste Murindwa, Gishamvu, 24 March 2006. 
39 Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
40 Interview with Justin Munyankindi, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
41 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April, 2007. 
42 Jean Hatzfeld, Une saison de machettes, récits, Paris, Seuil, 2003, p. 47. 
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“Caterpillar” bulldozer came from Butare to do the cleaning. It allegedly did that job for 
three days.43
 
  
 
In addition to Nyumba and Nyakibanda, the Gasyankingi hill located in the Gishamvu 
Sector and Mirambi are said to have registered also large-scale massacres but to an 
unequal degree:  
 
There in our Gishamvu Sector, there is one part in which genocide became harsh. 
It is the part of the hill where the smiths are located. That place is called mu 
Kabuga, close to the house of Mukimbiri, at the workshop of the smiths, that is 
where the killings were harsh. Many people died there. In another part of the hill, 
called mu Mirambi, there were less killings. The ones who died there, at the top of 
the hill are the ones who were fleeing there and who came from Nyumba and 
Nyakibanda and who were attempting to flee and go to Burundi. Then when they 
arrived at Mirambi, people stopped them and told them to remain there. They 
remained there. Towards the end of the night at the eve, policemen came, they are 
the ones who exterminated them using guns. […] It is the police who killed them, 
it is not the population.44
 
 
 
According to African Rights, at the place called mu Birambi of Gishamvu cell, which 
probably is the Mirambi mentioned above, an estimated 200 to 300 people lost their lives 
as they were fleeing from the bigger sites of Nyakibanda and Nyumba. Unlike what is 
said by the above informant, they are said to have been killed by both the policemen and 
the population, and then buried in latrines and mass graves.45
 
  
After the Nyumba massacre, some few Tutsi had gone to hide in nearby sorghum fields. 
According to Vincent Nsengimana, those caught there were taken out, killed and then 
thrown in the toilet pit that once belonged to the Tutsi businessman François 
Mukimbiri.46
                                                 
43 African Rights, The History of the genocide, pp.  10-11. See also interview with Anonymous 14. 
 For example, Kamuyumbo lost a lot of his children and family members at 
44 Interview with Léopold Muremangando, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
45 African Rights, The History of the genocide, p. 11. 
46 Interview with Vincent Nsengimana, Gishamvu, 24 March 2006. 
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the hill of Gasyankingi who were thrown in the toilet pit of François Mukimbiri’s house 
as well.47
 
 
My informant Vuguziga also lost her husband and son at the hill of Gasyankingi. They 
were killed in an igitero (killing mob attack), but she mentions three names of 
perpetrators: Ntacyonayigize, Gafaranga, and Mugarura. She also mentions other names 
already contained in the African Rights report.48
6.2.2. Genocide in Sholi Sector 
  
 
The Gishamvu Sector seems to have welcomed or undergone the violence order a bit 
earlier than the Sholi Sector. According to the informant Elias Karengera, it is after the 
inhabitants of Sholi saw some houses from Muboni Cell of Gishamvu Sector burning, 
that the Councillor of Sholi, John Ushizimpumu, told his constituents to go to mount a 
patrol at the Sholi hill: “We stood there all the ethnic groups […] Then he ordered old 
people to go back home. We went back home.”49
 
 
But when the order to kill the Tutsi reached the Sholi Sector, the Councillor 
Ushizimpumu seems to have joined the killing machine with enthusiasm. As one survivor 
explains, Ushizimpumu chose to move the Tutsi of his sector to Nyakibanda Seminary:  
 
Then the Councillor Ushizimpumu John of Sholi told some policemen who were 
former military to chase out the people and to direct them toward Nyakibanda, 
saying that they cannot shoot at people one by one, saying that the one who 
refuses to go is the one you will shoot there. Then they collected us and brought 
us to Nyakibanda. Those who were killed on the way were few. When we arrived 
at Nyakibanda, people were already a lot.50
 
 
 
Among high profile organisers of killings against Tutsi from Sholi, Augustin Sezibera is 
mentioned. His role seems to have been the going to Butare town to bring weapons such 
                                                 
47 Interview with Consesa Kamuyumbo, Gishamvu, 24 March 2006. 
48 Interview with Christine Vuguziga, Gishamvu, 24 March 2006. 
49 Interview with Elias Karengera, Gishamvu, 30 April, 2007. 
50 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
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as machetes.51 He was from Sholi Sector, but he taught at the Primary school of 
Mubumbano Sector of Gishamvu. During multiparty system, he was the head of MDR in 
Gishamvu in 1991.52
 
 That means that he had joined the “Power” faction at the time of 
genocide. 
 
According to Marc Rusanganwa, many Tutsi of Sholi were killed at Nyakibanda 
seminary. He is among those who sought refuge at Nyakibanda Seminary. Him and his 
nephew called Butoya left Nyakibanda amid the shootings by killers. They had spent only 
two days there, the day during which they arrived there and the other during which they 
left. They crossed Busoro and were attacked by Busoro people but they did not know 
them since they did not live at that area. Then they continued until Burundi.53
 
 
But the accounts of Emerite Kubwimana, bystander, and Augustin Bucyabutata, survivor, 
stress that a number of killings of Tutsi occurred on the territory of Sholi Sector as well. 
They talk about the people from Cyambwe going to kill Tutsi people living on Sholi hill 
and the ones from Sholi going to kill Tutsi of Cyambwe.54
6.2.3. Genocide in Kibingo and Liba Sectors 
 
 
The Burgomaster Kambanda is said to have at first stopped violence from entering his 
commune via the Kibingo border with Kigembe Commune:  
 
Kambanda heard that people from other communes were about to come in his 
commune to kill people. Then, he organised people to go at Kibingo border with 
Kigembe to forbid people from entering his area. But afterwards, he changed and 
compelled people to kill.55
 
  
It is possible that the time when he compelled the Hutu to kill the Tutsi is after the 19 
April 1994 when the genocide policy had been welcomed in the Butare Prefecture, while 
                                                 
51 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
52 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
53 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
54 Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; Interview with Emérite Kubwimana, 
Gishamvu, 19 and 21 April 2007. 
55 Interview with Augustin Gakuru, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
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the time when he prevented attacks against the Tutsi can be the time when the Prefect 
Jean Baptiste Habyarimana was still in charge, i.e., from 6 to 19 April. 
 
A number of Tutsi from Kibingo fled to Nyumba, few of whom escaped and more of 
whom were killed. Geographically speaking, the Tutsi from Kibingo could have fled as 
well at Kansi parish located in Nyaruhengeri Commune. This parish was closer than the 
one of Nyumba. But Léopold Hategekimana explains that the Tutsi of Kibingo were not 
killed at Kansi parish. They came to Nyumba, because the Burundian refugees who were 
settling at Rusagara in Nyaruhengeri towards the direction of the Kansi parish did not 
allow them to cross the way to Kansi parish.56 The account of Ntakaraba stresses that 
those Tutsi who did not flee to gathering places or to Burundi were killed at the hill, that 
is, at or near their homes.57 A number of those Burundian refugees are said to have 
participated as well in the killings of Tutsi in Kibingo.58
 
   
Among the hardcore killers in Kibingo, Ntakaraba mentions the sons of Léopold 
Nyabyenda, the well known person who was very active in the violence against the Tutsi 
in 1959-1962 but who lived in Liba Sector.59 Hategekimana also mentions that certain 
killers from Kibingo went to seek reinforcement from neighbouring Liba Sector killers’ 
mobs. 60
 
 
Unlike Kibingo Sector, several informants from Liba Sector assert that the Tutsi fled to 
many places and ultimately the bulk of them got killed. The first informant mentions 
Kansi Parish as well as paths crossed as places of death:  
 
Many people died after they had fled to Kansi. Liba is near Kansi parish. Others 
attempted to flee to Burundi, but we cannot know where they died. […] [The ones 
who were killed at their homes] are few. They died at Kansi and in roads and 
paths as they were fleeing. They were killing one by one as they saw them on the 
way fleeing, there were not group or mob attacks, people who died there were not 
                                                 
56 Interview with Léopold Hategekimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
57 Interview with Jean Berchmans Ntakaraba, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
58 Interview with Léopold Hategekimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
59 Interview with Jean Berchmans Ntakaraba, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
60 Interview with Léopold Hategekimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
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a lot. […] Tutsi were killed but also some Hutu who had a nose looking like the 
one of a Tutsi were also killed.61
 
  
 
The second informant also mentions Kansi Parish but adds that the Tutsi of Liba did not 
die at Liba: “[The Hutu] were accompanying them until Kansi parish. Most of them died 
at Kansi. In fact, all of them… but concerning genocide in Liba, the Tutsi of that place 
did not die at Liba”62 But the third informant asserts clearly that many Tutsi died on Liba 
territory: “In Liba, the Tutsi fled, the one God rescued survived, others got killed. [A big 
number of Liba Tutsi] were killed at their hill, a big number. It is the Hutu from parties 
[who killed them].”63
 
 
But in addition to Kansi Parish located in Nyaruhengeri Commune as a gathering place, 
one other informant says that some Tutsi from Liba fled to other gathering places such 
Nyumba and Nyakibanda mentioned above: “The Tutsi of Liba died few at Kansi… but 
most others came to Nyumba and Nyakibanda, where most died.”64
 
 
The main supervisor of killings at Liba often mentioned is Tharcisse Gashagaza, who was 
Director of Nyumba School Centre and prominent MDR member during multiparty 
system:  
At our hill there was a very nasty man called Gashagaza, he was patrolling with 
his mob, he was a teacher with some high education. […] He was a director at 
Nyumba. […] He had a section of the people with whom he worked during 
genocide, that group had many of his family members. […] He is the one who 
decided who should be killed. […] Another one with less education is John son of 
Rwatangabo, he worked with Gashagaza. Gashagaza was their chief. […] They 
had followers because of the money they were giving them, and the drinks, […] 
they also promised them the amasambu [land] of the Tutsi once they are all 
dead.65
 
 
The second account insists on the charismatic power that Gashagaza had gained during 
these hard times:  
 
                                                 
61 Interview with Cassien Rwanyange, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
62 Interview with Gaston Nzabamwita, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
63 Interview with Anonymous 11, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
64 Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
65 Interview with Gaston Nzabamwita, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
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It is the Director of schools at Nyumba called Gashagaza who brought and 
supervised killings there at Liba. […] At his home there was much livestock.  […] 
People were making fire at his home, they eat and drink. Because Gashagaza was 
a very bad person, he ironically told some injured people to sit and eat meat 
before dying. They tortured them. Then the whole Liba people became dirty. 
They started to chop with machetes and kill that way. Because at their place the 
Tutsi were not a lot, they attacked other sectors as well and killed. They also 
looted livestock, money, everything. […] Gashagaza had become like the new 
leader of the Liba Sector. Because they [the constituents] were no longer obeying 
the official Liba Councillor. They were obeying that one [Gashagaza]. 66
 
  
But another informant includes the Councillor of Liba among the hardcore killers at Liba. 
He calls him Juliani Maganabiri, but his true name is Julien Munyakayanza. Maybe 
Maganabiri [literally “two hundred”] is a nickname.67 According to informant 
Rwanyange, these hardcore killers had become even more charismatic than parents with 
their sons.68
 
 
Another person included on the list of hardcore killers at Liba is a handicapped man, who 
was a son of Léopold Nyabyenda, the one who had killed the chief Mutembe in 1960 (see 
chapter two): “Among the leaders of killings in Liba, there is a handicapped man, who 
also arrived here in Gishamvu to kill, I do not remember his name, but I remember the 
name of his father, it is Nyabyenda. […] The one who killed Mutembe. You know, there 
is a hereditary factor in the act of killing: he behaved like his father.”69
 
 The killers from 
Liba were considered so ‘courageous’ that they were called to execute killings even 
elsewhere:  
Concerning killers, Kambanda [Burgomaster] was calling the Liba people to 
come and kill elsewhere because he believed they were very strong… because 
other people believed they are the ones who are good at doing ‘the job’[…] Didn’t 
I tell you that they are the ones who killed Mutembe? The Liba people? You 
understand that they started to be nasty since long time ago.70
 
 
                                                 
66 Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. This pattern of hardcore killers being 
considered as “leaders” is also found in Kibayi. See following chapter. 
67 Interview with Anonymous 11, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
68 Interview with Cassien Rwanyange, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
69 Interview with Anonymous 11, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
70 Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. See also Interview with Gaston 
Nzabamwita, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
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This handicapped man is also mentioned in the Kibingo killings of Tutsi as seen above. 
6.2.4. Genocide in Gikunzi, Mukuge and Sheke Sectors 
 
a) Genocide in Gikunzi  
 
The reconstruction of Kumuyange, from Gikunzi, informs us that the bulk of the Tutsi 
living in Gikunzi decided to join those who were in the Gashiru and Bitare hills of Sheke 
Sector, and that in the process, all decided to go to Burundi. They succeeded in crossing 
the border peacefully, thanks to favourable circumstances on their way, as Kumuyange 
explains. As a result, the victims were few:  
 
Until on the 20th when we fled, some local population had not known what was 
happening. Here the events started on the 20-21st. […] In Gikunzi, at our hill of 
Kibu and Munanira that is where the Tutsi were numerous. But the rest of 
Gikunzi, no Tutsi was there ‘since the beginning of the earth’ as the people used 
to say. […] No Tutsi was living in the remaining Gikunzi. We were few [two hills 
only.] Many Tutsi were in Sheke and Bitare. […] The majority survived the 
genocide at our place. If you analyse, at Munanira and Kibu where I live, few 
people died, such as some elderly who could not flee. […] We, we fled. [..] We, 
we made a meeting and advised ourselves to join the Tutsi from Gashiru and 
Bitare, and then go to Burundi, […] Fortunately we went and found that the 
military at the border had left, on the 20th April when we left, we went in peace 
really. We all went with our cows, even myself I went with my cows until 
Burundi. […] Mubumbano, Gishamvu, Liba, etc. were exterminated. […] We, we 
fled because we decided not to go to the parishes, because we had been informed 
that at Cyahinda [Nyakizu Commune] and at Kibeho [Gikongoro Prefecture] 
massacres had occurred. They killed them even inside churches. That is when we 
advised ourselves to go to Burundi. The luck we had is that, the ones who fled on 
the 19th had been shot by the Habyarimana soldiers, then the soldiers from 
Burundi shot with machine gun to them in Rwanda and then they left. The latter 
fled and went. Then a news spread saying that the Barundi are about to attack 
Rwanda in order to save the Tutsi. That is why we crossed peacefully. […] We 
left here at 10:00 on the 20th April and arrived in Burundi at 17:00. We went all 
along the border, we did not pass in bushes.71
 
  
                                                 
71 Interview with Athanase Kumuyange, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
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However, the statistics available suggest that in Gikunzi, victims were slightly more than 
the half the Tutsi population of that sector.72
 
 Kumuyange was among those who crossed 
the border the first day, that is, Wednesday, 20 April 1994. As we shall see for other 
survivors, there is another group of those who crossed on April, the 21 April 1994. The 
20th and the 21st April seem most reliable dates for those two departures. See for example 
the following account of Christophe Batura, who also survived from Gikunzi by joining 
the Sheke group:  
We departed on the 19th […] Wednesday73, at 9:00 and arrived in Burundi at 
17:00. […] We were very exhausted; we found a tree which served as a roadblock 
at the border. A small girl said: ‘This tree is not a person”, and went to remove it 
and threw it in the Kanyaru river, and we crossed. Children are heroes, God 
speaks through them. That girl is my daughter; her name is Rose. […] We 
crossed, and the Burundi people welcomed us very well.74
 
 
This informant also corroborates the explanation of Athanase Kumuyange about the Tutsi 
from Gikunzi Sector who joined those from Sheke in order to cross together, but he adds 
that some other Tutsi from Mukuge Sector and even Nyakizu and Runyinya Communes 
were part of this group. There were also the Tutsi from Gikongoro who had fled to 
Gishamvu and who had stopped at Bitare and Gashiru hills.75
 
 
According to Christophe Batura, there are around a hundred victims who died in Gikunzi 
at a place called Gisenyi. It is those that the killers met there before they could flee. In 
Kirwa, where he lived, he says the victims numbered fifteen.76 Ananias Kabandana and 
Kanamugire are mentioned as hardcore killers in Gishamvu.77 Justin Nsengimana and 
Ndutiye are considered as those who instilled the Hutu to participate in the genocide 
against the Tutsi.78
                                                 
72 See infra.  
 Perhaps it is indispensable to remind ourselves who Dr. Justin 
Nsengimana was, since some archival documents mention him. Dr. Justin Nsengimana 
had been very influential in Gishamvu politics. He was a medical doctor, working at the 
73 According to the Calendar of April 1994, Wednesday was 20 April. 
74 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
75 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
76 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
77 Interview with Célestin Bangambiki, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
78 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
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University Hospital of Butare. He had also been President of the Technical Commission 
of the Gishamvu Commune.79 In 1975, he was on the list of Gishamvu inhabitants who 
were studying at university level in Germany.80 He was the son of Jean Nyambwana, who 
had been a teacher and member of the Commune Committee in 1975.81
 
 
b) Genocide in Mukuge  
 
In order to understand what happened in Mukuge Sector, I talked to three informants. To 
begin with, Anonymous 5 is among the Tutsi from Mukuge who survived by joining the 
Gashiru group. He is among those who crossed on Thursday, 21 April 1994. Here is how 
he narrates their exodus and trajectory as well as the fate of those who did not go:  
 
 
… the cell members are the ones who ordered the Tutsi to go and join others. 
[Some went to the church and the seminary,] others went to Bitare and Gashiru. 
They spent there about two weeks. They met with the others who came from 
Nyaruguru. Then one day they took the decision to flee in group. They were a 
huge group. They passed at Kigembe, Murama, Ngera, Ngoma and Kayonza, 
[Kigembe commune] they continued the whole tar road, then crossed the border 
and went to Burundi. They went in three sets. They were so numerous. The 
people in the road were unable to do anything bad to them, since they were a lot. 
That is how it happened. […] Me I was in the second set, no the third. Because 
they fled on Wednesday, the date was 20 April 1994, me I went on the 21 April. 
They were afraid of them because they had also weapons such as bows, spears, 
they said: ‘Just go, just proceed, God has sacrificed you, wherever you go you 
will die.’ That is how it happened. […] The one who stayed alone such as the 
elderly, the sick, they were killed, no one arrived in Burundi.82
 
 
On the other hand, the account of Kanamugire shows how the Tutsi organised themselves 
at Bitare and how they concluded they should go to Burundi. This reference shows that 
their choices were inspired by their experiences of the early 1960s:  
                                                 
79 Justin Nsengimana, Président de la Commission Technique de Gishamvu, Compte rendu de la réunion de 
la Commission Technique tenue au Bureau Communal de Gishamvu en date du 10 juillet 1989. 
80 Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Gishamvu, Lettre au Ministre de l’Education 
Nationale, Kigali, Objet: Liste des étudiants Rwandais, Réf. : n° 268/03.09.0I/9, date not clear, letter 
answering the one of 19 May 1976. 
81 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Report to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture 
concerning the election of  Commune organs on 21 December 1975, Ref.: No. 538/03.09.01/7, Gishamvu, 
29 December 1975. 
82 Interview with Anonymous 5, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
368 
 
In 1960, we [some Tutsi from Mukuge] had fled to Bitare and Gashiru and 
resisted successfully. Then we imitated the 1960 scenario and went to Bitare 
again. Once at Bitare, we made a meeting, then we realised that this time we will 
be exterminated. Then we decided to go to Burundi. We took weapons, livestock, 
and other important stuff. Then we resisted against some who were on our way.83
 
 
He was among those who left on Wednesday. According to him, the second group went 
on Thursday. They gave some cows to people who wanted to attack them. They also 
showed grenades to the military that they met, so that they would not attack them. 
According to Kanamugire, there were some Tutsi youths from Nyaruguru with twelve 
guns and six grenades in the group. But he is the only one to provide this information. He 
says that it was a secret: those Tutsi young military did not want to tell everybody that 
they had guns, but they were protecting them. Just in case of a serious attack, they could 
intervene.84
 
 
The next informant, Kanyamugenga, starts his account with an explanation of the reason 
why the Tutsi decided to flee into parishes. Their choice is also inspired by the 1960s 
experiences just as the previous choice of going to Bitare as stressed above: “Long time 
ago people were fleeing to parishes and survived. No one died there. […] As you 
understand, even now they said to themselves:  ‘Let us flee to the parishes, no one was 
killed there, so even now we will not have any problem.”85
 
 
 Then Kanyamugenga goes on narrating how he went to keep his belongings at the 
Nyakibanda Seminary where he worked before, then how he went home to collect his 
family and extended family which had gathered at his home because it is located near the 
road, then he brought them to Gashiru. Then he went back home and then went with his 
son to Busoro market to protect the wife of his son who was about to sell the sorghum 
beer before they fled. They protected that lady because the previous day the Hutu 
customers did drink the beer without paying. So the two men were there so that people 
could pay after drinking. Kanyamugenga says that he was fragile, because a certain 
                                                 
83 Interview with Vincent Kanamugire, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
84 Interview with Vincent Kanamugire, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
85 Interview with Callixte Kanyamugenga, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
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Niyizurugero who was the Inspector of Schools in Gishamvu was looking for him in 
order to kill him, as he narrates. Then Niyizurugero sent five persons to cut him with 
machetes, on 18 April. From Busoro, he went by foot to Gashiru, crossing dangerous 
roadblocks, and luckily, he reached Gashiru. On Wednesday, 20 April 1994, people 
started to flee towards Burundi. The big group went on that date, as Kanyamugenga 
explains. But he postponed his crossing and did not go in that group because he says that 
he and his family waited as some food was being cooked for children, so they went in the 
second group that travelled on Thursday, 21st April. This experience shows to what extent 
certain people were caring not just about their lives during those hard times, but were also 
trying to flee with as much material assets as they could. The remainder of his account is 
about his experience during the crossing:  
 
On Thursday 20th April [sic: 21st April], very early in the morning, we took safari 
[journey], we went with cows for those who had them, we proceeded with our 
spears and machetes, people seeing us. They were wearing ibirere [banana 
leaves], they could not do anything, because they were afraid, they saw that we 
had also weapons. They were only collecting some cow or sheep that was lost 
away and eating meat. Some however did throw stones at us, others were 
insulting us. We had departed at 5:00 am, when we arrived at Akanyaru river, we 
realised that corpses were floating on top of it. We found that the Burundi military 
have chased away the Rwanda military who were stopping people from crossing 
the border to flee. They had gone up the hill with their guns and uniforms, they 
were seeing us crossing. Then we went to Burundi.86
 
 
c) Genocide in Sheke  
 
As mentioned above, the bulk of the Tutsi from Gikunzi and Mukuge Sectors survived as 
a result of joining those from Gashiru and Bitare of Sheke Sector and then all of them 
decided to go to Burundi before the massacre of Tutsi at Nyumba and Nyakibanda 
occurred. I have chosen the dates of Saturday 23 April and Monday 25 April for large 
scale massacres at Nyumba and Nyakibanda, as the report of African Rights (2003) 
noted. But this same report had also suggested different other dates, such as 20, 21 and 22 
April for those same massacres.87
                                                 
86 Interview with Callixte Kanyamugenga, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
 Nevertheless, because the informants from Gikunzi, 
87 African Rights, The History of the genocide, p. 14. 
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Mukuge and Sheke assert to have left on 20 and 21 April and that they left before the 
killings happened at Nyumba and Nyakibanda, it is more plausible to place those 
massacres on 23 April and afterwards. Consider for example the following explanation:  
 
The role of Kambanda, at the day of our departure, we departed at around 5:00 
am. At 9:00 he had arrived at our place to check where we had assembled, 
because he had been informed that we had left our houses and that we were 
together. When he arrived there and found that we had left, he and the soldiers he 
came with, they got angry. They said: ‘The ones of Nyumba and Nyakibanda 
should also escape us?’ He immediately left, that is how you hear that they 
exterminated the people of those places [Nyumba and Nyakibanda]. That is his 
role in the genocide.88
 
 
According to my informant Augustin Rugengamanzi, they knew that the Tutsi had been 
massacred at Nyumba and Nyakibanda only after they had arrived in Burundi.89
 
 
The decision to go to Burundi – taken by the Bitare and Gashiru Tutsi, together with the 
Tutsi who came from Gikunzi and Mukuge sectors, as well as from neighbouring 
communes such as Nyakizu and Runyinya, and even from Gikongoro Prefecture – can be 
considered as both strategy and luck. It was a strategy because it came from the 
inspiration of the 1960s’ experience when some Tutsi survived by gathering at the Bitare 
hill and by resisting their attackers. It was also a strategy, because the Tutsi at those hills 
of Gashiru and Bitare decided to flee to Burundi after hearing the experiences of Tutsi 
who had spent some days there and who were from Nyaruguru region (Nyakizu, 
Runyinya and Gikongoro):  
 
Our decision about embarking [to Burundi] came from what we saw from 
Nyaruguru. The people from Nyaruguru fled in our direction. They said: ‘We, we 
fought at Kibeho [located in Gikongoro], at Cyahinda [located in Nyakizu], at 
Karama [located in Runyinya] [parishes], therefore, any parish you go in, you will 
be exterminated there. Do you carry a gun with you? Those small bows and 
arrows are useless. As for us, we are used to marching distances. We proceed our 
way.’ That is how we also we took the decision to go [to Burundi]. It is a decision 
we took in order to avoid being killed by those who know us. We preferred to be 
killed by unknown people. 90
                                                 
88 Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
  
89 Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
90 Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
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Alison Des Forges mentions that before the Tutsi gathering at Bitare left, they first 
underwent attacks from groups of assailants. When these noticed that the Tutsi were 
resisting successfully, they went to seek reinforcement from the military. This is when 
the Tutsi of Bitare decided to leave and to take the Burundi destination, as they noticed 
that it was no longer a simple war but “an extermination”. Des Forges also mentions the 
date of 20 April 1994 for the departure to Burundi.91
 
  This explanation shows that the 
strategy to go to Burundi was guided, not just by past experiences, but also by the 
conjuncture of present events. 
The following account insists more on the strategic agency of local Tutsi “intellectuals” 
to instil the Tutsi of Sheke to leave, than the inspiration of Tutsi from Nyaruguru region:  
 
The refugees from Gikongoro came to our place earlier. When they go to drink 
Ikigage [sorghum beer], some people loot them. Then they come to our homes 
and ask us something to eat, we give them. It was even a bad conjuncture period 
(i.e., poverty time), but we gave them what we had. When we give them they go, 
and so on. Then a time arrived when people […] who include Minani [Laurent] 
[…]. They came to advise us, because they used to interact with educated people 
of the commune, they explained to us how the war has started.92
                                                 
91 Interviews in Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 496. 
 And it is a war 
targeting one ethnic group. The ones coming from Nyaruguru were not narrating 
to us the situation, they were threatened, they used to come and go in forests and 
just wait. Then those men [the Minani] infiltrated and then came to inform us that 
the war is imminent and that we should take weapons and protect our homes. We 
did not know that we will flee. And then some local authorities who were the 
councillors came to tell us that there is peace. They came to our homes and 
convinced us not to flee outside our homes, that peace will prevail. They were 
coming from Kambanda [Burgomaster] and investigate the situation, after they 
had attended meetings, then they came to tell us that there was peace and that we 
should not flee and that we should not imitate the Nyaruguru displaced people. 
Yet they were planning how they will kill us. After some days, on 19 April 94 
they told us that peace prevails, but those intellectuals of ours [the Tutsi] told us 
that there is no peace, then they advised us to come and flee. We collected some 
movable things, then we went to a place called Gashiru, we spent a night there. 
Until morning, nothing bad had happened, then we came back to our homes. In 
the evening, Minani who was our neighbour came and circulated at all our homes 
92 A number of Tutsi teachers in Gishamvu were members of MRND party. As a result, they used to 
interact with the Burgomaster and the Subprefect easily. In particular, Laurent Minani had been President 
of MRND party in Sheke Sector (see chapter four), a sector that had a great number of Tutsi population. 
Yet, MRND was considered as a pro-Hutu party. 
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and told us ‘anyone who sleeps here and who is not a disabled one, it is his 
business.’ Minani Laurent was a teacher, he told us to collect some few things and 
go. No Hutu person advised us to go. Except those who interacted with them. […] 
Then we packed, we went…93
 
 
 
But fortune was also on the side of those victims. Consider for example the following 
account:  
 
People who prepared themselves to attack Bitare and Gashiru spent their night at 
Kambanda’s house. Kambanda stopped them from attacking, saying that if they 
attack, the battle is going to be tough at night. Because they could be injured. 
‘Stay here, you will attack tomorrow morning’, the Burgomaster said. That helped 
us to flee; it was luck from God. When they came in the morning, they found that 
we were long gone.94
 
 
Still, the following account, belonging to informant Innocent Nahayo, helps us see the 
combination of both strategy (or agency) and fortune:  
 
The reason why they survived, they became a big number at Bitare. On the 20 
April the authorities wanted to attack, then they changed their minds, it is the 
councillors who told us that news. They said that they need more help from other 
areas in order to attack us. Then on the 21 April we remained there, on the 19 
April we started our way to Burundi. When we approached people on the way 
they ran saying those are the Bitare people. Bitare people fled with their cows, 
those who died were not a lot, few people died such as the ones who were tired of 
walking, such as the sick. They went and arrived in Burundi. I am one of those. In 
fact, we split ourselves into two groups because we were a lot. […] I went in the 
first group. The second came on Thursday. We, we went on Wednesday.95
 
 
 
Finally, three informants were able to narrate in a more elaborate manner, how the travel 
to Burundi by foot went. The first reconstructed both the first day and the second day 
crossings and showed also the combination of both luck and strategy:  
 
The Prefecture of Butare was ruled by Habyarimana Jean. People hoped that he 
cannot get involved in those killings. They hoped that as a Prefect he will also 
oblige the Burgomasters not to embark in killings. Also we hoped that the killings 
in Gikongoro will not reach Butare, the way even before in 1959, 1963, 1973 
                                                 
93 Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
94 Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
95 Interview with Innocent Nahayo, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
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killings were always starting from Gikongoro. But after being informed about the 
death of Habyarimana Jean Baptiste, we understood that there was no escape. 
Then the refugees started to flee. We realised that the violence has reached us. 
The roadblocks were a lot, so it was difficult to cross them and flee. […] The first 
group of those fleeing fled on the 20 April 1994 in the morning. The perpetrators 
who wanted to kill them on the way, they threw them a young male cow or a goat. 
Then they followed that meat and left the people. People also had weapons such 
as sticks, machetes, so they could also fight. By chance, they did not meet military 
forces who could easily defeat them. Then they crossed Akanyaru [river]. The 
following day there was a big group which crossed again. They also were able to 
arrive in Burundi [21 April]. I was part of that second group which was saved by 
God and by being a big group.96
 
 
 
The second was a comprehensive account from an informant who was from Bitare, and 
who was part of those who crossed on the Wednesday 20 April group:  
 
During that time, we were at home at Bitare. We were a strong hill inhabited by 
Tutsi only. We protected ourselves. No one came to infiltrate us. We had some 
other relatives coming from Gashiru. When we heard that things have become 
worse, that people started to die, and that some of our children studying in Kigali 
and elsewhere had joined us, we united and protected ourselves. No one infiltrated 
us until 20 April. Then things became worse, we decided to flee, to go. We went 
with our cows, goats, pigs, rabbits in baskets, we went very well in a queue. The 
date is 20 April 1994. […] We used 3 to 5 hours to arrive to Burundi. […] Then 
we went to the camp of Mureke, they helped as much as they could, as all 
refugees are treated. A big number of people died of macinya (dysentery), but the 
majority survived and came back to Rwanda.97
 
 
The last one was part of the ones who crossed the border on Thursday, 21 April 1994 and 
who was from Gashiru:  
 
People from Cyahinda, Nyaruguru fled to Gashiru. Then the interahamwe after 
killing people near the Ibisi came to attack us. Then we decided to go out of our 
houses, we regrouped ourselves and spent the night together. We heard that 
people fleeing to Burundi are being killed by the FRODEBU… The first group 
departed on Wednesday. Then the killers went to look for reinforcement, saying 
that our people fled. Then we of the second group decided to depart the following 
day early morning and we departed. We were attacked at Ngera of Kigembe, but 
the people there decided to leave us the Bitare and Gashiru people in peace since 
they saw that we were ready to fight, we had our spears and bows. Only people 
                                                 
96 Interview with Anonymous 4, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
97 Interview with Anonymous 2, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
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with guns could defeat us, they did not have a gun. We continued our route. At 
13:00 we arrived at Kanyaru river. The Burundi people rejoiced, we had our 
cows, no one died in the crossing. We were more than 5,000 people. The people 
from here plus the ones from Kibeho, the whole Nyaruguru, Cyahinda had joined 
us. Even the Kigembe people joined us. […] We only suffered in the refugee 
camps and lost many people there because of macinya [dysentery] and hunger.98
 
 
As one can notice, the above accounts are about those who survived by crossing the 
border of Burundi. But in this group, some few people got injured or died on their way to 
Burundi.99
 
 
But some other Tutsi from Gishamvu died in Sheke Sector. They include the disabled, 
sick and the elderly who could not flee to Burundi by foot. They are fewer than the ones 
who survived as the interviews from Sheke informants suggest.100 Some other Tutsi 
people from Sheke had sought refuge at Nyumba. As a result, the bulk of those were 
killed.101 Also a number of the Tutsi from Sheke who were living in Kigali or Butare 
towns, or who were married elsewhere were killed as they were on their way back to 
Gishamvu.102
 
 
6.3. MAY-JUNE 1994: SECOND PHASE OF GENOCIDE 
6.3.1. The Tracking down of remaining Tutsi victims and the civil self-
defence policy 
 
After the first wave of genocidal massacres that occurred in April 1994, and that 
eliminated the bulk of Tutsi victims, several orders came from above to ask local leaders 
to search carefully those who had survived the first massacre and kill them. These were 
either the ones who had been able to hide in nature, such as in forests or sorghum fields 
                                                 
98 Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
99 Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
100 See for example Interview with François Munyantore, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with 
Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007, and Anonymous 1, Gishamvu, 19 April, 2007. 
101 Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
102 Interview with Thérèse Mukangwije, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Augustin 
Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
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or the ones who had been hidden in houses of Hutu inhabitants. These victims included 
mostly women and children.103
 
 
One lady, who lived in Muboni Cell of Gishamvu Sector where Nyumba massacre had 
occurred as mentioned above, explained in detail how this second phase of killing 
occurred at her place. It looks pretty much like what was happening in many other parts 
of the commune. 
 
Simbarikure [Subprefect], Kambanda [Burgomaster], Cyuma [Councillor] then 
said: ‘At this time, killing is finished.’ People did not know that it was a trick. 
They added: ‘Anyone who hid a Tutsi, be he/she a young lady, or a child, we are 
not targeting those. Those who hid them are not faulty, they are asked to bring 
them outside, they will not be harmed. The killing has been stopped, now we have 
cleaned ourselves, that’s it. Now they are not a threat, in fact a lady does not have 
an ethnic identity.’ At that time, those who were keeping them brought them to 
light. But after bringing them outside, they killed them. Q: When did that happen? 
A: In June [1994].104
 
 
Laurentine Nyirakanani adds that certain old people refused to show the Tutsi persons 
that they were hiding, as a result those survived. 
 
This “tracking down of the last Tutsi” was called “guhumbahumba”. It meant searching 
in every hiding place for the last Tutsi individuals who remained alive. This term was 
borrowed from agriculture where after harvesting beans, children are sent in the field to 
gather the remaining grains of beans. It was the result of too much sensitization and 
training done by local leaders to local populations in a programme that was called 
“civilian self-defence”. This programme focused mainly on the mounting and guarding of 
barriers or roadblocks, on the organisation of nightly patrols with the aim of discovering 
and catching “the enemy”. As one understands, bureaucratic organisation (i.e. civil self-
defence policy) was combined with – or translated in - an everyday language 
                                                 
103 African Rights, The History of the genocide, p. 5 and Interview with Bernadette Urayeneza, Gishamvu, 
24 March 2006. 
104 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
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(guhumbahumba) in order to make it more efficient. Particular emphasis was put on 
communes located near the border with foreign countries.105
 
 
One letter from the Gishamvu Burgomaster insisted both on roadblock mounting and 
organisation and on the tracking down of the “enemy”. It bore a war language:  
 
Dear Councillors, I urge you to monitor closely how roadblocks are being 
protected. You must inform us wherever they are set. No place must have a 
roadblock that you did not inform us about. Work in tandem with your respective 
cell committees. In addition, there must be a person responsible, this one must put 
in place a team that will monitor the roadblock. So that you can prevent the 
robbery that is happening in some places. Those who are surveilling the roadblock 
must do it very carefully, so that the enemy cannot have a way of crossing.106
 
 
We learn from this letter that the roadblocks were monitored and that they were not 
spontaneously made by local populations. Secondly, when the Tutsi happen to pass near 
the roadblock, they are called enemies, in the war logic. This discourse undoubtedly 
victimised them, as we saw in the previous chapter.  
 
As André Guichaoua, who has also done research on the Tutsi genocide in Butare 
Prefecture, wrote, there were a series of administrative documents disseminated by 
leaders towards the end of May 1994 and that were concerned about the programme of 
“civilian self-defence”. One such document was published on 25 May and was written by 
the Interior Minister, Edouard Karemera, and was about “the implementation of orders of 
the Prime Minister on the auto-organisation of civilian defence”. According to 
Guichaoua, civil self-defence units were given immense powers vis-à-vis political parties, 
military hierarchy and local administration services.107
 
 
At the level of the commune, the Burgomaster seems to have organised several meetings 
in his sectors in May 1994. For example, he planned to have a meeting with the Liba 
                                                 
105 See Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 545-546. 
106 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to All the Councillors, Ref.: 
108/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, le 19 May 1994. 
107 Guichaoua, Rwanda 1994, p. 318. 
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residents on 26 May 1994 at 9: 00 am, and this meeting took place.108
 
 It is likely that he 
organised similar meetings in other sectors of the Gishamvu Commune. 
On the 9th of June 1994, the Burgomaster Kambanda held a meeting at the Sheke Sector. 
That meeting was attended by a large number of inhabitants from Sheke Cell, while those 
from Gashiru and Bitare cells were few. According to the minutes of this meeting, the 
Sheke Sector was underpopulated at that time. This is true, because it was half populated 
by the Tutsi population before the genocide. At this time of June 1994, the bulk of the 
Tutsi from this sector had fled to Burundi, and those who failed to cross had been 
exterminated. The main issue of that meeting was about solving the misunderstanding 
that prevailed between the Councillor, Mr. Joseph Bacinoni, and his constituents, who, 
according to him, were not answering his calls, were not attending his meetings. The 
Burgomaster started his speech with a word of thanks to the residents for having united in 
the “struggle against the enemy and against his accomplices who wanted to bring a rule 
of Ubuhake again”, i.e., the Tutsi, but hastened to add that the struggle was not yet 
ended.109
 
   
Now concerning the civilian self-defence programme, on 1 June 1994, the Subprefect of 
Bosoro Prefecture, Assiel Simbalikure, issued a circular letter to Burgomasters of his 
territory that includes Gishamvu. Here is the main content of that letter:  
 
Dear Burgomaster,  
In order to stop the enemy who has attacked Rwanda, i.e. Inyenzi Inkotanyi, here are 
some of the instructions you must transmit to your constituents:  
1. To cross all the sides of the whole commune in order to catch the enemy because 
he is very clever, he knows how to hide like a snake. This checking must be done 
by the population in all cells and the roadblocks must be well monitored; 
2. To teach the population how to dig holes which they will use to hide when the 
enemy will attack; 
                                                 
108 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Cell Responsibles, Re: A meeting 
with the population, Ref.: No. 109/04.09.01/16, Gishamvu, 24 May 1994.  
109 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune and Rugemintwaza, Augustin, Secretary of the 
Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the 
meeting with the population of Sheke sector held on 9 June 1994, Ref.: No. 131/04.09.01/16, Gishamvu, 10 
June 1994.  
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3. To stop the enemy from capturing the commune. This means that if the enemy 
attacks, all the populations must stand up as one person, carry their traditional 
weapons, helped by the policemen of the commune and by that youth that was 
few days ago trained on how to protect the commune [civil self-defence units]. 
Those who live near the border must protect it very much…110
 
 
The Burgomaster made sure to transmit this letter the same day to the Councillors of his 
commune in order to follow this instruction of the Subprefect.111
 
  
Just two days after the Subprefect’s circular letter to Burgomasters to use civil self-
defence, a security meeting was organised in the Gishamvu Commune. The Burgomaster 
decided that the displaced people from Mayaga and Bugesera must not scatter among the 
population of Gishamvu, that they must be settled together at a hill called Akagunda in 
the Mubumbano Sector so that they can be helped. At this date, the RPF had taken over 
Bugesera, that is why the population of this area fled to Butare communes including 
Gishamvu and Kibayi. The Subprefect asked those who attended the meeting to teach the 
population how to protect themselves using traditional weapons. He said that it is urgent 
to teach the youth which knows democracy, i.e. the Hutu, to use guns. “So the population 
must be calmed down and taught how to fight.” These were the instructions given by the 
Prime Minister, as the minutes stressed. In the recommendations of that meeting, one 
stressed that “the security committees at the level of sectors are the ones that will be in 
charge of determining who is the accomplice and who is not, they are not entitled to take 
the final decisions as they are just consultative. The suspected ones must be submitted to 
the administrative authority.”112
 
 The way roadblocks were organised and the above final 
decision on determining the identity of the enemy show that orders at this time were 
highly centralised.  
                                                 
110 Assiel Simbarikure, Subprefect of Busoro Subprefecture, Copy, Letter to the Burgomasters of Gishamvu 
– Kigembe – Nyakizu – Runyinya Communes, Re: Security, Ref.: No. 64/14.09.01/4, Busoro, 1 June 1994. 
111 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Councillor of Sector, All, Re: 
Security, Ref.: No. 119/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 1 June 1994.   
112 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Augustin Rugemintwaza, Secretary of the 
Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the 
Security meeting held on 3 June 1994, Ref.: No. 130/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 10 June 1994. 
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Indeed, towards the 15th of June, the eastern part of the country was controlled by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front rebels, while the territory from Kigali to Butare was still 
controlled by the Rwandan Governmental Forces.113
 
 At this time, in Gishamvu, the focus 
was on the strengthening of civil self-defence units in the form of military training of 
those units. Surprisingly enough, a priest from Roman Catholic Church, Abbé 
Rusingizandekwe, was in charge of training during this genocide time:  
Dear President,  
You are asked to inform the constituents that have undergone the military training 
in your sector that they must quickly come to the Gishamvu Commune on Friday 
17 June 1994 at 8: 00 am so that they can undergo the second phase of military 
training that is given by Abbé Rusingizandekwe Thaddée from Nyakibanda. 
Please use also those who teach military training in your sectors and tell them to 
bring their learners.114
 
  
 
This second phase of genocide killing was very close to a “hunting exercise” as a number 
of researchers have observed. Having analysed the vocabulary that was used in the 
tracking down of the Tutsi in bushes and other hiding places, in the description of 
victims, of perpetrators and of the action of searching them, then killing them, they 
realized that this description was very close to the hunting of animals in forests. This is so 
in part because the victims had been animalized in the ideology demonizing them: 
 
On the level of common discourse, then, those who participated in the killing of 
Tutsi were able to see their actions as good for the wider society, and sanctioned 
by the highest authorities in the land. Indeed, using words like kuvuza induru 
(yell), kwihisha (to hide), kuvumbura (flush out of hiding), gushorera (to herd), 
guhiga (to hunt/chase), and kwichira ku gasi (kill in full view) the avoues I 
interviewed often seemed to be recounting hunting expeditions, rather than 
genocidal attacks. Psychologically, those people called to participate in the 
genocide transformed themselves into hunters in pursuit of dangerous animals. As 
for the victims (their prey), often they too felt dehumanized to the extent that it 
made sense on some level for them to be killed. Ironically, according to Rwandan 
tradition, it is a taboo to hand an animal that seeks refuge in someone’s compound 
                                                 
113 Paul, Quilès et al., Mission d’Information , France, Enquête sur la tragédie rwandaise (1990-1994) T.1. 
Rapport, Paris, 1998, pp. 300-301. 
114 Pascal Kambanda (P.O. Augustin Lyumugabe Assistant of the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune), 
Letter to the President of the Civil Self-defense Committee in the Sector, All, Ref.:  134/04.09.01/4, 
Gishamvu, le 15 June 1994.  
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over to its pursuers. During the genocide, however, Tutsi were not able to benefit 
from this loophole.115
 
  
The analysis of Tutsi genocide as a “hunting game” has also been made by Josias 
Semujanga. In addition to the enumeration of four steps of the ‘traditional’ hunting 
activity, - the departure to hunting, the arrival to the assembling place of hunters and the 
practice of rituals, the hunting, and the return after hunting – he stressed that several 
accounts of both survivors and perpetrators use words and representations of hunting 
activity.116
 
 
 The “hunting” that Mironko and Semujanga are talking about had become so common 
that a Priest who was based at the Nyakibanda Seminary, Abbé Rusingizandekwe, also 
reminded those at a security meeting he attended to search in the bushes in order to get 
the ‘enemy’ there.117
6.3.2. The policy around possessions 
 
 
While the Tutsi from Gikongoro, Nyakizu and Runyinya were fleeing to Gishamvu, they 
were looted on their way by certain young Hutu. Also during the massacres, the looting 
continued, this time involving property of the Tutsi from Gishamvu. 
 
After that phase of large scale massacres and the flight of some Tutsi victims, the looting 
of their property continued. However, in early May 1994, the government regulated the 
fate of those properties, especially of land, livestock, and harvest in fields: 
At its May 6 meeting, the prefectural security council decided to renew 
instructions on property from 1963-64, when most Tutsi land and belongings had 
been forcibly appropriated. […] [T]he policy seems in practice to have been the 
same as that being implemented elsewhere in the country. Local authorities would 
appropriate the most valuable goods for eventual sale, but would concede other 
                                                 
115 Charles Mironko, “Igitero: means and motive in the Rwandan genocide”, Journal of Genocide 
Research, 6, 1, March 2004, pp. 47-60, pp. 52-53 emphasis in original. 
116 Josias Semujanga, “Les fonctions des récits de chasse dans le génocide au Rwanda”, Etudes 
Rwandaises, N° 9, Série Lettres et Sciences Humaines, Septembre 2005, pp. 69-102, pp. 92-97. 
117 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Augustin Rugemintwaza, Secretary of the 
Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the 
Security meeting held on 3 June 1994, Ref.: No. 130/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 10 June 1994. 
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goods to looters; they would redistribute land; and they would leave standing 
crops to the disposition of the people of the cell or sector.118
Among the looters, the ones who had participated in the genocide seem to have been 
given more priority: “As for the land, they sold fields, they sold sorghum. You pay 2,000 
Francs, they give you a field. But at our place, they gave land to only those who have 
participated in the genocide. The one who did not ‘work’ did not get anything. I was 
promised to get sorghum, but I did not get any, they gave to those killers only….”
  
119
 
 
The cheaper price of land was itself an incentive for many people to rush after that deal, 
that is why, as the above quotation suggests, other criteria had to be considered. In 
Gishamvu Sector, the price of such goods went as low as 1,500 francs:  
 
… with regard to the victims’ crops and land, the councillor sold them to people 
at a very low price. Some people got several hectares of banana plants or fields of 
colocase for very low prices—no more than 1,500 Rwandese francs. Knowing the 
value of this land before the genocide, such a price was as good as giving it away 
for free. Victims’ houses were also destroyed. The looters took everything of 
value that they could transport: tiles, metal sheeting, bricks, trees, doors, 
windows, etc.120
 
   
Sometimes, the looters were going to occupy the land of the deceased despite the 
regulation about property: “Both in town and on the hills, some did not wait for the 
formalities but simply moved into empty homes and began cultivating fields that had 
belonged to Tutsi.”121
At local lever, the Councillors seem to have been the main agents of selling and/or 
redistribution. A number of interviews confirm this statement.
  
122
                                                 
118 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 562. 
 As this selling was 
occurring in May and June 1994, it coincided with the military advance of RPF rebels 
and defeat of government forces. As a result, certain Hutu citizens, when they noticed 
that they had bought fields of land only to flee some weeks later, concluded that the 
119 Interview with Anonymous 13, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
120 African Rights, The History of the genocide, pp. 5-6. 
121 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 562-563.  
122 Interview with Marie Ntawuyirushintege, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
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Councillors had lied to them that it was a purchase, whereas it was a swindle or a crooked 
deal:  
Things continued, they said that the guns of RPF are heard at Rwabuye. Then, 
Cyuma with other leaders lied to the population that they must go to collect the 
property of the Tutsi and promised to defeat the Tutsi. But they knew that RPF 
had defeated them. They lied to the people to give them money so that they can 
get the amasambu [land] of the Tutsi. Thereafter, they asked that money to people 
by force. […] They knew that they were lying to the people. Even a poor person 
was borrowing money in order to buy that land. Some sold their belongings in 
order to buy those Tutsi properties. Those leaders shared that money because it 
was a lot. For example, people said that Cyuma put the money he got in a bag and 
the bag became full. Then after two days, those leaders fled and the population 
remained in the confusion.123
 
 
6.4. THE “GUSUBIRANAMO” PHENOMENON  
 
In May and June 1994, after the Tutsi had been removed from the landscape, either by 
genocide or by escape, it is understandable that the Hutu were the ones who remained in 
communes, with of course the Twa who were always very few.124
6.4.1. Fighting over loot 
 One may suspect that 
no conflict would prevail any more, since society became “sociologically” homogeneous. 
But this did not become the case. Instead, a new conflict arose. That conflict was 
articulated around the targeting of property. It also concerned the Tutsi wives of the Hutu 
men. The latter had protected them despite the official call for killing any Tutsi, including 
anyone who is related to the Hutu matrimonially. It is this phenomenon of Hutu fighting 
against other Hutu that came to be called “isubiranamo” (noun) or “gusubiranamo” 
(verb), which roughly means to be against one’s fellows, in violent terms.  
 
                                                 
123 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
124 See the demographic statistics of the Twa in chapter three. 
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The gusubiranamo, i.e., the fighting of Hutu against Hutu, was unequivocally about the 
material targets. See for example what this informant explained: “After exterminating 
them [the Tutsi], life continued, it was in April. […] Then people started to be divided. 
[…] After the Hutu had done that killing, they started now the thing of attacking each 
other. They were fighting over the things looted.”125
 
  
In one letter, the Burgomaster planned for a security meeting on 3 June 1994, alleging 
that insecurity was being widespread in the commune, due probably to isubiranamo, i.e. 
violence among the Hutu.126
 
 Indeed, after the genocide, insecurity meant that 
isubiranamo phenomenon. One informant called it “the violence of the belly” in contrast 
with “the violence of identity” that concerned the genocide. The “violence of the belly” 
referred to Hutu-Hutu violence targeting the property, whereas the “violence of identity” 
concerned the Hutu violence against the Tutsi, targeted for who they were: 
In the meantime, except the material things of the Tutsi that people had looted, 
they started now to attack the Hutu and confiscate their belongings. It is the youth 
mobs who did that. Even the uneducated population did it. […]They started to 
fight over the material things. I even assert that it was luck that the RPF took over 
the country. Because a second massacre, very harsh, of the belly was to start. I 
think very few people would survive. They saw a person who was rich, having 
many cattle, then they accuse him of being a Tutsi who had changed his identity 
and become Hutu in 1960, as a way of justifying his killing and/or looting. That 
crime had started, and was escalating.127
 
 
More importantly, this quotation shows how the isubiranamo became a complex 
phenomenon. Though it was material based, the justification of the looting was based on 
the accusation of a Hutu owner being Tutsi so as to victimise him or her and then to loot 
him or her. Which means that identity was being used again as a weapon against even 
                                                 
125 Interview with Anonymous 14, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
126 Pascal Kambanda, (P.O. Augustin Lyumugabe, Assistant of the Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune), 
Letter to the Head of Security in Gishamvu Commune, to the Head of MDR, MRND, PSD parties in the 
Gishamvu Commune, Representative of Businessmen of Gishamvu, Re: An urgent security meeting planned 
on 3 June 1994, Ref.: No.  124/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 2 June 1994. This letter invited the members of the 
Security Council of the Commune, the heads of MDR, MRND and PSD parties in Gishamvu and the head 
of the Chamber of Commerce of Gishamvu. But it did not invite the representative of PL. It is likely that he 
had been killed in April. His name was Justin Senyange. Probably, this party was eliminated in Gishamvu, 
since it had members who were majority Tutsi. 
127 Interview with Anonymous 13, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
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their fellow Hutu. Agency also seems to have played a certain role. For example, those 
Hutu who were witches or considered so were also targeted.128
 
 
My informant Nyirakanani mentions a case of a man who had looted many things 
including cows, rice sacks, and US dollars in the Nyakibanda seminary. His name is 
Karangwa. So, in order to confiscate some of that property, some other Hutu persons 
came and at first accused him of hiding Tutsi in his house. He denied that he had Tutsi 
hidden in his house. They took everything. They also collected those Tutsi that he was 
hiding. 
 
Another accusation was party affiliation. Those who once belonged to moderate factions 
of parties started to be victimised by the extremist ones. Some Hutu moderates had been 
killed along with the Tutsi, as is known across the whole country. But those who were not 
killed and who remained in the country, faced this threat around material goods. The 
account of Marie Ntawuyirushintege explains both the issue of identity and party 
affiliation:  
 
The leaders would start to kill those that did not go with them to kill. Even my 
husband was going to be killed. […] First, people living on the hill and not having 
a known genealogy [and hence a known ethnic identity] were to die. As early as 
possible. Secondly, others who were not sharing the same party affiliation with 
them [the killers] were to die. They [the Hutu] got divided towards the end of 
May.129
 
 
The handling of this violence was taken seriously by the national and local leaders. 
Instructions came from the Prime Minister advocating the Hutu not to do violence against 
each other especially during those times of “war”, as he explained. This call was repeated 
over and over by the Subprefect of Busoro and the Burgomaster of Gishamvu. 130
 
  
                                                 
128 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, 27 April 2007 
129 Interview with Marie Ntawuyirushintege, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
130 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Augustin Rugemintwaza, Secretary of the 
Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the 
Security meeting held on 3 June 1994, Ref.: No. 130/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 10 June 1994. 
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But that violence was not stopping. For example, my informant Joseph Kubwimana lost 
his four nephews as a result of this Hutu-Hutu division.131 Another example is about a 
series of attacks and attempts of attacks. Gabriel Murara, who was medical assistant, who 
was the Head of MDR in Gishamvu, and who has been an active organiser of genocide in 
Sholi Sector132 and even in the whole commune,133 alleged in one security meeting that 
he was about to be himself attacked. Cyuma, Councillor of Gishamvu Sector, confirmed 
that information and added that he is the one who helped him and saved his life in that 
isubiranamo (Hutu-Hutu division). In that meeting, other cases were also reported. It was 
said that the Liba, Buvumu and Kibingo Sectors had people who were attacking other 
sectors in order to loot, and they were organised by some elite from those sectors. The 
members of that meeting agreed also to urge their populations to have good behaviour so 
that the foreigners who visit Rwanda find them in a “good condition”.134
 
 
Moreover, robbery was widespread during this time. For example, the Burgomaster sent 
Mr. Jean Paul Habinshuti from Gishamvu Sector to the Prosecutor. Habinshuti was a 
soldier in the army of Rwanda. He robbed a motorbike on 6 June 1994 at night with the 
complicity of a civilian, Grégoire Mwongereza.135
 
 
The existing administration did not just issue verbal messages. It also took tangible 
measures, such as the modification of the administrative leadership of certain sectors, 
where this violence was being seen between the constituents and their local leaders. For 
example, in Liba Sector, the Councillor, Julien Munyakayanza, resigned from his 
position on 24 May 1994. The Burgomaster accepted his resignation on 27 May. He was 
                                                 
131 Interview with Joseph Kubwimana, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
132 Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
133 African Rights, The History of the genocide, pp.  6, 12, 18 and 21. 
134 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Augustin Rugemintwaza, Secretary of the 
Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the 
Security meeting held on 3 June 1994, Ref.: No. 130/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 10 June 1994.  
135 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prosecutor of the Republic, 
Butare Prosecution Service, Re: Sending Habinshuti J. Paul and Grégoire Mwongereza who collaborated 
in robbing with gun, Ref.: No. 127/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 8 June 1994. 
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replaced by Théodomir Misago.136 The Burgomaster informed the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture about this replacement on 31 May 1994.137
 
 
Again in Sheke Sector, the population went into open conflict against their Councillor, 
John Bacinoni. That conflict was apparently over material things. As a result, the 
population asked for the dismissal of the Councillor. The population called the 
Burgomaster for a meeting. That meeting was held on 9 June 1994, between the 
Burgomaster, the population of Sheke, and the Councillor. In that meeting, the Councillor 
was disavowed by his population. They accused him of taking for himself one sorghum 
field of the Tutsi, of having harvested that field alone, an act that provoked the looting of 
the remaining harvests that were still in the fields untouched. They also accused him of 
insulting them that they were crooks. The Burgomaster advised the population of Sheke 
not to instil division among themselves. The constituents made it clear that if Bacinoni 
did not resign, they would not work with him. As a result, the Councillor Bacinoni 
accepted to resign from his post.138 This report from Sheke shows that during these hard 
times, the population was an active agent, that it was not a mere tool of the Councillor or 
the Burgomaster. Bacinoni was replaced by Ezéchiel Sindambiwe after the latter being 
elected by the population on 14 June 1994.139
 
 
The frenzy around land acquisition was so strong that when the bulk of Tutsi survivors 
came back in Rwanda in July or August 1994, they found that their area had been already 
owned by their neighbours or other Hutu: “We found our land already redistributed. In a 
month since April they had destroyed, cultivated everywhere: in the valleys, and even 
                                                 
136 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to Munyakayanza, Julien, Councillor of 
Liba Sector, Re: The reply to your letter, Ref.: No. 115/04.09.01, Gishamvu, 27 May 1994. 
137 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
A new Councillor in Liba sector, Ref.: No. 116/04.09.01, Gishamvu, 31 May 1994. 
138 Pascal Kambanda, Kambanda, Pascal, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune and Augustin 
Rugemintwaza, Secretary of the Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the meeting with the population of Sheke sector held on 9 June 1994, Ref.: 
No. 131/04.09.01/16, Gishamvu, 10 June 1994.  
139 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: 
Mr. Sindambiwe Ezéchiel has replaced Bacinoni Joseph to the position of Councillor of Sheke Sector, Ref.: 
No. 132/04.09.01, Gishamvu, 15 June 1994. 
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where it is not possible to cultivate. They had looted; nothing had remained on the 
hill.”140
6.4.2. Fighting over Tutsi wives of Hutu men 
 
 
Concerning the problem that was dividing Hutu men over the Tutsi wives of other Hutu, 
the Burgomaster of Gishamvu agreed with the other local leaders in one meeting to stop 
killing those Tutsi women and their children because “they are not the inkotanyi we are 
fighting against”, instead “that can make us dusubiranamo [divide ourselves] instead of 
helping each other to fight against the true enemy, i.e., the inyenzi-inkotanyi.” This was 
also an instruction of the Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda, of not dividing themselves so 
as not to weaken themselves.141
 
  
The research of the late Alison Des Forges also confirms this sparing of Tutsi women:  
Authorities often discussed disputes over women at the same time as they 
considered problems of property. This was not just because issues of marriage and 
inheritance were often related, but also because men were thought to have an 
interest in their wives or female relatives comparable to their interest in property. 
Thus Hutu men were generally recognized to have a right to protect their wives, 
even if they were Tutsi. Hutu men also intervened to defend their sisters, even if 
they were married to Tutsi husbands.142
She goes on to explain that in certain areas of Butare Prefecture, some clashes occurred 
between the Hutu men who wanted to extend the genocide to Tutsi women and the 
husbands of those women.
  
143
I remember at that time, I had my brother-in-law who had a Tutsi wife. He came 
to tell his brother that ‘I have sharpened my machete’. I saw another one who had 
 My informant Nyirakanani, who witnessed closely this 
phenomenon of attacking Tutsi wives of Hutu men, also corroborates the view of Des 
Forges:  
                                                 
140 Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
141 Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, and Augustin Rugemintwaza, Secretary of the 
Gishamvu Commune, Confidential, Letter to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: The minutes of the 
Security meeting held on 3 June 1994, Ref.: No. 130/04.09.01/4, Gishamvu, 10 June 1994. 
142 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 564. 
143 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 565. 
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a Tutsi wife [doing the same], that is, the Hutu were about to fight against each 
other. Had RPF not saved them, they were about to divide themselves 
[gusubiranamo]. One was sharpening his machete, the other one doing same. 
Some started to say: ‘Any one who knows that he had hidden a Tutsi, beware.’ 
Those who had hidden the Tutsi were leaving their house and going to stay 
outside. […] This means that the first war had ended, the second war was about to 
start. This time, any person who had a Tutsi wife… Because at our place, they 
were a lot those who had Tutsi wives, so one person who is my neighbour started 
to say: ‘Me too my machete is sharpened, that, anyone who chops my wife, me 
too I will chop his.144
Nyirakanani mentions two Tutsi wives of Hutu who got killed, because they were 
widows. The killers went to kill them, because they expected no resistance. Nyirakanani 
says that afterwards, the leader Cyuma called a meeting and said that ‘do not do those 
things, (killings of Tutsi women) stop them, they will lead us nowhere’. He said: ‘All we 
tell you is to protect yourselves from the enemy, and the enemy you know him.’ But she 
thinks that it was just a pretext, as he knew that all the Tutsi had been killed and that it 
was hard to kill the Tutsi wives who had Hutu husbands or older sons. Because naturally 
these would protect them. These Hutu husbands and sons would also argue that, after all, 
in the Rwandan kinship system, women do not have identity in the sense that their clan 
and ethnicity is not transferred to their children. But, as we know, Tutsi women were not 
spared in general, it is only some of these Tutsi wives of Hutu men who had that chance. 
  
 
Finally, this Hutu-Hutu violence became so frightening to some Hutu, that some of them 
alleged that the taking over of power by the RPF was a rescue of not just the Tutsi – the 
majority of whom by the way had been massacred– but of the Hutu who were about to be 
killed. Anonymous 13 and Nyirakanani already mentioned this above. Consider also this 
analysis or prediction of Nzabamwita: “Gashagaza wrote to me saying that they should 
ask me the amount of my belongings. […] If the Kagame troops did not come we were to 
be killed also, the Hutu would vanish too. Because they would finish up the Tutsi and 
then they start to target the property of the Hutu, in fact this had already started.”145
                                                 
144 Interview with Laurentine Nyirakanani, 27April 2007. 
 As 
we saw in chapter two, there was in this region a history of targeting property of those 
145 Interview with Gaston Nzabamwita, Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. See also Anonymous 13 and Laurentine 
Nyirakanani above. 
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who fled. This time, they would perhaps target the property of their fellows by taking 
advantage of being in a time of insecurity and chaos.   
 
6.5. RESCUE PRACTICES  
 
In general, the rescue of Tutsi by their Hutu neighbours was very limited but it occurred. 
One reason of this limited feature is that it was too risky to hide a person during that time. 
Indeed, local leaders had made it clear that to hide an enemy or an accomplice of the 
enemy was tantamount to treason and this was punishable by death. As a result, many 
Hutu tended to hide the Tutsi who shared kinship or matrimonial relations with them, 
very rarely their friends. It was even an exception for a Hutu to hide a Tutsi that he or she 
did not know, but a few cases existed. In the Gishamvu Commune cases, I found, among 
my informants, some who saved the Tutsi. Three were perpetrators, three others were 
bystanders, and some other cases include the accounts by survivors about cases of 
successful rescue and failed rescue. 
 
Anonymous 13 claims to have saved a girl who was around 7 during the genocide. Her 
name is Mutuyimana, she was daughter of Leopold from Rusatira Commune. She was 
still alive at the time of the interview and was studying in secondary school, according to 
this informant. 
 
Anonymous 14 also claims to have rescued a child called Josepha, daughter of Febronia. 
She kept her for three months during the genocide and returned her to her mother at the 
time when the Hutu were fleeing RPF soldiers, i.e., towards the end of June or beginning 
of July 1994. 
 
The informant Joseph Rwandanga also explains how he saved two kids by getting 
involved in the genocide at the Nyumba: “I was doing shooting with arc and arrows at 
Nyumba in order to save two kids I hid. The parents of those children are Sebuturo and 
Mukamudenge. Those children are still alive. I was accused of shooting at the church, but 
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if I did not do that, those children would be killed.”146
 
 He says that he got a paper from 
Burgomaster Kambanda proving that those children were his, but illegitimate children. 
This informant had been Councillor of Gishamvu Sector from 1975 until 1990, so he was 
a well known figure in local politics and acquainted with the Burgomaster. He was also 
one of the founders of the Smith Workshop of Gishamvu, a strong artisan craft 
association.  
Hakizamungu was also a smith. He claims to have saved six children of a lady called 
Emerita from Gishamvu Sector but who got married in Sholi Sector. Her family is 
neighbour to Hakizamungu. He saved also the children of his daughter who had a Tutsi 
husband. He explains that he used his smith craft to threaten those who came to attack 
him in order to kill those children, namely Kagarara and Nteziryayo.147 He told them: 
“You say you come to kill snakes here, go to the bush where snakes live. They said that 
they see Fransisco [I] has changed, they got afraid and went. In fact, they knew I was a 
smith. Note that smiths know the secret of poisonous and sharp metal tools and 
weapons.”148
 
 
Emerite Kubwimana says she saved some of her grandchildren, two who were alive at the 
time of the interview. She saved also a lady called Thérèse Mujawamariya, who was 
teaching in Mubumbano at the time of the interview. 
 
Segatashya alleges that he hid a girl called Nyirasangwa, whose parents were killed in 
Nyakibanda. He also saved the son of the wife of his brother but who did not belong to 
this brother. After the wife was killed, Segatashya pleaded for the son to be spared. He 
lied that that son was Hutu in order to save him. As a result, he survived. He was in the 
military at the time of the interview, his name is Harerimana. 
 
                                                 
146 Interview with Joseph Rwandanga, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. The Gacaca justice system sentenced 
Rwandanga to 15 years, as he spent 10 years in prison, he is left with 5 years of Community Work. 
147 These two names appear on the list of prominent hardcore killers in Gishamvu, as made by African 
Rights. 
148 Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
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Since all the above informants talked about themselves and because I did not meet with 
those that they rescued in order to ascertain the validity of these declarations, it is more 
prudent to take these rescue cases as provisional. Normally, the rescue that is ascertained 
by the survivor is, at first glance, more reliable than the one mentioned by the “rescuer”, 
because currently in Rwanda there is much at stake if one is acknowledged as “rescuer”. 
These include judicial advantages if one is a perpetrator, or moral advantages in other 
cases.  
 
There are also cases of rescue practices mentioned by victims or relatives of victims. 
Here is what my informant Rugengamanzi, who survived by crossing the border to 
Burundi narrated about the rescue of his younger brother in Kigali: “Me I had a brother 
who worked in Kigali for an agronomist. They were together for seven years. He hid him 
until the end of the war. If he killed other people, I do not know, but he rescued my 
younger brother.” But this informant did not remember the name of that agronomist.149
 
 
As for my informant Bucyabutata, from Sholi Sector, he, together with other two persons, 
was saved by his father-in-law who hid them and thereafter gave them a person to 
accompany them on the way to Burundi:  
 
How it happened to me, the killing started on Tuesday, but my wife was a Hutu. I 
had a cow from her father, I was taking care of it. Her father came and told me to 
give him back his cow so that they could not think it is mine and take it. I gave it 
to him. Another Tutsi man who had married his daughter also returned him his 
cow. On Wednesday, people started to come check our whereabouts, me and that 
other Tutsi man. They did not do anything bad to us, even when they saw us. The 
following day on Thursday they came this time to kill us. Someone came to tell us 
that when the people of Cyambwe, Sholi, come they will kill us. That is when we 
went to hide in the ceiling of our father-in-law who was Hutu. He was a powerful 
man. There was another child with whom we were, then they came to check, they 
did not check carefully. My father-in-law who was also our neighbour forbid 
them. They went to seek us elsewhere. They did not see us. Then our father-in-
law told us to flee to Burundi. ‘We hear that people are also being chopped there 
with machetes, but do not stay here, I do not want to see how they kill you in front 
of me’, he said. The Interahamwe [militia] continued to come and warn him that 
they will attack him. That Thursday around 7:00 pm we went to Burundi. The 
father-in-law gave a man to accompany us until at Kagera. We lived in the 
                                                 
149 Interview with Augustin Rugengamanzi, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
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bushes. We continued crossing that valley. We continued, there was a lot of rain 
water. The killers had wood with fire, and were eating meat and drinking and 
dancing. The war had just started. We were listening to them. We finally arrived 
in the Akanyaru. We crossed. When we arrived in Burundi, we met with the Tutsi 
of Gashiru and Sheke who had just arrived there.150
 
 
But when he came back home from exile in July or August 1994, Bucyabutata found his 
wife alive since she was Hutu, but his son had been killed by the brother of his wife, 
called Nzabande. But his daughter survived. That other man who also shared the same 
father-in-law with Bucyabutata found his family alive. But Bucyabutata lost also the 
family members of his elder brother, as he narrates.151
 
 
Though the above rescue experience stresses a case of a successful rescue, the following 
case, of François Mukimbiri, is one that illustrates a failed rescue action. As stated 
before, Mukimbiri was a well known businessman in Gishamvu. In fact, he was 
Chairperson of the Chamber of Commerce of Gishamvu.152 He had also been member of 
the Commune Committee in 1975.153
 
 During the multiparty system, he was member of 
PSD party. 
One version says that Mukimbiri went to hide at Kambanda’s house and the latter 
welcomed him and hid him because they were long time friends. The informant 
Kumuyange, who was acquainted to both Mukimbiri and Burgomaster Kambanda 
narrated this account:   
 
When genocide started, we, we fled on the 20 April, the situation was not yet very 
harsh. […] At first, Kambanda was not a nasty person. He was not very involved 
in those killings. As we heard from other people after leaving, he was not very 
involved. But his wife was more virulent than her husband. […] There is a man 
called Mukimbiri François, he died at Burgomaster’s house. It is his wife who 
betrayed and sacrificed him and his son Lambert. Instead, Kambanda peed in his 
                                                 
150 Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
151 Interview with Augustin Bucyabutata, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
152 See Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Letter to the Mr. Mukimbiri François, 
Chairperson of the Chamber of Commerce of Gishamvu Commune, Re: Concerning a meeting of 
businessmen planned on 9 February 1994 at Butare, Ref.: No. 37/04.09.01/16, Gishamvu, 2 February 
1994. 
153 Kambanda Pascal, Burgomaster of Gishamvu Commune, Report to the Prefect of Butare Prefecture 
concerning the election of  Commune organs on 21 December 1975, Ref.: No. 538/03.09.01/7, Gishamvu, 
29 December 1975. 
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pants after hearing that Mukimbiri was dead. He allegedly trembled, and peed in 
his pants. You understand that he was not a bad person. This proves it.154
 
 
According to informant Anonymous 7, Mukimbiri and his son Lambert were sacrificed 
by the Burgomaster: “The other thing I heard about him [Burgomaster Kambanda], there 
is a man called Mukimbiri who was his friend, he fled to his place with his son. Then he 
[Kambanda] sacrificed them.”155
 
 
Another version says that Mukimbiri was being rescued by André Ndibwami. The latter 
was carrying him on a motorbike straight to his home to hide him. Thereafter, it rained. 
As a result, they found themselves in need of roof, so they went to Kambanda’s house to 
protect themselves from rain. It is worth noting that Ndibwami and Mukimbiri knew each 
other very well and were both close to the Burgomaster Kambanda. Indeed, Ndibwami 
André was a medical assistant. He had been influential in Gishamvu politics just as the 
businessman François Mukimbiri. Ndibwami had been member of the Technical 
Commission of Gishamvu Commune since 1975.156
 
 Concerning the death of Mukimbiri, 
the informant Anonymous 12, who was one of Gacaca tribunals judge in Gishamvu, had 
this to explain:  
I went there [to the trial of the wife of Kambanda], but I found that she had 
finished testifying. [During the genocide], there is a person who came and found 
me at my father-in-law and told me ‘[…] The one who was powerful, that is, 
Burgomaster Kambanda, it is as if we are ruling him now.’ He said: ‘Now we are 
doing whatever we want. My father-in-law asked him: ‘What are you doing 
really’. He answered: ‘Mukimbiri is now dead, he died as we removed him from 
the Kambanda’s house.’ The way they removed him there, if I refer to news from 
people of here [Gishamvu Sector, where the interview was taking place] who 
went there [Gikunzi sector, the home of Burgomaster Kambanda], they say that 
there is a man called Ndibwami André who was a medical assistant in Butare. It is 
said that Ndibwami came a certain morning with a motorbike to help Mukimbiri 
flee, then when they arrived at the way going to the Burgomaster’s house, it 
                                                 
154 Interview with Athanase Kumuyange, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
155 Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
156 Palatin Kabalisa, Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, Transmission des listes des Commissions 
Techniques, Réf. n° 1118/03.04/1, Butare le 21 août 1975. For his membership in 1989, see Justin 
Nsengimana, Président de la Commission Technique de Gishamvu, Compte rendu de la réunion de la 
Commission Technique tenue au Bureau Communal de Gishamvu en date du 10 juillet 1989. 
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rained. This man [Ndibwami] was living a bit far from Kambanda’s house.157 On 
the way to Kambanda’s house there was a high mountain on which there were a 
mob of people watching people who pass and attack them. That rain became 
heavier. Ndibwami could not continue his journey. Then he went with Mukimbiri 
at Kambanda’s home. Once there, that mob attack which was at the Ibisi 
mountain, came down and met with some people of here [Gishamvu Sector] and 
then they went in that house. […] The wife [of Kambanda] was there, with the 
brother of his husband, Ludovico Gatama. I heard that he is the one who said that 
Mukimbiri must go out. They exchanged bad words, then he entered and removed 
him from the house and sacrificed him to those mobs. They took him and pulled 
him down, then they went to kill him near a river at the border between Gishamvu 
Sector and Kibu [Gikunzi Sector]. They killed him there, and buried him. That is 
how we knew that information. Me I am an Inyangamugayo [a Gacaca judge, it 
means literally a person of integrity], I am telling you the truth, he did not last a 
long time at Kambanda’s house. After entering, that mob came to remove him. 
Ludovico, that extremist and nasty guy, entered there. The wife [of Kambanda] 
testifies that she is faulty because she was present at that moment of the sin, 
accepted that that person entered in her house, she also accuses herself for having 
failed to rescue him.158
 
 
 
Yet another version, which is like a combination of the two previous ones, asserts that 
Ndibwami was only accompanying Mukimbiri to Kambanda’s house:  
 
Mukimbiri went to hide at Kambanda’s house, he was accompanied by 
Ndibwami. He had given his money to Kambanda, Ndibwami and Nsengimana 
Justin so that they hide it for him. The wife of Kambanda, after reaching the 
money, she… If you analyse, you realise that she sacrificed him. […] It is the 
prisoners who conclude that the wife of Kambanda had sacrificed Mukimbiri. […] 
It is allegedly Mukimbiri who had helped Kambanda to take office, also who – 
with Abbé Niyibizi, Paul Gakuba, Masabo, and Kubwimana – had brought 
development here. In such a way that when Kambanda came and found that 
Mukimbiri has been killed, it is said that he trembled of fear and then peed in his 
shorts, I mean in his trousers.159
 
  
It is the two informants Athanase Kumuyange and Christophe Batura who mention that 
the Burgomaster Kambanda peed in his pants as a reaction to the killing of his long time 
friend and collaborator. As one can speculate, Mukimbiri was Tutsi but the Burgomaster 
                                                 
157 Burgomaster Kambanda lived in Kibu, Gikunzi sector, while Ndibwami lived in Gashiru, Sheke sector. 
See Gishamvu Commune, List of persons who will work in the Election Committee, Gishamvu, 22 
November 1988 and Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
158 Interview with Anonymous 12, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
159 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
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Kambanda had failed to see him as “the other” or as invisible: “The Other (autrui) is the 
sole being whose negation can only announce itself as total: a murder. The Other (autrui) 
is the sole being I can wish to kill. […] To be in relation with other (autrui) face to face is 
to be unable to kill.”160
 
 As far as the gender aspect is concerned, the reaction of 
Burgomaster Kambanda produced a controversial effect as compared to the one of his 
wife, if we are to believe the active role ascribed to her above. A man reacted like a child 
in the face of violence against a friend, whereas a woman behaved as a fully aware and 
responsible person. The woman was able to see the victim in an abstract or remote form, 
whereas the man could not, given their friendship. Masculinity, as we know it at least in 
stereotypical forms, was in crisis here. 
The last case of rescue or survival concerns the crossing of the border to Burundi. As 
already mentioned above, the bulk of Tutsi who survived from the genocide, especially in 
Gikunzi, Mukuge and Sheke (Bitare and Gashiru), did so for having crossed the border of 
Burundi. But even a big number of survivors from other sectors of Gishamvu Commune 
and of other communes of Butare Prefecture survived because they had the idea and the 
possibility of taking the exit route to Burundi and of encountering fewer mortal obstacles 
on their way.161
 
 Those who had crossed before the 20 April seem to have encountered 
Rwandan soldiers at the border of Rwanda and Burundi and to have been killed en masse. 
But those who crossed on 20 and 21 April, as stated before, found fewer obstacles and 
survived in big numbers. Those are the ones who constitute the most considerable 
population of survivors in Gishamvu Commune. 
When they arrived in Burundi, those Tutsi from Gishamvu and from other communes of 
Butare were put in refugee camps such as Mureke and given humanitarian help. The main 
suffering endured there was the disease of dysentery that attacked them severely and 
several hundreds lost their lives there. One informant who survived there, and who fought 
against that disease, narrates this:  
 
                                                 
160 Adriaan T. Peperzak et al. (eds.), Immanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings, Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1996, p. 9, emphasis in original. 
161 Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, p. 221 ; Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 432-
433. 
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We crossed, and the Burundi people welcomed us very well. […] We spent there 
two months. Macinya (dysentery) killed us until we resorted to the traditional 
medicines. I worked there for free since they had nothing to pay me. I was 
sending them to go and look for herbs. […] It is there that I learnt how to cure 
macinya [dysentery] and cholera. There is a physician who taught me how to mix 
herbs and acids. Now I cure also cholera. In exile people also learn.162
 
 
At the national level, other rescuers include the RPF rebels who were fighting against the 
RGF and militias and at the same time were saving the Tutsi. Also the fact of having 
stopped the genocide is in itself an act of rescue, for, the lives of those who were hiding 
in Rwanda depended on it. To a lesser extent there is the UN force that saved some few 
thousands of Tutsi, but also the controversial Opération Turquoise did save some lives, 
though it was at the same time protecting the perpetrators of genocide.163
 
 
 6.6. THE APPROXIMATE NUMBERS OF VICTIMS 
 
Certain state censuses and statistical research have made available some data on the 
number of victims and alleged perpetrators. These figures are very important because 
they help us have an approximate picture of the effects of genocide. This usefulness 
explains why I cannot ignore them in this study. However, they need to be problematized, 
that is, to be interpreted with scrutiny. Since they bear limits, they also need to be taken 
just as an approximate picture of what happened and where, on what scale, etc., not as 
absolute and precise reports of facts.   
 
According to the census made by the Ministry of Local Government of Rwanda 
(MINALOC) in 2000, published in 2002 and revised in 2004, there were 14,499 declared 
victims of genocide in Gishamvu Commune.164
                                                 
162 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
 This number surely includes the Tutsi 
who came from other places, such as Gikongoro, Nyakizu, Runyinya and even Ngoma, 
and who fled to places of gathering in Gishamvu. The interviews even mention a number 
163 Esther Mujawayo et Belhaddad Souâd, SurVivantes, Rwanda, dix ans après le génocide, suivi de 
entretien croisé entre Simone Veil et Esther Mujawayo, Editions de l’aube, 2004, p. 176; Alex de Waal and 
Bridget Conley-Zilkic, “Reflections on How Genocidal Killings are Brought to an End”, 
http://howgenocidesend.ssrc.org/de_Waal/, published on Dec 22, 2006, accessed on 10 November 2007. 
164 MINALOC, Dénombrement des victimes du génocide et des massacres, Rapport final, version révisée, 
Kigali, MINALOC, avril 2004, p. 47. 
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by far bigger than the one of the MINALOC. These other numbers are 40,000 victims165 
and 37,000166. Indeed, all these numbers are bigger than the overall number of Tutsi 
population of Gishamvu commune before the genocide. For example, in January 1994, 
the Tutsi population of Gishamvu was 11,108.167
 
 If we add 1 per cent for the following 
three months in order to determine the Tutsi population in April-May 1994 at the time of 
genocide, since increase of the population in Rwanda was around three per cent per year, 
then in April ending and May beginning, the Tutsi population in Gishamvu Commune 
was around 11,219. 
The other figures are about the number of survivors of genocide, as availed on the 
website of the National Service in charge of Gacaca jurisdictions. These figures establish 
that in Gishamvu survivors were 5,819. The details are shown in the below table.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165 Interview with Christophe Batura, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007. 
166 Conversation with my research assistant Janvier Kayiranga in April 2007. 
167 See table 2 in chapter two. 
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Table 3: Number of survivors in Gishamvu 
 
SECTORS MALE FEMALE ORPHANS WIDOWS/ 
WIDOWERS 
DISABLED 
BY 
GENOCIDE 
TOTAL 
Bitare 
Sheke of 
Huye 
Sheke of 
Nyaruguru 
Sheke =  
  72 
   
  12 
 
 608 
692 
  80 
   
  14 
 
 705 
799 
  58 
   
  93 
 
 440 
591 
27 
 
23 
 
19 
69 
  4 
    
  2 
 
   8 
14 
  241 
   
  144 
 
 1780 
 2165 
Buvumu 101 193 108 50 25   477 
Gikunzi 206 201 10 8 4   429 
Gishamvu  48 97 55 15 4   219 
Kibingo of 
Huye 
Kibingo of 
Nyaruguru 
Kibingo = 
 
 182 
 
 100 
282 
 
 236 
 
   99 
335 
 
  188 
 
    69 
257 
 
 53 
 
 22 
75 
 
28 
 
 11 
39 
 
 687 
 
 301 
988 
Mukuge 221 234 35 17 5 512 
Nyakibanda 47 79 39 22 5 192 
Sholi 66 110 17 22 8 223 
Mubumbano 158 256 87 80 33 614 
TOTAL 1 821 2 304 1 199 358 137 5 819 
NB: No data for Liba Sector. 
 
Source: National Service for Gacaca Courts, Number of survivors of genocide, 
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/abarokotse%20english.pdf, consulted on 6 October 
2007, pp. 21-22, 24. 
 
If we accept this figure for Gishamvu, and we also accept the above figure of the Tutsi 
population at the time of the genocide (11,219), then the victims were 11,219 - 5,819, that 
is, 5,400. That means that the victims reached around 48.1 percent of the Tutsi population 
of Gishamvu. This total number of victims of genocide does not include the persons who 
died after the genocide. For example, there are some women who had been contaminated 
with HIV/AIDS through rape and who died some years after 1994.168
 
  
                                                 
168 Françoise Nduwimana, “Women and Rwanda’s Genocide: What Goes Unsaid”, News Clippings, 
Excerpt from Libertas (Rights & Democracy’s  Newsletter), Vol. 14, No. 2, December 2004. 
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As for the victims of genocide in each sector of Gishamvu, it is hard to calculate them 
with absolute certainty. But an approximate view is possible, if we refer to available data 
stressing ethnic population per sector. Unfortunately, the only table that contains ethnic 
identity data for each sector which I could find in the archives was the one of 31 
December 1992. It would be better to find at least the one of 31 December 1993 which 
was close to April 1994 at the time of the genocide in order to compare it with the table 
of survivors as this one is organised per sector. This way we could know how many 
victims were registered per sector. But because the total population of Tutsi in Gishamvu 
rose from 11.054 (31 December 1992) to 11.219 in May 1994 as we estimated, the 
difference (165) is not big enough to forbid us from comparing data from the two tables, 
keeping however in mind that these are just approximate figures. 
Table 4: Population of Gishamvu Commune on 31 December 1992  
Administrative 
sector 
Ethnic identity Total 
Hutu Tutsi Twa 
Buvumu 4,368 1,238  5,606 
Gikunzi 2,689 870  3,559 
Gishamvu 2,834 1,172  4,006 
Kibingo 3,115 1,216 42 4,373 
Liba 2,544 1,254  3,798 
Mubumbano 4,426 1,417  5,843 
Mukuge 2,517 804  3,321 
Nyakibanda 2,204 1,052 24 3,280 
Sheke 1,913 1,460 11 3,384 
Sholi 3,026 571 124 3,721 
TOTAL 29,636 11,054 201 40,891 
 
Source: Kambanda, Pascal, Bourgmestre de la Commune Gishamvu, A Monsieur le 
Ministre de l’Intérieur et de Développement Communal, Kigali, Rapport annuel sur le 
recensement de la population, édition 1992, Réf. : n° 157/04.05/1, Gishamvu, le 
23/04/1993. 
 
However, the comparison of these two tables is difficult. Indeed, it is worth noting that 
the figures of Table 5 were reconstructed in line with the administrative reform of 2005, 
which means that the boundary of communes and sectors had changed. These changes 
had affected Sheke, Kibingo and Liba Sectors, but other sectors had remained slightly the 
same. If one combines the data for these two tables, one finds that the victims for each 
sector would be approximately the following:  
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Table 5: Approximate number of Tutsi victims of Gishamvu Commune per sector 
Sector Number of Tutsi 
population on 31 
December 1992 
Number of Tutsi 
survivors 
Approximate 
number of victims 
Buvumu 1,238   477 761 
Gikunzi 870   429 441 
Gishamvu 1,172   219 953 
Kibingo 1,216 988 228 
Liba 1,254 No data provided  
Mubumbano 1,417 614 803 
Mukuge 804 512 292 
Nyakibanda  1,052 192 860 
Sheke  1,460 2,165 Impossible  
Sholi 571 223 348 
 
As one can comment, it is sure that the approximate number of victims is slightly bigger 
than the number shown in this Table 7, because also the number of Tutsi population in 
April-May 1994 is bigger than the one presented above for 31 December 1992 (column 
two). As for Sheke, the data obtained are impossible to understand, since the number of 
survivors (2,165) is bigger than the one of Tutsi population at the time of genocide (a bit 
more than 1,460). This is not possible, because we know from interviews that some few 
people died in Sheke. So the number of survivors would logically be lower than the one 
of the Tutsi who lived in Sheke before the genocide.   
 
But it is possible to make comments for the remaining sectors: Gikunzi, Gishamvu, 
Mukuge, Nyakibanda, Sholi, Buvumu and Kibingo. The first observation from Table 6, 
shows that the Tutsi lived in every sector, unlike the Twa. Again, the Tutsi were less 
numerous in Gikunzi, Mukuge and Sholi if one takes their proportion vis-à-vis the Hutu. 
Also, the proportion of Tutsi was bigger in Sheke more than elsewhere. Then for Table 7, 
Gishamvu and Nyakibanda seem to have registered the biggest number of victims. This is 
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corroborated also by the fact that the large-scale massacres occurred in those two places, 
namely Nyumba in Gishamvu Sector, and Great Seminary in Nyakibanda. This means 
that the bulk of the Tutsi from Gishamvu and Nyakibanda Sectors died at Nyumba and 
Nyakibanda. Then follows Buvumu for which almost two thirds of Tutsi who were living 
there were killed. Then follows Gikunzi which also registered a big number of victims, 
slightly more than the half of the Tutsi population indeed, although there are also some 
who survived by joining the Sheke Tutsi and by crossing the border to Burundi as 
mentioned above. This means that those victims may have been killed in their homes or 
on their hills or else at Nyumba and Nyakibanda where they may have fled. Sholi also 
registered victims who were above 50 percent. Only Kibingo and Mukuge had a number 
of victims which was below 50 percent. It is probably Sheke that registered the smallest 
number of victims, as the interviews made it clear. 
 
6.7. PERPETRATORS AND ALLEGED PERPETRATORS 
 
According to African Rights, the main architects of genocide in Gishamvu were: 
President Théodore Sindikubwabo, Assiel Simbarikure, Subprefect, Laurent Kubwimana, 
also Subprefect in Butare but lived in Gishamvu, Pascal Kambanda, Burgomaster of 
Gishamvu, Célestin Kubwimana alias “Cyuma”, Councillor of Gishamvu Sector, Gabriel 
Murara, medical assistant at Butare University Hospital, Jean Niyizurugero, school 
inspector in Gishamvu, and Eliphaz Liberakurora, Assistant Burgomaster and Alexis, 
alias “CDR”.169
 
 
There are other hardcore killers per sector. John Ushizimpumu is mentioned for Sholi 
Sector that he led since December 1974.170
                                                 
169 African Rights, The History of the genocide, pp. 6, 12 and 18. 
 Among other Councillors accused there is 
Julien Munyakayanza of Liba Sector. Gishamvu Commune policemen are accused almost 
in total. Joseph Nyamwasa, Benoît Karenzi and Emile Ntagugura were mentioned. 
Edouard Gasasira, who was an intellectual, is mentioned in killings that occurred in 
170 Interview with Marc Rusanganwa, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Pascal Kambanda, Bourgmestre de la 
Commune  de Gishamvu, au Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, Liste du Personnel Communal au 
31/12/1993, N° 47/04.01.02 du 14/2/1994. 
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Nyakibanda Sector.171 Evariste Gatabazi, driver of the Gishamvu Commune since 1983 
and Mutangana are mentioned by Anonymous 9.172 Among the local intellectuals, there is 
Tharcisse Gashagaza from Liba as mentioned above. He had been secretary of MDR in 
Gishamvu in 1992.173
 
 
At the national level, the number of alleged perpetrators as calculated by the Gacaca 
jurisdictions following the gathering of information of 2005 was 818,564. In category 
one, that is, the planners of genocide and the hardcore killers, there were 77, 269 people 
accused. In category 2, that is other killers, there were 432,557 accused. And in the third 
category, that is, those who looted and/or destroyed property, there were 308,738 
accused.174
 
 
In Gishamvu, almost a thousand persons were accused of genocide participation and put 
in category one, while more than four thousand were put in category two. Which means 
that around five thousand were accused of murder charges. The details are given in the 
table below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
171 Interview with Anonymous 13, Gishamvu, 30 April 2007. 
172 Interview with Anonymous 9. Gishamvu, 26 April 2007. 
173 See chapter four. 
174 Service National des Juridictions Gacaca, “Synthèse des accusés par Province et Ville de Kigali” 
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw …, consulté le 15 octobre 2007, p. 1. 
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Table 6: Numbers of alleged Perpetrators of Gishamvu Commune (i.e., accused of 
genocide participation) following the Gacaca gathering of information of 2005 
 
Sectors Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Total per 
Sector 
Bitare 
Sheke from Huye district 
Sheke from Nyaruguru 
district 
Sheke 
46 
11 
 
4 
61 
 
198 
91 
 
31 
320 
214 
2 
 
22 
238 
458 
104 
 
57 
619 
Buvumu 91 521 711 1323 
Kibingo from Huye 
district 
Kibingo from Nyaruguru 
district 
Kibingo 
 
60 
 
153 
213 
 
197 
 
397 
594 
 
16 
 
189 
205 
 
273 
 
739 
1012 
Mubumbano 288 1339 1569 3196 
Nyakibanda 67 314 868 1249 
Sheke 11 91 2 104 
Sholi 27 201 85 313 
Gikunzi 24 156 99 279 
Liba 80 310 164 554 
Mukuge 92 336 110 538 
TOTAL GISHAMVU 
COMMUNE 
954 4182 4051 9187 
 
Source: Service National des Juridictions Gacaca, (check spelling), “Synthèse des 
accusées par Province et Ville de Kigali,” http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw …, consulté 
le 15 octobre 2007, pp. 20-21, 23. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has shown to what extent the Tutsi genocide had an unequal distribution 
over the commune’s territory, but that it occurred in every sector. Furthermore, the 
geographical situation of Gishamvu allowed a number of Tutsi victims to cross the border 
and survive that way.175
                                                 
175 See Charles Kabwete Mulinda, “Le sauvetage dans la zone frontière de Gishamvu et de Kigembe au 
Rwanda”, in Jacques Sémelin, Claire Andrieu, Sarah Gensburger (eds.), La résistance aux génocides. De la 
pluralité des actes de sauvetage, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2008, pp. 361-375.  
 Concerning timing, the phases of massacres resemble the ones 
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that occurred in several other parts of the country. There was the first wave of massacres 
that occurred after 21 April 1994 and that took lives of the bulk of Tutsi victims. Those 
who died in the second wave of May and June 1994 were fewer. The killing in the first 
wave was done in the open air, while the second one was done in secret, as some few 
international observers and journalists were arriving in Rwanda. But Genocide in Butare 
Prefecture occurred some two weeks later than many other parts of the country. 
 
Although the content of this chapter seems somewhat detailed, it also bears many gaps 
and this leaves many questions unanswered. For example, it is hard to know from local 
informants how the killings were prepared, step by step. The archives provide some few 
scarce documents on how meetings and orders on civil self-defence were organised, how 
the administration functioned, but there is no written indication of the April massacres’ 
preparation and supervision. This, despite the fact that during the genocide, the 
administration continued to function as if it was during normal days. Filip Reyntjens has 
written that it looked like “business as usual”.176
                                                 
176 Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda: trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1995, p. 90. 
 For example, the Gishamvu Commune 
continued to deliver authorizations of entering the commune and moving to other 
communes, reports were being typed and sent to relevant upper and horizontal 
authorities, etc. But the gap of the local preparation of genocide remains. Secondly, for 
every sector of the commune, all the perpetrators are not known, although many have 
been accused. Also not all places where the killings occurred have been identified, 
although major sites for mass killings are known today. And many others. These gaps are 
recognised for the genocide in the whole country, they are not an isolated case of 
Gishamvu and Kibayi. The next and last chapter, which is on the genocide in Kibayi, tries 
to address the issues developed here and to include further specificities.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE GENOCIDE IN KIBAYI 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter concerns the Tutsi genocide in Kibayi Commune. It relies mainly on 
interviews of perpetrators, bystanders and victims. The content is organised per sector, 
that is, according to a smaller subdivision of the Commune territory, whenever possible. 
This approach is followed because, in the reconstructions of the genocide witnesses, the 
majority of them talked about their individual experiences that occurred either at, or close 
to, their homes. This means that the reconstruction of the approximate picture of what 
occurred at the level of the Commune effectively became my task.  
 
The focus of the content of this chapter is on the beginning, the unfolding and the ending 
of the genocidal violence. In the process, several other elements are mentioned. These 
include the outcome of the genocide, namely the killing of the Tutsi, as well as the 
unpredicted, that is, acts that arose without necessarily being intended by the perpetrators 
of genocide, such as the survival of certain victims, or the violence between people who 
were not among the targets or the perpetrators.  
 
7.1. HOW GENOCIDE STARTED IN KIBAYI 
 
The way that genocide started in the Kibayi Commune is narrated in various ways, 
depending on the place (cell or sector) where one was located. The dates seem different if 
one considers when violence started in each Sector of the Commune. This suggests that 
violence did not start in the Commune on the same day. It happened in a graduated way. 
Moreover, violence seems to have started in certain areas by the targeting of property 
first, and in other areas by targeting both the property and the Tutsi inhabitants.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
406 
To begin with, the Kibayi inhabitants learned about the shooting of the presidential plane 
in the news and in verbal exchanges, just as any other Rwandan learned. Although 
violence did not immediately reach Kibayi, some signs that violence had started 
elsewhere in the country were seen in Kibayi. For example, smoke of houses burning was 
seen in the sky from Nyakizu Commune. Also, some people from the Bugesera region 
(South-Centre), from Gikongoro and even from nearby Nyaruhengeri were passing in 
Kibayi as they were fleeing. Some from Kigembe even stayed at the Kibayi Commune 
office and sought refuge there together with other Tutsi of Kibayi.1
 
 
Secondly, some Tutsi individuals heard rumours from their fellow Hutu residents about 
the imminent violence against Tutsi. But, given the context in which they were and the 
local interaction that existed between those Tutsi and the Hutu, the bulk of Tutsi seem to 
have not taken the news seriously. For example, Ntukabumwe was at the Kanyaru river 
when the violence against the Tutsi started, allegedly on Monday (18 April 1994), but he 
did not cross the river as he paddled canoes on the Kanyaru river. Instead, he went to see 
his friend the Hutu Councillor of Mukindo Sector, François Macumi, and asked him to 
protect his wife and children. Another informant from Saga Sector, François 
Mukezamfura, was told by two party leaders that violence was about to start but ignored 
that information, since he did not immediately take flight:  
 
I went to the bar to drink with the Assistant Burgomaster Vunabandi. We were 
neighbours. We went to drink in the bar of Raymond. Masima [Jean Baptiste 
Mukuralinda] ordered a bottle of drink. […] He was head of MDR power [in 
Saga] […] He said: ‘Let them give you a bottle so that I give you farewell.’ I 
asked: ‘How can you tell me goodbye whereas I am not going on a trip?’ He 
answered: ‘Anyway you should know that your fate is going to be sealed very 
soon.’ So I said: ‘If it is a bottle you are offering me, let them give you a bottle to 
drink too.’ The assistant Vunabandi laughed and emphasized: ‘But you should 
start to tell people goodbye.’ That is when I heard [how things were going to be 
hard].2
 
 
                                                 
1 Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007; Interview with Augustin Nemeye, Kibayi, 
21 May 2007; Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007; Interview with François 
Ntukabumwe, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
2 Interview with François Mukezamfura, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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Before the genocide, some time in 1993 or 1994, Mukezamfura indicates that some 
Burundian friends told him that they heard from meetings of the Hutu that the Tutsi were 
going to be killed. But at that time, as he emphasizes, he could not know that this would 
happen. 
 
Thirdly, between the 7 and 19 April 1994, some actual attacks against Tutsi and some 
looting of property occurred. But still several Tutsi did not read the signs of the times 
correctly. Some accounts narrate how incidents of early violence occurred in Joma 
Sector, then it reached Shyombo Sector, and then Mukindo Sector. Indeed, some children 
who were from Secondary School and who were returning home for vacation passed 
through Joma, and some of them were killed and others were injured. Then the 
Burgomaster came to collect those injured and took them allegedly to hospital, but this is 
not confirmed.3 In addition, the house of a certain Rutazigwa from Nyamabuye cell of 
Joma Sector was burned. The Burgomaster, together with the gendarmes, took those who 
had burned it to jail them. But in the process, he went to enquire in Butare how to halt 
these episodes of violence.4 In Shyombo, André Uzaramba, who was Councillor of 
Shyombo Sector at the time of the genocide and who was among my informants, narrated 
how three Tutsi boys ran towards him as they were being followed by men who wanted 
to assault them. When they saw him, they stopped their plan to attack those children. As a 
result, he took those children, calmed them down and brought them to their parents. Two 
belonged to Mr. Vénuste Boneza and one to Mr. Joseph Sikubwabo.5
 
 
Then concerning the looting in certain sectors, in Saga Sector some early looting 
occurred but was not seen as a sign of violence to come. Here is the account of Augustin 
Nemeye from Saga:  
 
On Monday [probably 18 April 1994], the mobs looted the cow of Rutabana. He 
went to lay a charge against them at the Commune office. He was told to return 
home, the leaders assured him that they would give him an answer later. […] But 
long time ago, he had given cows to the Kinyonga [Laurent Hakizimana, leader of 
MRND] who were strong in parties [that means that they had become strong 
                                                 
3 Interview with Domitilla Niyonsaba, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
4 Interview with François Shirubute, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
5 Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
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friends]. So they intervened in his favour, and his cows were recuperated. But this 
was to mislead him [things became harsh thereafter]. Then on Monday the first 
group started to flee, going to Burundi. But we, we felt that it was not necessary 
to flee. We thought that those attacking and advising us to flee just wanted to 
benefit by taking our belongings, but that no one could kill a person.6
 
  
This looting was also mentioned by people from Kanage of Mukindo Sector. According 
to the informant Ildéphonse Habimana, a businessman and wealthy cattle merchant from 
Kibirizi in Nyaruhengeri Commune named Sebasoni was fleeing to Burundi via the 
Kanage crossing bridge. As he was fleeing, he met with some Tutsi people from that area 
and informed them that violence had started where he came from. Some decided to join 
him and they fled to Burundi. Following this flight, the Burgomaster asked certain 
neighbours of Tutsi who had fled to take care of their property including some cows that 
were wandering around without any herders and destroying crops. The Burgomaster took 
some other property to the Commune office allegedly to look after it.7
 
 One of these 
Tutsis from Kanage is Cyriaque who was an old man. Here is what my informant 
Anonymous 15 says about the targeting of the property of those who fled: 
Cyriaque was an old Tutsi man from Mukindo. He fled to Burundi, and left his 
cattle. Then some men from Kanage came to tell Kajyambere [the Burgomaster] 
in the following morning that those people fled. Then Kajyambere went to collect 
those cattle and brought them to the Commune office. Then the population came 
to see him at the Commune office around these hours [around 13:00] and told 
him: ‘Give us those cattle, we want to eat them, especially if you fail to tell us the 
whereabouts of the owners of these cattle.’8
 
 
On Monday, 18 April 1994, the house of Gaca from Kanage was destroyed and looted by 
some people from Kanage, Mukindo.9 My informant from Mukindo, François 
Ntukabumwe, also indicated that his three houses located at the Kanage centre were 
destroyed, some of his cows were eaten and his wife and children fled but not to 
Burundi.10
 
 
                                                 
6 Interview with Augustin Nemeye, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
7 Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
8 Interview with Anonymous 15, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
9 Interview with Vénuste Sindabizera, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
10 Interview with François Ntukabumwe, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
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In Joma Sector also, some accounts point to early looting and the intervention of the 
Burgomaster:  
 
Some others from Joma started to slaughter livestock and to evict people. They 
were coming, they find you in your house, they take your livestock and slaughter 
it. When the Burgomaster knew about this, he went to collect the gendarmes. Here 
there was a small section of the gendarmerie that was staying at Makwaza 
mountain. He caught those people, and some of them were shot. […] It was after 
the death of Habyarimana, but the killing had not started. [6-19 April]. So he went 
to stop those things. I am telling you, some people were shot and injured. […] 
That was done by the gendarmerie. Things became hot. When the Burgomaster 
became overwhelmed, he allegedly went to Butare to report on that case at the 
Prefecture.11
 
 
The account of François Manirabona from Joma mentions the robbery of one goat of a 
Tutsi person by a group of Hutu persons who were from Joma and Shyombo and who 
were neighbours to that Tutsi person. He also mentions the burning of houses and the 
looting of property in several houses of Tutsi, the intervention of the gendarmerie to halt 
those acts of vandalism and the arrest of the perpetrators.12
 
 Although this informant 
observes that the organisers of those actions were not known, it is possible that in 
Shyombo and Joma, the initiative to loot property seems to have come from the residents 
themselves, since the authorities came to stop it. 
The fourth pattern identified in the narratives about how genocide started in Kibayi 
concerns the decisions and actions of the Burgomaster and the Commune Security 
apparatuses in reaction to early violence against the Tutsi and against their property. In 
reaction to the attack against the Tutsi, narratives say that the Burgomaster together with 
the gendarmes told the Tutsi who had gathered in their southern sectors such as Shombo, 
Joma and Mukindo to go to the Commune office in order to be protected there against the 
attacks of their neighbours. As Ildéphonse Habimana explained, the Tutsi who agreed to 
go to the Commune office gathering place were refering to the experience of 1959 where 
again the Tutsi had fled and remained safe. They thought that it could be the same 
                                                 
11 Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
12 Interview with François Manirabona, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
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again.13 According to Narcisse Nzaramyimana, the Tutsi spent around one week at the 
Commune office, between 15 and 22 April 1994, in his estimation. They had fled there 
with their livestock and with some other belongings, which probably helped them to 
survive. Also some Hutu relatives were visiting them, bringing them some few things 
needed for consumption. They were mixed with some few Hutu who felt insecure at their 
homes.14
 
 
Finally, concerning the northern sectors, that is Runyinya, Kibayi, Saga and Rwamiko, 
the accounts stress that early violence was recorded in Kibayi and Runyinya before Saga, 
and Saga before Rwamiko.15
 
 
In reaction to early violence and early looting, the Burgomaster went to the Prefecture 
office to enquire how to stop it. Then he allegedly came back with the genocide schedule. 
The informants stress that it is from Butare meetings that the Burgomaster received that 
order. Indeed, on 19 April 1994, a meeting held by the President Sindikubwao and the 
Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda in Butare Prefecture put in place the new Prefect, 
Sylvain Nsabimana and demoted Jean Baptiste Habyarimana. It is in this meeting that the 
President made a speech exhorting the Butare people to be active in the genocide. Then 
on 20 April, the new Prefect Sylvain Nsabimana held a security meeting in which they 
discussed ways of implementing the genocide order.16
 
 Also, another meeting took place 
on 21 April 1994 in Ndora Commune at the Headquarters of the Gisagara Subprefecture. 
It was held by the President Sindikubwabo.  
7.2. GENOCIDE IN SECTORS OF KIBAYI COMMUNE 
7.2.1. Genocide in Shyombo, Joma and Mukindo Sectors 
 
                                                 
13 Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
14 Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
15 Interview with Vénuste Sindabizera; Anonymous 15; Epaphrodite Ndibaze and Laurent Rwabigwi. 
16 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, Paris, Karthala, 2008, p. 223 ; Alison Des forges, 
‘Leave None to Tell the Story.’ Genocide in Rwanda, London, Brussels, Human Rights Watch, Paris, 
Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, 1999, pp. 465-467. 
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Shyombo, Joma and Mukindo Sectors can be combined as far as genocidal massacres are 
concerned for a number of reasons. First, the bulk of the Tutsi population that lived in 
those three areas are said to have fled to the Commune office located in the Mukindo 
Sector. Secondly, those Tutsi who were killed at their homes are said to have been fewer 
than those who were massacred at the Commune office. Thirdly, the Tutsi who survived 
in those three sectors seem to have used almost the same means that include crossing the 
border to Burundi immediately, hiding in Hutu friends’ homes and then crossing the 
border to Burundi, as well as hiding in their Hutu fellows’ homes until the end of 
genocide. 
 
a) How the Tutsi gathered and went to the Commune office 
 
It can be said that the Tutsi of Shyombo Sector gathered on their own initiative, but went 
to the Commune office on the initiative of the Councillor. Indeed, the bulk of Tutsi 
inhabitants from Shyombo who did not flee to Burundi gathered together at one hill, 
close to a certain Mujyejye’s home17 and were then asked to proceed to the Commune 
office where the authorities promised to protect them against the Hutu attackers. The 
gathering at that hill took place on Monday, 18 April, a suggestion that the threat against 
the Tutsi of this area occurred before the Butare Prefecture call to genocide (i.e., 19 April 
1994).18 This gathering of Tutsi was provoked by the attack and killing of some Tutsi 
people at the small centre in Kazenga. This attack also occurred on Monday, 18 April.19
 
  
This gathering was also the result of Tutsi trying to protect themselves as they heard 
rumours coming from the neighbouring Joma Sector where a certain Evariste Rutazigwa 
was evicted. The killers’ mobs ran after him in order to catch and kill him, but he escaped 
by running away and crossing the Kanyaru river up to Burundi. This is what Bisamaza 
reconstructs:  
 
                                                 
17 Interview with André Uzaramba and Jean Bosco Nzeyimana. 
18 Interview with Anonymous 17 and Ildéphonse Bisamaza. 
19 Interview with André Uzaramba. 
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At our Sector, things started on Monday 18 April. I still remember it. We heard 
that things were bad in Gikongoro. Then the ones who live near Kanyaru river 
told us that they saw corpses floating in the river coming from Gikongoro. It is on 
Sunday 17th that we heard here that things were severe. They said that the war is 
about to occur. At first we underestimated this information [that is why many did 
not flee immediately.] We said: ‘From where will the war originate?’ On Monday 
18th, we spent the day helpless and fearful, and our neighbours changed their 
mood and face. It looked as if they secretly knew about things. Some of them 
started to sharpen their machetes, day and evening. Then on Monday around 15 
hours, we heard rumours from Nyamabuye cell. People were running after the 
man Evariste Rutazigwa, who was Tutsi from Nyamabuye. The war started in 
Nyamabuye. […] That rumour was saying that the Tutsi have exterminated the 
Hutu.20
 
 
When the Tutsi who gathered at Mujyejye’s home saw the Councillor, André Uzaramba, 
they asked him to help them. According to this Councillor, they asked him to take them 
to the commune office. Then he accompanied them there, with some of their belongings. 
When he arrived in Kazenga, he found corpses of slain people really there. He says that 
near those bodies he found a certain François Bijyibwami, who was seemingly in charge 
of that killing, and who was from MDR party. He also found Ananias Bavumiragiye and 
Emmanuel Nshimiyimana there. They were from Joma but ‘worked’ everywhere. 
Bijyibwami was in prison in Butare at the time of the interview, while Bavumiragiye and 
Nshimiyimana had fled to Congo. Those are the ones who initiated the killing between 
Shyombo and Joma. Then concerning the Tutsi from Shyombo who fled to the Commune 
office, here is what this former Councillor said:  
 
[Some of] those who fled to the commune office were living here in Shyombo, 
and it is me who escorted them, by way of helping them to flee. As the population 
had surrounded them, they told me: ‘Please Councillor, deliver us from these 
people and make us arrive at the administration office, you see these people want 
to kill us.’ […] They spent two nights at the Commune office, then the massacre 
happened.21
 
  
 
                                                 
20 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
21 Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
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Anonymous 17, who is from Nyakazana Cell and who chose not to go to the Commune 
office and as a result survived, argues that Uzaramba took those Tutsi from Shyombo to 
the Commune office, knowing very well that it was a place of death rather than of rescue:  
 
The Tutsi who were close there assembled together. Makanyaga [nickname of 
Councillor André Uzaramba] came and brought the military. He took them to the 
Commune office. He said that it was a way of seeking a refuge for them. You 
seek a refuge for them, whereas you take them to death? So he went on asking: ‘Is 
there anyone remaining here?’ […] The ones who wanted to cross the border, he 
forbade them to do so, this man [Makanyaga]. He took them back to the 
Commune office. All of them vanished.  
 
 
Those Tutsi that Councillor Uzaramba accompanied were from Nyakazana and Nyabiryo 
cells of Shyombo Sector. In his estimation they were around thirty families.22  Ladislas 
Harerimana who was Hutu but had a Tutsi wife, calculates that around forty people from 
his wife’s family were taken from Shyombo to the Commune office and were all killed.23 
Anonymous 17 from Nyakazana calculates that the victims who were from her extended 
family and who perished at the Commune office were around twenty five.24 According to 
Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, no Tutsi among those who were from Shyombo and who went to 
the Commune office survived.25
 
 
While there is consensus that those Tutsi who were taken to the Commune office were 
exterminated, the contradiction or the debate is over the intention of the local leader who 
took them there. Because the Councillor took the Tutsi to the Commune office before the 
genocide occurred, he may argue that he did not have the signal to commit genocide at 
that time, which means that he did not intend to sacrifice them. But if it happens that he 
knew that they were to be assembled in order to be killed, then he was fulfilling the 
genocidal project. The result shows they were not rescued. But before the killing, that is, 
at the time of taking them to the Commune office, it is hard to dispute his claim that he 
was rescuing them. That is what makes the case against this Councillor very complicated. 
                                                 
22 Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
23 Interview with Ladislas Harerimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
24 Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
25 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Kibayi, 12 mai 2007. 
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Concerning the Gacaca tribunal trial of this case, Councillor Uzaramba received a three 
year sentence, suggesting that he was not put in the category of those who planned or 
incited others to commit acts of genocide, which would have earned him a sentence of 
life imprisonment. As he had spent nine years in jail, he was a free man at the time of the 
interview.26
 
 
The bulk of Tutsi of Joma and Mukindo were told by the Burgomaster or their 
Councillors to go to the Commune office.27
 
 But some other Tutsi took their own decision 
to go there, where they saw others gathering.  
b) Massacre at the Commune office 
 
Three informants from Mukindo claim to have been witnesses of the massacre at the 
Commune office of Kibayi located at Nyabisagara of Mukindo Sector. Two were 
bystanders and one was a victim. The first one, Narcisse Nzaramyimana, narrates how the 
Tutsi gathered and how the decision to start the massacre was communicated:  
 
Then when people here got afraid, they sought how to flee, they fled here in this 
house in which we are sitting [former Commune office, where the interview was 
taking place], but they were outside this house in the courtyard. […] I think the 
killing started on 22 April. I guess they had been here a week before. It may be 
between 15 and 22 April. They came from various sectors of the Commune. They 
lived here, but the mood was not fine. […] It is the Tutsi who came here, or the 
others who had misunderstandings with the state, but the Tutsi were the majority. 
They fled here with their livestock, or with some other stuff. We were also 
visiting them, because there were some of our relatives among them. The existing 
authorities were giving them morale. The day the killing started, in the morning 
[of 22 April 1994], I remember that the leader of this Commune met with me as I 
was standing with other men who included Tutsi, then he talked to us. It was 
morning, then he went to Butare town. We heard that he went to the meeting of all 
leaders of the Communes of Butare. Before they left they had said how to protect 
the population who were here. But what came from the meeting of Butare, they 
are the ones who know it. But the outcome became about exterminating people. 
[…] When they came back around 15 hours, that is when he came, that day he had 
                                                 
26 This contradiction between Uzaramba and Anonyous 17 was also present in the trial of Uzaramba, 
because Anonymous 17 was among his plaintiffs. 
27 Interview with François Manirabona and François Ntukabumwe. 
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gone together with the soldiers, when they came back, they were meeting with the 
people who were badly waiting for news about what was happening. All the 
people were near the road. They told them: ‘You are stupid, what are you waiting 
for there?’ They gave them secret codes, they ordered them to kill.28
 
 
The following part of Nzaramyimana’s account is about how the massacre was done and 
the strategies to have more people participate:  
 
Then immediately the killing started, some used whistles to call people telling 
them that the Inkotanyi (RPF rebels) have attacked the Commune office, so that 
they could convince them to join them, in reality they came to kill those who had 
fled here. […] Another thing that made the killing become severe here is that as 
people from here had refused at first to kill, they used the youth from the 
Burundian camp of Kanage who had fled war from their country and who were 
used to fighting. They used them in the killing of people who were here. The 
killing lasted two days.29
 
 
The account of the second witness adds something to the previous one:  
 
So the people [the Tutsi] started to assemble, the Hutu gathered, came close to 
them, then the killing started. It is the guns that were used at first by the police at 
the Commune office. They were shooting, but not shooting at people. They had 
had a briefing on this, they told the killers who went to kill those others: ‘When 
you hear us shooting, the Tutsi will get fear and will scatter, so you, you will start 
to kill them.’ Therefore, they were shooting, they were in the yard of the 
Commune office. Me too, I remember, I was there too. I had gone there to visit 
some family members of mine who had fled there. When they shot, people 
jumped. Me too I jumped, and ran. So for others, the one who jumps, they cut him 
with a machete. The killing started that way. […] It was the Hutu cutting the 
Tutsi, it is the population from here. Among them there were Burundians who 
were staying in a camp at Kanage, who were working with the population here, of 
these two sectors [Joma and Mukindo]. They went to kill the Tutsi there, they 
chopped them. They killed them in two days at the Commune office. The first 
day, and the morning of the second day. They finished them at the evening [of the 
second day].30
 
 
According to both informants, the massacre lasted two days. The account of the third 
witness, who was also among the people who had fled at the Commune office and who 
miraculously survived there, gives dates which are different from the ones of 
                                                 
28 Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
29 Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
30 Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
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Nzaramyimana, but confirms that the massacre lasted two days. The first part of his 
account is about how he ended up at the Commune office:  
 
As I was at Kanyaru [river], I heard from my son Koku and my worker called 
Aphrodis that my three houses were destroyed at the Kanage centre, but refused to 
go to Burundi without my wife and children. The people ate my cattle, and my 
wife and children fled. I refused to cross, I went to see the Councillor Macumi. He 
told me that the fate of the Tutsi is sealed. I asked him to help me find my family 
members. He allowed me to sleep at his home and promised to help me. We had 
been friends. He took me to the Commune office the following morning. ‘Let me 
take you to the Commune office, he said, then I will search for your wife and 
children. Nothing bad will happen to you at the Commune office.’ Then he 
brought me here at the Commune office. But as we walked, we saw houses 
burning. When I arrived here, I found several Tutsi here. I found also my younger 
brother Evariste Nzunkize with my mother. They were living in Runyinya Sector. 
Then we realised that the mother had a problem. We told her to go back home to 
seek protection to her brothers, since they are Hutu, they have no problem. The 
mother went, so I remained with my brother. So we spent the whole day here [at 
the commune office where also the interview was taking place].  
 
The following part of the interview is about the Burgomaster going to Butare to enquire 
about how to deal with the issue of security of the displaced Tutsi: 
 
Then the Burgomaster told us: ‘Listen, don’t go away from here, stay here, you 
see the population has attacked you. You Claver [Assistant Burgomaster Claver 
Zirimwabagabo] look after these people, see these are the policemen, me I go to 
Butare.’ Then he took some soldiers, put them in the car and went. He went after 
telling us that. […] We were all here. Then after a short time, the Burgomaster 
came back, as he was from Butare. He arrived here at 14 hours. He parked his car 
there [in front of the Commune office], the soldiers came out of it, then he called 
Claver who was Assistant Burgomaster, he told him: ‘All these people who have 
fled here are accomplices of Inkotanyi. These are the ones who came to take over 
the country, in fact they came to take over the Commune office. These are the 
spies. Therefore, they must not flee, we must kill them, they have been 
sacrificed.’ […] This was Kajyambere Burgomaster telling this to Claver 
Zirimwabagabo who was Assistant Burgomaster. […] He was saying this here at 
the ground in front of the Commune office, at our presence. He had a megaphone 
with so many soldiers from there at Makwaza. The date was 18 April 1994, on 
Wednesday [sic, in reality, Wednesday was 20 April 1994]. ‘Yes, we must kill 
them.’ We did not know that these things had been planned well before.31
 
 
The last part of the account of Ntukabumwe is about how the massacre was done:  
                                                 
31 Interview with François Ntukabumwe, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
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Then we saw all the inhabitants coming with spears, the soldiers and the police 
surrounded the area, they started to shoot at us. The population collected stones, 
threw them on us, we also threw back the same stones at them. But because many 
people had fled here, approximately it can be 15,000. They were Tutsi from 
Kibayi. Some others had come from Butare [i.e., urban centre of Butare 
Prefecture]. […] There were also some students who could not cross, and then 
they came to administrative areas to seek protection. Even some from Mugombwa 
were coming. […] Others from Murama of Kigembe also came here seeking 
protection from the ruling power. […] Then they started to shoot. The first to 
shoot was Charles from Nyagahuru who was a policeman. Another is Alexis, who 
used a gun with legs, he also shot here.32 Then the situation became severe, the 
population also threw stones at us. We threw back those stones. That allowed the 
women and the children to enter the house of the Commune office. We tried to 
flee, but we failed. We realised that the Commune office was surrounded, no one 
could pass. […] It was the population of the Commune who surrounded it. They 
had spears, others bows, so we also entered the Commune house. There were also 
Burundians who were in the refugee camp who used grenades to bomb us. They 
even had home made grenades, made in bottles which exploded like grenades. We 
entered the office, they shot at us the whole night, it was also raining. They shot, 
they threw stones. This office was full of people, some we went in the ceiling. A 
person shot me an arrow on the leg. At the night Kajyambere [Burgomaster] put 
lights of his car on so that the killers could continue shooting. Those who were 
behind the Commune office fence which was destroyed then had also torches. 
Then they shot the whole night. In the morning, the people were finished. But me, 
I remained here alive, there were also four women alive in the morning of 
Thursday. With three women and me alive. I was just injured and painful, all of us 
were injured. They removed us from the ceiling. The Councillor Macumi said: 
‘Come here.’ We came away, so the people there took the women to the medical 
centre. He said: ‘Take also this man.’ They refused, they said they must kill me. 
Macumi objected, alleging that since long ago I am a peaceful man, although I am 
Tutsi.33
 
 
This informant Ntukabumwe was not killed. Nevertheless, he lost his brother in that 
massacre. But, as we shall see later, he was ordered to participate in the genocide in order 
to be spared, and he accepted. All these three informants point to the participation of 
policemen and local population in the massacre, but also the participation of Burundi 
                                                 
32 The policemen of Kibayi Commune were the following on 31 December 1993: Gilbert Diriye, Sylvestre 
Nzabamwita, Charles Matabaro, Claver Ndikunkiko and Alexandre Semashinge. (Pierre-Canisius 
Kajyambere, Bourgmestre de la Commune de Kibayi, A Monsieur le Préfet de la Préfecture de Butare, 
Objet : Liste du personnel communal de Kibayi au 31/12/1993, Réf. : N° 19/04.01.02, Kibayi, le 2/2/1994.) 
33 Interview with François Ntukabumwe, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
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refugees who settled at Kanage refugee settlement in Mukindo Sector, just near to the 
Commune office.  
 
Four other people such as Shirubute, Niyonsaba, Nyirimana and Baritunga confirm the 
going of the Burgomaster to Butare and the coming back with the genocide project. The 
use of grenades is mentioned by Joseph Baritunga.34
 
  
Concerning the number of victims at the Commune office, I was informed by the 
administrative leader of Mukindo in June 2007 that the estimated number of victims who 
were killed at the Commune office is 1,700, almost all being Tutsi. This number was 
reached following the counting of bones of victims that were found later at the Commune 
office.35
 
 
c) How certain Tutsi did not go to the Commune office but were killed  
 
The killing of Tutsi in Shyombo, Joma and Mukindo did not occur only at the Commune 
office. A number of others were killed at or near their homes. Though it is difficult to 
determine their number from interviews, the informants estimate that those killed on hills 
were less numerous than the ones who were killed at the Commune office. An analysis of 
some specific cases mentioned by my informants reveals that the bulk of those Tutsi 
killed at the hills where they lived tended to be the ones who were either related to – or 
those who had built strong friendship ties with – the Hutu neighbours. As a result, they 
did not go to the Commune office with other Tutsi, or did not take the option of crossing 
the Kanyaru river in order to reach Burundi, as these hills of Mukindo, Joma and 
Shyombo have the Kanyaru river as their valleys, which means that a walk of about thirty 
minutes was sufficient to arrive on the other side of the Kanyaru, that is, in Burundi. 
 
                                                 
34 Interview with Domitilla Niyonsaba, Kibayi, 10 May 2007; Interview with François Shirubute, Kibayi, 
11 May 2007; Interview with Jean Baptiste Nyirimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007; Interview with Joseph 
Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
35 Telephonic conversation with David Ntiyamira Muhire, Executive Secretary of Mukindo Sector, on 1 
June 2007. The Mukindo Sector since 2006 includes more than the half of the territory of former Kibayi 
Commune. 
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These include the father of my informant Bisamaza who was killed at his hill with two 
children from his second wife who was Hutu. As he had a Hutu wife, and because the 
Hutu were not targeted by genocide, he may have thought that he could be spared. But 
only that wife survived. This father of Bisamaza was attacked with a machete allegedly 
by a certain Harerimana, a Burundian bachelor. Bisamaza also lost his younger brother in 
the killings that happened on the hill, but he did not stress whether this brother was 
related to the Hutu or not. He was allegedly killed by two men, Joseph Semakuba and 
Paul Ndimurwango.36
 
 
Another case mentioned is that of the families of Augustin Mararo and his son Gérard 
Birasa. My informant Ladislas Harerimana was neighbour to Birasa and his father 
Mararo’s homes.  These are the families which were targeted in the Cyimana cell of 
Shyombo Sector as they were the only Tutsi families in that cell. According to 
Harerimana, some neighbours protected these Tutsi families.  
 
They said: ‘The ones who want to fight against these they will first fight against 
us.’ As the attacking mobs were few, they withdrew and went. They did not kill 
them at that day. They instead went to destroy houses. They destroyed, they 
looted. Afterwards, they came back more powerful and searched for them, 
discovered them and killed them.37
 
 
This informant says that the killers of Birasa include Vitaliani Nduwumwami, 
Shumbusha, Munyandekwe and many others such as Mirenzo. Some of these have died. 
Others, such as Munyandekwe, are jailed because of this. The ones who killed Mararo 
include Nyandwi Byankandondera, who is said by some to be a Burundian, while others 
say that he was a Rwandan who had just been living in Burundi.  
 
Another informant, Alfred Ndahimana, also from Cyimana Cell, asserts that he was 
among the Hutu who were protecting Mararo, and that, as a result, he came under 
suspicion. He had to kill a person in order to redeem himself, as he narrates: 
 
                                                 
36 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
37 Interview with Ladislas Hererimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
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My role [in genocide], I was able to kill a person, after being ordered to do so by 
those who led the killers’ mobs. They told me that if I don’t kill him, me too I will 
die. They ordered me to do this because of the Tutsi Augustin Mararo whom they 
wanted to kill, then I intervened in his favour. I even gave prices for him to get 
rescued. Then they turned against me, saying that I am part of the enemy, they 
said if I don’t kill a person, I will die with him. That is how I committed the sin.38
 
 
Indeed, he killed a person called Alexandre Ngarukiye. He claims to have not killed any 
other person. He thinks that he killed that person just at the beginning of the genocide. He 
was jailed in August 1996 and was released in May 2003, he is left with one year of 
community work. It is Vitaliani Nduwumwami who ordered him to kill Ngarukiye.39
 
  
Another element that stressed the long time interaction of Gérard Birasa with the Hutu is 
that after his death, his six children were hidden by the Hutu neighbours. They were 
killed in the second phase of genocide in May 1994 at the time of the hunting of Tutsi 
who were hidden by Hutu.40 As for the perpetrators in Shyombo, Vitaliani Nduwumwami 
and Shumbusha are said to have been leaders of mobs of killers. Others included Jean 
Bosco Nzeyimana and Vénuste Bizumuremyi.41
 
 
Some killings of Tutsi occurred also on Joma hill. Those that I came across in my 
interviews are also cases of Tutsi who expected a hiding place from their Hutu relatives. 
For example, my informant Théodosie Kanyanja was married in Joma but she was 
originally from Kibayi Sector. She was Tutsi but had a Hutu mother and a Hutu husband 
called Augustin Mutungirehe. A few days before the beginning of massacres in Kibayi 
Commune, she went with her husband to visit her family members at Kibayi Sector. 
When they arrived there, genocide started. As a result, she and her husband decided to 
return to Joma. In the process, she took with her two boys, one was her brother and the 
other was the son of her elder sister. When they arrived in Joma, she hid those two boys 
in the ceiling of their house. Her husband went to arrange a deal with another man to 
accompany those children to Burundi at night. It was Manariyo who agreed to drive the 
                                                 
38 Interview with Alfed Ndahimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
39 Interview with Alfed Ndahimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
40 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Kibayi, 12 mai 2007. 
41 Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Kibayi, 
12 mai 2007. 
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children in a small boat. He had accepted 5,000 Francs for that deal. Then before they 
went, it was in the morning at 8:30 am of a certain day, they heard a noise, some people 
emerged from a forest down from their house:  
 
They came hunting, as people who hunt wild animals, that means the killing was 
starting. We were standing at Nyabikoni in Joma, they came until home. Those 
children were still in the house. I was also in the house. They surrounded the 
house and the sorghum field, it was April, the month of the starting of growing of 
sorghum. Those attackers include Xaveri Hatungimana, Nibivugire and Rutoni, 
they are from Nyamabuye, Joma. Those children, in fact they were almost grown 
up teenagers, went up in the roof. Then they said: ‘Hey, don’t destroy this house, 
let us come down to you.’ My husband ran as he heard that the children had said 
to come down. Nibivugire ran at him and shot him an arrow with a bow in the leg, 
he got mildly injured. When he arrived at his maternal aunt, as she was in the field 
in the valley, she covered him with grass. […]Vianney Uwimana, who just talked 
[to me in the interview, as he is also part of my informants] was part of that attack 
from Nyamabuye. He is part of those who killed that teenager Vénuste Bizimana, 
son of my elder sister. He removed his clothes.  
 
They killed those two children, then continued to search for this informant Kanyanja. In 
order to escape, she went to hide to Nzanywayimana’s house at Nyabikoni, Rebero cell, 
Joma Sector.  
 
The man called Nsenga who was Professor at Save Secondary School [Vincent 
Nsengiyumva] was going all over with books explaining to people that he had 
studied that those actions are allowed: ‘Whatever I say, you must do it, as I am 
Professor.’ Then my mother-in-law asked him: ‘Do you have a book of law that 
says to kill people? This blood you are throwing you will pay the consequence of 
it.’ They took her with hands behind and threw her in a field. He is the one who 
attacked our home with a mob coming from Nyamabuye. […] I hear that Nsenga 
is in Malawi, but I am not sure. He was born in Nyamabuye. 
 
She got a person to accompany her to her mother-in-law and hid there. Her husband also 
came there so they saw each other. Then they heard a whistle calling people to go to 
rescue the Commune office with their weapons, saying that the Commune office has been 
attacked by the Tutsi. Which means that the killing in Joma started probably before the 
massacre at the Commune office. She says that they stayed in the house for three days, as 
the killing at the Commune office was happening.42
                                                 
42 Interview with Théodosie Kanyanja, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
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The leadership of killings at Joma by Vincent Nsengimana, teacher in Secondary School, 
is confirmed by my informant Vianney Uwimana who was among those who killed the 
two boys in the home of Kanyanja and Mutungirehe:  
 
The killing started here [Joma] on the 18 April. The ones who initiated it are two 
men: Vincent Nsengiyumva and Joseph Enquêteur. But Enquêteur is not a name, 
it is the job he did, he was Joseph from Gitarama. Those are the ones who took 
the lead in killing the Tutsi here in Joma, and in mobilising the population about 
the killing. Nsengiyumva was a teacher at Save. Enquêteur was investigator at the 
Commune office. When they started that [killing], they attacked the man Evariste 
Rutazigwa, the following day, they went to the man Mutungirehe, even myself I 
was with them at Mutungirehe’s house. Then we killed people there. Then they 
continued, them they continued. […] Rutazigwa did not die, he ran until he 
reached Burundi. His wife and children fled to the Commune office. […] 
Rutazigwa lives in Nyamabuye, we are neighbours. But Mutungirehe is Hutu. 
[They killed a child who had sought refuge at Mutungirehe’s home] […] I was 
only part of the mob that killed that child. […] He was killed by Ezéchiel 
Karikurubu, who is at Karubanda [prison]. […] I accused myself for my 
involvement in that killing.43
 
 
Another person mentioned as an inciter of killings is Pierre Kanimba.44 According to 
Vianney Uwimana, only a few people died at their homes. The majority went to public 
gathering places.45
 
 
In Mukindo Sector, some Tutsi were killed at their homes. But in the estimation of 
Baritunga, they were fewer than the ones who were killed at the Commune office. He 
counted fourteen people who were killed at Nyabisagara hill, which is part of Mukindo. 46
                                                 
43 Interview with Vianney Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
 
The well known businessman Nyirimpunga who had a shop at the Kibayi Kabuga 
commercial centre is believed to have been killed in Mukindo Sector as well. The 
military gendarmes located at Makwaza promised to rescue him. As a result, they brought 
him and his family to Makwaza mountain. According to my informants, it was a trap in 
order to collect his money, his goods and his car. Once the money was finished, they 
44 Interview with François Shirubute, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
45 Interview with Vianney Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
46 Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
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killed him and his family members and went to throw their bodies near the water pools at 
a place called mu Kadahokwa located not far from the Commune office.47
7.2.2. Genocide in Kibayi Sector 
  
 
Apart from the Commune office, another place where a mass killing of Tutsi occurred in 
the Kibayi Commune is the Kabuga commercial centre, located in Kibayi Sector. Kibayi 
Sector accommodated more Tutsi than any other sector of Kibayi and was close to 
Nyagahuru which also had a significant Tutsi population in the Commune after Kibayi, 
Rwamiko and Saga Sectors. Furthermore, the Kibayi commercial centre had shops which 
belonged to businessmen who were mainly Tutsi. When attacks against the Tutsi started, 
it is probably for these two reasons that the Tutsi of the Kibayi Sector and of Nyagahuru 
and of some other surrounding sectors felt secure to gather at the central ground of that 
business centre.  
 
After the Tutsi had gathered at Kabuga centre, the leaders and the military went to 
mobilise the Hutu population of Kibayi Sector but also of Runyinya Sector. At first, they 
told them to come to rescue the Tutsi who were allegedly attacked. Thereafter, the 
message changed, they told them that the Tutsi were the enemy and that they had to go to 
loot the Kabuga shops.48 They emphasized that the Tutsi were killing the Hutu. As a 
result, some Hutu from surrounding areas flocked to Kabuga to respond to that call. They 
looted the shops, but the military were allegedly the ones who looted more things, as they 
were using cars in the transportation of looted goods.49
 
 
The message to kill the Tutsi only came later, if we refer to the account of one informant 
who was present at Kabuga during the massacre of Tutsi there. Her name is Drocelle 
Uwimana. She lived in Joma Sector where she was married since 1990, but her parents 
lived in Kibayi Sector. She was Tutsi but her husband was Hutu. In the first part of her 
                                                 
47 Interview with Jean Marie Vianney Hategekimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007; Interview with Théodosie 
Kanyanja, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
48 Interview with Anonymous 15, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
49 Interview with Vénuste Sindabizera, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
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account, she narrates how she arrived in Kibayi Sector at the beginning of the violence 
against the Tutsi:  
 
My husband was not around, he had gone to Kigali to visit her sister, so he failed 
to make his way back home as there was no public transportation [after the 6 
April 1994]. At Kibayi [Sector] there were many Tutsi at my home, so they hoped 
that no one could attack them. At home, they feared for me, since in Joma the 
Tutsi were few, it was like two families only. They sent my elder sister to come to 
fetch me. She came, we went together at my family home. On our way, we met 
with others fleeing to the Commune office. We hoped that no one could attack us 
since there were many young men. We arrived at home, I saw that there was no 
problem. I had a child. I gave him a bath, then we went in the house, we slept.  
 
Towards the evening of the day when she arrived in Kibayi Sector, the attack against 
Tutsi occurred, the attackers being both the civilians and the military, as Uwimana picks 
up in her narrative:  
 
In the evening, we heard around Saga an igitero (attack) coming from there at 
night. We went out of the house and into the valley. We came back in the morning 
and felt that there was no problem. Around 8:00 am, we saw another very big 
igitero [killers’ mob attack] that was threatening. This igitero was side by side 
with the Tutsi from Linda. All were rushing, but they were not killing them, they 
overtook them. Then we became a lot in Kabuga centre, just in the middle [of 
shops], that is where we were. Then the time arrived, we saw the military coming 
in their cars. We saw many Hutu coming, wearing banana branches. They came 
dancing, with bows on their chests. But I thought it was ordinary things, I hoped 
that they could not kill people. Then the military came, lied to the Tutsi, told them 
to assemble their weapons, and put them somewhere. I am jumping some parts of 
the account. They started to throw stones at each other. From Mugombwa and 
from the road up Kabuga there were many people coming from there flocking, it 
was many mobs on the attack. There were some women, and some young maids 
with baskets of stones. All their weapons were with them. Some came from 
Mugombwa, others from Saga, others from Kibayi. It was a mixture of 
populations. They came, the military shot into the air, those populations lay down. 
One soldier went to talk to those who were sleeping down, we saw that he was 
giving them a small briefing forbidding them to attack. Then when the time 
arrived, they [the military] came and told us: ‘These people had become 
hardliners, take all your weapons, keep them somewhere, and we, we will face 
those people.’ They went to ask them also for their weapons, they [the Hutu] also 
agreed to hand them over. But the military kept those weapons at a place known 
by them. For others [the Tutsi] they kept their weapons in an area they did not 
know. But some clever people kept their weapons with them. After keeping those 
weapons, it was like 16 hours. They had put women in one place, we were very 
numerous, an overwhelming number. All women of Linda, Kibayi and 
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Mugombwa had fled to Kabuga. So many, countless. Then God helped me, the 
child cried. So I went out of the group, it was a fat baby, so I said to myself, let 
me go to ask water, as I slept last night in grass, so that I can bathe it. I knew the 
Kabuga centre houses, because I was working there when I was still single, I was 
sewing clothes there. I planned that afterwards, when I come back, I will go with 
others at Mugombwa parish, because my mother had told me that if we are able to 
go to Mugombwa [parish] with others, we will be safe. I went with the baby, as I 
was bathing it, I saw that where I was sitting, all those mobs came with their 
weapons. We did not know where they got those weapons. Then they started to 
chop people with machetes, then people started to scatter. The men ran. They 
chopped the women who refused to leave the children. Those who knew they 
should run, ran, others ran after them. Others continued to chop them in Kabuga. 
They chopped from 16 hours to 19 hours. As they scattered, many of them fled to 
Mugombwa church, others to Kabuye.50
 
 
 
Mugombwa Church located in nearby Muganza Commune, and Kabuye hill located in 
Ndora Commune, became two of the biggest sites of genocide where tens of thousands of 
Tutsi were massacred. Drocelle Uwimana went to hide with an old lady neighbour and 
then with the Councillor of Kibayi Sector, Jean Bosco Ndagijimana. Then she went back 
to Joma after some weeks, probably in early May 1994.  
 
The Councillor told me: ‘I have kept you for a long time, now what can I do?’ As 
I felt I had no problem being killed, I followed a medical nurse called Josepha, I 
put the child on my back and went with her. We crossed the whole Kibayi. By the 
protection of God, no one stopped me on the way. I was covering my face with a 
dress. It was in May, I had spent a long time there [at Ndagijimana’s house]. 
Wherever we passed, they thought it was the Hutu passing by.  
 
When she reached the Commune office, she met with Burundians who stopped her. Her 
clothes were broken as she says. She saw Kajyambere the Burgomaster ordering one of 
his workers to go and kill a Tutsi man who came out of his hiding place in the bush. He 
came there to seek help because he found his house destroyed. So Kajyambere ordered 
one of his men to take him somewhere, in fact they went to kill him and threw him in a 
hole. The Burundians on the other hand took Drocelle, counted her ribs to verify if she 
was Tutsi. They also checked her hands and fingers. They asserted that she was Tutsi. 
They took her. Then the Director of IGA [adult literacy learning programme], Ignace, 
                                                 
50 Interview with Drocelle Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
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asked the Burundians to let her back, so that he can go to bring her husband to collect the 
children. 
 
He went with a bicycle, collected family members of my husband, no, he took 
instead people who were praying with us, since my husband’s family members 
did not support me. They were angry at their child marrying a Tutsi, but my 
husband had hidden that from me. Then those people came and we went together. 
Those we prayed with include Rukizangabo who prayed with my husband. We 
went home.  
 
Until the end of the genocide in Joma, Drocelle was protected by her husband. Then 
when the RPF won the war and the Hutu fled, Drocelle fled with her husband to Burundi. 
They settled at a place called mu Cyahi in Burundi in a Pentecostal church. But then 
Drocelle was threatened to be killed by the Hutu who were there. She decided and 
convinced her husband to come back to Rwanda in September 1994. Most Hutu came 
back in 1996. Drocelle had two children, both survived. They had a third, then the 
husband died of sickness. She got remarried and had a fourth child at the time of the 
interview. In her family, people who survived were: one girl who just completed high 
school education and a soldier from the RPF rebellion. They are only three. His father 
died of sickness two days before the genocide started. Others were killed. All her brothers 
were killed. Even her mother who held a Hutu ID book was also killed: “My mother was 
Hutu, but in reality a Tutsi who had changed her ethnic identity. During the war 
[genocide], they killed her, because they discovered she was Tutsi.”51
 
  
I was not able to find numbers of people who were killed at the Kabuga commercial 
centre of Kibayi Commune, but they must be several hundreds. 
7.2.3. Genocide in Runyinya Sector 
 
The accounts of survivors, bystanders and even perpetrators from Runyinya indicate that 
the Tutsi from Runyinya were killed either at the Commune office, or near their homes 
and that the bulk of them were killed by being thrown in the Kanyaru river. 
 
                                                 
51 Interview with Drocelle Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
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For example, the family members of Anselme Rutabingwa were killed at the Commune 
office.  
 
Here genocide started later. We heard about it elsewhere. When it arrived here, I 
was among those who fled earlier. I went around 20 April 1994. […] There is a 
policeman who was a friend of our family. His name was Semashinge. He took 
my mother, my grandmother and my sisters to the Commune office [as a way of 
rescuing them]. They are among the people who got shot at the Commune office. 
I think no one escaped from the massacre at the Commune office. Because they 
put them in the room and threw grenades on them, and set them on fire. 
 
He was the only one to survive in his family among those who were in Rwanda.52
 
 
My other informant, Augustin Nemeye, survived by crossing the border to Burundi. He 
indicates that his elder brother and the family of the latter were killed at the Commune 
office.  
 
Several other Tutsi were killed by being thrown in the Kanyaru river. Here are some 
accounts. 
 
Among the people with whom we lived [in Runyinya], some died, others 
survived, but the majority died. […] I also took part in the genocide. But I did not 
kill a person. I only accompanied mobs of killers. I was among them. For 
example, we took a lady with her two children and went to throw them in the 
Kanyaru river. There is another person. His brother-in-law came to call us and 
told us that he had hidden him, he asked us to come and collect him. So we 
collected him from his hiding place and brought him, then they killed him.53
 
  
 
A big number of family members of Béatrice Yambabariye were thrown in the Kanyaru 
river: 
 
Kajyambere mobilised people to work. Then people endeavoured to work, they 
exterminated [the Tutsi]. I had seven children, they killed them, with their father 
as the 8th person, with my father-in-law, mother-in-law, with the wife of my 
brother-in-law, with my other brothers-in-law and their children. They finished 
them. […] Me I got saved by an old lady Nyirabayovu who was my aunt, she was 
married to a Hutu. But her husband had died before. […] My five children were 
thrown in the Kanyaru river, others fled with their father, I don’t know where they 
                                                 
52 Interview with Anselme Rutabingwa, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
53 Interview with Anonymous 15, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
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were killed. […] Me I live near the Kanyaru river, down there in Runyinya 
Sector, Gitega Cell. I stayed there [at Nyirabayovu’s house] for three months until 
we fled.54
 
 
 
Fortunée Mujawamariya also explains that the Tutsi of Runyinya were taken to the 
Kanyaru river, drowned there, and that no one was killed on the Runyinya soil.55
 
 But 
Nemeye stresses that he lost two children of his younger brothers, who were killed in 
Runyinya, at a place called Kw’Ishinga, which suggests that certain killings of Tutsi 
occurred in the territory of Runyinya Sector. 
Finally, the account of Libérathe Nyiratabaro indicates that certain Tutsi from Runyinya 
were killed in remote places. For example, she lost certain members of her family at the 
Commune office. Others were killed on the hill of Runyinya. As for her and her sisters, 
they fled to Kabuye. She survived because she was hidden by her maternal uncle who 
was Hutu. 
 
By the time killing started, some fled to Nyabisagara where the Commune office 
was located, others fled to Kabuye. I am among those who fled to Kabuye. […] It 
is a hill which is not inhabited, just like this hill we are on. It is located in 
Gisagara. […] My father and my two younger sisters and my step mother fled to 
the Commune office. Me at Kabuye I was with some of my young sisters. It was 
the fleeing in a scattered way. Then we went to Kabuye. Once we arrived there, 
they started to kill. They killed there so many people. […] They killed and 
exterminated people. As for me, I was able to hide and go slowly. I came with my 
younger sisters, but they were killed here [Runyinya] in such as way that they 
removed them from soil few days ago during the burying process.56
 
 […] They 
were two.  
Those who fled to the Commune office were killed, including the younger brother of her 
father. But her mother survived as she was Hutu. She died in July 2006.57
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Interview with Béatrice Yambabariye, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
55 Interview with Fortunée Mujawamariya, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
56 In Rwanda after the 1994 Tutsi genocide, the state, and the survivors identified sites where the Tutsi had 
been killed and organised each year the their burial. It was, and still is, a way of restoring their dignity and 
keeping their memory.    
57 Interview with Libérathe Nyiratabaro, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
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7.2.4. Genocide in Saga Sector 
 
The Tutsi of Saga died in several places that include Saga territory, Kabuye hill, and 
Mugombwa church. According to Mukezamfura, Nyirisenge and Uwiringiyimana, a few 
died at Mugombwa Church and at Kabuye, while a lot were killed at or near their homes 
in Saga and thrown in the Kanyaru river and into toilet pits.58
 
 
Genocide is said to have started in Mukindo before Saga.59 Just as it is the Burgomaster 
who initiated killings at the Commune office at Mukindo, Saga informants indicate that it 
is he who also came to mobilise the Saga Hutu to start killing the Tutsi: “At Saga, it is 
Kajyambere who came to make a meeting. He told people to kill the Tutsi. He said: ‘No 
one must remain alive, kill even the child.’ Then they started. They killed. In an extended 
way.”60
 
 
Julienne Uwiringiyimana, a Hutu lady married to a Tutsi man, lost her husband and 
children as well as almost all family members of her in-laws, most of whom died at Saga. 
Here is her account:  
 
[The Tutsi households at Saga were a lot] […] Some died at the parish of 
Mugombwa. Some were killed and put in toilet pits, some were killed at the hill 
outside, as they were seeking refuge, and failing to get secure paths. They died 
different deaths. Some were thrown in the Kanyaru river. For example, my 
husband, they chopped him [with machete] and then threw him in the Kanyaru. 
Our brothers-in-law fled to the Church [of Mugombwa], then the killers threw 
grenades inside, they got cut into pieces, were killed and exterminated. Their 
wives died together with their children, scattered place by place. Everyone had his 
or her own death.  
 
She knows this from the fact that she was in Saga the whole time of the genocide, as she 
was hidden by a Hutu man Ladislas Ntirushwamaboko, who was the friend of the 
extended family of her in-laws: he was cultivating for them since he did not have a big 
piece of land, then they used to give him food as payment in kind. She also followed 
                                                 
58 Interview with François Mukezamfura, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
59 Interview with François Mukezamfura, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
60 Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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Gacaca tribunal testimonies in her area. She mentions some among the perpetrators who 
were responsible for the death of her relatives:  
 
Among those who came to attack our extended family area, there is Kagaragara, 
Ntambara, Macumi, Matayo Cyiza, Batakanwa, Masima [nickname for Jean 
Baptiste Mukurarinda] also who went on organising them, leading them. He 
became famous, a star in genocide. With many other bad people. […] These 
included Burundian refugees who were settling at Saga. They were students, other 
Burundians had gone back to their home [country]. Those students remained. 
They are the ones who organised the Rwandans, teaching them how to throw 
(burst) grenades. They said: ‘That’s not how you kill people, do it like this.’ They 
worked in conjuction with the Rwandans. But because I did not arrive at 
Mugombwa, I cannot know who was a Rwandan working with those Burundians. 
However, a lady came to be noticed among the killers, her nickname was 
Kibeberi, but now I hear that she passed away. People say that she collaborated 
with those who were throwing grenades. […] [In that church] our two brothers-in-
law, Emmanuel Niyibizi and Laurent Ubonabaseka, died there. Others died on the 
hills, others got thrown into toilet pits.  
 
She complains that the neighbours who saw them killed kept quiet at the time of the 
Gacaca trials and do not want to tell her how the whole extended family died, who killed 
them, where are their bones, etc. But she expresses acknowledgement about the current 
prisoners who testify, plead guilty and tell how the Tutsi were killed. That is how she 
came to know the situation about some of her family members mentioned above.61
 
 
The role of Jean Baptiste Mukurarinda, alias Masima, is asserted in the whole Saga and 
even Rwamiko Sectors. According to Jean Sindayigaya, who lived just near the Kanyaru 
river at the place where people passed to cross the river to go to Burundi in Bucaya cell, 
Masima came to order the population there to stop those Tutsi who were crossing the 
river from that place. Vincent Kamanzi, the head of the Bucaya cell, disagreed with 
Masima and advocated that people should let those who were fleeing pass peacefully. 
“But the youth that was checking the paths used to loot the belongings of the fleeing 
Tutsi. Then Kamanzi with other Hutu people forbade those youth to loot them.” That was 
the first day when violence reached his place. No person was killed, according to 
Sindayigaya. Then the following day, information came saying that the Tutsi caught there 
must be killed.  
                                                 
61 Interview with Julienne Uwiringiyimana, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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The one who meets with those groups of bad people gets killed. The killing 
started on the second day, at the first day it was the looting. […] They kill him or 
her, and bring his or her corpse to the Kanyaru river. And so on. Thereafter, a law 
came which stated that no one will throw corpses again in the Kanyaru river, 
because that can pollute the water. […] It was still in April 1994. People no 
longer threw people in the river. They killed them at the hill, in the fields, others 
in the holes, in the toilet pits, etc. […] At that time, I remember, Kajyambere 
came in the Saga Sector, just around four days after the war [massacre]. […] He 
asked: ‘Is there any Ibyitso [accomplices] among you?’ The people of Saga 
answered: ‘No Ibyitso are among us.’ He said: ‘[…] If they are among you, 
remove them from you.’ He proceeded and went. The killing continued.  
 
Sindayigaya did not see Prefects coming to mobilise inhabitants about the killing. 
Instead, he saw soldiers with spears in the car, crossing Saga, showing people those 
spears. He says he did not know how the killing occurred at hills, because he was in the 
Bucaya Cell, located at the border. And also he lived with two Tutsi families, one in his 
cell of Saga, another family located in Runyinya Sector, but close to this home. The one 
from Runyinya, Sebagabo, was killed by Runyinya people. They killed him with two of 
his sons.  
 
The way he [Sebagabo] was killed, they descended from their Sector [Runyinya], 
they came as a very big group, they were like a wedding. They came, they found 
him. The war was even over, after maybe five days [from the first massacre]. 
They found him cultivating. He had allegedly lied to them that he was Hutu. Then 
they did an investigation and found out that he was Tutsi. They then found him in 
the valley cultivating. They called him. He went up with his two sons with whom 
he was cultivating. Me too, I was cultivating this other side, I was covering 
cassava with soil. They called him, he went up, they took him to his house. I 
heard what they were asking him. They were asking him what evidence he had to 
prove that he was Hutu. They asked him: ‘You say you are Hutu, so why some of 
your children have fled?’ The one who had fled is the one who is our neighbour 
on the Saga side. Truly speaking the one who had fled to Burundi was his son, 
and had a wife with five children. Those escaped. They asked him: ‘Why did they 
flee, why did you remain?’ They did not tell him many things, they collected him 
immediately with those other male children, they went, they disappeared behind a 
hill, where I was no longer seeing them. So I did not follow his death. I only saw 
that they went beyond the hill where he lived, and took him to the Rubona hill. 
That is where they killed him. They killed him with those two sons of his.62
 
  
                                                 
62 Interview with Jean Sindayigaya, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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The death of Sebagabo and his two sons shows how geography was conflicting with 
identity dynamics. Had Sebagabo wanted to flee, it could be easier for him, since he was 
cultivating just near the Kanyaru river, and Burundi was just some metres ahead. The 
proof is that his other son had easily fled. But because he relied on the Hutu identity that 
he had acquired through manipulating the system, he thought that he would not be 
targeted for genocide. As a result, he remained at home. But because during the genocide 
the checking of ethnic identity became sophisticated, they caught him and killed him. 
This case shows once again that those Tutsi who thought that they had been welcomed 
within the Hutu community through social interaction or changing of ethnic identity were 
the ones who tended not to flee, and as a result, the majority of them were killed. For 
these, the proximity with the border did not become a loophole.  
 
Finally, Alison Des Forges mentioned a case of the killing of thirty to forty Tutsi staff 
from MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières) who were working in the Saga refugee camp for 
Burundians. The soldiers and militia ordered the Hutu staff of MSF to kill their Tutsi 
colleagues.63
7.2.5. Genocide in Rwamiko 
  
 
The signal for violence is said to have arrived in Rwamiko from Saga and Kibayi Sectors. 
Some people from Saga came to loot selected houses in Rwamiko. As a result, the 
Rwamiko people went to protect themselves.64
 
 According to another informant, on a 
certain Tuesday and Wednesday, violence was severe in Saga and Kibayi Sectors. A 
Tutsi man, Sabukeye, who was a tailor, went with his bicycle to the Kabuga centre where 
he worked. He found in Saga and Kibayi that houses were on fire, people were 
slaughtering and eating cattle and killing people. But in Rwamiko that was not yet 
reached. That man came back to Rwamiko and narrated what he saw in Saga and Kibayi 
to the Councillor of Rwamiko, Christophe Ndagijimana.  
                                                 
63 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 503-504. 
64 Interview with Viateur Twiringiyimana, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
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After that man narrated that [which he saw], the Councillor [Christophe] 
Ndagijimana came to enquire how the situation was. I saw them at the hill where I 
live, the hill of Rwamabare, they were watching the situation of Saga and Kibayi. 
All of us Tutsi and Hutu were assembled there, no one thought he or she could 
kill another person at that time. It was Wednesday morning. […] The Councillor 
said: ‘Please do not dare to kill anyone; we, we must protect ourselves, so that no 
one dies in our area.’ That is how things began. The Councillor said: ‘Please calm 
down, we will protect ourselves, I will not sacrifice you. Also no one will come to 
kill someone from us if we remain united.’ We remained there, then when the 
evening came, people from Kibangu, with the Saga people, started to attack 
towards Rwamiko. They destroyed houses of our neighbours. Those houses were 
destroyed by people from the Mwaryi cell [Rwamiko], they also looted. The 
owners of those houses went to hide in the bushes. No one understood how that 
attack came, it surprised us. […] In the evening, they started to eat cows, after that 
the following morning of the next day they killed the man Kabalisa during the 
day. The whole Kibangu had descended, so they started to do catastrophic things. 
They became hot, after being influenced by the Saga people, and by the 
Burundian people who were in the Saga refugee camp. They instilled those things 
[the killing of Tutsi] in the youths who were active in party activities. Before that, 
we heard that the Inkotanyi are snakes, are cockroaches, so people understood that 
those Inkotanyi will be one day killed.65
 
 
Ndibaze continued her account by explaining that the population of Rwamiko was united, 
but that it got divided when the Burgomaster Kajyambere came to mobilise the 
population about killing the Tutsi, following the meeting of the President of the Republic, 
Théodore Sindikubwabo held in Gisagara Subprefecture. The Burgomaster is also 
allegedly the one who brought soldiers and Burundians to participate in the killing of 
Tutsi.66 Ignace Gatabazi corroborates the view that the violence started in Kabuga before 
Rwamiko and that the Councillor Christophe Ndagijimana stopped the first attack against 
the Tutsi in his sector, before being overwhelmed by other attacks and ultimately joining 
the killings.67
 
   
The account of Twahirwa somewhat resembles the ones of Ndibaze and Gatabazi as to 
how genocide started in Rwamiko following Mukindo and Kabuga and the initial role of 
the Councillor Christophe Ndagijimana. Twahirwa was in Saga when the genocide was 
about to start. He says that it was Tuesday evening. He went there to visit his mother-in-
                                                 
65 Interview with Epaphrodite Ndibaze, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
66 Interview with Epaphrodite Ndibaze, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
67 Interview with Ignace Gatabazi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
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law in Saga. Then an old man coming from Mukindo said that in Mukindo the burning of 
houses of Tutsi had started. Then he said: “What are you doing [as you don’t imitate 
them?].” The next morning, Wednesday, Twahirwa went to Kabuga ka Migina centre. 
Then back at Rwamabare, Rwamiko, he found the Councillor with many people, they 
were observing how at Kibangu, houses of Tutsi were burning. He said: “No one must 
touch the houses of anyone before we understand why those things are being done.” 
Twahirwa continues his account by explaining how the killing occurred, and his role:  
 
We were together, the Hutu and the Tutsi. Then at around 10:00 o’clock, the 
Councillor came to tell us to go back to our homes to collect arms in order to 
protect our cell. Machete, spear, bows were brought. We spent time there. When it 
was 15 hours, a big group of attackers (igitero) came from Kibangu and Saga, it 
came and scattered us and entered in that cell [of theirs]. They went until evening 
eating cows. They had started to burn houses by 17 hours. It was houses of the 
Tutsi. The people fled from houses, as they were being burnt. People started to be 
killed on Thursday. At the first house I was part of the attackers. The man 
Kabalisa was killed, with Leodomir, with two children of the latter. The teacher 
Gasasira died, his elder brother Antoine Kabera also died. My brother-in-law 
Callixte Kamanzi also died. Those are the ones who died at that Thursday. Those 
are the ones in whose killing I took part. The next day, some others died, I did not 
take part in their death. They were killed by others on Friday. Until Saturday the 
killing continued, and the people of our place had finished by Saturday, there was 
no one left among those to be killed. 
 
Twahirwa also mentions some leaders of killings:  
 
The first igitero [killers’ mob attack] came from Saga. In it there was the man 
Kamanzi, the man Sinamenye, and Bertin. Those are in general the ones who 
were leaders. In our place Rwamiko, the first attack was led by Shinani, with a 
teacher called Narcisse. This one worked in the ibitero of Nyabitare and 
Rwamiko, he was still a bachelor, he had gone to the military. It seems that he had 
the rank of Lieutenant when the Inkotanyi attacked in 1990. He was there in 1994. 
Those are the ones I could see who led those attacks. 68
 
 
In contrast with the above informants, the account of Laurent Rwabigwi suggests that the 
act that triggered the genocide in Rwamiko is the killing of the businessman Ignace 
Mbuguje, who had a big shop at the Kabuga commercial centre but who was living in 
Rwamiko. This businessman had built strong ties with Hutu people in his area. Many 
                                                 
68 Interview with Paul Twahirwa, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
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were his friends and others his trusting customers. As a result, they promised to protect 
him, which they did. For several days, they pushed back the attacks against him. But 
ultimately, more powerful attacks from Saga and from Burundian fighters defeated those 
who were protecting him. He consequently got killed, an act which heralded killings of 
other remaining Tutsi:  
 
Here at our home, if Burundians were not involved, no Tutsi could die here. 
Because we spent the whole week waiting, hesitating. The people of Saga came, 
burned, and ate cows. We kept some other cows. But when the Barundi came in, 
when they started by killing that man Ignace Mbuguje… He is the only one they 
killed, and said that: ‘We give you the example.’ […] They killed him a certain 
Friday, whereas the genocide had started on Tuesday. […] The Burundians were 
in conjuction with Masima. Masima used to walk with record books that 
contained lists of Tutsi of Kibayi. So, even the person we did not know was Tutsi, 
he discovers him and uses that book to trace his ancestry. Then he says ‘that one 
must die.’ After the Burundians killed, we entered also the killing. […] On the 
killing of Mbuguje, Masima gave the order only, then one Rwandan 
Nyamukwaya, and the Burundian Kavamahanga, with the man Ntihabose – others 
were spectators – it is Nyamukwaya and Kavamahanga who actively killed him. 
Kavamahanga cut him with the sword. Mbuguje was an old man, but still 
strong.69
 
 
According to this informant, the case of Mbuguje became the master choice to start the 
killing in Kibangu and in Rwamiko Sector. It had an impact, because of the respect he 
had. Then an order came asking to hunt his children such as Thomas who was also in 
Kabuga centre. Then Saga mobs came, collected cows, and killed. People from Kibangu 
cell allegedly realised that the Saga people were taking over the whole booty, so they 
decided to enter the killing in order to gain the remaining cows.70
 
 
In addition, by the time genocide started, the Councillor Ndagijimana went on mobilising 
the Tutsi to gather at the church of Kirarambogo, claiming that that is where he was 
going to provide for their security.71
                                                 
69 Interview with Laurent Rwabigwi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
 Many Tutsi accepted that call and hid in the 
Kirarambogo church. But, According to Ndibaze, only one person was killed on those 
premises. A grenade was thrown in the church, the watchman opened the church and the 
70 Interview with Laurent Rwabigwi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
71 Interview with Paul Twahirwa, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
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Tutsi fled outside, only to be caught and taken to Kanyaru river where they were 
drowned.72
 
  
The Kanyaru river seems to have been used excessively to kill the Tutsi. According to 
Gatabazi, few Tutsi people were killed on the hills of Rwamiko. The bulk of them were 
thrown in the Kanyaru river.73 However, after some days of throwing the Tutsi in the 
Kanyaru, the local authorities realised that the bodies were polluting the water of that 
same river. They forbade the killers to throw the Tutsi into the Kanyaru river anymore.74 
Furthermore, to go to the Kanyaru river was time and energy consuming because of the 
distance. As a result, the killers decided to kill the Tutsi at their locations.75
 
 
Apart from the Tutsi who had sought refuge at the Kirarambogo church and elsewhere, 
some others sought refuge to their close Hutu relatives’ and friends’ homes as in the case 
of Ignace Mbuguje. But the bulk of them were not lucky enough to survive. Ndibaze 
explains that the killers always went to search the Tutsi at the homes of the Hutu who 
were known to be related to them or to be their friends. As a result, so many Tutsi who 
fled to Hutu relatives or friends were discovered and killed.76
 
 This situation reduced 
significantly the likelihood of being hidden until the end of the genocide.   
One example of this pattern is narrated by the informant Cesaria Uwambajimana. Claude 
Twagirayezu and Nkundabagenzi were sons-in-law of the Hutu man Habiyambere. They 
went to hide at his home. But a killer called Serwenda who was very close to 
Habiyambere suspected that Claude and Nkundabagenzi went to hide there as he knew 
their matrimonial ties. He was right, they were there. Claude Twagirayezu was the 
husband of this informant. She narrates: 
 
Serwenda went with spears, he went to check, pointing at pots, down the beds, my 
husband was underneath the bed.  […] Then my husband said: ‘Don’t injure me 
                                                 
72 Interview with Epaphrodite Ndibaze, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
73 Interview with Ignace Gatabazi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
74 Interview with Jean Sindayigaya, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. See also above. 
75 Interview with Cesaria Uwambajimana, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
76 Interview with Epaphrodite Ndibaze, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
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with the spear, I am here.’ He immediately came out of the hiding place. Then my 
father intervened saying: ‘Serwenda, my son, you know I had an Igihango [sort of 
strong friendship oath] with your father.’ He whispered in his ear saying: ‘Please 
forgive me, look, you are alone in this attack, please don’t make my daughter a 
widow.’ The man refused to hear that, we were standing there, saddened. He said: 
‘Me, don’t bring me those Igihango rituals explanation, I came here as a pitiless 
person, I have seen him, this one is the enemy, I am collecting him.’ ‘You have 
lived together, as he was selling in business, now you realise that he is an 
enemy?’, my father said. The man immediately put his hand on the mouth and 
yelled strongly to call people from afar. The man Abdallah from Mwaryi came 
and helped him to put him [her husband] out. Then my husband removed the 
dress he was covering himself with underneeth the bed, threw it down and said: 
‘Take this dress, maybe you will use it to put on the bed of the child, since you 
fled with nothing.’ Then they took the man behind the house as we were 
witnessing, they took him to Kanyaru river, but he did not go there alone, he was 
taken there with many other Tutsi who were taken from the family of the old man 
called Nkwaya, who also was attacked by the igitero (mob). […] They took my 
husband to the river on Friday, then on Saturday, that man [Serwenda] came back 
at my home. He said: ‘I come to see that son of Claude who remained. Even this 
foetus which the wife is pregnant of, we will remove it and kill it by all means.’ I 
became dead with fear, the stomach was sticking to the back. That man came 
around 13 hours with that killers’ mob.  
 
Then that group killed his son. According to Cesaria, it was made of the following 
people: Serwenda, Bizumuremyi, Ntirenganya called Nyarubwana who was also a child; 
he is the one who killed her son. Others include Rubayiza, Ntegayino, and many others 
she could not recall. She says that all the above were jailed at the time of the interview. 
She also stresses that they beat her and “did bad things to her”, which means probably 
that they raped her, an act that made her abort after a week or two.77
 
 
Finally, according to Viateur Twiringiyimana, the Burundian refugees who are often 
accused of having taken part in the genocide side by side with Rwandans were not alone. 
There were also some Burundian citizens who were not refugees but who used to cross 
the border and come to kill the Tutsi and loot property. Those mentioned by this 
informant lived just at the hill next to Rwamiko.78
                                                 
77 Interview with Cesaria Uwambajimana, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
 
78 Interview with Viateur Twiringiyimana, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
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7.3. SECOND PHASE KILLINGS 
 
The large scale massacre at the public places became itself a mobilisation to kill the rest 
of the Tutsi who had remained in hiding. It had shown that the order of the day was the 
killing of the Tutsi, for, they were killed openly. As we know now, there was no genocide 
law published in the official gazette of laws (Journal Officiel de la République 
Rwandaise). But genocide had become a law in the factual sense, that is, it had been 
engineered by the state, had been ordered by it. As a result, the military and the civilian 
population took it as a law. In the foucauldian sense, the tactic or the practice had become 
a law in itself. 79
 
  
After the April killings, in several places, the bulk of killers believed that they had 
exterminated all the Tutsi inhabitants. But soon, in early May 1994, the authorities and 
the civil self-defence committes realised that a certain number of Tutsi were still hidden. 
As a result, they organised again a series of meetings to mobilise by word now. 
Otherwise, the first mobilisation was by action. Before the massacre, it is possible that 
the former mobilisation was about whispering to future perpetrators what to do, so that 
the victims would not know that there was a threat and flee to the border. As some 
survivors mentioned, there was too much secrecy and less information. This was a kind 
of tactic of effectiveness and surprise. Once the agenda of killing was no longer a secret, 
that is, after the first large scale massacre of April 1994, meetings about killing became 
normal and were held openly. 
 
Those Tutsi who had escaped the first massacre were hunted from early May onwards. It 
was, as the narratives describe it, the “hunting time” as opposed to the first phase which 
was the “massacring time”. They were preceded by meetings of Prefecture leaders who 
often came to mobilise Commune leaders about the new tactic. This tactic was about 
“clearing the bushes” so that they could discover the “enemy” who were hiding there. It 
                                                 
79 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality”, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, with two lectures by and interview with Michel Foucault, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 87-104, p. 95. 
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was also about ordering the Self-defence committees to search in houses of Hutu who 
were suspected of hiding certain Tutsi. It was also about ordering those Hutu who were 
hiding Tutsi to bring them to the fore and sacrifice them.  
 
This was done through a very clever method. Indeed, when in May those second phase 
killings were occurring in homes, at roadblocks and in bushes or sorghum fields, the 
killers were noticing that their targets were not being met: certain individuals who were 
believed to be hiding were still missing. As a result, the local leaders informed the 
population that peace has been proclaimed, that anyone who was hiding the Tutsi could 
bring them outside. Some, as we saw in the previous chapter, were misled by this 
message and disclosed their Tutsi protected ones. Those got killed. Others, but few, 
continued to hide them. Those are the few cases of people who hid until the formal end of 
genocide and who survived. For example, in Runyinya Sector, one head of the cell called 
Juvenal held a meeting with his constituents and at first told them that it was a time of 
peace. After disclosing the Tutsi who were hiding, he came back with the message of 
extermination.80
 
 
The words that are reported to have been pronounced by those Prefecture leaders show 
the clear genocidal impulse. For example, after Lieutenant Colonel Alphonse Nteziryayo 
was appointed Prefect of Butare Prefecture, that is, after 17 June 1994, he arrived in 
Kibayi Commune and stressed that “no one [Tutsi] must remain alive.” 81
 
 
Prefecture leaders who came to mobilise the Kibayi people about the second phase of 
killing the Tutsi included administrative leaders such as the Prefect and Subprefects, the 
Army, Gendarmerie Leaders and Civil-self defence committees coordinators. The most 
often mentioned names are Colonel Tharcisse Muvunyi, Colonel Aloys Simba, 
Lieutenant Colonel Alphonse Nteziryayo and the Subprefect Dominique 
Ntawukuriryayo.82
                                                 
80 Interview with Libérathe Nyiratabaro, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
  
81 Interview with François Manirabona, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
82 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 516-517; Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 
2007. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
440 
 
For example, at a meeting that was held on 20 May 1994 by the Subprefect of Gisagara 
Subprefecture, Dominique Ntawukuriryayo, of which Kibayi Commune was part, warned 
the Gisagara constituents not to remain neutral, using the 19 April 1994 words of 
President Sindikubwabo. He insisted that everyone must denounce the enemy who was 
not just the RPF rebels, but any other Tutsi found in the surrounding area of his 
territory.83
 
 
In a meeting that was held at the Kibayi Commune office in June, the Prefect of Butare, 
Alphonse Nteziryayo said approximately this:  
 
Why did you work partially? The result was not very good. You killed some, you 
kept others and you hid them. You will see the consequence of that. I order you, 
anyone who is keeping someone, must go and kill him or her or sacrifice him or 
her. Anyone who knows where there is any Tutsi, must go and kill him or her. 
[…] Anyone refusing to give the hidden person to you, he or she will also be 
killed.84
 
 
Some other words attributed to a head of cell in Runyinya Sector seem to be a repetition 
of the above:  
 
Juvenal, Responsible of Runyinya Cell, said that if you eat a whole snake’s body, 
you cannot fail to finish the tail too. He said that they must collect those 
remaining few and exterminate them. He added: ‘There will be people who will 
come and see the empty landscapes and wonder who were living there. […] They 
should answer them that they woke up in the morning, then found that those 
people went to Arusha in Tanzania.’ […] That is when they started to kill anew.85
 
 
This was probably an ironic expression against the Arusha accords in which the RPF had 
received a substantial share of power as a promise, but which was not fulfilled. Some 
other words attributed to Colonel Tharcisse Muvunyi and which remained famous, go 
                                                 
83 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 547. 
84 Interview with François Shirubute, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
85 Interview with Libérathe Nyiratabaro, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
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this way: “When a snake coils itself around a calabash [or a churn], there remains no 
other alternative but to smash the calabash.” 86
 
 
The remainder of this section is about particular cases of killings of Tutsi that occurred in 
May and June 1994. This killing took the lives of mostly children,87
 
 but also women. The 
bulk of men seem to have been killed in the first phase of massacres. 
In Cyimana Cell of Shyombo Sector, six children of the Tutsi Gérard Birasa were killed 
in that second phase of killings. They had been hidden by Hutu neighbours. Six other 
children whose parents are not specified were killed together with Birasa’s children. 
Birasa had been killed in April 1994. They were killed near the Kanyaru river and their 
corpses were thrown in the river.88
 
 
In Joma Sector, the cases often mentioned include the one concerning the children of 
Evariste Rutazigwa. They were hidden by Vianney Uwimana, my informant. He narrates 
how they got killed:  
 
Rutazigwa was my friend. His children came to my house. I kept them. It was on 
18 April. Towards 2 May, someone passed near my house and noticed their 
presence. Then he asked me why I am locking children inside the house. I told 
him that there is no other possibility, they are children of a neighbour. After one 
day, he brought people who were from the night patrol, they came and took those 
children. I also followed them to see where they were taking them. They killed 
them in my presence. I plead guilty for not having been able to rescue them, 
though I did not have the power to do that.89
 
 
Those children of Rutazigwa were three according to the informant Shirubute. This 
informant pleaded guilty for his involvement in the killing of those three children. He 
narrates how he killed children at the roundabout of Nyamabuye Cell of Joma Sector. He 
says that it is a certain Pierre Kanimba who brought him into the killer mob. Kanimba 
                                                 
86 Gashegu Muramira, “Muvunyi trial ends today”, The New Times, Issue 14036, 2 October 2009, 
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=14036&article=20668, accessed on 2 October 2009. In the 
Rwandan belief, it is a taboo to smash or break the churn, igisabo.  
87 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Kibayi, 12 mai 2007. 
88 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Kibayi, 12 mai 2007. 
89 Interview with Vianney Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
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brought three children of Rutazigwa who were hiding at Vianney Uwimana’s home. 
Kanimba ordered to his brother Haburuvugo to kill those three children. He gave him a 
club to do that, but the latter refused. So Kanimba gave the club to the informant 
Shirubute who killed them.90
 
  
Shirubute testifies to have killed another six children. Some were hidden at the old man 
Nturo’s home. They were his grandchildren from his daughter Cansilde Nyirandama who 
was living in Rususa Cell of Mukindo Sector down at Makwaza mountain. Nyirandama 
had fled with her children to Nyamabuye at her father’s house. Pierre Kanimba brought 
another two children belonging to Francine Iyakaremye, a Hutu lady with Tutsi kids and 
brought them to the roundabout where the informant was with other mob killers. The 
number of children brought to the roundabout became six. So Kanimba asked Shirubute 
to kill those children. He killed three with the club, when he was about to kill the fourth, 
the club went flying out of his hand. As it was a sloping area, he went to look for the 
weapon which had landed far away. When he came back, the other three children were 
dead, which means that it is Kanimba with another person, Cyubahiro, who killed them, 
according to Shirubute’s assumption. So the mob buried them, and went back home. 
Shirubute calculates that he killed six people but that he would have killed nine had the 
club not left his hand.91
 
 
In Mukindo Sector also, those Tutsi who were killed in May and June included those who 
were hidden in neighbours’ houses and especially children who were hidden by some 
family members who were Hutu. The perpetrators kept on hunting them, and killed them 
when caught.92
                                                 
90 Interview with François Shirubute, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
 For example, at Mukindo, near the Makwaza mountain, my informant 
Raymond Hakizimana lost his grandchildren from his daughter. They were from Joma, 
they fled to Hakizimana’s home who was their grandfather, then they were killed there. 
91 Interview with François Shirubute, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. Shirubute was tried by the Gacaca Court on 31 
June 2006. He received a sentence of eleven years of prison. He had spent almost ten years in prison, so at 
the time of interview he remained with a one year punishment. He stresses that he agreed to testify about 
his role in the genocide because there was a Commission that was advocating prisoners to do that.  
92 Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
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Although Raymond Hakizimana had been a strong party leader since 1991 as he was 
President of MRND in Kibayi, he failed to rescue them.93
 
  
In Runyinya Sector the second phase killing also occurred. Two cases of killings that I 
found include a man called Hategekimana, who was cousin of my informant Nyiratabaro. 
He was killed in May or June 1994.94 Another case is about the killing of a person called 
Ryamukuru from Linda. He came to seek refuge to the home of his father-in-law who 
was Hutu in Runyinya Sector. They hid him in a sorghum field. But afterwards, his 
brother-in-law and sisters in-law decided to sacrifice him, because a message came 
stating that if they caught someone hiding a Tutsi, they would either kill him or her, or 
charge him or her 20,000 francs, or his/her house would get destroyed. Only his father-in-
law wanted to protect him at all costs. My informant Sindabizera alleges that he was 
forced by one of the in-laws of Ryamukuru called Nyabenda Nkundineza Kamatari to 
come and participate in that mob attacking Ryamukuru. He came and they went to ‘hunt’ 
him in the sorghum field. This informant surrendered to pressure and accompanied them. 
But by the time the killers went to murder Ryamukuru at night, this informant claims that 
he was back at his home since he did not have a wife to look after his house.95
 
 
In Saga Sector, that second phase of killing also occurred. One informant who took part 
in the killing narrated one case: “In fact, the [April] killing did not last many days. People 
died in three days only.  Some of them had hidden at some places. Children going to their 
grandparents. That is the trap I fell in.” 96
                                                 
93 Interview with Raymond Hakizimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
  Then Aloys Mutarambirwa recounts how, as he 
was going to a place where he had his land, he met with Aimable Uwimana who was with 
Kazihise (nicknamed Rutamu). He saw those men entering into the house of the old man 
called Minonko. He heard them ordering him to bring two kids he was hiding who were 
his grandsons from his daughter married to a Tutsi. Her husband was already killed. The 
children were a girl and a boy. In general, the killers were discovering the whereabouts of 
hiding places and going to collect the Tutsi and kill them. He is accused of having been 
94 Interview with Libérathe Nyiratabaro, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
95 Interview with Vénuste Sindabizera, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. This is seemingly his alibi. 
96 Interview with Aloys Mutarambirwa, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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part of the mob that collected those children. According to him, this killing occurred in 
late April or early May 1994.  
 
Even in Rwamiko Sector, some cases of this second round of killings were recorded. My 
informant Laurent Rwabigwi alleges that he became involved in the genocide during this 
time. He says that he entered the killing after all the Tutsi of Kibangu had been 
exterminated, i.e. during the first April massacre. These are the murders he testifies to 
having taken part in: 
 
The igitero [mob] from Saga came once again, and said to me: ‘You, they told us 
that you spend your time selling only. Now come and join us. All the people we 
will catch, you will kill them.’ I endeavoured to join them. They got the first 
person, so they beat him with a club, and me I injured him with a spear. I know 
that person, I do not remember his name, but his mother-in-law is Agnes, and his 
father-in-law is Sendababonye. My elder brother beat his wife, the man 
Sinderibuye finished him. Their child also got killed, as they were four. They 
were not from Kibangu cell of Rwamiko Sector, they were from Mwaryi cell. 
They had come to Kibangu to hide. As you understand, there must have been 
someone who denounced them [to the killers].  
 
 
Rwabigwi stresses that he also joined the attack against a man called Nkotanyi. The 
killers’ mob was led by Laurent Nzibavuga. Rwabigwi’s role was to enter the house and 
bring them outside their hiding place. They were six people. They freed one lady who 
was Tutsi but sterile, and told her that she can go back home, she is useless, they cannot 
kill her. They freed also one child and gave her back to her grandmother who was Hutu, 
so that this child could continue helping the Hutu old woman to fetch water. Then the 
remaining four people were taken by Nzibavuga and Ndiyonibyo down the road and then 
they killed them. After those people died, no one else died in their cell (Kibangu) or in 
Mwaryi cell, in Rwabigwi’s view. He explains that most people of their area were thrown 
in the Kanyaru river alive, at least according to his experience. He narrates how he took a 
man called Zachariah Banani to the Kanyaru river, who chose to die with his whole 
dignity: He put on his expensive suit. My informant Rwabigwi alleges that he did not 
beat him. He himself plunged into the Kanyaru river and died. This allegation is hard to 
ascertain, especially when one hears it from the perpetrator. In fact, it cannot be verified, 
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because the one who could tell us what actually happened, namely the victim Banani, is 
no longer alive.97
 
 
The above few cases show that almost in every Sector of Kibayi Commune this second 
phase of killings of Tutsi occurred. In addition to the killing of Tutsi, also their houses 
were targeted for destruction. Those houses which had been destroyed in part, following 
the looting of doors, windows, tiles, and the furniture inside the houses, got destroyed 
entirely. The decision to destroy them entirely came some time in May 1994 when 
national leaders started to fear the investigations of some international journalists and 
humanitarian agencies. As a result, the Subprefect of Gisagara and the Burgomaster of 
Kibayi gave the order to destroy houses “because those houses were accusing them”. The 
population was also ordered “to plant gourds” in those empty spaces, so that no one could 
know that any homestead ever existed there before.98
                                                 
97 Interview with Laurent Rwabigwi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. As Derrida put it, killing the witness is 
destroying the archive. (Jacques, Derrida, “Archive Fever (A seminar by Jacques Derrida, University of the 
Witwatersrand, August 1998, transcribed by Verne Harris)”, in Carolyn, Hamilton et al. (eds), Refiguring 
the Archive, Cape Town, David Philip Publishers, 2002, pp. 38-80 (even pages), p. 50.) Although we need 
to problematize the archive (Premesh Lalu, “The Grammar of Domination and the Subjection of Agency: 
Colonial Texts and Modes of Evidence”, History and Theory, Vol. 39, No. 4, Theme Issue 39: “Not 
Telling”: Secrecy, Lies, and History, December 2000, pp. 45-68), that archive has to be available first. 
Thus, the availability of the archive is the first condition, its problematization comes next. Rwabigwi was 
jailed since 30 January 1996. He went to serve his jail term in Nyanza prison. Then in 1997, some 
Adventist Church pastors came to sensitize prisoners about the need to testify about their crimes. Where he 
was, he was always dreaming about the people of Kibangu he killed, he was traumatized, as he says. So he 
accepted to speak out, that way he recovered. He agreed to plead guilty in 1997. He continued to pray. He 
was brought to Karubanda prison in 2000 or 2001 with other people who pleaded guilty. He was given a 
task of advocating other prisoners to plead guilty or testify about their crimes in case they had any. They 
were given a room, which they called “Arusha” at Karubanda prison. When they arrived at Karubanda, 
there were 60 (who had pleaded guilty), but by the time he left prison the number had reached 1,800. That 
was according to him the result of their job. He was then released. He went to be judged by the Gacaca 
tribunal of his hill in February 2007, that sentenced him to ten years prison. As he had spent eleven in 
prison, he was freed. He has since then been appointed in the Gacaca structure of his cell as the 
Chairperson in charge of the activity of pleading guilty and testifying. So even outside the prison he was 
continuing his job of ‘sensitizing’. He was in charge of preparing the dossiers. 
 
98 Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. On some international actors who entered the 
Rwandan territory during the genocide, see Bernard Kouchner, Interview: “Un échec terrible des 
humanitaires” in Humanitaire, n° 10, Printemps/Eté 2004, Le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda, pp. 43-48. 
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7.4. GUSUBIRANAMO 
As we saw in the previous chapter on Gishamvu, the division between the Hutu in May 
and June 1994 following the first massacres of Tutsi which occurred in April 1994 
escalated despite the efforts of national and local leaders to unite the Hutu. This 
phenonomenon of Hutu-Hutu conflict also occurred in Kibayi. The Subprefect and the 
Burgomaster urged the Hutu constituents “not [to] attack their brothers”,99
Some examples show this pattern. One informant explains how he was obliged to hide, 
this despite the fact that he was Hutu, and had an ID bearing the “Hutu” designation. 
There were doubts about him because he was not originally from Saga, also because he 
had interacted with Tutsi chiefs during the late colonial period, and possibly because he 
had a Tutsi wife. He had spent around forty years there, but they were still dubious about 
his ID. As a result, he lost some of his family members in the genocide.
 but this call 
seems to have not been welcomed. 
100
 
 
Another person whose ethnic identity was a matter of doubt is the Councillor of 
Rwamiko, Christophe Ndagijimana. The members of MDR party allegedly attacked him 
several times because he was not originally from Rwamiko of Kibayi. He had lived there 
for more than twenty years, had been Councillor since the 1970s,101 but during the 
genocide, they had doubts about him. But as the informant Gatabazi explains, he was 
saved by his ID book that stressed that he was Hutu.102
                                                 
99 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 523. 
 The informant Ndibaze explains 
that the Councillor Christophe Ndagijimana was originally from Nyaruguru area, and that 
100 Nyirisenge lost some of his nephews: one among them died with his three children, he was thrown in the 
water of the Kanyaru river. Another one died with five children. They killed her with her husband. 
Nyirisenge also lost his daughter. She was killed along with her husband and one child. He lost only one 
child however, that daughter. Paradoxically, he has one son who took part in the genocide. He was in jail in 
Butare prison at Rwandex at the time of the interview. That son had pleaded guilty and was about to come 
to be tried in Gacaca tribunals.  So, one complex question remains: Is this old man a bystander, or a victim, 
or both? (Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007.) 
101 See for example République Rwandaise, Préfecture Butare, Rapport annuel 1974, pp. 7-8. 
102 Interview with Ignace Gatabazi, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
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he was very tall, a physical description often attributed to the Tutsi. That is why, she 
thinks, he was suspected of being Tutsi.103
 
  
My informant Ladislas Harerimana was legally Hutu, but he says that he was targeted, 
because he was suspected of having changed his ethnic identity from Tutsi to Hutu. They 
suspected that his grandfather was Tutsi since he came from elsewhere to settle in 
Shyombo. This was a strategy to loot his cows and other livestock, as he stresses, and 
they actually were looted.104
 
 The cases of Nyirisenge, Ndagijimana, and even Harerimana 
show that geography and ethnic identity were instrumentalised during this time.  
The last case however is about two political rivals in the Kibayi Commune, namely the 
Burgomaster Kajyambere and the former Inspector of schools, and head of MDR party in 
Kibayi, Christophe Nyandwi. It is about instrumentalisation of political rivalry during the 
genocide. It is a case of a Hutu-Hutu division but that occurred in April 1994, not in May 
as most other cases did.  
 
Christophe Nyandwi, whom I was able to interview, together with his wife, narrated how 
he was attacked many times by people sent by the Burgomaster Kajyambere: He went to 
tell Kajyambere about some people who were killed at Kazenga, he also told him that he 
was threatened. Then Kajyambere asked him: “Don’t those people know that you are 
Hutu?” Nyandwi alleges that his home was attacked several times, until they used a 
grenade and guns in one final and harshest attack. Then he and his wife fled to Burundi. 
According to him it was PSD members who killed people in Kazenga. According to him 
again, PSD, MDR and MRND all became involved in the genocide. His informant who 
told him how people attacked his house, how Kajyambere ordered Joma youth to attack 
him and kill him because he was an accomplice of RPF, is an old man called Jeremy. But 
Jeremy is dead. So, the only informants who assert that Nyandwi was victimized are 
himself and his wife. Kajyambere is in exile, so it is hard to check the veracity of the 
Nyandwis’ claims of victimhood. But there are nevertheless some additional pieces of 
                                                 
103 Interview with Epaphrodite Ndibaze, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
104 Interview with Ladislas Hererimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
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evidence: his Shyombo house got destroyed and looted, as his wife at the time to return 
home from exile chose to live in their Mukindo house which could be easily repaired. 
Another issue is that his car was looted, but whether it was by Kajyambere, as Nyandwi 
alleges, or not, is yet to be proved. Another issue is that Nyandwi, his wife and children 
fled at the end of April 1994. But Nyandwi came back to Rwanda in June 1994, which 
shows that he was not afraid, or he did not feel himself to be a victim at that time. He 
narrates himself how he came from Burundi to Rwanda on 25 June 1994, passed through 
Nyaruteja, went all the way to Butare town by foot to see the then Prefect of Butare 
Prefecture, Sylvain Nsabimana, who had been his colleague in High School, to ask him to 
examine his problem of being wronged by the Burgomaster Kajyambere. He found that 
Nsabimana had been removed from office and the new Prefect was Alphonse Nteziryayo 
who had been appointed on 17 June. Yet, the latter was also a friend to Burgomaster 
Kajyambere and originated from Kibayi, Runyinya Sector.105 Then Nyandwi told Prefect 
Nteziryayo how he had been robbed and attacked by Kajyambere, and how he needed 
help from him. While he was in Butare town, the town was attacked by RPF rebels, then 
he had to flee in the cars of the French Turquoise Operation to Kibeho, to Gikongoro 
Prefecture. It is around 1 July 1994 that they fled to Kibeho.106
 
  
It is clear that property was very important, because Nyandwi took all this risk to come 
back to Rwanda, in order only to reclaim his house, his car, his cows and some other 
property. In fact, my other informant, Claver Ntirushawamaboko, explained that some 
                                                 
105 Nyandwi, the Burgomaster Kajyambere, and the Prefect Nteziryayo knew each other very well. They 
worked together in several Kibayi Commune commissions such as Umuganda Commission, Development 
Council, and the Technical Commission. (Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, 
To the Prefect of ButarePrefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune Umuganda Commission held on 3 
October 1983, Ref.: 271/03.09.02/4, Kibayi, 10 October 1983; Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, Bourgmestre 
de la Commune Kibayi, A Monsieur le Ministre de l’Intérieur à Kigali, Objet: Proposition de remaniement 
de la Commission Technique, Kibayi, Réf.: N° 314/03.04./1, Kibayi, le 30 novembre 1983 ; Technical 
Commission of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of Butare Prefecture, Re: Minutes of the Commune 
Technical Commission held on 2June 1984, Ref.: 266/04.04/1, Kibayi, 10 September 1984; Pierre-Canisius 
Kajyambere, Burgomaster of Kibayi Commune, To the Prefect of ButarePrefecture, Re: Minutes of the 
Commune Development Council held on 7 February 1986, Ref.: 63/04.04/1, Kibayi, 17 February 1986.) 
106 Interview with Christophe Nyandwi, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. When Nyandwi came back to Kibayi in 
January 1995, he went to teach for three months, then on 11 April 1995, he was jailed. He was released in 
2005, and judged by the Gacaca tribunal on 2 February 2007. He was accused of having participated in 
Augustin Mararo and Gérard Birasa families’ death. He was proclaimed innocent. So he was free at the 
time of the interview. 
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killings happened as a settling of scores over property ownership conflicts. If there were 
for instance land disputes between two persons, the time of genocide became a 
favourable moment for one person to eliminate the other, even if it was a Hutu against 
another Hutu.107
 
 
A second conflict that occurred between the Hutu in addition to the identity and material 
pretexts or claims, is the battle over Tutsi wives belonging to Hutu men. This conflict 
also occurred in Gishamvu as we saw in the previous chapter. It seems to have been a 
generalised pattern in the whole Butare Prefecture. But it is in this Kibayi Commune case 
that more explanation about leaders’ management of this issue is provided. Indeed, I was 
able to find Tutsi wives of those Hutu men to give me more explanation.108 I also talked 
to some Hutu men having Tutsi wives who survived.109 I also talked to perpetrators.110
 
  
All of them asserted that these Tutsi women were spared if they had lived for a long time 
with their husbands. But if they had been “married” (i.e., taken by force) during the time 
of genocide, they were killed. Those who were spared, their remission came after a long 
debate and after some of them had been violated. Indeed, some Hutu men had been 
obliged to pay money to attackers in order to protect their wives.111
 
 Others had fought.  
Then in June, a meeting was held at the Kibayi Commune office and led by the Butare 
Prefecture authorities. It was the time when Lieutenant Colonel Alphonse Nteziryayo was 
Prefect, which means after 17 June 1994. At first, the authorities decided to kill everyone. 
Then some arguments arose, which obliged the leaders to review their decision.112 That is 
when they decided that those Tutsi women who were long-time wives of Hutu and had 
children with them were to be protected, for they were no longer Tutsi (ntabwo 
babandwa imandwa z’abatutsi), those have become like Hutu.113
                                                 
107 Interview with Claver Ntirushwamaboko, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
 But the then Prefect 
108 Théodosie Kanyanja, Drocelle Uwimana and Fortunée Mujawamariya. 
109 Ladislas Harerimana, Ladislas Nyirisenge, Ignace Gatabazi, and Raymond Hakizimana. 
110 Laurent Rwabigwi, Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Paul Twahirwa, and Vianney Uwimana. 
111 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana and Fortunée Mujawamariya. 
112 Interview with Théodosie Kanyanja, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
113 Interview with Narcisse Nzaramyimana,Vianney Uwimana and François Shirubute. 
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was accused of having ordered the killing of young women just “married” some days 
previously during the genocide.114
 
  
Finally, in May and June 1994 during the genocide, a new phenomenon or behaviour in 
the power structure appeared. Formal local leaders, i.e., the Burgomaster, the Councillors 
and the heads of cells, underwent the concurrence of informal leaders, that is, those who 
had become famous in the killings. These tended to hold a more charismatic power than 
the one of formal leaders, because they were in most cases heads of the Civil Self-
Defense committees and it was the time of killings. As the agenda of killings was more 
prominent than any other agenda during this time, everyone feared these hardcore killers. 
 
The explanation of one perpetrator in Kibayi is telling:  
 
At that time, no one had a say, there was even no place to go to accuse them 
[those Hutu who attack other Hutu]. Q: What was the Burgomaster doing? A: He 
was not seen. At that time power was in the hands of the population, of the 
Committees’ members. These were the people who had become powerful because 
of getting involved in killings. […] For example, there was Nsengiyumva from 
Joma, if anything had to be done, they asked him. The Burgomaster was no longer 
appearing, he was not seen. When the Burgomaster meets this man Nsengiyumva, 
he greets him with respect: ‘Leader, have you arrived?’ Things had changed. 
Some peple say that he was afraid of him. […] In Shyombo, a person who was 
powerful in that way, whom people considered as a Councillor is called Vitaliani 
Nduwumwami; whatever he said the population followed. They had trusted him. 
Q: Why was he powerful? He became powerful because he was from MDR, and 
MDR was powerful here, because they trusted this party to tell the truth. When 
meetings were organised, he liked to ask questions, so people thought he is strong, 
though he did not have formal education. He was a peasant like others. He did not 
                                                 
114 ICTR/BUTARE, “Nteziryayo Allegedly Ordered the Killing of Tutsis”, NI/CE/FH (BT’’0413e), April 
13th , 2004, 
http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/caefd9edd48f5826c12564cf004f793d/bfb327260c1bed7ac125672
1007e3837?OpenDocument, accessed on 7 January 2008; ICTR/BUTARE, “Killing Started After 
Nteziryayo's Speech, Witness Says”, NI/KN/ JA/GF/FH (BT''0419e), April 19th , 2004, 
http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/caefd9edd48f5826c12564cf004f793d/0be0c45d241c2dc6c12566b
10055877e?OpenDocument, accessed on 7 January 2008. 
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kill anyone, he was only leading people to kill, he was present in every igitero 
[attack] we went in.115
 
 
In Saga Sector, a person who held such charismatic power although he was not a formal 
local leader is Jean Baptiste Mukurarinda, alias Masima. He was a primary school 
teacher, then he became a party leader in MDR during the Multiparty system. At the time 
of the genocide, he reinvented himself as a security committee leader, a position that 
made him the most feared person in Saga and Rwamiko Sectors. He is depicted as the 
most active perpetrator of genocide in both Saga where he lived and in Rwamiko. His 
role was mainly to lead killing mobs. Here is the description of Ladislas Nyirisenge: 
“There was a man called Masima, he is the one who had become the chief of Saga, who 
was ordering people to go to kill. He was ruling them, he was ruling ibitero [mobs of 
killers]. […] He was a teacher.” 116
 
 Another informant from Saga had this to say about 
Masima:  
The head of that committee [in charge of redistributing property] was 
Mukurarinda Masima. He was also the leader of the killings, he is the one who 
gave orders for assembling ibitero [killers’ mobs], he was also the administrator 
of Saga. It was like the one who was Councillor [Bikorabagabo Théodore] had 
stepped down, because the population had to follow what Masima ordered 
them.117
 
 
 
Another informant who survived the genocide also described Masima as the then 
“leader”: “Masima had the right to attack wherever he wanted, and did whatever he 
wanted to do. […] I heard about him even in Runyinya, he arrived everywhere. […] He is 
the one who led, in fact he was like the Burgomaster. […] Kajyambere [Burgomaster] no 
longer had a say, except that he had set the fire, i.e. he had begun the killings.”118
 
 
7.5. POLICY AND PRACTICE AROUND PROPERTY 
 
                                                 
115 Interview with Jean Bosco Nzeyimana, Kibayi, 12 mai 2007. 
116 Interview with Ladislas Nyirisenge, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
117 Interview with Jean Sindayigaya, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
118 Interview with Augustin Nemeye, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
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The narratives about the Tutsi genocide and about Hutu-Hutu violence also include the 
conflicts around the looting of material goods. The land of the Tutsi who had been killed 
was a matter of contention. Most of the livestock was being eaten during the genocide. 
But those who had looted cows were also envied by others. As a result, the conflicts 
around material goods arose mostly among the killers. In most cases, those who had 
participated in the killing of members of a household were also the looters of that 
household’s property.119
 
 
The existing administration resolved this conflict by setting up a Committee to administer 
the material goods looted from or left by the Tutsi. Those committees were put in place 
towards the end of May 1994 at Cell, Sector and Commune levels. It was the local 
leaders who designated the people to form those committees. In principle, each 
committee had about 10 to 15 people that included local leaders and ordinary citizens. 
But in practice, those members are the ones who had been more active in the genocide 
activity. Their role was to capture the land and fields of the Tutsi, that is, to take them 
over from those who had looted them, to redistribute the usufruct of those lands and 
fields to the citizens who had the money that was requested in order to apply for this 
usufruct and to give a receipt to the citizens who had received the usufruct. Then the 
Committee members had the right to pay themselves half of the income from that 
usufruct and then submit the other half to the Commune Property Committee at the 
Commune office.120
 
  
The price of a piece of land or a field containing crops to be harvested in future varied. It 
was around 5,000 Rwandan Francs for a big piece of land,121 5,000 RwF for a big field of 
crops,122 900 to 950 RwF for a small field located in the marshland123
                                                 
119 Interview with Paul Twahirwa, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
 and 3,000 RwF for 
120 Interview with André Uzaramba, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
 Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 May 2007; Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana, Kibayi, 11 
May 2007; Interview with Fortunée Mujawamariya, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
121 Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
122 Interview with Jean Sindayigaya, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
123 Interview with Faustin Nduwayezu, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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a banana field.124 Some of the informants who give these prices have actually paid those 
amounts in order to get a piece of land or a field of crops. According to Jean Sindayigaya, 
not everyone could approach the Property Committee in order to get the usufruct of these 
properties. The most eligible were the hardcore killers. Then the other Hutu peasants had 
to approach those who could easily buy from the Committee and then get the right to 
apply for usufruct.125 For instance, Sindabizera was unhappy that rich people were still 
the ones who obtained the land and the cows of the Tutsi.126
 
 
As land was very scarce and precious at this time, it constituted an incentive for 
participation in the genocide. Genocide participation entailed material reward, sometimes 
in the form of land allocation. At the same time, the refusal to participate entailed 
victimization, as some Hutu were looted for having been reluctant to participate in the 
killing of the Tutsi.127
 
 
7.6. RESCUE PRACTICES AND SURVIVAL 
 
In general, the victims who were killed at or near their homes were the ones who had 
expected to be given hiding places by the Hutu. The ones killed at the Commune office 
were the ones who expected protection from the local administration. Those who did not 
ask for help from the local Hutu and from leaders, crossed the border. As a result, the 
bulk of them survived. But specific cases of those who were hidden by those Hutu until 
the end of genocide do exist, just as at the Commune some few, probably less than ten, 
survived. While some hundreds of Tutsi died even in Burundi either on their way to, or in 
the refugee camps as a result of dysentery, it is worth noting that the majority of Tutsi 
survivors are the ones who crossed the border to Burundi.  
 
Some Tutsi survived the genocide by crossing the border immediately. They avoided 
going to gathering places such as at Mujyejye’s house in Shyombo, at the Commune 
                                                 
124 Interview with Augustin Nemeye, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
125 Interview with Jean Sindayigaya, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
126 Interview with Vénuste Sindabizera, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
127 Interview with Claver Ntirushwamaboko, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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office, in Kabuga commercial centre and elsewhere. Indeed, if one sees to what extent the 
Rwamiko, Saga, Runyinya, Mukindo, Joma and Shyombo Sectors share the border with 
Burundi and the way the commune and sector leaders convinced their Tutsi constituents 
to save them, one learns that the latter did not suspect that the existing power could kill 
them. If they had gone between 6 and 19 April 1994, they would not have been 
exterminated. Those who decided to cross immediately seem to have had more chance 
than those who decided to hide in Hutu fellows’ homes. As for those who went to public 
gathering places, they stood less chance of survival. For example the Tutsi who survived 
at the Commune office are less than ten, according to two of my informants.128
 
 
I was able to gather some cases of those who crossed the border immediately. For 
example, Evariste Rutazigwa from Joma survived by running away towards the Burundi 
border just at the beginning of the killings around 18 April 1994. The killers ran after him 
but he escaped them. He crossed at a place called Kigoyi. He allegedly swam across the 
Kanyaru river and reached Burundi that way.129
 
 
Anonymous 17 was part of those who refused to gather at the Shyombo hill near 
Mujyejye’s home. She chose to cross the border and survived. She went into the bush on 
18th April, and she crossed the border only on 23 April. No one helped her to cross. She 
lost one daughter who died in Nyaruhengeri at her aunt’s place, i.e. the sister of the 
informant. She says it is God who helped her to cross because they kept on hunting her, 
but God hid her from their eyes. She fled at first to Gatsinda in Burundi, then went to 
Mureke camp. On her way back to Rwanda she passed through Bugesera.130
 
 
Ildéphonse Hitayezu survived by crossing the border earlier, before the killing started in 
Shyombo. He heard how genocide started in Kigali and elsewhere in the country from the 
radio, so he decided to go early. He crossed on 19 April. Unfortunately he survived alone: 
he says he witnessed how his home was destroyed, as he was standing on the Burundi 
                                                 
128 Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana and Domitilla Nsabimana. 
129 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; Interview with François Shirubute, Kibayi, 
11 May 2007. 
130 Interview with Anonymous 17, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
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hill, as his home is near the Kanyaru river. He mentions names of people who destroyed 
their houses and who killed his mother. As for his three elder brothers, they were killed 
and thrown in the Kanyaru river, their wives and children were also killed. One sister of 
his was killed in the Kabuye massacre. Another one was killed in Joma.131
 
 
The second case concerns those survivors who started by hiding and then later crossed 
the border to Burundi. For example, Anonymous 16, having parents of both ethnic 
groups, but being Tutsi from his father, having also a Hutu wife, survived because he did 
not go to the Commune office, as he explains. He also survived because he gave drinks, 
and some livestock to the Hutu neighbours so that they would not attack him during the 
first days of the genocide. Then he went to hide at Makwaza mountain until 28 April 
1994 when he had the possibility to cross the border. As he explains, “my day was the 
night, because that is when I could move more safely.” He was helped by his mother-in-
law to get some money while fleeing. It is also she who hid his children, his younger 
sisters and brothers. Her name is Xaverina Nyirandora. Anonymous 16 went to Burundi 
and reintegrated in the Mubuga camp. From Makwaza mountain to the Kanyaru river, it 
is a thirty minutes walk. He includes another rescuer, a certain Mpakanyi who was Hutu 
by having changed his ethnic identity, but who was Tutsi before, who advised him not to 
continue on his way to the Commune office.132
 
 
The account of Ildéphonse Bisamaza shows that his family and himself survived by 
crossing the border, after however hiding provisionally with a Hutu friend and dispensing 
money. On Monday 18 April, a strong rain fell, as Bisamaza narrates, then the Kanyaru 
river became full and dangerous. The Bisamaza family did not sleep at night. On 
Tuesday, 19 April, he decided to flee to Burundi with his wife and five children. They 
behaved as if they were going to the Kanyaru marshland to cultivate sweet potatoes as a 
way of camouflaging their flight. When they arrived outside they saw local populations 
on the road waiting and watching them, so he strategised and went to the house of 
Narcisse Butare, a Hutu friend, who lived just near the Kanyaru river. They went to hide 
                                                 
131 Interview with Ildéphonse Hitayezu, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
132 Interview with Anonymous 16, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
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there. He had seen that houses on Shyombo were already burning. That was before the 
Commune office killing that occurred on Wednesday 20 April. As he explains, this was 
the advantage of living near the border. They lived about 600 m from the Kanyaru river. 
They heard a strong gunfire around 11 o’clock. Around 2 pm, Butare who had gone out 
came back and told him that things were severe. He told him that he had heard that at 
Nyamabuye they had already killed three people. Then he told a son of a neighbour called 
Emmanuel Mbarushimana to accompany them and help them cross the Kanyaru river. 
Mbarushimana asked for money, so they bargained and after some time he accepted the 
only money they had, namely 200 francs that the son of Bisamaza had and 500 francs that 
Bisamaza had. That was 700 francs in all. He once more refused that amount saying that 
it was too little. Bisamaza added the hoes they had carried since leaving home in the 
morning. Mbarushimana refused again. So Bisamaza told him: ‘The one who is gone is 
gone. I don’t know what will happen afterwards, so I give you also my sweetpotatoes 
field, take it.’ It is Butare with his son Birutukwinginga who helped Bisamaza convince 
Mbarushimana to accept all those things. ‘That young man is called Mbarushimana, but 
now he is in jail in the prison of Butare. He is accused of having participated in the 
genocide, but he did all what was possible to rescue us.’ Indeed, he put one child after 
another on his back and swam across. He helped Bisamaza cross last. Then he came back. 
When they arrived in Burundi on that Tuesday, they found Burundians waiting to attack 
them. But one Burundian came and threatened to denounce them to the commanding 
officers. In the process another Burundian, Vénance Miburo, helped him with a mat for 
children to sleep on during that night when they crossed the border. Then Bisamaza and 
his family went to Nyamurenza, and then from there they went to Mureke seminary camp 
in Ngozi using the car of the High Commission of Refugees (HCR) from 2 May 1994 and 
stayed there until 3 August 1994.133
 
 
The nuclear family of Jean Baptiste Nyirimana, that is, himself, his father, mother, 
brothers and sisters, fled to his maternal uncles who were Hutu who hid them and 
ultimately accompanied them to Burundi. But his other extended family members fled to 
the Commune office and as a result got exterminated there:  
                                                 
133 Interview with Ildéphonse Bisamaza, Kibayi, 12 May 2007. 
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In my extended family, it is my father who remained in the rural dwellings, all 
others had gone to the Commune office. It was Wednesday, in the morning. They 
killed them towards 15 hours.  […] All were killed. It is my father who survived 
in the whole family. You see, we were going here and there hiding with my 
maternal uncles. By the time of going to Burundi, my mother had to pay money to 
people who helped us cross. When we crossed we were four. My father went first. 
You see, we were not all hiding at one place. We were scattered, because we did 
not like to go together. We assumed that if some die, some others will survive. 
[…] I do not remember when we crossed. We crossed four days after the 
massacre had occurred. It was Saturday or Sunday. […] The people who 
accompanied us left us at the Kanyaru river. They were Hutu, friends of my 
family. They put a rope on two people, one Hutu stays on the Rwandan side, the 
other on the Burundian side, they throw two people in the water, and then the 
ones on the Burundi side pull us until we cross. They wished us a safe trip: 
‘Whether you will die, or whether you will survive, we don’t know.’ Then by 
God’s will we survived. Among the people who accompanied us, there is my 
maternal uncle Vincent Gakwaya, he was Hutu. Others are Munyakayanza, and 
Kuyavuga.134
 
  
However, one other maternal uncle of Nyirimana, called Murindahabi, wanted to betray 
Nyirimana’s family, because, according to Nyirimana, they had previously had land 
conflicts. The other maternal uncles had to isolate and threaten him first in order to stop 
him from calling the killers’ mobs to kill the Nyirimana family. But Murindahabi was not 
satisfied. Ultimately, the mother of Nyirimana had to pay him in kind and in cash. She 
gave him the bank booklet in order for him to withdraw the money later, and gave him 
the bananas which were in the field. That is how Murindahabi stopped yelling for the 
killers’ mobs against the Nyirimana nuclear family. This account shows again to what 
extent the material goods were important elements in determining the fate of some Tutsi. 
 
Another informant, François Mukezamfura, took his children and went to hide them with 
Vincent Kamanzi, who was the local leader.  He went back to collect also his wife who 
was pregnant by several months. He heard people saying that no Tutsi must cross the 
border.  
 
                                                 
134 Interview with Jean Baptiste Nyirimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
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When I arrived at Kamanzi’s house, I found a document, a letter, coming from 
Theodore [Bikorabagabo], Councillor, stating that no Tutsi must cross the border. 
‘Kill all of them.’ After reading that letter, I asked to Kamanzi: ‘Why didn’t you 
tell me this?’ He answered: ‘There was no other way.’  
 
That is when he went back home to fetch his wife. Then he met with a killers’ mob that 
had come from killing a man called Mvugayabagabo. He went to fetch her from the home 
of Sematabaro who had hidden her, and who advised him to take his wife, since they 
were checking for her. When he went back with the wife to see the children at Kamanzi’s 
house, he found that the wife of Kamanzi had driven them out. So he found them in the 
bushes, they were three girls. Then they made their way to the Kanyaru river, it was 
night. They arrived at Kanyaru, but did not find the boatmen. He also found one of his 
nephews at the Kanyaru river. He moved to another crossing bridge, and found boats 
available. He came back, fetched his family members. Then they fled to Mubuga in 
Ngozi in Burundi.135
 
 The experience of the Mukezamfura family shows that some 
problems occurred at Hutu homes that had resolved to hide the Tutsi, that not all 
members of Hutu families agreed to help the Tutsi. 
Finally, another informant, Domitilla Niyonsaba, hid with Hutu friends before crossing. 
She crossed the border on 28 April 1994. She was hidden by her godmother who was 
Hutu and helped by the children of this godmother to hide during the day and night in the 
coffee field and in the house. She was accompanied across the border on 28th April, but 
her mother was killed while attempting to cross. Her children survived.  A certain Sasaba 
was accused of having killed her mother.136
 
 
The last case is about a number of survivors who survived by being hidden by the Hutu 
from April to early July 1994 during the whole time of the genocide. Their profile shows 
that they were mostly very close relatives of the Hutu, either by marriage or by having 
one of their parents a Hutu. The first informant, François Ntukabumwe, is a special case. 
This informant is Tutsi but had a Hutu mother. As mentioned above, he is among the very 
few who survived in the massacre at the Commune office building. After the first night of 
                                                 
135 Interview with François Mukezamfura, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
136 Interview with Domitilla Niyonsaba, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
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shooting and macheting, in the morning of the second day of the massacre, Ntukabumwe 
found himself alive together with other two ladies amid more than a thousand corpses. 
Then the killers took the ladies who were alive to the hospital as they were injured, but 
resolved to kill Ntukabumwe. It is the Councillor of Mukindo Sector, François Macumi, 
who intervened in his favour. Then the killers decided to use him as killer in order to 
spare him, as he explains:  
 
So they [the killers] said: ‘You Tutsi are clever, […] in order to help us you must 
join us in the struggle. If you refuse, then we will kill you.’ […] They gave me a 
machete, they brought one person, so they said: ‘In order for you to be part of our 
struggle, kill this person.’ I killed that person, I did not know his name, we had 
just fled together here [to the Commune office where the interview was taking 
place]. He is from Linda, I think. […]Then they used me. They made me sin, I 
accepted the sin I did, I even thereafter got imprisoned for that. 
 
But another person wanted to kill Ntukabumwe. As a result, the Councillor took him to a 
person called Ndirazi to hide him. Afterwards, Ntukabumwe went to hide with his in-
laws who were Hutu. At first he hid with his mother-in-law, then with his brother-in-law 
who stayed in Nyabiryo, called Nsabimana. This one was bringing him food in the bush 
amongst the pinhus trees where he was hiding. He met with his wife and children in June 
1994. They were alive, except one girl who was killed. Others have survived. He narrates 
that he came out of hiding in the pinhus forest in early July 1994, and came to participate 
in a Security meeting held at the Commune office. The Burgomaster was telling the 
population that the Inkotanyi (RPF) rebels were approaching their area, he urged the 
civilian population to take weapons and go to Ntyazo to stop the advance of those rebels. 
Ntukabumwe adds that during that meeting, the Burgomaster said that no one should 
attack him. As a result, he became safe, he went back home, the neighbours helped him to 
build a grass house and his friend Ndirazi hosted him again for few days. Then the RPF 
rebels came and he fled with the Hutu to Burundi in early July 1994.  
 
The informant Ntukabumwe indicates that once at Munzungu refugee camp in Burundi, 
people discriminated against him since he was Tutsi in a camp of Hutu. So he fled to the 
camp of Byerwa, also a camp of Hutu refugees. Again he experienced discrimination, so 
he decided to come back to Kibayi in October 1994. He was immediately jailed and was 
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released only in 2006. He says he is the one who told the authorities what he did, so they 
jailed him. The Gacaca tribunal sentenced him for seven years prison, but as he had been 
in jail for twelve years, they freed him entirely. At the time of the interview, he was a free 
man at home, but he was facing problems of social integration, as the Hutu were against 
him, because he accused them for the killings and the looting they did to his family. The 
Tutsi survivors were also against him because he had been involved in the killing. As he 
explains, when the national service in charge of registering and helping survivors came to 
register survivors, they refused to register him, because he had been in prison. So he 
asked at least that his wife and children be registered as survivors. The local authorities 
were still analysing the issue at the time of the interview.137
 
  
Another informant who had a Tutsi father and a Hutu mother is Jean Marie Vianney 
Hategekimana. He was a teenager at the time of the genocide. When the April 1994 
violence started, he fled to the Commune office. Thereafter, he left there and joined his 
friend called Habimana who was Hutu and a cook at the military gendarmes camp located 
at Mukindo on the Makwaza mountain. This camp was in charge of protecting the 
refugee camp of Burundian refugees who were settling in Mukindo Sector. Hategekimana 
stayed in that military camp during the time of massacre at the Commune office. But, as 
he explains, as his mood changed during that time as he was thinking about the fate of his 
family members, the military noticed that he had a problem and suspected him of being 
Tutsi. But he negated having any problem. He ultimately became a cook too, and he was 
considered to be even better than his friend Habimana.  
 
Then Hategekimana decided to go to neighbouring Kigembe Commune to his mother 
who is Hutu and some other family members from her mother’s side. His friend 
Habimana negotiated and got a document for him attesting that he is Hutu. So he made 
his way to Kigembe via Gikore Sector of Nyaruhengeri Commune. He crossed many 
roadblocks there, but after showing the document, they let him pass, because they did not 
doubt his ethnic identity. When he arrived at Kigembe, he went to live with his half-sister 
who was Hutu. But after some days, the brother-in-law of his sister came to attack him 
                                                 
137 Interview with François Ntukabumwe, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
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alleging that he was Tutsi and that he fled to Kigembe. It was then in May 1994 during 
the second phase of killings. He was saved by one of his cousins. This cousin had been a 
hardcore killer, so everyone feared him.  One of his uncles was among those who wanted 
to kill him. Moreover, the killers’ mob charged money from his mother in order to spare 
him. Hategekimana says that he learned about the issue of money during the Gacaca 
hearings. Then in early July 1994, Hategekimana fled together with his mother, his sister 
and other Hutu to Burundi’s refugee camps. Just as the previous informant, he was 
discriminated against there. From an area called Mparamirundi, he went to Ruvumu camp 
and then to Magara camp. He ultimately came back to Rwanda, and to Kibayi in 
December 1994.138
 
 
Two other Tutsi women, my informants Théodosie Kanyanja and Drocelle Uwimana, 
also remained hidden by their Hutu family in-laws in Joma until the end of the genocide 
in early July and fled with their husbands to Burundi. Concerning the experience of 
Kanyanja and her husband, they did not go to refugee camps in Burundi. One Burundian 
friend of theirs hosted them from July to September 1994 as a gesture of gratitude to 
them because they had also helped him and his children when they were also refugees in 
Rwanda. He had also protected Kanyanja in Rwanda at the time of the genocide by 
threatening the Rwandan killers.139 As for Drocelle Uwimana, she was in Kibayi Sector 
at the time of the beginning of the genocide. From there to Joma where she was married, 
she was helped by several people who hid her for a few days each. Those people included 
an old lady called Nyiraminani, the Councillor of Kibayi Sector, Jean Bosco 
Ndagijimana, and her husband.140
 
   
The last case is the one of a Tutsi lady who was saved by an old lady. This lady is my 
informant Béatrice Yambabariye. She lost her husband and seven children, together with 
the extended family of her husband. She was rescued by an old lady called Nyirabayovu, 
who was her aunt and who was married to a Hutu man. She stayed there for the whole 
                                                 
138 Interview with Jean Marie Vianney Hategekimana, Kibayi, 10 May 2007. 
139 Interview with Théodosie Kanyanja, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
140 Interview with Drocelle Uwimana, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
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three months of the genocide. She also fled to Burundi to the Hutu refugee camp of 
Murehe.141
 
 
7.7. VICTIMS AND SURVIVORS 
 
As seen above, the Tutsi of Kibayi Commune were massacred at several places that 
included public gathering places, smaller gathering places near their homes, at or near 
their homes and the Kanyaru river. But a large number of Tutsi were also killed in 
scattered places far from their homes as they were fleeing. The public gathering places 
included the Kibayi Commune office, the Kibayi commercial centre of Kabuga, but also 
two other gathering places located outside Kibayi Commune such as the Mugombwa 
parish church where around 26,000 Tutsi were killed, and the Kabuye hill massacre 
where between 40,000 and 50,000 Tutsi were massacred.142
 
 
The number of genocide victims who were recorded for Kibayi Commune is 8,557.143
 
 
This number surely includes the Tutsi of other communes who were killed in the Kibayi 
territory. In order to determine the number of the Tutsi from Kibayi who were killed 
during the genocide, we need to calculate the number of those Tutsi on the eve of the 
genocide and the number of survivors. The difference between these two will be the 
number of victims. 
Concerning the number of the Tutsi in April 1994, the available data on the number of 
Tutsi in the Kibayi Commune per sector is that of 1989 which gives the estimate of 3,128 
Tutsi.144
                                                 
141 Interview with Béatrice Yambabariye, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
 Considering that there was an annual increase of population of 3% at national 
142 For the number of Tutsi victims at Mugombwa parish church see Joan, Kakwenzire, and Dixon, 
Kamukama, “The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda 1990-1994”, in Howard 
Adelman and Suhrke Astri (eds.), The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaïre, The path of a genocide, New 
Brunswick (USA) and London (UK), Transaction Publishers, 1999, pp. 61-91, pp. 81 and 86. For the 
number of victims at Kabuye hill, see ICTR/Butare Trial, “Nteziryayo and Kanyabashi allegedly Ordered 
Killing of Tutsis”, NI/CE/FH(BT’’0315e), Arusha, March 15th, 2004, 
http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/caefd9edd48f5826c12564cf004f793d/bfb327260c1bed7ac125672
1007e3837?OpenDocument, accessed on 7 January 2008. 
143 MINALOC, Dénombrement des victimes du génocide et des massacres, Rapport final, version révisée, 
Kigali, MINALOC, avril 2004, p. 47. 
144 See Table 1, chapter 3. 
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level, if we apply it to Kibayi Tutsi population, that means that the Tutsi population of 
Kibayi was 3,222 in 1990; 3319 in 1991; 3,419 in 1992; 3,522 in 1993. For April 1994, 
we can add 1 per cent increase to the 1993 estimate, since it is four months, i.e., a third of 
the year. That means that in April 1994 ending, the Tutsi population in Kibayi was 
approximately 3,557. The table below gives us the number of those who survived the 
genocide in Kibayi.  
Table 7: Number of survivors in Kibayi 
 
SECTORS  MALE FEMALE ORPHANS WIDOWS/ 
WIDOWERS 
DISABLED  
BY 
GENOCIDE 
TOTAL 
Joma   9   26 8 5 0      48 
Kibayi 35 151 94 63 17    360 
Mukindo  50   60 12 18 1    141 
Mukomacara 25   48 11 12 5    101 
Nyagahuru I: 28   53 48 35 7    171 
Runyinya 42 110 19 24 4    199 
Rwamiko 74 119 20 55 75    343 
Saga  46   85 30 17 2    180 
Shyombo 49   84 21 10 2    166 
TOTAL 358 736 263 234 113  1709 
 
Source: National Service for Gacaca Courts, Number of survivors of genocide, 
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/abarokotse%20english.pdf, consulted on 6 October 
2007, pp. 18-19. 
 
Using the above two estimates, we can calculate the number of victims of genocide in 
Kibayi as follows: 3,557 (approximate number of the Tutsi who lived in Kibayi in April 
1994) minus 1,709 (number of survivors in Kibayi). The difference is 1,848. This is the 
probable number of victims of genocide in Kibayi. It is around 52 % of the total Tutsi 
population of Kibayi Commune. That means that those who survived are around 48 per 
cent.  
 
 
This survival was undoubtedly mostly the result of proximity with the border of Burundi. 
And this has been ascertained not just for Gishamvu and Kibayi, but also for a number of 
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other communes of Butare Prefecture.145 In fact, had several Tutsi who trusted their Hutu 
fellows as a way of survival chosen to go to Burundi, the number of survivors would 
have increased significantly. As we saw, several Tutsi who had Hutu connections (social 
capital) and had material wealth (economic capital) tended not to flee despite the 
closeness of the border. They believed that those social and economic assets would 
protect them, but that was to underestimate the danger of the then politics. In fact, the 
killers knew most of the Hutu connections that those Tutsi had. As a result, they easily 
determined where to find them. In this regard, politics surpassed the social and the 
economic. On the other hand, those Tutsi who took the road to the border earlier tend to 
be the ones of modest socio-economic situation, and of less closeness to the Hutu 
community. But this is not a general rule. It is a trend. As Bhavnani and Baker have 
shown, the trust of Hutu officials and choice of their hiding place increased the degree of 
risk and death of Tutsi victims rather than the other way around.146
 
  
7.8. PERPETRATORS 
 
The perpetrators of Tutsi genocide in Kibayi were both the leaders and the ordinary 
citizens. The leaders often mentioned by informants are mostly at prefecture level. From 
Butare, the two prefects during the genocide, i.e., Sylvain Nsabimana and Lieutenant 
colonel Alphonse Nteziryayo were mentioned as having played a mobilising role. Both 
are being tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Nteziryayo had been a 
prominent actor in Kibayi politics in the 1980s, was a brother-in-law of Isidore 
Nzeyimana who was a well-known politician in Rwanda and in Butare since the 1960s. 
The Subprefect of Gisagara, Dominique Ntawukuriryayo, was also mentioned. His name 
was number 70 on a list of perpetrators of genocide who are abroad. He was arrested in 
October 2007 in France, was transferred to Arusha, Tanzania in June 2008 and his trial 
started in May 2009.147
                                                 
145 See Kimonyo, Rwanda : Un génocide populaire, p. 221. 
  At the commune level, the role of the Burgomaster of Kibayi, 
146 Ravi Bhavnani, and David Backer, “Localized Ethnic Conflict and Genocide. Accounting for 
Differences in Rwanda and Burundi”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44 No. 3, June 2000, pp. 283-
306, p. 303. 
147 United Nations and Centre for International Law, Université Libre de Bruxelles, ICTR, Reports of 
Orders, Decisions and Judgements, 1995-1997, Brussels, Bruylant, 2000, p. 548; United Nations and 
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Pierre-Canisius Kajyambere, in both the planning and execution of genocide is 
ascertained. At Kabuye massacre where a number of Tutsi from Kibayi perished, the role 
of the Burgomaster of Muganza Commune, Elie Ndayambaje is mentioned.148
 
 
While the leaders were mainly in charge of planning and mobilising, the role of the local 
population was effectively the execution of the genocide. To elaborate, those who were 
accused of being among the killers by the Gacaca tribunals were around 2,500 (catergory 
2 in the table below), while those who were accused of being part of the genocide think-
tanks and hardcore killers were around 300 (category 1 in the table below). The 
remaining alleged perpetrators were accused of material destruction and/or looting 
(category 3 in the table below). The Table below shows the estimate of alleged 
perpetrators as gathered by the Gacaca tribunals. Apart from Rwandans, some Burundian 
refugees were mentioned as having participated in the killing of Tutsi, as we saw above. 
Table 8: Statistics of alleged perpetrators (i.e., accused of genocide participation) in 
Kibayi Commune following the Gacaca gathering of information of 2005 
 
Sectors Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Total/Sector 
Joma 18 106 43 167 
Kibayi 20 166 206 392 
Mukindo 19 334 301 654 
Mukomacara 54 354 418 826 
Nyagahuru I 66 120      198           384 
 
Runyinya 13 289 291 593 
Rwamiko 99 520 700 1,319 
Saga 23 292 247 562 
Shyombo 22 320 692 1,034 
TOTAL KIBAYI 
COMMUNE 
334 2501 3096 5,931 
                                                                                                                                                 
Centre for International Law, Université Libre de Bruxelles, ICTR, Reports of Orders, Decisions and 
Judgements, 1998, Brussels, Bruylant, 2003, pp. 1108-1110; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
Case No: ICTR – 97 – 29 – I, Amended Indictment, Prosecutor against Sylvain Nsbimana/Alphonse 
Nteziryayo, 12 August 1999, pp. 1, 32, ; List of people suspected of having participated in the Genocide of 
1994 in Rwanda and who are abroad; The Hague Justice Portal, “Ntawukuriryayo, Dominique”, 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/10/583.html, accessed on 4 May 2010; André, Guichaoua, 
Rwanda 1994: Les politiques du génocide à Butare, Paris, Karthala, 2005, pp. 181, 214, 218-220. 
148 United Nations and Centre for International Law, Université Libre de Bruxelles, ICTR, Reports of 
Orders, Decisions and Judgements, 1995-1997, Brussels, Bruylant, 2000, pp. 462-463. 
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Source: Service National des Juridictions Gacaca, (check spelling), « Synthèse des 
accusées par Province et Ville de Kigali » http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw …, consulté 
le 15 octobre 2007, p. 18. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Genocide was done by both the leadership and the population. Although it started later 
than in several other parts of the country, it became harsh. Part of the reason was that it 
was well prepared. This preparation can be seen in the way the local leadership assured 
protection to the Tutsi population, assembled this population in public places and 
thereafter turned the protection place into a place of massacre, especially after defining 
the displaced Tutsi as the enemy. Between 6 and 19 April 1994, the Commune 
administrative leaders hesitated about whether to attack the Tutsi population or not. This 
is probably the result of the initiative taken by the Butare Prefect at that time of not 
getting involved in the genocide. Once he was removed from office and replaced, and 
once the issue of genocide was taken seriously by national leaders who came to hold 
meetings to win over local leaders in the Butare prefectures and in subprefectures, these 
local leaders of Kibayi also joined the genocide project.  
 
The Tutsi who had gathered at public places were massacred. The bulk of those who had 
sought refuge among Hutu friends and relatives were also killed. However, the Tutsi 
individuals who distrusted the leadership at an earlier stage and who took the direction of 
Burundi survived in the majority. Others were helped by close Hutu friends or relatives 
and some of them survived, while the bulk of others were killed during the second phase 
of killings. The expectation that I had before doing this research was that in Kibayi the 
number of survivors would be much bigger than in Gishamvu because it was located just 
near the border with Burundi. But this was not the case, part of the reason being that the 
survivors did not flee in greater numbers at an early stage, as they did not predict what 
would happen after 19 April 1994. 
 
As we saw, during the second phase of killings, some other aspects of violence appeared. 
These include violence among the Hutu over Tutsi wives of some of the Hutu men and 
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violence over material things. The Tutsi Genocide stopped in early July 1994 as a result 
of the military victory of the RPF rebels over the Rwandan army and the militias. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to understand the conditions that made possible the 
Tutsi genocide in Gishamvu and in Kibayi. It argued, like many previous works, that the 
state played a crucial role in the occurrence of this genocide. As we saw, on the one hand 
the state in Rwanda has always been the object of political competition. The control of 
the state was the means for claiming paramount political power. The state was also the 
terrain or the framework within which that competition operated. On the other hand, the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda was, like the other twentieth century genocides, engineered by 
the state. The aim of the Hutu extremists was to control the state and get the benefits 
thereof. They saw the Tutsi genocide as a means to this end. They succeeded in 
implementing the genocide but were defeated militarily, and as a result, they failed to 
reach their objective of definitively controlling the state.  
 
Since colonial times, the state in Rwanda strove to control the central government (high 
politics), but also to reach the local level, that is, to control society (deep politics). And to 
a large degree, it succeeded in controlling society, despite some resistance to this trend as 
shown in chapters three and four. This success of the state agents was due in part to the 
geographical situation of Rwanda, a country with a small territory, hence manageable to 
administer. Moreover, the Rwandan society was to some extent a society with a culture of 
obedience to the existing authority, hence an opportunity to control it. In addition to this, 
civil society remained weak all through the twentieth century, a condition that the state 
agents exploited significantly.1
 
  
As far as time is concerned, the Rwandan state was both colonial and postcolonial. We 
saw that the postindependence state inherited authoritarianism from the colonial state. 
But, given that the authoritarian type of regime under Kayibanda varied at least in degree 
vis-à-vis the Habyarimana regime, I stressed in chapter three that hand in hand with the 
                                                 
1 André Guichaoua, (sous la direction de), Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994). 
Analyses, faits et documents, 2è édition, Paris, Karthala, 1995, p. 44. 
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colonial legacy, postindependence agency was also important. Was the postindependence 
Rwandan state weak, a failed state or a gatekeeper, as Marennin, Herbst and Cooper have 
argued for African states?2 Though Rwanda shared several features with other African 
states, the state in Rwanda seems to have controlled society and resources a great deal. 
The state remained strong in several different phases.3
 
  
Even in times of turmoil, the state conserved its monopoly of coercion. This monopoly 
was challenged only at the time of the multiparty system in areas controlled by the 
opposition parties, such as in Butare Prefecture as seen in chapter four. But even there, 
the challenge to state force remained limited and circumscribed in limited and scattered 
regions. But even during the time of the genocide, the state conserved its strength.4 One 
theory has linked the strength or the centralisation of the state with the likelihood of the 
occurrence of lethal violence.5
 
 Although this cannot be verified in every case of 
centralized states across history and across the world, it has some merit as far as Rwanda 
is concerned. Lethal violence in Rwanda has always been the consequence of competition 
for the control of central power.  
All through the postindependence period, the Rwandan central state strove, and often 
succeeded, in controlling local administration. It appointed local leaders at the level of 
the prefecture and the commune, and gave immense powers to prefects and burgomasters. 
These appeared more as representatives of the central state at local level than the 
representatives of the constituents. At the time of the genocide, they did not become an 
exception. They continued to implement the orders of the central government. Therefore, 
that the genocide bore the aspect of a “decentralised” genocide is not an accident. It was 
                                                 
2 Marenin Otwin, “The Managerial State in Africa: A Conflict coalition Perspective”, in Ergas Zaki (ed.), 
The African State in Transition, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1987, pp. 61-85, p. 65; Frederick, Cooper, 
Africa since 1940, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 156-157; Jeffrey Herbst, States and 
Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2000, pp. 254-255. 
3 Helen M. Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
37, 2, 1999, pp. 241-286, p. 245. 
4 Timothy Longman, “State, Civil Society, and Genocide in Rwanda”, in Richard Joseph (ed.), State, 
Conflict and Democracy in Africa, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, pp. 339-358, p. 340. 
5 Mark Cooney, “From Warre to Tyranny: Lethal Conflict and the State”, American Sociological Review, 
Vol. 62, No. 2, April 1997, pp. 316-338, p. 332. 
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the result of a structural evolution of centralization since colonial times. Hence, 144 of 
145 communes of Rwanda embarked on the genocide.6
 
 
Genocide was carried out by both the leadership and the population. Mamdani has argued 
that the genocide stemmed from planning and participation, and that any comprehensive 
account needs to consider both the state and the society in understanding why the 
government planning and call for genocide resonated with tremendous support at local 
level.7 This is what my dissertation has attempted to do. From chapter one up to chapter 
four, it traced political and socioeconomic developments that bore the features of conflict 
and violence both at the top and at local level and from colonial times up to the eve of the 
genocide. It showed in chapters five, six and seven how the ideology of genocide was 
engineered and then spread and how genocide came from the top down to the bottom. At 
the most local level, the Tutsi genocide was implemented mostly by groups of killers and 
rarely by individual killers.8
 
   
A number of tools have been used in these struggles for access to power and control. 
Violence was the means and sometimes the end of such struggles. We saw in chapter two 
the violence that occurred during the time of decolonization. We also saw the violence 
that occurred in the early 1990s at the time of extreme economic crisis and political crisis 
following the attack of the RPF. While criminal violence showed Gishamvu and Kibayi 
residents striving to have access to some of the material goods and property of their 
fellows or of the Commune, the violence among political party members was about 
increasing the influence of each party at the expense of the other. If we concede 
Foucault’s point that politics is war by other means, at the time of multiparty politics, 
politics was becoming just war, that is, war by means of war. And again, in Rwanda, 
                                                 
6 In 1991, there were 11 prefectures, 32 subprefectures, 145 communes and 1,490 sectors. (République 
Rwandaise, Service National de Recensement, Recensement général de la population et de l’habitat au 15 
août 1991, Résultats provisoires, Kigali, Décembre 1991.) It is only the Giti Commune that did not take 
part in the Tutsi genocide. 
 
7 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p. 7. 
8 Fujii, Killing Neighbors, pp. 7 and 155-179. 
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politics has come to mean plots, conflict or upheavals. Times of politics (igihe cya za 
politike) meant “times of open violence”. 
 
The manipulation of the discourse around identity was also used. As far as conditions of 
possibility of violence are concerned, we have learned a number of things all through this 
thesis. First, that ontology did not always determine – or coincide with – agency. People 
(rulers and ruled, perpetrators and victims and bystanders) from the same identity 
behaved differently vis-à-vis modes of rule, or the production or execution of violence. 
Certain people from the same identity group behaved differently, or else people from 
different identities acted in the same direction, because they shared interests in doing so. 
In this respect, David Newbury has warned against the view that Hutu and Tutsi were 
“absolute corporate groups”, and against the view that all Tutsi or all Hutu shared the 
same welfare or suffered the same fates in different periods, whether precolonial or 
postcolonial. As groups, they did not share the same positive or negative experiences in 
an absolute manner.9
 
 
Secondly, the extremist party leaders instrumentalized ethnicity in their competition for 
power. They racialized political discourse,10 they insisted on the equation of Hutu as 
majority and Tutsi as minority, Tutsi as a threat11 and Hutu as victims, etc. The point 
about Hutu and Tutsi identities as being political, in other words shaped by the evolution 
of the state in Rwanda, was still valid until 1994. Those identities took the shape that 
state holders wanted them to have. Lee Ann Fujii is right to say that “[t]the story of 
genocide was thus not one of ethnic conflict – old and new – but an even older tale of 
power and politics.”12
 
 
                                                 
9 David Newbury, “Understanding genocide”, African Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, April 1998, pp. 73-
97, pp. 84-85. 
10 Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide”, p. 249. 
11Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide. Race, Power and War in Rwanda, Ithaca and London, Cornell 
University Press, 2006, p. 225.  
12 Fujii, Killing Neighbors, p. 46, see also p. 121. 
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However, socially speaking, since precolonial times, there has been no recorded 
systematic violence between Hutu and Tutsi13 and no deep rooted hatred between them.14 
Moreover, Hutu and Tutsi never constituted two separate communities.15 Serious social 
division among the Hutu and the Tutsi came all the way from the colonial policies and 
historiography.16 It was only in 1959 that violence among Hutu and Tutsi occurred, 
amidst political competition between parties in order to inherit the state following the end 
of colonial rule. Then it was perpetuated by postindependence regimes up to 1994.17 
However, ethnic identity intervened in the genocide, because the Tutsi were killed for 
who they were18 and not for what they did.19
 
  
It was not the RPF attack of 1990 nor the economic crises of 1985-1994 that led the Hutu 
perpetrators to kill the Tutsi.20
                                                 
13 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1995, p. 39. 
 Nor was the death of President Habyarimana the cause of 
genocide. The preparation of the genocide was done long before 1994. Some authors 
have proposed dates for that preparation, between 1991 and 1994 (see chapter five) and a 
number of massacres against the Tutsi had been implemented in certain areas of the 
country between 1990 and 1993. They bore features that resembled the Tutsi genocide of 
April-July 1994 a great deal. Furthermore, as we saw for Butare Prefecture, Gishamvu 
and Kibayi Communes, the genocide started some twelve days after the shooting down of 
the presidential plane. This suggests that the death of the president was not sufficient to 
instil the determination to exterminate the Tutsi population within Rwanda. The killing of 
President Habyarimana was instrumentalized as a pretext to start exterminating the Tutsi. 
14 Alain Destexhe, Rwanda and the genocide in the twentieth century, London, Pluto Press, 1995, p. 36. 
15 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Le défi de l’ethnisme. Rwanda et Burundi : 1990-1996, Paris, Karthala, 1997, p. 
198. 
16 Voir André Karamaga, “Les Eglises protestantes et la crise rwandaise”, in André Guichaoua, (sous la 
direction de), Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994). Analyses, faits et documents, 2è 
édition, Paris, Karthala, 1995, pp. 299-308, p. 304. 
17 Ntaribi Kamanzi, Imizi y’icyaha, Kigali, Editions REBERO, 1995. 
18 Einar Braathen et al. “Ethnicity Kills? Social Struggles for Power, Resources and Identities in the Neo-
Patrimonial State”, in Einar, Braathen et al. (eds.), Ethnicity Kills? The Politics of War, Peace and 
Ethnicity in Subsaharan Africa, London, Macmillan, 2000, pp. 1-22, p. 3. 
19 Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide”, p. 264. 
20  Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide”, p. 248; Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “Un génocide africain : de 
l’idéologie à la propagande”, in Raymond Verdier, et al. (eds.), Rwanda. Un génocide du XXè siècle, Paris, 
L’Harmattan, 1995, pp. 45-55, p. 46. 
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It was not the cause of the genocide. As we saw all along this thesis, the context of the 
genocide was there. That is what I called a space for genocide, in other words, the 
conditions that made possible the genocide. I have explored this dynamic throughout the 
entire dissertation. What the shooting down of the plane achieved, was to provide the 
pretext for the implementation of what was long prepared and engineered.21
 
 And for 
Butare, the national leadership needed even to demote and kill a reluctant Prefect in order 
to make the genocide a possibility.  
In addition to violence and the instrumentalisation of ethnicity, material benefits were 
also powerful tools used during major episodes of violence. One of the material assets so 
dearly competed for was land. Since colonial times, land was defined as the state’s 
property. It was redistributed for usufruct by central and local state agents. The 
redistribution of land gave leaders immense influence in economic life. This influence 
grew as the population size kept on increasing up to 1994. During the violence of 1959-
1966, land was the target of most attackers of those designated as Tutsi and monarchists. 
Land was ultimately redistributed to mostly those who had taken part in their expulsion. 
During the genocide, land was one of the main incentives for popular participation. It was 
promised to perpetrators, was targeted by perpetrators and thereafter was redistributed to 
them.  
 
Structural violence that was recorded during the twentieth century in terms of inequalities 
and injustices, can also be applied to the types of struggles for control of power and 
appropriation of resources. In many African countries, holders of power tended to 
monopolize the public goods as well. Normally, genocides did not happen wherever 
structural violence was identified, but genocides against particular groups followed their 
                                                 
21 According to Meïr Waintrater, to imagine the Hutu group as reacting to the death of President 
Habyarimana by killing their Tutsi neighbours is to insult them. See Meïr Waintrater, “Comment ne pas 
reconnaître un génocide”, in Revue d’histoire de la Shoah : Rwanda : Quinze ans après : Penser et écrire 
l’histoire du génocide des Tutsi, n° 190, Janvier/Juin 2009, pp. 173-200, pp. 184-186 ; Timothy Longman, 
“Genocide and socio-political change: Massacre in two Rwandan villages”, Issue: A journal of opinion, 
Vol. 23, No. 2, 1995, pp. 18-21, p. 20. 
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exclusion or discrimination in everyday life.22
 
 In chapter three, I developed cases of 
structural violence that occurred in the whole country and in Gishamvu and Kibayi in 
particular.  Most complaints were about Tutsi from all over the country and Hutu from 
particular regions experiencing discrimination in the education and employment sectors. 
It is interesting to note that the answers of my informants from Gishamvu and Kibayi as 
to why genocide became possible in their communes revolved around power and material 
assets. Half of the informants who answered this question said that genocide stemmed 
from the fact that those who held power refused to share it; instead, they chose to 
exterminate the Tutsi community. As to those who responded to the call of participation 
in the genocidal project, the informants said that they targeted the wealth of the victims.   
Let us just consider some few passages: “The crisis came from the fact that people 
wanted to eat alone, and leave others hungry.”23 Another informant added: “What caused 
the genocide is the big belly of people. […] It is the big belly of the ordinary Hutu who 
were excluding the Tutsi, and hunting them for their belongings, their cows, saying: ‘let’s 
kill him so that we can eat those cows.’”24
 
 The big belly is a literal translation of “inda 
nini”. This kinyarwanda expression also means lust for material things. It is repeated by 
several informants. Another term close to that one is “bad belly” which is a metaphor to 
mean envy of others’ belongings. It was used by Célestin Karemera:  
[The main cause of killings] is the bad leadership. If you analyse, the peasants did 
not have guns. I guess, if the government told the military to stand there, and 
shoot anyone who wants to kill the Tutsi, no one could dare approach there. The 
bad power sent them to kill, helped them to kill, and they killed. […] Some had 
started to receive the land of the ones they killed, and they had already taken the 
banana fields. Others had the cows taken from those killed. Don’t you see that 
killing was not useless? Those are the benefits they got. It is the bad belly. It is the 
bad belly that destroyed this country.25
 
  
If the monopolizing of power by Hutu extremist parties seems the incentive for planning 
the genocide, the target of material things is suggested as the main incentive that brought 
                                                 
22 Eric D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide. Utopias of race and nation, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton 
University Press, 2003, pp. 14-15. 
23 Interview with François-Xavier Hakizamungu, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007. 
24 Interview with Gérard Segatashya, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007. 
25 Interview with Célestin Karemera, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007. 
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more participation from the side of the ordinary peasants in Gishamvu and Kibayi. As far 
as sensitization to genocide participation is concerned, the material discourse functioned 
at two levels. One level was the promise given to all untargeted people that once the Tutsi 
are exterminated all their belongings would be given to the perpetrators. For example, 
Anonymous 2 explains that the Hutu peasants were told that if the Tutsi are killed, all 
their belongings will be distributed to Hutu. The property that was promised included 
mostly land, but also household furniture, materials from destroyed houses, livestock and 
groceries.26 That promise fell on fertile ground for two reasons. First, because even in the 
1960s, the redistribution of land of those who had fled had been accomplished and the 
active participants were visibly the most privileged beneficiaries. Secondly, even the 
conjuncture of 1994 was favourable to the spread of such hopes. As it was the time of 
famine, as stressed by a number of informants, several peasants found it an occasion to 
profit from some gains. But more importantly, as a big number of the youth were 
landless, the promise of access to land attracted a number of them.27
 
  
There was also a certain level of expectation among certain Hutu inhabitants of 
Gishamvu and Kibayi. Some of those who had Tutsi neighbours were tempted by the 
latter’s land and considered themselves as potentially the first beneficiaries of the 
belongings of those Tutsi neighbours: “A person who had an isambu [land] near the one 
of a Tutsi, believed that if he is able to kill him, he can just move the imiyenzi [plant that 
serves as border of two land properties of different people], then his isambu gets 
extended.”28
                                                 
26 Interview with Anonymous 2, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 7, Gishamvu, 23 
April 2007; Interview with Domitilla Niyonsaba, Kibayi, 10 May 2007; Interview with Godeberthe 
Mukagitoli, Gishamvu, 24 April 2007; Interview with Ladislas Hererimana, Kibayi, 12 May 2007; 
Interview with Joseph Baritunga, Kibayi, 10 May 2007; Interview with Théodosie Kanyanja, Kibayi, 11 
May 2007. 
 Vénuste Sindabizera also mentioned this case: “Neighbours also enjoyed to 
take over the land of the Tutsi who were close to them. They are the ones who either 
killed them or fomented a plan to denounce them. In the Gacaca tribunal trials, we 
27 Interview with Athanase Kumuyange, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 5, 
Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; Interview with Anonymous 1, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with 
Laurentine Nyirakanani, Gishamvu, 27 April 2007; Interview with Godeberthe Mukagitoli, Gishamvu, 24 
April 2007. 
28 Interview with Aloys Mutarambirwa, Kibayi, 17 May 2007. 
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always hear such cases of people who denounced their neighbours.”29 Intellectuals 
expected even bigger gains. For example, some people alleged that the teacher Masima 
from Saga in Kibayi, as he was among the influential leaders of MDR party and a 
hardcore organiser of killings, he would later become burgomaster of Kibayi and then the 
burgomaster Kajyambere would be appointed to a higher position.30
 
 
Some other informants sought explanations of why the genocide became possible in their 
area in terms of older colonial practices. They pointed out that the Tutsi genocide was 
caused by the ethnic policy engineered by the colonial rulers and by the later 
misrepresentation of Tutsi chiefs in school history books.31 This follows one of the main 
points of Mamdani: “The origin of the violence is connected to how Hutu and Tutsi were 
constructed as political identities by the colonial state, Hutu as indigenous and Tutsi as 
alien. The reason for continued violence between Hutu and Tutsi, I argue, is connected 
with the failure of Rwandan nationalism to transcend the colonial construction of Hutu 
and Tutsi as native and alien.”32
 
 
Finally, the interviews point to the groups who were more active in the participation in 
the genocide. Some say the youth were more active. Others blame charismatic individuals 
and leaders, or the elderly. If one may arrange them by order of importance, they include:  
 
1. the youth who mostly needed land in order to settle and get married,  
2. old men who knew what the benefits were in getting involved in such killings and 
upheavals, 
3. political party hooligans in order to loot minor movable property, cattle, etc. but 
without more ambition of getting very rich, 
4. neighbours of the Tutsi who hoped to be the first beneficiaries of their land, as 
mentioned above, 
                                                 
29 Interview with Vénuste Sindabizera, Kibayi, 9 May 2007. 
30 Interview with Paul Twahirwa, Kibayi, 21 May 2007. 
31 Interview with Marguérite Nyirabititaweho, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Gérard 
Segatashya, Gishamvu, 19 April 2007; Interview with Damien Rwarinda, Gishamvu, 23 April 2007; 
Interview with Tharcisse Karengera, Gishamvu, 21 April 2007; Interview with Ildéphonse Habimana, 
Kibayi, 11 May 2007; Interview with François Manirabona, Kibayi, 11 May 2007. 
32 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p. 34. 
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5. the rich people in order to protect their assets, 
6. the rulers, military, police, administrative employees and teachers because of their 
employment in the civil service, and because of the expectations of being 
promoted. 
 
Perhaps, the most important tool for making genocide a possibility was to instil more 
obedience in the state’s authority. As we saw in chapter five, although the multiparty 
system of 1991-1994 produced a serious challenge to the state, at the time of the 
genocide, opposition parties had been weakened, divided and scattered, and in the 
process the Hutu PAWA faction had been strengthened. When a decision came ordering 
to exterminate the Tutsi, sufficient coherent opposition did not exist to contradict this 
position.  
 
Concerning the outcome of the genocide in Gishamvu and Kibayi, some few observations 
need to be stressed. First, as we saw in chapters six and seven, each sector underwent 
genocide, albeit to an unequal degree. In Gishamvu, the Nyakibanda and Gishamvu 
Sectors were the most victimised. In Kibayi, the major genocide sites of large-scale 
massacres included the Commune office located in Mukindo Sector, and the Kabuga 
commercial centre located in Kibayi Sector. Many Tutsi from Kibayi were also 
massacred at Mugombwa Church and Kabuye hill, both located outside Kibayi 
Commune. The Kanyaru river became also the space of killing by throwing the victims 
into the water, alive or dead.  
 
Secondly, the proximity of Gishamvu and Kibayi with the border of Burundi did save the 
bulk of survivors from those communes, but, as we saw in chapters six and seven, had the 
Tutsi anticipated the occurrence of genocide, more survivors would be registered, given 
that these two communes were very close to Burundi and the genocide started later in 
those communes. Indeed, border dynamics were very crucial in this region. We saw that 
the proximity with Burundi has offered a number of occasions of interaction for the 
populations of Gishamvu and Kibayi, both at the time of tense political developments and 
in everyday life. The Burundi populations located near the border with Rwanda interacted 
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with Rwandans in business, in matrimonial relations, in friendship, and even during the 
time of acute violence in both sides. Alternatively, even during the violence of 1994, 
some Burundians took part in the killings and in the lootings in Kibayi just as some 
Burundians saved lives of certain Rwandans. Burundi hosted Rwandan refugees from 
1959 to 1966, in 1973 and in 1994. Rwanda also hosted Burundian refugees in 1972 and 
in 1993. Sadly again, for both Rwanda and Burundi, violence recorded in one country’s 
politics served as a powerful ingredient for violent political rhetoric or violence itself in 
the other. Gishamvu and Kibayi seem to be among Rwandan communes that have 
witnessed this Burundian influence on an acute basis. This explains why all through this 
dissertation, accounts concerning border experiences abound.  
 
Thirdly, as far as my estimates in chapter six and seven are concerned, that Gishamvu 
registered less genocide victims than Kibayi is a complex issue. Normally, given the 
geographical proximity of Kibayi with the border to Burundi, I was expecting that the 
victims in Kibayi would be less than the ones in Gishamvu. But that was not the case. 
Moreover, as we saw in the four earlier chapters, the inhabitants of Gishamvu and Kibayi 
communes were used to crossing the border to Burundi either for commercial purposes, 
or even social interactions, not to mention political ones, when they had to flee political 
upheavals. Kibayi had an even bigger Burundian population than Gishamvu. But why the 
Tutsi population did not use this opportunity to flee earlier is hard to understand. 
Especially given that, as the genocide in the whole country lasted about ten days before 
the majority of Butare territory was touched, it is possible to think that the Tutsi of 
Gishamvu and Kibayi would have used those days to flee. 
 
One possible explanation is that, as we saw in chapter six and seven again, even a few 
weeks after the genocide began, Gishamvu and Kibayi people still did not believe it 
would possibly reach their place. Most of them hoped that peace would hold, as the then 
Prefect, Jean Baptiste Habyarimana, protected them during those first two weeks. As a 
result, the delay in crossing the border did have an impact on the limited survival of the 
Tutsi community, even in this area where it was only a short distance to reach Burundi. 
Indeed, despite some years of spreading ethnic hatred messages in a high degree, several 
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Tutsi living in the country were not thinking that the genocide could be imagined. This is 
very well explained by Helen Hintjens:  
 
Many Batutsi apparently failed to anticipate the genocide, in spite of mounting 
evidence that something was being planned, and in spite of periodic killings of 
unarmed Batutsi civilians. […] Had they believed genocide possible, many more 
Batutsi would have fled the country before April 1994. It is important to explain 
how it was that the genocide remained an ‘open secret’ until the day it began.33
 
  
Had they anticipated the possibility of genocide, perhaps more survivors could be 
registered in Gishamvu and Kibayi, and maybe more in Kibayi than in Gishamvu. 
Sociologically, Gishamvu had the bigger percentage of Tutsi population than Kibayi. Did 
that element have an impact of explaining slightly higher Tutsi survival rates in 
Gishamvu than in Kibayi? Given especially that as we saw in chapter six, those who 
could, fled en masse. Did this help them not to be attacked on their way? One other 
sociological element made the Tutsi people of Kibayi become even more fragile. A great 
number of them had integrated themselves with the Hutu community through 
matrimonial ties. As a result, more Tutsi who had Hutu relatives went to seek refuge 
there. But the killer mobs knew about those ties. Hence, during the second phase of 
killings, they went in search of particular Tutsi individuals or families at the Hutu homes 
where they knew they would hide. That is how a big number of Tutsi died in Kibayi after 
refusing to flee to Burundi before and even during the genocide. 
 
Finally, though I can say that I am lucky to have obtained interview responses from all 
sides of the population – perpetrators, victims and bystanders, and to have had access to a 
wide range of archival materials of different periods and agencies, I cannot claim to have 
found all the answers and to have covered everything. Some people told me a selected 
version after extracting what they did not want me to know, some exaggerated parts of 
the testimony that they wanted me to focus on, others kept quiet and said “I do not 
remember”.34 Some avoided remembering,35
                                                 
33 Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide”, pp. 245-246. 
 some failed to put in words certain parts of 
34 On the difficulty of collecting genocide experience views in the aftermath of the genocide, see Christine 
Stansell, “‘I Was Sick during the Genocide’. Remembering to Forget in Contemporary Rwanda”, Dissent, 
Spring 2007, pp. 11-19. 
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their recollections, some did not exteriorise their “inner language” as opposed to their 
“private language”, some failed to put in words what they have witnessed or undergone, 
some were afraid to do that for reasons known by themselves, some did not find in 
current language the vocabulary to describe what they witnessed, some stuck to my 
questions which did not attend to the totality of their experiences, etc.36
 
  
In addition to the above difficulties, in a study of genocide such as this one, many 
experiences remain unsaid. A person who was killed will definitely not tell his/her 
experience of the genocide. I will hear it from the survivor, the perpetrator or the 
bystander. These accounts will not be sufficient without that of the dead. The dead person 
is the “complete witness” who lived the genocide experience up to its completion, but 
who “could not bear witness” as argued by Giorgio Agamben.37 In this regard, any 
history of genocide remains a mutilated knowledge.38
 
 This is not even to mention 
witnesses that I did not interview, simply because it is impossible to interview the whole 
population.  
In the same vein, the fact that many survivors in the own narratives about their genocide 
experiences consider themselves as dead raises some questions. On the one hand, we 
consider them as alive as we see them before us and interact with them. But on the other 
hand, we hear them talk about themselves as dead among the dead during the genocide. 
Expressions such as “they killed us”, “they finished us”, “we were all exterminated” were 
fully articulated in their accounts. In fact, that means the killers wanted them killed, 
finished, exterminated. As Derrida said, if someone wants you dead, then he has killed 
you; you are dead even if still alive. That follows what Schreiber called the “dead-dead”, 
and the “alive-dead” among the Tutsi.39
                                                                                                                                                 
35 Veena Das, Life and Words, Life and the Descent into the Ordinary, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 2007, p. 54. 
  
36 On similar cases of memory fences about violence, see Das, Life and Words, p. 11. 
37 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz. The Witness and the Archive, New York, Zone Books, 2002, 
p. 34. 
38 In fact, Paul Veyne asserts that history in general is a mutilated knowledge: Paul Veyne, Comment on 
écrit l’histoire, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1971, pp. 24-25. 
39 Jean-Philippe Schreiber, “Le génocide, la mémoire et l’histoire”,  in Raymond Verdier, et al. (eds.), 
Rwanda. Un génocide du XXè siècle, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1995, pp. 165-182, p. 170. 
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As Staub and Diamond argued, there is a hope that understanding the conditions that 
made possible the genocide in Rwanda has the capacity to help prevent the same thing 
happening again in future, in the same country or elsewhere.40 In the time such as the one 
we are living in, we need to understand the making of extreme violence, and to promote 
more advocacy for human rights: “We must…more than ever stand on the side of human 
rights. We need …human rights. We are in need of them and they are in need, for there is 
always a lack, a shortfall, a falling short, an insufficiency; human rights are never 
sufficient. Which alone suffices to remind us that they are not natural.”41 We need to 
acknowledge that the road to a world free of genocide is still far away.42 Indeed, it seems 
as if present states do not learn from past violence. Despite this obstacle, Totten 
advocates the increased efforts to prevent further genocides, since this is about the 
survival of humankind.43 But on an optimistic note, one seminal paper has made it clear 
that knowledge about the making of group-targeted violence can be used as expertise for 
halting future group-targeted violence before it occurs or even during its occurrence.44
 
 If 
this hope stands, then my research has had also a useful purpose. 
Given that there was enough early warning signs, some authors argued that the Tutsi 
genocide could easily have been prevented.45
                                                 
40 Ervin Staub, “Genocide in Rwanda: Origins, Prevention, Reconciliation”, in Victoria M. Esses and 
Richard A. Vernon and (eds.), Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations: Why Neighbours Kill, 
Malden (USA) and Oxford (UK), 2008, pp. 245-268, p. 247; Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies 
Choose to Fail or Succeed, New York, Viking Penguin, 2005, pp. 326-327. 
 Dallaire warned the UN Security Council 
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before the genocide, and attracted the attention of the international media during the 
genocide in order to instil awareness and prevent extreme violence, but nothing was done 
by the UN or by western countries to stop the genocide.46 This raised the issue as to 
whether to consider the international community as a bystander or complicit in the Tutsi 
genocide.47
 
 
This dissertation has argued that the state was strong even in rural areas, that the culture 
of violence since the decolonization time up to 1994 had reached even remote communes 
such as Kibayi and Gishamvu and that ethnic relations, even though they had their 
regional specificities, depended a great deal on the direction of state policies in matters 
relating to identity. It has also argued that rural areas were not spared from intense 
multiparty politics both in 1959-1965 and 1991-1994. Finally, material benefits were 
paramount in decisions of various people at different times, but the decision to embark on 
genocide stemmed from politics. 
 
It is worth noting that the Tutsi genocide was not the sole case where the ordinary 
citizens were persuaded to exterminate innocent victims. In the holocaust this also 
occurred.48 In Serbia and Bosnia, it also occurred.49
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path of a genocide, New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK), Transaction Publishers, 1999, pp. 93-107, p. 
94. 
 But the peculiarity of the Rwandan 
case lies in the magnitude of that mass participation and the occurrence of it at nearly 
every corner of the country. This obliges us to pursue the investigation of the Tutsi 
genocide in several other communes of Rwanda. Such local studies can contribute to a 
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deepening of the understanding of the nature and the management of power at local level, 
as well as social relations, material culture and local behaviours during the genocide.  
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• République Rwandaise, Office National de la Population (ONAPO), Le problème 
démographique au Rwanda et le cadre de sa solution, Vol. 1 : Interrelations 
Population – développement, Rapport, Kigali, 1990. 
• République Rwandaise, Parquet de la République, Butare, Interrogatoire de 
Mperekeje Innocent, par l’IPJ Nsengiyumva François, Butare, le 13 octobre 1990. 
• République Rwandaise, Parquet de la République, Butare, Interrogatoire de 
Maniraho Faustin, par l’IPJ Nsengiyumva François, Butare, le 13 octobre 1990. 
• République Rwandaise, Présidence de la République, Bureau National de 
Recensement, Recensement Général de la Population et de l’habitat, 1978, Vol. 
IV : Ménages et habitat, Archives Nationales, Document n° 5511. 
• République Rwandaise, Service National de Recensement, Recensement général 
de la population et de l’habitat au 15 août 1991, Résultats provisoires, Kigali, 
Décembre 1991. 
• United Nations and Centre for International Law, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 
ICTR, Reports of Orders, Decisions and Judgements, 1995-1997, Brussels, 
Bruylant, 2000. 
• United Nations and Centre for International Law, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 
ICTR, Reports of Orders, Decisions and Judgements, 1998, Brussels, Bruylant, 
2003. 
• United Nations, Information Centre for the Nordic Countries, Chronology of 
Events Relating to Rwanda and Transcript Of Daily Press Briefing Of Office Of 
Spokesman For Secretary-General, Copenhagen, 11-12 March 1996. 
 
1.3. List of Informants interviewed by author 
 
1. Anonymous 1, Survivor, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 19 April 2007. 
2. Anonymous 2, Survivor, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 19 April 2007. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
496 
3. Anonymous 3, Bystander, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 21 April 2007.  
4. Anonymous 4, Survivor, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 23 April 2007. 
5. Anonymous 5, Survivor, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 23 April 2007. 
6. Anonymous 6, Survivor, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 23 April 2007. 
7. Anonymous 7, Survivor, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 23 April 2007.  
8. Anonymous 8, Bystander, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 26 April 2007. 
9. Anonymous 9, Survivor, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 26 April 2007. 
10. Anonymous 10, Bystander, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 30 April 2007. 
11. Anonymous 11, Bystander, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 30 April 2007. 
12. Anonymous 12, Survivor, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 24 March 2006 and 30 
April 2007. 
13. Anonymous 13, Perpetrator, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 30 April 2007. 
14. Anonymous 14, Perpetrator, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 30 April 2007. 
15. Anonymous 15, Perpetrator, Interviewed in Runyinya, on 9 May 2007. 
16. Anonymous 16, Survivor, Interviewed in Mukindo, on 10 May 2007. 
17. Anonymous 17, Survivor, Interviewed in Shyombo, on 12 May 2007. 
18. Bangambiki, Célestin, M, Born in 1928, in Gishamvu, Gikunzi, Catechist and 
Councillor, Bystander during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 24 April 2007. 
19. Baritunga, Joseph, M, Born in 1950, in Kibayi, Mukindo, Former civil society 
employee, former local leader and farmer, Perpetrator and rescuer during the genocide, 
Interviewed in Mukindo,  on 10 May 2007. 
20. Batura, Christophe, M, Born in 1947, in Gishamvu, Gikunzi, Messenger, civil 
servant and traditional medicine practitioner, Survivor during the genocide, Interviewed 
in Gishamvu, on 27 April 2007. 
21. Bisamaza, Ildéphonse, M, Born in 1951, in Kibayi, Shyombo, Farmer and plumber, 
Survivor during the genocide, Interviewed in Shyombo,  on 12 May 2007. 
22. Bucyabutata, Augustin, M, Born in 1953, in Gishamvu, Sholi, Farmer, Survivor 
during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 21 April 2007.  
23. Gakuru, Augustin, M, Born in 1939, Gishamvu, Nyakibanda, Farmer, Secretary of 
APROSOMA in 1961, Bystander during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 27 
April 2007.  
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24. Gatabazi, Ignace, M, Born in 1947, in Masisi, Congo, originally from Kibayi, 
Rwamiko, Farmer and Craftman, Bystander during the genocide, Interviewed in 
Muganza, on 21 May 2007. 
25. Habimana, Ildéphonse, M, Born in 1967, in Kibayi, Joma, Former military, former 
policeman and now Farmer and secretary of Joma Cell, Bystander during the genocide, 
Interviewed in Joma,  on 11 May 2007. 
26. Hakizamungu, François-Xavier, M,  Born in 1932, in Gishamvu, Formerly Smith, 
Bystander during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 19 and 21 April 2007. 
27. Hakizimana, Raymond, M, Born in 1933, in Kibayi, Runyinya, Former 
burgomaster, civil servant and local leader of party, Bystander during the genocide, 
Interviewed in Mukindo,  on 10 May 2007. 
28.    Hakizimana, Théoneste, M, Born in 1971, in Gishamvu, Peasant, Survivor during 
the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 24 March 2006. 
29. Harerimana, Ladislas, M, Born in 1968, in Kibayi, Shyombo, Farmer, Bystander 
during the genocide, Interviewed in Shyombo, on 12 May 2007. 
30. Hategekimana, Jean Marie Vianney, M, Born in 1976, in Kibayi, Mukindo, Farmer, 
Survivor during the genocide, Interviewed in Mukindo, on 10 May 2007. 
31. Hategekimana, Léopold, M, Born in1935, in Gishamvu, Kibingo, Farmer, 
Bystander during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 26 April 2007. 
32. Hitayezu, Ildéphonse, M, Born in 1969, in Kibayi, Shyombo, Former teacher, 
Survivor during the genocide, Interviewed in Shyombo, 12 May 2007. 
33. Kabano, Evariste, M, Born in1933, in Gishamvu, Kibingo, Farmer, Was not in 
Rwanda in 1994, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 26 April 2007. 
34. Kamuyumbo, Consesa, F, Born in 1937, in Gishamvu, Farmer, Survivor during the 
genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 24 March 2006. 
35. Kanamugire, Vincent, M, Born in 1937, in Gishamvu, Mukuge, Farmer and small 
retailer, Survivor during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 26 April 2007. 
36.   Kanyambo, Esther, F, Born in 1920, in Nyakizu. Married in Gishamvu in 1959, 
Muhambara, Sholi in 1959, Farmer, Bystander during the genocide, Interviewed in 
Gishamvu, on 24 April 2007.  
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37. Kanyamugenga, Callixte, M, Born in 1947, in Gishamvu, Mukuge, worker at the 
Nyakibanda Seminary, Survivor during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 27 
April 2007. 
38. Kanyanja, Théodosie, F, born in 1970, in Kibayi, Farmer, Survivor during the 
genocide, Interviewed in Joma, on 11 May 2007. 
39. Karemera, Célestin, M, Born in 1948, in Gishamvu, Farmer, Bystander during the 
genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 24 April 2007. 
40. Karengera, Elias, M, Born in 1931, in Gishamvu, Sholi, Former burgomaster from 
1962 to 1963, civil servant: state mason from 1963 to 1993, Bystander during the 
genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 30 April 2007. 
41. Karengera, Tharcisse, M, Born in 1959, in Gishamvu, Sheke, Farmer, Survivor 
during the genocide, Interviwed in Gishamvu, on 23 April 2007. 
42. Kubwimana, Emérite, F, Born in 1937, in Gishamvu, Kibingo, Farmer. Bystander 
during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 19 and 21 April 2007. 
43. Kubwimana, Joseph, M, Born in 1946, in Gishamvu, Liba, Veterinary. Bystander 
during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 26 April 2007.  
44. Kumuyange, Athanase, M, Born in 1943, in Gishamvu, Gikunzi, Typist at 
Nyakibanda Seminary, Survivor during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 27 
April 2007. 
45. Manirabona, François, M, Born in 1971, in Kibayi, Joma, Farmer, small retailer. 
Now local member of administrative structure, Bystander during the genocide, 
Interviewed in Joma, on 11 May 2007. 
46. Mazimpaka, Augustin, M, Born in 1972, in Kibayi, Joma, Farmer and Catechist, 
Bystander during the genocide, Interviewed in Joma, on 11 May 2007. 
47. Mujawamariya, Fortunée, F, Born in 1958, in Kibayi, Runyinya, Part time teacher, 
Survivor or bystander during the genocide, Interviewed in Runyinya, on 9 May 2007. 
48. Mukagitoli, Godeberthe, F, Born in 1945, in Gishamvu, Sheke, Farmer and 
Dressmaker, Survivor during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 24 April 2007. 
49. Mukangwije, Thérèse, F, Born in 1944, in Gishamvu, Sheke, Farmer, Survivor 
during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, 23 April 2007. 
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50. Mukezamfura, François, M, Born in 1948, in Kibayi, Saga, Farmer and Hunter, 
Survivor during the genocide, Interviewed in Muganza, on 17 May 2007. 
51. Munyankindi, Justin, M, Born in 1946, in Gishamvu, Gishamvu, Farmer and 
mason, Survivor during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 21 April 2007. 
52. Munyantore, François, M, Born in1928, in Gishamvu, Mason, Bystander during the 
genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 19 April 2007. 
53. Munyarugamba, Théodomir, M, Born in 1936, in Gishamvu, Kibingo, Farmer and 
seller of cows, Was not in Rwanda during genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 24 
April 2007. 
54. Muremangando, Léopold, M, Born in 1938, Gishamvu, Farmer and Night watch, 
Bystander during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 23 April 2007. 
55. Murindwa, Evariste, M, Born in 1954, in Gishamvu, Farmer, Survivor during the 
genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 24 March 2006. 
56. Musabyemariya, Claire, F, Born in 1981, in Runyinya, Gikombe, Student, Survivor 
during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 24 March 2006. 
57. Mutarambirwa, Aloys, M, Born in 1973, in Kibayi, Saga, Farmer and Carpenter, 
Perpetrator during the genocide, Interviewed in Muganza, on 17 May 2007. 
58. Mutarambirwa, Emmanuel, M, Born in 1959, in Kibayi, Shyombo, Farmer and 
Catechist, Bystander during the genocide, Interviewed in Shyombo, on12 May 2007. 
59. NAHAYO Innocent, M, Born in 1944, in Gishamvu, Sheke, Alphabetisation 
teacher and Farmer, Survivor during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 21 April 
2007. 
60. Ndahimana, Alfred, M, Born in 1960, in Kibayi, Shyombo, Farmer and Seller of 
beer, Perpetrator during the genocide, Interviewed in Shyombo, on 12 May 2007. 
61. Ndibaze, Epaphrodite, F., Born in 1965, in Kibayi, Rwamiko, Farmer, Bystander 
during the genocide, Interviewed in Muganza, on 21 May 2007. 
62. Nduwayezu, Faustin, M, Born in 1952, in Kibayi, Saga, Modern Farmer, 
Perpetrator during the genocide, Interviewed in Muganza, on 17 May 2007. 
63. Nemeye, Augustin, M, Born in 1951, in Kibayi, Saga, Farmer and small 
businessman, Survivor during the genocide, Interviewed in Muganza, on 17 May 2007. 
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64. Ngirabega, Claude, M, Born in 1932, in Gishamvu, Kibingo, Farmer, Was not in 
Rwanda during genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 26 April 2007. 
65. Nikuze, Eugénie, F, Born in 1960, Mukura, Mpare, Married in Gishamvu, Sholi, in 
1979, Farmer, Bystander during the genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 24 April 
2007. 
66. Nikwigize, Mariam, F, born in 1976, Ndora, Kinywerere, Married and lived in 
Gishamvu Commune, Gishamvu Sector, Farmer, small retailer, Bystander during the 
genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu on 27 April 2007. 
67. Niyonsaba, Domitilla, F, born in 1958, Kibayi, Mukindo, Former teacher and 
Farmer, Survivor, Interviewed in Kibayi on 10 May 2007. 
68. Nsengimana, Vincent, M, born in 1969, Gishamvu, Gishamvu, Gishamvu, Peasant, 
Survivor, Interviewed in Gishamvu on 24 March 2006. 
69. Ntakabumwe, François, M, born in 1952, Kibayi, Mukindo, Farmer and Driver of 
canoe, Survivor and perpetrator, Interviewed in Mukindo, on 10 May 2007. 
70. Ntakaraba, Jean Berchmans, M, born in 1923, Gishamvu, Kibingo, Farmer and 
Carpenter, Bystander, Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 30 April 2007. 
71. Ntawuyirushamaboko, Marthe, F, born in 1948, Gishamvu, Farmer, Bystander, 
Interviewed in Gishamvu, on 24 April 2007. 
72. Ntawuyirushintege, Marie, M, born in 1949, Kigembe, Ngoma, Married in 
Gishamvu in 1969, Farmer, Bystander, Interviewed in Gishamvu on 30 April 2007. 
73. Ntirushwamaboko, Claver, M, born in 1957, Kibayi, Saga, Catechist and Farmer, 
Bystander, Interviewed in Muganza on 17 May 2007. 
74. Nyandwi, Christophe, M, born in 1953, Gishamvu, Mubumbano, arrived in 
Shyombo, Kibayi, in 1956, Former teacher, former school inspector and local leader of 
party, Bystander, Interviewed in Shyombo on 12 May 2007. 
75. Nyirabega, Marie Thérèse, F, born in 1927, Kibayi, Runyinya, Farmer, Bystander, 
Interviewed in Runyinya on 9 May 2007. 
76. Nyirabititaweho, Marguérite, F, born in 1920, Kigembe, Ngera. Arrival in 
Gishamvu, in Sheke after her marriage, Farmer, Survivor, Interviewed in Gishamvu on 
19 April 2007. 
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77. Nyirakanani, Laurentine, F, born in 1964, Gishamvu, Gishamvu, Farmer, 
Bystander, Interviewed in Gishamvu on 27 April 2007. 
78. Nyiramariza, Mélanie, F, born in 1925, Kibayi, Mukindo, Farmer, Bystander, 
Interviewed in Mukindo on 10 May 2007. 
79. Nyirandugu, Suzanne, F, born in 1901 [sic?], Kibayi, Runyinya, Farmer, Bystander, 
Interviewed in Runyinya on 9 May 2007. 
80. Nyiratabaro, Libérathe, F, born in 1976, Kibayi, Runyinya, Farmer, artisan, 
Survivor, Interviewed in Runyinya on 9 May 2007. 
81. Nyirimana, Jean Baptiste, M, 1978, Kibayi, Joma, Farmer, Survivor, Interviewed in 
Joma on 11 May 2007. 
82. Nyirisenge, Ladislas, M, born in 1930, Kibayi, Saga, Farmer and former Catechist, 
Bystander, Interviewed in Muganza on 17 May 2007. 
83. Nzabamwita, Gaston, M, born in 1928, Gishamvu, Liba, Farmer, Bystander, 
Interviewed in Gishamvu on 26 April 2007. 
84. Nzaramyimana, Narcisse, M, born in 1967, Kibayi, Mukindo, Farmer, mason and 
local leader, Bystander, Interviewed in Mukindo on 10 May 2007. 
85. Nzeyimana, Jean Bosco, M, born in 1965, Kibayi, Shyombo, Farmer, Perpetrator, 
Interviewed in Shyombo on 12 May 2007. 
86. Rugengamanzi, Augustin, M, born in 1952, Gishamvu, Sheke, Farmer and mason, 
Survivor, Interviewed in Gishamvu on 27 April 2007. 
87. Rusanganwa, Marc, M, born in 1951, Gishamvu, Sholi, Farmer and Manpower in 
construction, Survivor, Interviewed in Gishamvu on 19 April 2007. 
88. Rutabingwa, Anselme, M, born in 1973, Kibayi, Runyinya, Farmer and mason, 
Survivor, Interviewed in Runyinya on 9 May 2007. 
89. Rwabigwi, Laurent, M, born in 1971, Kibayi, Rwamiko, Farmer, Perpetrator, 
Interviewed in Muganza on 21 May 2007. 
90. Rwandanga, Joseph, M, born in 1930, Gishamvu, Gishamvu, Smith and Councillor 
of Sector, Perpetrator, Interviewed in Gishamvu on 21 April 2007. 
91. Rwanyange, Cassien, M, born in 1930, Gishamvu, Liba, Farmer, Bystander, 
Interviewed in Gishamvu on 26 April 2007. 
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92. Rwarinda, Damien, M, born in1930, Gishamvu  Kibingo, Farmer, Was not in 
Rwanda during genocide, Interviewed in Gishamvu on 23 April 2007. 
93. Rwigimba, Gratien, M, born in 1912, Kibayi, Runyinya, Farmer and Driver of 
canoe, Bystander, Interviewed in Runyinya on 9 May 2007. 
94. Segatashya, Gérard, M, born in 1924 or 1926, Sholi or Gishamvu, Farmer, 
Bystander, Interviewed in Gishamvu on 19 and 21 April 2007. 
95. Shirubute, François, M, born in 1960, Kibayi, Joma, Farmer, Perpetrator, 
Interviewed in Joma on 11 May 2007. 
96. Sindabizera, Vénuste, M, born in 1952, Kibayi, Runyinya, Farmer, Craftsman and 
Builder, Perpetrator, Interviewed in Runyinya on 9 May 2007. 
97. Sindayigaya, Jean, M, born in 1967, Kibayi, Saga, Farmer, Bystander, Interviewed 
in Muganza on 17 May 2007. 
98. Twahirwa, Paul, M, born in 1968, Kibayi, Rwamiko, Farmer, Perpetrator, 
Interviewed in Muganza on 21 May 2007. 
99. Twiringiyimana, Viateur, M, born in 1973, Kibayi, Rwamiko, Farmer, Bystander, 
Interviewed in Muganza on 21 May 2007. 
100. Uwambajimana, Cesaria, M, born in 1971, Kibayi, Rwamiko, Farmer, Survivor, 
Interviewed in Muganza on 21 May 2007. 
101. Uwimana, Drocèle, F, born in 1970, Kibayi, Kibayi, Farmer and Dressmaker, 
Survivor, Interviewed in Joma on 11 May 2007.  
102. Uwimana, Vianney, M, born in 1956, Kibayi, Joma, Farmer, Fisherman and 
Smuggler, Perpetrator, Interviewed in Joma on 11 May 2007. 
103. Uwiringiyimana, Julienne, F, born in 1965, Kibayi, Saga, Farmer, Survivor, 
Interviewed in Muganza on 17 May 2007. 
104. Uzaramba, André, M, born in 1949, Kibayi, Shyombo, Former councillor and 
retailer, Perpetrator, Interviewed in Shyombo on 12 May 2007. 
105. Vuguziga, Christine, F, born in 1955, Gishamvu, Farmer, Survivor, Hutu wife of a 
Tutsi man, Interviewed in Gishamvu on 24 March 2006. 
106. Yambabariye, Béatrice, F, born in 1952, Kibayi, Runyinya, Farmer, Survivor, 
Interviewed in Runyinya on 9 May 2007. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: COLONIAL CHIEFS AND SUBCHIEFS IN THE TERRITORY 
THAT BECAME GISHAMVU AND KIBAYI1
 
 
Bashumba Nyakare 
 
In 1925, Kabera was chief of Bashumba and Sezikeye was chief of Nyakare. Kabera was 
replaced by his son, Rutamu around 1932, while Sezikeye was replaced in 1934 by his 
son Mutembe, born in 1910. Both Rutamu and Mutembe had studied at the Nyanza 
primary school and Rutamu had done an internship at the Territory as Indigene Secretary.  
In 1946, Bashumba and Nyakare were merged to form a new chiefdom of Bashumba-
Nyakare. This new combined chiefdom was given to the new chief Elie Gitambaro, who 
by 1940 had completed his education at the Astrida Secondary School. He kept office 
until January 1956. He was then replaced by Eugene Muhikira who kept office until the 
1959 “revolution”. Then Nyangezi Fiacre was appointed as Chief ad interim. He kept 
office until May 1960, then was replaced by Cajetan Bisumbukuboko. Bisumbukuboko 
was the last Chief of Bashumba-Nyakare. He was chief until February 1961 when 
Chiefdoms were officially cancelled and replaced by Prefectures.  
 
In 1955, the following were subchiefs: Bucagu was ruling Shori; Namahungu was 
administering Bitare since 1936; for Buvumu it was Kanyarugerero; for Mubumbano it 
was Gatege and for Kibingo it was Nzabamwita. In 1957 administrative reform, Shori is 
cancelled and annexed to Mubumbano. At the end of 1958, Mubumbano had still Gatege 
as subchief. The subchiefs were Kanyarugerero or Sefigi, Hutu for Mubumbano; Bitare 
still had Namahungu and Kibingo still had Nzabamwita. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Unpublished and published annual reports of the Belgian Administration in Ruanda-Urundi, of the 
Residence of Ruanda, and of the Territory of Astrida, from 1921 to 196. 
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Nyaruguru 
 
Nyaruguru has had respectively Sendashonga, Michel Kayihura, Hormisdas Mbanda and 
Phocas Kabagema as chiefs. 
 
By 1932, Gashagaza was already subchief of Nyakibanda. In 1957, Gashagaza was no 
longer in office; he was replaced by Gasamunyiga. At the end of 1959, Nyakibanda was 
led by Kabirigi. 
 
Buhanga-Ndara 
 
Senyamambara, from Nyiginya clan, was chief of Buhanga from 1928 to 1930 after 
completing his Nyanza School education. In 1933, Kayondo is chief of Buhanga, but 
makes himself represented in Buhanga by his son Kimonyo, while he rules elsewhere. 
Kimonyo is replaced by Justin Gashugi in 1939. 
 
In Ndara, Rwasamanzi son of Ntizimira, was chief before the administrative reform. 
Then, in 1934, he asked for resignation and suggested his nephew Bucyanayandi, from 
Abega clan, to replace him. His choice was confirmed by the Belgian administration. The 
chief of Ndara was Bucyanayandi from 1934 until 1941. Then in 1941, the two 
chiefdoms were merged to form Buhanga-Ndara that was given to Justin Gashugi, from 
the Nyiginya clan, from 1941 to 1959. Following the violence of November 1959, 
Gashugi was demoted and replaced by Rucyahana, who was also Tutsi, as Chief ad 
interim.   
 
Rusengamihigo was subchief of Runyinya in 1932. Then from 1934, it was directly 
administered by Chief Bucyanayandi (1934-1941). Then Kagabo, son of Rubibi, 
administered Runyinya from 1942 to 1947. From 1947, Kibwana was appointed to 
replace Kagabo in Runyinya. He held office until late 1959. 
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Saga, Muganza and Kirarambogo subchiefdoms were ruled by Urayaha son of 
Rusengamihigo in 1947. He had started in 1942 and ended his office in 1948. Then 
Rwasamanzi, son of Gatunzi, took over in 1949 and ruled until 1959. In 1952 
Kirarambogo hill became a new suchiefdom led by Nyakarundi until 1957 when it was 
cancelled again. Rwasamanzi of Saga was replaced by André Hitimana (alias Kiramoto), 
Hutu, in Saga in 1959. In 1960, this area of Ndara became Saga Commune and was ruled 
by André Hitimana who was elected as first Burgomaster. 
 
Mvejuru 
 
In 1925, Cyitatire was chief of Bwanamukari (that became later Mvejuru). He was 
replaced by his son Semutwa, who kept office from 1927 to 1946. Then François 
Rusagara took over and kept office until 1959. On 31 December 1959, chief Rusagara 
had been replaced by Minani, a Hutu. 
 
Before the administrative reform of 1930, Mukomacara subchiefdom was ruled by 
Kigoye; Joma subchiefdom by Fangari; and Magi by Rumashana. Then the 
administrative reform of 1926-1931 regrouped these three subchiefdoms. They were 
ruled by Ruzindana, son of Kayijuka, in 1939. In 1952, Ruzindana is the subchief of 
following hills: Magi, Mukomacara, Joma, Nyabisagara and Mukindo. In 1958, 
Ruvebana had replaced Ruzindana. In 1959, Magi had a new Hutu subchief by the name 
of Raymond Hakizimana. 
 
Before the reform, Linda was ruled by Gatambira and Nyagahuru by Rutabana. After the 
reform in 1939, Linda, Nyagahuru and Kibu were given to Kanamugire, son of 
Musonera, as subchief. In 1958, Kanamugire had been replaced by Kabisa. The latter was 
dismissed in 1959 and replaced by Habimana, a Hutu ad interim Subchief. 
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APPENDIX 2: CAMPAIGN MEETINGS IN GISHAMVU AND KIBAYI from 1991 
to 1993 
 
Campaign meetings in Gishamvu 
 
Party Date Whereabouts Chairperson Observation 
MDR 15 August 1991 Soccer field of 
Nyumba near the 
Commune office 
Jean Kambanda, 
Head of the MDR 
committee in 
Butare Prefecture 
Foreseen (means 
that the party has 
applied for the 
permission to hold 
a campaign 
meeting at that 
date, but that the 
local authorities 
haven’t answered 
yet.) 
PSD 23 August 1992 Gikunzi Sector Aloys Sibomana, 
Executive 
Secretary of PSD 
in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
PSD 31 August 1991 Gishamvu 
Commune 
Félicien Gatabazi, 
National Executive 
Secretary 
Done 
MDR 29 September 
1991 
Ikibuye cya Shali 
for Mubumbano, 
Buvumu, Liba and 
Kibingo members 
Augustin Sezibera, 
President 
Allowed. 
MRND 26 October 1991 Commune 
Gishamvu office 
Augustin Kabiligi, 
Coordinator of 
MRND in 
Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MDR 22 December 1991 Gishamvu 
Commune 
Augustin Sezibera, 
President 
Foreseen 
PSD 10 November 
1991 
Gishamvu Sector Aloys Sibomana, 
Executive 
Secretary 
Foreseen 
PSD 17 November 
1991 
Sheke Sector, 
place: Ku Nyundo 
Aloys Sibomana  Foreseen 
PSD 24 November 
1991 
Mubumbano, 
Buvumu, Liba and 
Kibingo Sectors, 
place: Ikibuye cya 
Shali 
Aloys Sibomana  Foreseen 
PSD 22 January 1992 Gishamvu 
Commune office 
Aloys Sibomana  Foreseen 
PL 25 January 1992 Busoro, Gishamvu A. Rutsindura, Sr., 
Secretary of the 
regional committee 
of PL in Butare 
Prefecture 
Foreseen 
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MDR 2 February 1992 Gishamvu 
Commune Office 
Responsible of 
MDR in Butare 
Prefecture (no 
name) 
Foreseen 
MDR 09 February 1992 Gishamvu, Kibayi 
Communes and in 
other three 
communes of 
Butare 
Jean Kambanda, 
Responsible of 
MDR in Butare 
Prefecture 
Allowed  
MRND 16 February 1992 Nyumba Augustin Kabiligi, 
President of 
MRND in 
Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
PSD 1 March 1992 Mubumbano 
Sector office 
Aloys Sibomana, 
Executive 
Secretary of PSD 
in Gishamvu 
Allowed 
PSD 8 March 1992 Buvumu Sector Aloys Sibomana, 
Executive 
Secretary of PSD 
in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MDR 8 March 1992 Gikunzi Sector Augustin Sezibera, 
President of MDR 
in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MDR 14 March 1992 Buvumu Sector Augustin Sezibera, 
President of MDR 
in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
PSD 15 March 1992 Liba Sector Aloys Sibomana, 
Executive 
Secretary of PSD 
in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MDR 21 March 1992 Sholi Sector Gabriel Murara, 
Acting 
representative of 
MDR in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
PSD 22 March 1992 Kibingo Sector Aloys Sibomana, 
Executive 
Secretary of PSD 
in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MDR 22 March 1992 Liba Sector Gabriel Murara, 
Acting 
representative of 
MDR in Gishamvu 
Foreseen  
MDR 28 March 1992 Kibingo Sector Gabriel Murara, 
Acting 
representative of 
MDR in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MDR 29 March 1992 Sheke Sector Gabriel Murara, 
Acting 
representative of 
MDR in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MRND 29 March 1992 Subprefecture of 
Busoro 
Assiel Simbalikure  Allowed 
MDR 4 April 1992 Mukuge Sector Augustin Sezibera, 
President of MDR 
Foreseen 
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in Gishamvu 
MDR 5 April 1992 Mubumbano 
Sector 
Augustin Sezibera, 
President of MDR 
in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MDR 11 April 1992 Gishamvu Sector Augustin Sezibera, 
President of MDR 
in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MDR 18 April 1992 Nyakibanda Sector Augustin Sezibera, 
President of MDR 
in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MDR 31 May 1992 Subprefecture 
Busoro 
Jean Kambanda, 
Head of MDR 
committee in 
Butare 
Allowed 
MDR 9 August 1992 Buvumu Sector  Laurent 
Kubwimana, Head 
of MDR in 
Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MDR 23 August 1992 Sheke Sector Laurent 
Kubwimana, Head 
of MDR 
Committee in 
Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MDR 30 August 1992 Sholi Sector Gashagaza, 
Secretary of MDR 
in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MDR 6 September 1992 Gikunzi Sector Gashagaza, 
Secretary of MDR 
in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
MDR 
 
 
 
6 September 1992 Ikibuye cya Shali 
for Mubumbano, 
Buvumu and Liba 
Sectors 
Justin Senyange, 
President of PL in 
Gishamvu 
foreseen 
PL 6 September 1992 Busoro 
Subprefecture 
Alphonse 
Rutsindura, , 
Secretary of the 
Regional 
Committee of PL 
in butare 
Foreseen 
PSD 8 September 1992 Mukuge Sector Aloys Sibomana, 
Executive 
Secretary 
Foreseen 
PL 13 September 
1992 
Busoro 
Subprefecture 
office 
Secretary of 
Regional 
Committee of PL 
in Butare 
Allowed and done 
MDR 18 September 
1992 
Liba Sector Gashagaza, 
Secretary of MDR 
in Gishamvu 
Foreseen 
PSD 27 September 
1992 
Nyakibanda Sector Aloys Sibomana, 
Executive 
Secretary 
Foreseen 
PSD 10 October 1992 Busoro 
Subprefecture 
office 
Charles 
Mulindahabi, 
Regional Executive 
Foreseen 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
543 
Secretary of PSD 
in Butare 
PSD 11 October 1992 Busoro 
Subprefecture 
office 
Regional Secretary 
of PSD in Butare 
Allowed 
MDR 18 October 1992 Gishamvu Sector National leaders of 
MDR 
Foreseen 
MDR 25 October 1992 Gishamvu 
Commune 
National leadersof 
MDR 
Foreseen 
MDR 26 September 
1993 
Gishamvu 
Commune, area: 
soccer field at 
Nyumba 
Gabriel Murara, 
President of MDR 
in Gishamvu 
Allowed 
PSD 3 October 1993 Mubumbano 
Sector, area: 
Ikibuye cya Shari 
Executive 
Secretary in 
Gishamvu 
Allowed 
 
Sources: Letters of party representatives applying for authorization to hold campaign 
meetings, letters of administrative leaders authorizing the holding of campaign meetings 
of parties, and reports of party leaders and administrative leaders on parties’ activities.   
 
 
Campaign meetings in Kibayi 
 
Party Date Whereabouts Chairperson Observation 
MDR 9 February 1992 Kibayi Commune 
office 
Responsible of 
MDR in Butare 
Foreseen 
MDR 20 September 
1992 
Commercial Centre 
of Kabuga, for 
Kibayi and 
Muganza 
Communes 
President of MDR 
in Butare  
Allowed 
 
Sources: Letters of party representatives applying for authorization to hold campaign 
meetings, letters of administrative leaders authorizing the holding of campaign meetings 
of parties, and reports of party leaders and administrative leaders on parties’ activities.  
 
 
 
 
